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# RISE & FALL OF TIBET

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIA

WRITTEN BY

DR. ASHOK NIGAM



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# **RISE & FALL OF TIBET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIA**

By Dr. Ashok Nigam



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


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# CHAPTER 1



## INDIA, NEPAL, TIBET, AND CHINA RELATIONSHIP SINCE EARLIER TIMES TILL 1907

# CHAPTER 1

## INDIA, NEPAL, TIBET, AND CHINA RELATIONSHIP SINCE EARLIER TIMES TILL 1907

### 1.1 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The plateau of Central Asia occupies a situation of crucial importance in the strategic map of the Himalayan border lands. Here the ancient Himalayan state of Tibet, situated between Russia, China, India and Nepal, was destined to play an important role in shaping of the foreign policy objectives of both India and Nepal. These last named countries in their own relations and in their relations with the other big powers - China and Russia - could not overlook the significance of Tibet. As a corollary to this, the policies that India, China and Nepal pursued to promote their respective national interests in Tibet were responsible for bringing China into direct contact with Nepal and for the growth of Sino-Nepalese relationship, which, in turn, influenced the course of the Indo-Nepalese relations.

Tibet and Nepal, taken together, used to constitute an effective buffer separating the respective spheres of influence of the imperial powers of Russia, China and British India. Tibet was able to play an important role in the formation of the Indo-Nepalese relationship for a number of reasons. Like Nepal, Tibet also has had strong ties with India, both religious and cultural. Tibet offered a field of profitable trade with the trans-Himalayan region. The Dalai Lama of Tibet had traditionally been recognised as their spiritual head by the Buddhists in the Central Asian territories of Mongolia, China, Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. Tibet's own political significance could not be overlooked in the geo-politics of the region<sup>1</sup>.



### **1.1.1 Early Contacts between India and Nepal**

The earliest contacts between India and Nepal can, in be traced back to the earliest recorded history of the two countries which are amply documented<sup>2</sup>. Nepal and India are situated in the same geographical region. Geographically, Kathmandu valley is inseparable from the Indo-Gangetic plains. Further, both countries have always enjoyed open borders as well as free trade & commerce. Their populations also have remained intermingled at border region. Even some houses are half on one side of border while remaining part of the same falls in the other country. That is why the two countries could never in the history remain isolated from socio-political movements in the two Countries. As a result of these continuous interactions, a process of acculturation has been constantly taking place in which Nepal too has made significant contribution to the cultural heritage of the sub-continent<sup>3</sup>.

### **1.1.2 Buddhism - how it entered & grown in Tibet**

Although there is some controversy about the question whether Buddhism reached Tibet via Kashmir and Nepal or through China, this fact cannot be denied that this Indian spiritual doctrine has provided the underlying foundation for the religious system in Tibet<sup>4</sup>. Before Buddhism reached Tibet, a form of nature worship called "Pon" (referred to as Bon at some places) was prevalent there. Only in the middle of the seventh century, with the powerful monarch Songtean Gam-po's conversion into Buddhism following his marriage with a Buddhist Chinese princess, was Buddhism declared the State religion of Tibet. This matrimonial alliance is evidence of the Tibetan military might at that time. In spite of this royal patronage, Buddhism did not gain a mass following immediately. Buddhism developed rapidly only after the visit of the Indian Buddhist scholar Padm Sambhava, who had realised the potential of amalgamating some of the native beliefs, rituals, and some deities with the Buddhist rituals<sup>5</sup>.

### **1.1.3 Commercial Contacts**

The commercial contacts between India and Central Asia are at least as old as the cultural ties. Various travel accounts of the Chinese, Indian and European sources testify that bonds of trade and commerce existed between India and Tibet from very early times through the Himalayan passes in Kashmir, Sikkim and Bhutan. It seems unlikely that Buddhists would have spread so

rapidly in the absence of these commercial contacts<sup>6</sup>. It is important to note that the kingdom of Nepal was inevitably drawn in the Indo-Tibetan relationship because of various geo-political and historical reasons<sup>7</sup>. The climatic factor also influenced this process. Tibetan scholars wishing to visit Indian centres of learning to study Buddhism would stop at Nepal to avoid the heat of the plains. Thus, the current of intellectual influence began to flow more and more from India to Tibet via Nepal. As Buddhism began to wane on face of foreign invasions and the rise of new religious movements in India, Nepal became a sanctuary for Buddhism. Absence of any central authority or a coherent policy on the part of the Indian rulers towards Tibet allowed Nepal to assume an ever-increasing commercial importance. The trade route passing through Nepal became more important, while other routes remained neglected<sup>8</sup>. Thus, both commerce and religion contributed to tie India, Nepal and Tibet in a triangular relationship. The Tibetan contacts, however, became more confined to the Indian borderlands – Kashmir, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal in this relationship. The situation remained almost unchanged till the advent of the East India Company, which took a keen interest in expanding the contacts with Tibet wondering what opportunities it could offer for a profitable trade. Tibet's relations with its northern neighbour China, also influenced its relationship with its southern neighbours – India and Nepal.

#### **1.1.4 Early Sino-Tibetan Relations**

From the earliest time Tibet had been inhabited by a number of primitive tribes of the Mongol origin who lived a purely pastoral life and were always busy in fighting with one another. The Chinese records trace back the Chinese relationship with them to the rule of Han dynasty, in the Second Century B.C., while western scholars are of the view that regular contacts between the two countries began in the Seventh Century A.D. only.<sup>9</sup> The Tibetans, in conjunction with the Central Asian groups to the north, expanded across the mountains, separating the Central Tibet from China, which ultimately led them to a military clash with the Chinese<sup>10</sup>. Significantly, "even at this early date, one can discern the classic Chinese frontier policy – the separation of the Tibetans and Mongol nomadic tribes by the insertion of wedge of a Chinese – controlled territory between the two areas"<sup>11</sup>.

These contacts started with a clash between the Chinese and the Tibetans and turned into a cordial relationship between Chinese Emperor Tai-tsung, who after his failure in driving the invading Tibetans out, granted princess Won-Cheng to the Tibetan monarch Tsang-tsen Gam-po. The princess succeeded in converting the king himself to Buddhism. This quickened the

spread of Buddhism in the Country. The Chinese became interested in Tibet's adoption of Buddhism as it was likely to change the war like attitude of the Tibetans. Trade developed steadily following increased contacts between the two countries.

As time passed, the internal situation in Tibet deteriorated & soon turned into worst. The continued clashes between the various factions ruined the country to such an extent that people had neither peace nor protection. Under these circumstances, the Buddhists monasteries grew in size, and gradually became centres of temporal authority also, ruling their respective localities. When the Mongols were about to establish their rule in China, the large monasteries in Tibet were engaged in fighting to get control over Tibet. Ultimately the Sakya Monastery, the largest amongst them, succeeded in establishing its authority. Ties between Tibet and China were considerably strengthened when in 1259 A.D. Kublai Khan, after having conquered the Eastern Tibet, invited Phagpa, the Grand Lama of the Sakya Monastery, to Peking to conduct his enthronement ceremony<sup>12</sup>. This was the beginning of the Patron-Lama relationship between Chinese & Tibet<sup>13</sup>. With the passage of time and acquisition of riches, most of the Tibetan Buddhist lamas became very corrupt. The Chinese conferred various kinds of economic favours on the Lamas who became profit-seekers rather than promoters of religion<sup>14</sup>. A reform movement was started by Toang Ka-pa, founder of the Celugpa or the "Yellow sect"<sup>15</sup>. After his death in 1418 A.D., his mantle fell on his disciple GedumTruppa. With a view to continuing the reign of the Yelow sect without jeopardising the vow of celibacy, the expedient custom of reincarnation was invented/ adopted. This was the beginning on the institution of the Dalai Lama as supreme power centre of Tibetan State. The subsequent history of Tibet is full of incidents challenging the authority of the yellow sect and Dalai Lama, the head of the sect, seeking assistance from the Mongols to counter them. Gradually the Dalai Lama succeeded, with the help of the Mongols, in making the yellow sect the dominant sect in all ecclesiastic as well as temporal affairs of Tibet<sup>16</sup>.

As stated earlier, Buddhism was encouraged by the Chinese Emperor and promoted in order to tame the war-like Tibetans the Dalai Lama was patronised in order to use his influence over the indomitable Mongols in the Emperor's favour. The Chinese Emperor emphasised the spiritual role of the Dalai Lama and underlined the personal element in the Lama's relationship with the emperor<sup>17</sup>. After the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1680 A.D. Tibet fell into intrigues and disorder. In the following years the Chinese Emperor intervened twice, at the request of the reigning Dalai Lama, to restore him to his throne (in 1720), and to quell a rebellion. After the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1680 A.D., Tibet fell into intrigues and disorder. In the following



years the Chinese Emperor intervened twice, at the request of the reigning Dalai Lama, to restore him to his throne (in 1720), and to quell a rebellion (in 1727). Frequent interventions gave opportunity to the Chinese Emperor to station a permanent force in Tibet and also a representative to keep a watch on the developments as also to carve out space for Chinese empire. Two thousand Chinese troops were permanently stationed in Tibet and Chinese Amban (Resident) was posted at Lhasa. This had a tremendous bearing upon the Sino-Tibetans relations, as it showed the Chinese Emperor's decision to exercise control over Tibet. The posting of the Chinese Amban and the troops irritated the Tibetans<sup>18</sup> on the other hand. The Chinese further introduced far-reaching changes in the political institutions of the land. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Dalai Lama has achieved a certain consolidation of his position in the troubled water of Tibet under the new administrative system<sup>19</sup>.

#### **1.1.5 Tibet -Nepal Relations During the Early Phases**

As to Tibet's relation with Nepal, a meaningful relationship between them can be traced back to the Seventh Century A.D.<sup>20</sup>. It was in the middle of the Seventh Century that a triangular relationship between Nepal, Tibet and China was forged by royal matrimonial alliances, inaugurating a new trade-route between India and China through Nepal and Tibet<sup>21</sup>. The relationship between these three seems to have frozen in a limbo for the next four centuries due to the continuous warfare between Tibet and China. The contacts were restored again in the period between 1381 and 1427 A.D. At least five Chinese missions visited Nepal and seven Nepalese missions visited China during this period<sup>22</sup>.

This frequent exchange of missions appears to have been inspired by a certain community of interest between China and Nepal during this period. Nepal was torn with internal dissensions and its rival factions contending for power might have thought that the cultivation of closer relations with China might bolster their respective position at home. On their part, the Chinese were faced with great difficulty in their relations with the Mongols in the north who were assisting anti-Chinese. With China might bolster their respective position at home. On their part, the Chinese were faced with great difficulty in their relations with the Mongols in the north who were assisting anti-Chinese elements in Tibet and they hoped to outflank the latter by wooing Nepal. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, two ambitious rulers in Nepal - Ram Shah of Gorkha and Pratap Malla of Kathmandu - managed to control the main trade-routes between Nepal and Tibet<sup>23</sup>.

This culminated in the signing of Nepal- Bhot Treaty which established the Nepalese monopoly of Indo-Tibetan Trade<sup>24</sup>. Kathmandu retained this very strong profitable intermediary position until the British opened alternative route to Lhasa through Sikkim and Chumbi valley following Young husband's expedition of 1904. Tibet had by now become once again a hotbed of power – rivalry. But Nepal could not take advantage of the situation as it was itself engaged in bitter court-feuds. The Chinese control over Tibet was almost complete after 1747 and the dominant warring factions in Nepal thought it prudent to resume the custom of sending missions to China after a long gap. Around the same time, Prithivi Narayan Shah occupied the throne of Gorkha and after a bitter fight with other small principalities, he emerged victorious & was able to accomplish the unification of Nepal by the year 1769.No further mission was sent to China during this period as Prithvi Narayan Shah had in the meantime consolidated the entire Country under his rule and a united Nepal had no need to seek the Chinese favour or recognition.

Tibet's entry into the Chinese orbit had an important bearing over the politics of the region. It was because of Tibet, and through its instrumentality only, a relationship between China and Nepal was made possible. It was Chinese policy in Tibet on the one hand, and the Indian and Nepalese interests in Tibet on the other hand, which gave content to the Indo-Nepalese relations. This special relevance of Tibet to the Indo-Nepal relations continued even after the advent of the British in India and the consolidation of their colonial rule in India. Subsequent developments in domestic politics of Nepal and Tibet and the transformation of Company's commercial interties into British imperial interests resulted in subtle shifts in the policies of all the three participants.

#### **1.1.6 The Company in the Himalayan Politics**

The early European contacts with India were purely commercial. The East India Company was registered in United Kingdom as a trading concern only, but with the decline of the Mogual authority, rivalry with the other European powers soon involved it in the Indian politics. After their victory in the battle of Plessey in 1757, the British emerged as the dominant power in India. This also marked the beginning of a new era in the inter-state relationship in the Himalayas as it was beginning of a rule in the Indian heartland whose prime concern and motivations were commercial. During the first phase of its activity, the Company's interests also were purely economics in this region.

Things were soon to change as victorious campaigns of Prithvi Narayan Shah brought him in confrontation with the British power in India. By 1769, Shah had conquered several kingdoms

in that part of the region which is today termed as Nepal-Himalaya. The eastern extremity of his domain became co-terminus with the boundaries of Sikkim and Cooch-Bihar. He opted for a policy of closing his territory to any possible direct Indo-Tibetans trade<sup>25</sup>. It was for this reason that he imposed a blockade on the periphery of Kathmandu. As a result, the trade between Tibet, Nepal and India came to a virtual stand till.

The British in India could not remain indifferent to the situation. The Beas Mall king of Kathmandu, Jai Prakash Mala, requested for the British assistance and the Company responded promptly because of the prospects of not only resuming the Indo- Nepalese trade but also opening of Tibet for trade with India as a result of an alliance with the Mala King said to be closely associated with the "Pontiff of Lhasa". Captain Kilnoch was sent at the head of a small and ill-equipped force, but his mission ran into heavy weather. The vagaries of weather, difficult terrain and ravages of disease combined to frustrate him and he was soon forced to retreat. The ill-advised mission on the other hand, contributed to the deterioration in relationship between the Gorkhas and the Company.

Several attempts were made by the Company during the period 1769 to 1788 to reach a settlement With the Gorkha king, but without success. Pressing economic consideration, however, forced the Shah to attempt a revival of Trans-Himalayan trade and Commerce. One of his most cherished objects was to establish Kathmandu as the primary trade-center in the Himalayan region, and to establish a monopoly of trade between India and Tibet by managing to route the entire quantum through Nepal<sup>26</sup>.

In the meantime, the Tibetan Lamas and the officials had developed heavy financial stakes in this trade and they were also interested in revival of the trans- Himalayan trade. An occasion of Anglo- Nepalese collaboration was provided during the Company's campaign against Chet Singh, Raja of Banaras. Prithvi Narayan Shah readily came to the Company's aid and tried to impress upon them Nepal's friendly intentions. The sudden change of policy on the part of Prithvi Narayan Shah may also be explained differently. Tibetans had earlier urged Chet Singh, the Raja Of Banaras, to resume the Indo- Tibetan trade which The Gorkha conquerors of Nepal had disrupted. Shah, who was keen on establishing a monopoly over the same, was naturally averse to such a development.

The British, on their part, were not unwilling for a rapprochement with the Gorkhas, but the same could not materialize. The British began to examine the possibilities offered by alternative trade- routes.



### 1.1.7 Indo-Bhutan Treaty

The outbreak of hostilities between Bhutan and Cooch -Bihar in 1771 offered the Company the much-desired opportunity. British help was readily given to the Raja of Cooch-Bihar when it was sought, as the Company was keen to establish a foothold in the Himalayan region. Finally, a treaty between the Company and Bhutan was signed in 1774. The only explanation for the generous terms of the Treaty and the British decision to divert its already scarce resources from the strife-ridden plains to distant Himalayan borders at a time when its own position was threatened, can be found in the importance it attached to the trade with Tibet<sup>27</sup>. This trade, while not significant in itself in the Company's commercial relations, held promise of considerable expansion providing a favorable balance in terms of much needed gold<sup>27</sup>.

Hasting, the then Governor General of India, attached considerable importance to cultivating influential Lamas in Tibet, as he thought that they could provide a channel of communication with the Peking Government. The British had long objected to the trading system in China which confined their commercial activities to Canton. Possibility of developing a trade route between India and China via Tibet was also not ruled out. Thus, considerations of China trade lent still greater importance to relations with Tibet and the British interventions in Bhutan was looked upon as an attempt to attain the key to the "gateway to China".

The repercussions of this seemingly isolated incident in Bhutan were long reaching. Soon after concluding treaty with Bhutan, Hastings further hoped that the trade could be developed with the Western China provinces through Tibet - with Indian subjects of the Company allowed access to these areas which were otherwise still inaccessible to the Company's British merchants at Canton. Hastings dispatched George Bogle, the Secretary of the Select Committee of the Company, in a mission to Lhasa seeking to establish regular communication and direct trade with Tibet in May, 1774. He could not, however move beyond Tashilhunpo, the seat of the Panchen Lama, and had to remain contented with the contact he established with the second person in Tibetan hierarchy. This was followed by a few other embassies.

Prithvi Narayan Shah had, on the other hand, realized the implications of the situation from very beginning and had tried to save Bhutan from falling to British by suggesting mediation by the Panchen Lama. This advice, however, had totally unfavorable and undesirable results. It was the Tibetan offer for mediation that established preliminary contacts between the Company and Tibet and inspired the dispatch of Bogle mission.

Prithvi Narayan Shah reacted sharply to the Bogle Mission both militarily and diplomatically. He had as much concern for the Tibetan trade as Hastings. To forestall any direct trade arrangement between Tibet and India, he communicated to the Regent (of the Dalai Lama, as the Lama was minor at that time) in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama his offer to open factories at the Nepal- Tibet borders and urged him not to have any connection with the 'Phiranghees'. The same letter carried a threat of war if his wishes were not complied with. Tensions mounted, but the death of Shah in 1775 relegated these problems to the background.

### 1.1.8 Nepal- Tibet War

A treaty was signed after Prithvi Narayan Shah's death between Nepal and Tibet in 1775, but the provisions of the treaty did not touch the main disputed issues like minting of coins for Tibet (lotus), exchange rate, and circulation of the new Gorkha currency in Tibet and the trade structures. These remained unresolved until the Tibeto-Nepalese war of 1788 and the Sino-Tibetan invasion on Nepal in 1792. This came in the wake of victorious Gorkha campaigns during the regency of Bahadur Shah in Nepal. Under him the Gorkhas had successfully overwhelmed Sikkim and territories to the north and the east.

In the meantime, the death of the Panchen Lama while on a visit to China in 1780 had made the situation in Tibet very fluid. Although an infant successor to the Panchen Lama had been found, the Peking had appointed a Regent, named Chungpa Hutuphtu.

A dispute immediately arose regarding the Regent's power during the infancy of the Panchen Lama. The issue had both political and religious over-tones because the leader of the rival faction was Regent's own brother, Ninth Karmapa Lama, the Shamar Truluku (in many places referred as the Swa-dar-mapa Lama), who belonged to the Red Sect<sup>28</sup>. The new Regent was rash in action. He forcibly seized the treasury of the former Panchen Lama from Shamar Truluku and made his position in Tsang untenable.

The Regency in Nepal had by this time gone back to Bahadur Shah. Shamar Truluku Lama enjoyed good relations with Bahadur Shah. He, in the process, sought an asylum in Nepal and incited the Nepalese to attack Tibet, tempting them with fascinating tales of fabulous wealth of the Tibetan monasteries.

While it is difficult to gauge the extent to which factor influenced the Nepalese, soon an ultimatum was served, and when it was disregarded, the Gorkha troops marched into Tibet in

1789. The Tibetans were unable to defend themselves and sought the British help. The Britishers did not respond as they thought that it may affect their trade with China adversely. A peace-agreement was concluded in June 1789, under which Tibet agreed to pay Nepal an annual tribute of 300 silver ingots and promised to accept the Nepalese Narayani currency<sup>29</sup>.

These agreements were reached with the connivance of the Chinese Amban at Lhasa, who managed to get a stipulation that the Gorkhas, in turn, would pay a token tribute of local produce to the Manchu Emperor. The objectives of the Chinese Amban were two - fold, first, to obtain from the Nepalese a promise not to invade Tibet again, and secondly, to secure at least a symbolic submission of the troublesome Gorkhas to the Emperor. Nepal itself was quite willing to accept these conditions as it had obtained very favorable terms in the treaty and was well aware of the fact that the arrangement implied the Chinese assent to the treaty, which could improve considerably the prospectus of its implementation. The Tibetan politics, as pointed out earlier, has traditionally been characterized by a rivalry between Lhasa and Tsang, the seats of Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama respectively. There was an attempt, both by Tsang authorities and the Chinese Amban, to conceal the actual terms of the treaty both from the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Emperor, the former being mainly motivated by their desire to avoid a greater danger posed by Lhasa's or Peking's intervention bringing eventually stricter control of them over their province.

The Chinese Emperor remained blissfully ignorant of the true nature of Tibet-Nepalese war and the violation of Tibetan border in the beginning<sup>30</sup>. He however, was soon disillusioned. The Tibetans withheld payment of the next installment of tribute to Nepal which was due in 1791. The Gorkhas once again invaded Tibet and penetrated up to Shigatse.

A Nepalese mission was then visiting Peking as per stipulation of the 1789 treaty and the incident could not be concealed. The Chinese Emperor could not condone the attack upon Tashhihunpo, a sacred place for him, and ordered a full-fledged expedition against the Gorkhas so 'as to teach them a lesson'.

Kathmandu became seriously concerned about the possibility of a Chinese attack and made all-out efforts on diplomatic and military front to safeguard itself in such an eventuality. There was a reversal of the traditional anti-British policy and treaty negotiations were inaugurated with the Company representative, Duncan, on trade and commerce. These culminated in the signing of the first Anglo-British Treaty of Commerce on 1<sup>st</sup> March, 1792<sup>31</sup>. A careful examination of the

treaty's contents reveals that Nepal was not only considered a trading - zone, but the British were thinking of it as a transit- route - to Tibet as well.

The Chinese assault could not be contained by the Nepalese and although they had secured their rear through an Anglo-Nepalese treaty, they did not receive the expected help from the British. In response to the Gorkha request for military assistance, Cornwallis offered only to mediate for an amicable settlement between Nepal and China. In the meantime, the Sino-Tibetans armies captured Kutti and Kerong passes and soon reached Nawakot within a day's march from Kathmandu. Hard pressed in the battle field and disappointed by the cold British response, the Nepalese gave up their recently adopted pro-British policy and instead sought peace with Chinese<sup>32</sup>.

The Chinese on their part, were equally eager to stop hostilities as they were only interested in Tibet and did not wish to get unnecessarily involved in south of the Himalayan crest. The Chinese General, therefore, accepted the offer and withdrew. Subsequently a treaty was signed at Lhasa between Nepal and Tibet in the presence of the Chinese Amban. The Treaty incorporated acceptance of the Chinese hegemony by both Tibet and Nepal and provision for Nepal sending Quinquennial mission with tribute of local produce to China<sup>33</sup>. The Nepalese were made to realize the wisdom of Prithvi Narayan Shah's counsel on foreign policy, who had advised close ties with China and minimum contacts with the British without severing relations with them. Cornwallis's Emissary reached Nepal only after the conclusion of the war when there remained nothing to be mediated upon and as soon as the last Chinese soldier left the Nepalese soil, the Nepal Durbar turned its back on its 1791 Treaty commitments with the Company. Cornwallis's offer to mediate earned him ill-will of both the parties. While the Gorkha pride was injured, the Chinese also became suspicious of the Company's attempt to intervene. The British diplomacy during this crisis failed miserably. The British reluctance to follow a more active policy, however, was primarily due to their concern for the Chinese trade at Canton. The event, on the other hand, brought the strengthening of the Chinese control over Tibet and almost closed its trade with the British India.

The Sino - Nepalese war was a sobering experience for China as well. The fighting was bitter and long drawn, and the outcome in terms of territorial gains was nil. The Chinese were also made to realize the futility of such an adventure entailing such a high- cost without ensuring future stability. Subsequently, the Chinese policy in the trans-Himalayan area lost its earlier dynamism and instead remained primarily confined to the maintenance of the political system established in Tibet. The war had impressed upon the Chinese the fighting caliber of the Gorkhas and their

capacity for diplomatic intrigue. The distrust of Nepali intentions and approaches characterized the attitude of the Chinese officials in Tibet for several decades following the 1791-92 war. By and large Peking did not attach importance to political developments to the south of the Himalayas - if they did not threaten its position in Tibet. Kathmandu was, therefore, handicapped in its attempts to counter-poise the Chinese against the British.

The British could formulate their policy towards Nepal without being perturbed about the any sharp reactions on the part of China once they perceived the real nature of Chinese interest in the area. It will however, be wrong to underestimate the traumatic impact of the Chinese military expedition on the Nepalese mind. This also was the basic object of the campaign - the Emperor Chien-lung thought that Nepal would behave in its relations with Tibet only if the Gorkhas had impressed on their consciousness a high regard for the military might of China.

Charles Bell, in his evaluation of the Chinese campaign in Nepal, has correctly observed that its achievement will always remain a memorable one. Even now one hundred and twenty-eight years later, it services to inspire the Gorkhas with a lingering dread of China". It is also a fact that there was no serious crisis in the Nepal- Tibet relations for over sixty years after the war. It was only when China's energies were completely absorbed in the mighty internal upheaval, the Taiping rebellion that Nepal again attempted to insert itself into the developments across the Himalayas.

Nepal, however continued to attempt arduously to exploit its nominal vassalage to China in its relations with the Government of India<sup>34</sup>. This vassalage, which was not more than a most gentle and unobtrusive 'subordination', proved to be of immense value to Nepal in the first half of the nineteenth century, when Nepal's basic objectives in the conduct of its external relations was to avoid absorption in the ever-expanding British empire in India<sup>35</sup>. Whenever their relations with the British. The setback received during the Sino- Nepalese war did not extinguish the British quest for a participation in the Himalayan trade.

As Tibet was now closed for direct trade with India, John Shore, the new Governor - General, resumed the Company's efforts to establish trade - ties with Nepal. The British attempted to remove the taste of their inept diplomacy, which lingered after the Sino - Nepalese war, by deputing Captain Knox to negotiate a new treaty with Nepal and to press for establishment a residency at Kathmandu. But the dynastic situation in Nepal was quite disturbed and the treaty signed in 1801 with Knox was abrogated in 1804. In the same year, Ram Bahadur, who had been living in the exile in India, returned to Nepal only to be killed soon after. Tripur Sundari, one of his queens, became the Regent. She appointed Bhimsen Thapa as the Prime Minister, who



remained in power for next thirty years<sup>36</sup>. These three decades were to be the most troublesome period in the Anglo-Nepalese relationship.

### 1.1.9 Anglo -Nepalese war and its aftermath

Contained in the North as it was, Thapa's policy of expansion by encroachment on British Indian territory in the South led to an outbreak of hostilities sparking -off a protracted war with the British that culminated in the final defeat of the Gorkhas and in the signing of the 'Treaty of Segowlee' in March 1816<sup>37</sup>. The Anglo -Nepal war reasserted to a large extent the British prestige in the region. The Nepalese could now clearly understand the strength of the East India Company and could easily conclude that it was not advisable to come into direct conflict with the British.

It also prompted the Nepalese to seek Chinese assistance to safeguard their Independence against further British encroachments. Bhimsen Thapa, who had not accepted the Segowlee Treaty as the final word on his country's relationship with the British, maintained cool and distant relations with the British and continued to seek the Chinese help for the expulsion of the British resident, despite the complete disinterestedness shown by the Chinese during the Anglo - Nepalese war of 1814 - 15. Nepal made frantic request for Chinese help on the plea of their subordination to the Chinese throne through the petition sent along with their Quinquennial Mission to Peking in 1813 itself, but the Chinese Emperor showed no interest in the plight of Nepal as such. The Nepal then tried to force their hand by playing upon the Chinese sensitivities regarding Tibet. They suggested to the Chinese Amban at Lhasa, and to the emperor, that in fact the English wanted to invade Tibet and as Nepal had refused to give them passage under obligation to the Chinese Emperor, the English were then invading Nepal with an ulterior motive to gain access to Tibet<sup>38</sup>.

This, however, showed the importance of Tibet as a factor in Indo -Nepal relations in Company's calculations. The Chinese Amban, however, refused to entertain the request, as 'it was against Chinese policy' and as 'both the English and the Nepalese are equal in the eyes of China'<sup>39</sup>. As the war thickened, Nepalese at last desperately wrote to the Amban that Nepal being a small power, it would have to bow-down to the British who would probably disprove the tribute being sent to China. The Chinese Emperor thereupon made his priorities clear by instructing the Amban at Lhasa to communicate that, "Tell them (the Nepalis) you dare not report this to me.

As a matter of fact, they can join the "Firnaghi" rule if they like, so long as they send tribute and so long the Firanghis do not cross the Tangut (Tibetan) frontiers<sup>40</sup>.

The British Governor- General in India had also communicated to the Chinese Emperor through the Amban at Lhasa the details of the origins of the war cautioning him against adding the Gorakhas in the impending fight. The emperor did not like the tone of the letter. He, however, dispatched a military detachment to Tibet to ascertain the exact state of affairs and to protect the boundaries of the Empire<sup>41</sup>. The boundaries did not include Nepal was made amply clear by the course adopted by this deputation<sup>42</sup>. The Nepalese assertions of the tributary status during this period were only to induce the Chinese to be used against British in which they failed. The detachment reached Tibet in May 1816, but desisted from crossing over into the Nepalese territory.

However, the Nepalese never gave up their attempt to persuade the Chinese to come to their assistance against British whenever they found the slightest opportunity to do so<sup>43</sup>. This attitude continued up to the year 1846<sup>44</sup>. In 1842, King Rajendra dispatched an emissary to China appealing for military and financial assistance. He received the following humiliating reply from the Chinese Emperor,

“The Emperor of China is the master of the whole world. There are so many like you - running after me for help and all of them are equal for me<sup>45</sup> .

Accordingly, the Chinese Resident in Lhasa curtly rejected the Nepalese request by stating that, "it was not the policy of China to send troops for the protection of foreign barbarians"<sup>46</sup>. Even when the Chinese encountered trouble with the British during the 1839 -40 Opium War, they refused to accept the Nepalese offer to open a second front against the British in India.

The British, on the other hand, were quite keen to expand and consolidate their interests in Nepal, and they took advantage of the internal feuds in Nepal to sign an agreement with Kathmandu on 6<sup>th</sup> November, 1839 under which an authentic statement of all duties livable in Nepal was to be delivered to their Resident -an obvious attempt to bail their Tibetan trade out from the clutches of prohibitive duties levied by Nepal since the time of Prithvi Narayan Shah in the latter's attempts to monopolies the Himalayan trade. Nepal, however, tried once again to invoke the Chinese assistance against the British in 1846, only to be rebuffed. At long last the Nepalese began to realize that China was both unable and unwilling to extend the type of assistance Nepal required to defend itself against the British expansion. There was the growing

understanding in Nepal that a new Foreign Policy was called for to meet the exigencies of the situation.

## **1.2 GROWTH OF SINO-BRITISH RIVALRY IN THE HIMALAYA**

Nepal experienced the worst Palace intrigues in its history between April 1843 and September 1846. A massacre of all in the line of succession to Nepalese throne & their supporters took place within the precinct of Royal Palace. The course of events resulted in Jung Bahadur Rana's rise to undisputed power which was accomplished, allegedly with the British help, after the 'Kot-massacre' (Royal Palace of Nepal)<sup>47</sup>. The unprecedented blood-bath resulted in the elimination of almost all other claimants and Jung Bahadur finally became Prime Minister of Nepal on September 1, 1846.

### **1.2.1 Nepal's New Foreign Policy**

Jung Bahadur realised that Nepal's independence could not be retained against a determined policy of the Company. He clearly perceived that if the basically anti-British policy followed by King Rajendra was continued, Calcutta would not tolerate it, especially when they have sensed the Chinese indifference towards Nepal. Jung Bahadur's visit to Great Britain and France also convinced him that China could no longer be counterpoised to balance the British power. He realised that a policy aiming at cultivation of goodwill of the British Indian Government was necessary if Nepal were to avoid the fate of the Indian princely states. Consequently Jung Bahadur made a number of gestures to humour the British. He sent presents to the Viceroy, agreed to the delimitation of boundary between India and Nepal, and offered them the services of the Nepalese troops in the second Sikh war<sup>48</sup>.

The Nepalese Prime Minister also decided in 1847 not to send the regular Quinquennial mission to China, may be with a view to avoid offending the British. In 1852, the practice was resumed primarily to secure first-hand knowledge of internal conditions in China after the Taiping rebellion. Jung Bahadur was astute enough a politician to realise that though China could hardly be expected to provide assistance against seems that not much political significance was attached to this mission sent to China by the Indian Government<sup>49</sup>. Finding China too busy in internal wars, Nepal decided to attack Tibet in 1854. Jung Bahadur later told the British Resident that he had waged the war against Tibet because of the ill-treatment of the Nepalese in Tibet<sup>50</sup>. As a

matter of fact Jung had been putting his army on war-footing for quite some time past on the pretext that he had been invited by the Imperial Chinese Government to help suppress the Taping rebels<sup>51</sup>. However, it seems more likely that he was motivated by the desire to prevent the British from establishing control over Tibet in the near future, thereby jeopardising Nepal's trade interests. The Nepalese military operations began in 1855 and ended in 1856. The Chinese Resident in Tibet sent proposals for peace with some money and presents in August 1855, but the Nepalese spurned the offer<sup>52</sup>. The Treaty was finally concluded in 1856<sup>53</sup>. To reassure the Chinese that the Nepalese belligerence was confined to Tibet and its hostile intentions did not extend to China, a clause was added to the preamble of the final draft of the Treaty which read:

*"The command of the Chinese will be obeyed by both sides as before", and that "both sides are to treat each-other as brother"*<sup>54</sup>.

It is significant that this war had no repercussions on British Government's relations with Nepal. The Government of India remained neutral throughout the war. The Governor -General held that if Nepal fought with Tibet, Government of India had no locus standi<sup>55</sup>. The British were also able to secure from Nepal the much-desired Extradition Treaty of 1855 during these developments<sup>56</sup>. Nepal, which had resisted this for many decades, now agreed presumably to secure the goodwill of the Government of India at this critical juncture.

### 1.2.2 Indian war of Independence: Role of Nepal

The British in India also faced a mighty revolt against their regime in 1857. Jung Bahadur decided to support the British and did render valuable help to the Company Government<sup>57</sup>. The Company Government, in turn, rewarded him amply both in cash and kind. Nepal got back, through a treaty concluded on 1<sup>st</sup> November, 1860, the most of the territory it had earlier lost to the Government of India under the Treaty of Segowlee in 1816<sup>58</sup>.

The war, however, ended East India Company's rule and the Country was formally incorporated into the British Empire. The British became thereafter the undisputed masters of India and after consolidating their powers in the plains, they turned their attention towards the Himalayan kingdoms with increased interest and confidence. To begin with, the British Imperial Government continued to pursue the policy of promoting British trade and commercial interest in the region. In the course of time -with the increasing threat of the Tsarist manipulations and enlargement of imperial ambitions, the security interests and strategic considerations got

inextricably mixed up with these. The 1857 Indian war of Independence had raised in the British mind the spectre of Indian masses revolting against the colonisers. The detachment of Gorkha soldiers had played an important role in the suppression of the revolt in India. Recruitment of Gorkha soldiers in the Indian army, therefore, added another important factor in the Government of India's Nepal-policy. Nevertheless, the consideration which remained uppermost in the British mind regarding their policy towards Nepal was the role that Country could play in providing a gateway to Tibet.

Kathmandu was greatly alarmed by the news of despatch of "secret agents" to Tibet by the British Indian Government through Nepal. With changing circumstances, Nepal's assessment of its essential interests was also changing<sup>59</sup>. Jung Bahadur sought to meet the challenge by isolating Nepal from the undesirable influences from south and also took care not to antagonise the British by an offer of loyal support to British Raj in the field of international relations and facilitating recruitment of Gorkhas in the British Indian Army. The Nepalese Army was kept strong, but care was taken to allay the British apprehensions regarding Nepal's designs in Himalayan politics.

The British incursions in Sikkim in 1861 & in Bhutan in 1865 and subsequent declaration of protectorate over these kingdoms<sup>60</sup>, however, prompted Nepalese to think along the lines of closer Sino-Nepalese relationship to exclude the British interest from Tibet and to protect Nepal's monopoly of trade over that region. The Chinese Amban was quick to sense the opportunity and sent feelers to the Government of Nepal for the resumption of customary mission<sup>61</sup>. The practice was revived in 1866 after a gap of ten years. The Government of India saw no point in objecting to this as it considered that, "The Nepalese Durbar is of course at liberty to act in this matter as it may think proper"<sup>62</sup>

Disturbances in China hindered the Mission from proceeding to China. The delay was not considered inconvenient by the Nepalese who appeared to be primarily concerned with private commerce. The members of the Mission complained of maltreatment at the hand of the Tibetans and the relations between Nepal and Tibet became very strained during 1867<sup>63</sup>.

The British Resident reported to the Government of India that the Durbar seemed to be preparing for a war against Tibet. The British Government did not want a war on their borders as the conflict was likely to involve China and the situation would have been quite embarrassing for the Government of India. The Resident in Nepal was accordingly asked to do everything in his power to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and to further the establishment of friendly

relations between the two countries. "Beyond this", he was told, "You should be careful not to interfere"<sup>64</sup>.

The war was averted and the British Resident was of the opinion that Jung Bahadur had decided not to go to war because of superiority of Tibet in arms<sup>65</sup>. Jung Bahadur had enquired from the Resident as to whether the Government of India would support Nepal against China in a conflict with Tibet<sup>66</sup>. The British, due to their interest in China and larger imperial considerations, could give him no such assurance. The British Resident instead advised Jung to settle differences amicably<sup>67</sup>.

The Indian Government revived its efforts in 1873 to open profitable trade routes to Tibet. It was decided by the British to send a mission to examine trade routes between Burma and Yunnan<sup>68</sup>. During the expedition, a Chinese interpreter was killed and in subsequent negotiations with the Chinese, the Indian Government obtained the right to send an exploratory mission to Tibet in 1877<sup>69</sup>. Meanwhile, the Indian Government had also completed a road through Sikkim up to the Jel-pa pass leading into the Chumbi valley of Tibet.

Nepal, along with Tibet and China, was greatly disturbed, but there was little that could be done to prevent these developments. Once again Jung Bahadur, who had not sent the mission in 1871-72, was persuaded to dispatch a mission to Peking on the next due date in 1876<sup>70</sup>. The British Resident was informed of the Nepalese intentions regarding the despatch of the mission.

The Indian Government still had no objection to this enterprise, as the Viceroy was of the opinion that Nepal was not amongst "the tributaries of Indian Empire" and that it enjoyed the powers of "making war" entering into treaties and sending embassies without let or hindrance from the British Government<sup>71</sup>. However, before the mission could be despatched, Jung Bahadur died. Ranodip Singh, who succeeded Jung Bahadur, was weak in character, and did not display such initiative. He decided to continue with Jung Bahadur's foreign policy based on "isolation", friendly co-operation and a firm attitude on certain issues towards the British Government<sup>72</sup>. Although Ranodip Singh offered the British Nepalese assistance when he learnt that rising tensions with Russia might lead to war<sup>73</sup>, his attitude essentially remained anti-British<sup>74</sup>. For this reason, as also under domestic compulsions, he was even more interested than Jung in the despatch of the mission to China. The mission finally left Kathmandu in July 1877<sup>75</sup>.

The Chinese, despite the previous permission granted by them, interfered with the Nepali Mission in Tibet itself on the plea to save the mission from any inconvenience "due to interruptions in communication", which may be due to then disturbed conditions in the main

land. However, as the Chinese were quite aware of the importance of Nepal in the protection of the Chinese interests in the Himalayas<sup>76</sup>, the Mission was allowed to proceed to Peking in January 1878<sup>77</sup>, and a reciprocal Chinese delegation was sent in the same year to Kathmandu to confer upon Ranodip Singh the same title that Jung Bahadur had received earlier<sup>78</sup>.

### 1.2.3 Nepal- Tibet tension and India

Small irritants, however, continued to cloud the Nepal-Tibetan relationship. This was perhaps due to the concern felt in Tibet over the improvement in Sino-Nepal relations that could threaten Tibet's autonomy. A trifling dispute over a piece of coral between a Tibetan woman and a Nepali merchant thus ignited large scale rioting in which 87 Nepali shops were burnt. The Nepalese threatened to go to war if Tibetans refused to reimburse the losses. The Chinese Amban could perceive the real cause of the trouble, and following his advice, Peking instructed him to "take such equitable action in the manner laid down in the treaty as shall duly stifle the elements of discord"<sup>79</sup>. This Chinese diplomatic intervention was ultimately successful and the accord was signed on May 26, 1884<sup>80</sup>.

The British could notice a change in the Chinese attitude towards the dispute between Nepal and Tibet which was obviously a departure from their attitude in 1792. But the British continued to remain reluctant to interfere; as such an effort was bound to be resented by the Nepalese. More important perhaps was the consideration of not annoying China. H.M. Durand, the Foreign Secretary, the British Government of India, noted that,

"Such an interference would reduce Nepal into the level of an acknowledged feudatory and might be very unpalatable to her, just when he want to keep on good terms with her. It would also give us much trouble diplomatically and might end in our finding ourselves involved in differences with China on behalf of Nepal. I think that any differences with China should be very scrupulously avoided ...."<sup>81</sup>.

On May 25, 1884, with the assistance of the Chinese Amban, an agreement was signed between Tibet and Nepal. The settlement was favourable to Nepal. Consequently, Nepal's bonds with China were considerably strengthened. Probably to forestall a Sino-Nepalese alliance, Lhasa tried to improve its relations with Nepal.

Thus, the period 1857-85 closed as it had opened, with Tibet striving to protect its autonomy while Nepal and China sought eagerly to exploit all available opportunities to extend their areas



of influence. The Tibetans war also focussed Government of India's attention on the problem of Nepal's right to import arms through India. This had long been a vexing issue in Indo- Nepal relations and, with the deterioration in Nepal - Tibetan relations, this issue assumed greater importance<sup>82</sup>. The Resident in Kathmandu thought that a gift of some arms be made to Nepal to check the threat of smuggling. The Resident, however, was not unaware of the possible repercussions of such an action on the Nepal - Tibetan relations. In the same breath, therefore, he advised the Indian Government not to make such a gift to the belligerent Prime Minister Ranodip, as this may provoke him to go to war with Tibet<sup>83</sup>.

On November 1885, Bir Shumsher staged a successful coup and became the Prime Minister of Nepal. Ranodip and Jagat Shumsher, along with all other contenders, were done away with. As Bir Shumsher has assumed power by violent means, upsetting the tradition of succession for hereditary premiership set originally by Jung Bahadur, he urgently needed British recognition to legitimize his rule. For the first time in the Nepalese history, a Nepali Premier, which has always resented any Indian interference, was anxiously waiting for the recognition by the Government of India. Acting on the Resident's advice, Calcutta gave its tentative de facto recognition within a week of his assuming power and Bir Shumsher promised to improve the recruitment facilities of Gorkhas to British Indian Army. Nevertheless, the British gave a safe refuge to the survivors of the Jung faction to be used just in case the policy had to be reversed in future.

Bir Shumsher, in turn, tried to strengthen his own position by trying to cultivate better relations with the Chinese. He requested the Chinese Amban to convey to the Chinese Emperor his eager willingness to be granted titles signifying recognition and the role of office, etc.<sup>84</sup> He also requested permission for the despatch of the Nepalese mission to Peking<sup>85</sup>.

The British could not remain indifferent to the Nepalese overtures to China at this point of time. In September, 1888, Major Durand, the British Resident at Nepal, forwarded to the Government of India an abstract translation of a letter sent by the Nepalese Durbar, pointing out, "in what cringing lines China is addressed". He suggested that if any negotiations were to take place between the Government of India and China regarding Tibet, opportunity should also be taken to clear the relations of India with Nepal, vis-a-vis China<sup>86</sup>. Soon, he informed the Government of India of the Chinese Mission's impending visit to Nepal for the aforesaid bestowal of the Chinese honours, etc., upon Bir Shumsher<sup>87</sup>.

The British authorities, who had initially attached little importance to this mission, gradually began to feel considerable concern about the thickening of the Sino- Nepalese relations. This

was due, in part, to the delicate negotiations then going on between the British and the Chinese over Sikkim and Tibet and the possible effect that the Nepal-China alliance would have on the outcome of these talks. Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary, commented that the mission was "very undesirable", and that, "Sooner or later we shall have trouble with China all along the Himalayas", but admitted that, "I am afraid, we cannot help it".

Major Durand, the British Resident in Nepal, again added to Calcutta's apprehensions by his reports of the reception Bir Shumsher gave to the Chinese Mission<sup>88</sup>. Durand noted that Chandra Shumsher, Bir's brother, who was second in line for succession to the premiership, "always asserts openly that Nepal was subordinate to China, is no way so to the Government of India". Durand concluded that, "the settled policy of the Durbar is to play off China against us, and to make use of pretended subordination to the power as a safeguard against the spread of any influence over the country"<sup>89</sup>. Reports were also prevalent in India, spread assiduously by some of the Nepali refugees in the country, that Nepal and China had concluded a secret alliance inimical to the interests of the British Indian Government<sup>90</sup>. In spite of Chandra Shumsher's utterances, Bir Shumsher offered to help the British against Russia, in case there be a war. Durand, however, greatly distrusted the Nepalese and regarded this offer just another trick by which the Durbar hoping to obtain a reward. He believed that Bir Shumsher was steadily opposed to any rapprochement with India and that he would not open his country to the British<sup>91</sup>.

All these factors led Calcutta to consider more fully the nature of the relationship between Nepal and the Government of India. Major Durand recommended that the British should assert to Nepal "the fact of the supremacy of the British Government (recognised in a way by Jung Bahadur), the fact of absolute dependence of Nepal upon the generosity and liberality of the Indian Government, and the fact that no outside claims or interferences with undoubted protectorate could be tolerated in regard to any state on this side of the Himalayas"<sup>92</sup>. There was general agreement in the British circles that steps should be taken to restrain the Chinese influence from increasing in Nepal<sup>93</sup>. While Calcutta felt reasonably sure that no drastic step was necessary, as a precautionary measure, Major Davis was despatched to Nepal to secretly assess the available information regarding a possible invasion of Nepal<sup>94</sup>.

#### **1.2.4 Early British efforts to open Tibet**

The Congress of Vienna had by no means removed the cause of friction and by 1885 Anglo-Russian tensions had once again assumed dangerous proportions. This was added incentive for

the British to open Tibet to make it secure against any expansionist design either of Russia via Sinkiang or of the French from Indo-China through Yunnan and Szechuan. They decided to exercise the right obtained from the Chinese under the Chefoo Agreement of 1877 to send an exploratory mission to Tibet<sup>95</sup>. The Tibetans had, in the meantime, grown increasingly independent of China, become more stubborn and were extremely zealous to protect their autonomy. The Tibetan Government imposed several restrictions on the Indian-Trade and marched its troops into Sikkim occupying Leng-tu, against the Chinese advice<sup>96</sup>. The Indian Government in turn decided to resort to force. After repulsing several Tibetan attacks, the British pushed into the Tibetan territory and occupied the Chumbi Valley<sup>97</sup>.

The developments were not at all congenial to Nepal, as it wanted to preserve its pre-dominant position in the Tibetan trade. Bir Shumsher did his best to discourage the British from despatching their missions to Tibet and appears to have encouraged Tibet in its defiant attitude towards the British. But he was quick to realise the inevitability of the course of events after the British Indian army had advanced into Sikkim. Revising Nepal's trans-Himalayas policy, he advised Lhasa to retrace its aggression in Sikkim and to settle their dispute with the British amicably<sup>98</sup>. Ultimately an agreement between the Government of India and China in relation to Tibet was signed on March 7, 1890<sup>99</sup>. In view of the concessions given by Peking in 1890 Convention on Tibet, Kathmandu was constrained to bring about a shift in its pro- Chinese foreign policy. Bir Shumsher sought to improve the British India - Nepal relations through a series of concessions, the most important being a more cooperative attitude towards the much-wanted Gorkha recruitments for Indian army. The number of Gorkha regiments in Indian army shot up from 9 in 1888 to 15 in 1891. The British displayed their appreciation by conferring British honours on Bir Shumsher<sup>100</sup>.

In 1892, Kathmandu and Lhasa again got involved in a dispute over salt- trade and border adjustments which dragged on till 1895. When no settlement was reached despite the participation of the Chinese Amban, Nepal instructed its Vakil to settle the dispute directly with the Tibetan authorities. The Amban resented this and wrote to Kathmandu that the Nepalese Commissioner should be sent back to negotiate the Tibetans dispute with the Amban only<sup>101</sup>. Bir Shumsher agreed to this. The dispute could perhaps have been settled earlier, but for the show of unhappiness to the British by Bir Shumsher at not receiving Government of India's consent for his desire to visit U.K. This was embarrassing to Bir Shumsher as his opponents were interpreting this as Calcutta's disapproval of his regime. When this purpose was served, agreement on all issues in dispute were quickly reached<sup>102</sup>.

British relations with Tibet, on the other hand, continued to be strained. The Tibetans found unacceptable the treaties of 1890 and 1892, implying thereby their refusal to recognize Chinese paramountcy and refusal to relinquish their customary right of grazing cattle in Sikkim<sup>103</sup>. The Tibetans were proving to be obdurate, while the Chinese were evincing a more conciliatory attitude. The Tibetan intransigence may well have been shaped by hopes of securing the Russian support for their stand.

The Indian trade in Tibet had considerably increased in volume during this period and the Indian traders had begun to pressure on the Government to open Tibet for a free flow of trade<sup>104</sup>. Taking advantage of the arrival of the new Amban, Lord Elgin solicited him to resume negotiations. The Tibetans viewed all these developments with grave concern. China's bowing down to British demands regarding Tibet one after the other convinced them that it will not, even if it so liked, be able to resist British pressure for an eventual opening of Tibet - a possibility they feared most. The Dalai Lama alleged the complicity of the Chinese Amban in a plot of his assassination with the Regent.

The total absorption of China in Sino - Japanese war of 1894 -5, and in the second Muslim uprising in the Northern Tibetan border further diminished the Chinese influence over Tibet in the period 1895-1905. China, after its humiliating defeats, no longer posed a threat to Tibet's autonomy. On the other hand, it exposed Tibet to the British expansionism. A subordinate relationship with China was no longer considered as of a protective value. So, the search for a new support against the British began. Nepal had proved to be an unreliable ally, more concerned with maintaining reasonably good relations with the British than in protecting its historical interests in the trans- Himalayan area. So, they now looked towards the Russians. The introduction of this new factor altered radically the policies pursued by the various powers concerned in this area in the first decade of the Twentieth Century.

### **1.3 CURZON AND THE OPENING OF TIBET**

Before the negotiations could start, Lord Elgin retired and Lord Curzon succeeded him to the viceroyalty of India. The appointment of Lord Curzon added new vigor to the trans-Himalayan British policy, often named as the "forward policy".

#### **1.3.1 Curzon's Forward Policy**

Curzon's was a strong-willed, empire-building personality. He found that there are many important reasons to bring Tibet in line. Besides the fact that it suited to the "imperialist", mentality of the British Indian officials, there were prospects of rich trade with Tibet and western China. The possibility of Russian or French expansion into Tibet was also gaining ground, and last but not the least, was his determination to protect British Indian interest in any possible future dismemberment of China from the region<sup>105</sup>.

The Viceroy was, however, skeptical about the utility of the intermediary in dealing with Tibet from the very beginning and would have preferred to press for direct relationship, but London's attitude was not similar to that of Calcutta. British interests were for greater in China proper than on the periphery of the Ching Empire. Then, there was always the danger of China being forced into an alliance with Russia or France, if the British pressed too hard on the border area. Nepal's reaction, on the other hand, could not be ignored; the British had realized the importance of the small, but stubborn Himalayan Kingdom as a vital link not only in the policies of India's northern borderlands but also in the suppression of dissidents in India itself. Moreover, British activities in the trans-Himalayan region were bound to have repercussions not only in Asia, but in Europe and Africa as well. This, according to British Government, was not being appreciated by the Indian Government. Finally, topographical factors, such as expenses involved in trans-Himalayan adventures appeared to them over-balancing the expected benefits—political or commercial. Whitehall, therefore, pressed Curzon to work through China.

With this policy background, Curzon found the new Chinese Resident Wen Hai's latest proposal of December, 1898 worth consideration. Apart from other things, it at least tried to meet, through half-way, the most important British demand for shifting of the Trade Centre from Yatung to Phari, a much more advantageous place for the Indo-Tibetan trade.

Lord Curzon, therefore, intimated to the Chinese envoy his willingness<sup>106</sup> to discuss the matter with him on the basis of the Chinese proposals. But the Tibetans objected to the opening of Phari as a trading mart and proposal was rejected<sup>107</sup>.

Relations between India and Tibet continued to deteriorate. Reports were received from the Bengal Government that the attempts made by the India Tea Association to introduce tea into Tibet had been rendered fruitless by the obstructions of local Lamas and officials<sup>108</sup>. With a view to seeking a practical solution to this problem, Lord Curzon believed that negotiations with China would not yield any positive results. The most effective means of securing compliance with the trade Regulations, therefore, would be to occupy the Chumbi Valley. If these were deemed too

drastic, the other course open would be to stop all Tibetans trade with India altogether. With the growing realization of the futility of Chinese mediation, a search for the alternative channel began in the Foreign Department. Since Tibetans had refused direct negotiations earlier, Curzon contemplated to use Nepal<sup>109</sup> as an intermediary but was discouraged in it by the former Resident, Wylie<sup>110</sup>.

Bir Shumsher expired on January 2, 1901, and Deb Shumsher took over the reins. But soon after, Chandra Shumsher staged a coup d'etat on June 29, 1901. His usurpation of power was almost instantaneously recognized by Calcutta. It is to be pointed out that since 1888, when Chandra Shumsher was appointed Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of Nepal, he had consistently shown a pro - British attitude. Later on, he claimed to be instrumental in Bir Shumsher's decision to offer better recruitment facilities to British and also in capturing the Raja of Sikkim and making him over to the Government of India. Moreover, it was Chandra, who performed most of the functions during Bir's visit to India in 1892, because of his indisposition<sup>111</sup>.

The Chinese, to whom Nepal had become of ever greater importance with the deterioration of their position in Tibet, acted promptly and in May 1902, Chandra Shumsher received the same recognition as had been granted to Jung Bahadur, Ranodip and Bir Shumsher<sup>112</sup>. He then asked for the Chinese Imperial patent (decree) together with all the official robes, which were also dispatched to him without the usual delay<sup>113</sup>.

### **1.3.2 Tibetan -Russian Rapprochement and the British**

The Tibetans, now convinced of Chinese impotency, appeared to be inclined towards Russia for its help to face the situation. Dorjeff, a Russian born Buriat, who had come to Lhasa at an early age and who had been tutor to Dalai Lama also, was dispatched by Dalai Lama to Russia in 1900. He was hailed by the Russian press as one bearing an important diplomatic mission from Lhasa and was received in audience by the Czar. It was generally believed that the chief object of the Tibetan mission was to strengthen the friendly reactions with Russia in order to oppose British penetration into Tibet<sup>114</sup>. Dorjeff visited Russia for the second time in June, 1901 and rumors were afloat that China and Russia have entered into a secret agreement with regard to Tibet<sup>115</sup>.

Many British officials feared that Russia's interest in Tibet was largely due to the Russian - British rivalry for the spheres of influence in the West Asia. The Russia could have out - maneuvered the Royal Indian Army by establishing a sphere of influence in Tibet, the task of the then

Government of India would have become considerably more difficult. It might not have posed a serious military threat, but would have affected India's relations with Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and even Kashmir and it would also have given to Russia immense advantage in the event of any possible dismemberment of China. Even more, the great influence Dalai Lama wielded over the Mongol tribal groups inside and outside the Russian territory made relationship with Tibet of strategic importance to Russia. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now apparent that Russia's interest in Tibet was not so much in mischief - mongering in the Himalayan area and India as in the more immediate problem of Russia's relations with the Mongol communities of Central Asia.

Tibet under British control would have been as serious a threat to the Russian position in Central Asia as Tibet under Russian control would have been to the British position in India. British expansion towards Tibet in the 1870-1900 would have necessitated vigorous counter-measures. All things considered, both Russia and India would have probably preferred an autonomous Tibet under nominal Chinese control, otherwise an independent Tibet.

Despite, the repeated denials from the competent Chinese and Russian officials, Calcutta, however, continued to believe that some such agreement did exist. British diplomats later were to discover their error of judgment, but British Himalayan policy in the crucial 1903-4 period was greatly influenced by the uncertainties surrounding Russian - Tibetan and Russian - Chinese relations.

While the Tibetans Mission was busily engaged in Russia in diplomatic activities, the Indian Government again tried unsuccessfully to communicate with the Tibetan authorities directly. Curzon was distraught by his inability to communicate directly with Tibet. In a note sent to the Home Government, he complained that the impossibility of holding direct communication with a neighboring country in the Twentieth Century was indeed an "extra - ordinary anachronism"<sup>116</sup>.

Fearing a rupture of Indian - Tibetan relations, the Chinese Government, besides urging the Indian Government to continue the frontier discussions, appointed You-tai as its new Amban and ordered him to proceed to Lhasa immediately so that the precarious situation could be retrieved<sup>117</sup>.

It gave little solace to Curzon who had by then become convinced that the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was a constitutional fiction, a political arrangement which had only been maintained because of its convenience to both the parties. This made it imperative that if and when a new treaty was concluded, it should not be signed by England and China alone but by a direct representative of the Tibetan Government as well because the Tibetans have been insisting that



Tibet itself should be a prominent party to any new agreement as without their own participation, the Tibetans would not regard it as binding on them. Moreover, the Dalai Lama was believed to be exercising a great personal authority, and was the de facto as well as de jure *sovereign* of that country. For the first time in the modern Tibetan history, there was a ruler with whom it was possible to deal instead of dealing with an "obscure junta" masked by the Chinese Amban<sup>118</sup>.

Finally, Lord Curzon decided that the first law of national existence is the self-preservation, which required the British to take such steps as would overcome any obstacles detrimental to them, and to place the security of India on an assured and impregnable footing. He therefore dispatched a mission to Tibet to negotiate with the Lhasa Government. In view of the possibility of resistance, the mission was accompanied by an armed escort sufficient to overwhelm any opposition that might be encountered on the way, and also to ensure its safety while it was in Lhas.

### 1.3.3 Nepalese Premier Supports Curzon

Chandra Shumsher tried to take advantage of this rivalry and Nepal's policy towards Tibet underwent a great change. It no longer laid importance on Tibetan - Nepalese trade. By 1900, the trade route through Kalimpong was the principal transit area for Tibet-India trade. Nepali merchant families continued to play an important role in this trade, since they still enjoyed a privileged position & extraterritorial rights in Tibet, but centers of operation were now Kalimpong and Darjeeling rather than Kathmandu and the Nepalese Government no longer received sizable revenue from India's trade with Tibet. Chandra Shumsher, like his predecessors, was anxious to expand Nepal's influence over Tibet, but he knew it well that Nepal was no more able to achieve this by her own resources in 1901 than it had been earlier. This was particularly true in view of the relationship then developing between Tibet and Russia, which could have seriously tilted the balance of power between Tibet and Nepal to the latter's disadvantage.

Unable to check the Russian influence through its own efforts, Nepal's only alternative was to seek British assistance in this direction. For the first time there existed a common link of interests between Kathmandu and Calcutta. Furthermore, Chandra must have perceived that in the event of broader framework of a British - Russian clash resulting from their conflict of interest in Tibet, Nepal would get an opportunity to auger its own interests.

In these circumstances, Chandra Shumsher became one of the most assiduous abettors of the British – Russian rivalry. A veritable flood of rumors concerning Russian activities in Tibet, which could neither be confirmed nor denied, had its origin in Kathmandu. The Coronation Durbar in Delhi in June, 1903 provided Chandra Shumsher with another opportunity to impress upon the British Government the necessity of taking prompt action in Tibet to forestall Russians.

Immediately after his arrival in India to attend the Durbar, Chandra Shumsher sought an interview with the Viceroy, who was initially reluctant to grant it due to his preoccupations but later relented as the Foreign Secretary pointed out that Nepal was quite different from other Indian States. As Louis Dane, the Foreign Secretary, later remarked, it was during this time that their relations with Nepal were put on a very satisfactory foundation<sup>119</sup>. During his interview, Chandra told Curzon frankly that his government would be prepared to endorse and actively support any action which the British Government in India might consider necessary for safe guarding their interests<sup>120</sup>.

Curzon was only too happy to find Chandra Shumsher of his side. Only a few days after his interview, we find him sending to London his letter of January 8, 1903, recommending the dispatch of an expedition to Tibet. In this communication, Curzon had said that, “We should contemplate acting in complete union with the Nepalese Durbar throughout our proceedings ... The Nepalese Government regards rumors of intrigue in Tibet with most lively apprehension, and considers the future of the Nepal State to be directly involved, and further, the Maharaja is prepared to cooperate with the Government of India in whatever way is thought most desirable, either within or beyond the frontiers for the frustration of designs which he holds to be utterly inconsistent with the interests of his own country<sup>121</sup>.”

There seems to be little doubt that Curzon's letter was directly inspired by his talks with Chandra, convincing him both the feasibility and necessity of punitive action against Tibet. Moreover, it seems improbable that Curzon had contemplated seriously any immediate forward thrust into Tibet prior to his interview with Chandra, as in such a case his alleged reluctance to hold an interview with Chandra Shumsher cannot be explained satisfactorily<sup>122</sup>.

#### **1.3.4 Nepal - factor Influences Whitehall**

However, when the Committee on State Affairs with the British Prime Minister presiding and Lord Lansdowne and the Chancellor of the Exchequer attending, met in London to consider the

issue, it also examined the argument that "even if Russia establishes her influence in Tibet, how will that cause any danger, given defenses and organization of the Indian Empire".

The answer advanced was: apart from wider considerations of Asian politics, Nepal is unfortunately outside those defenses and that organization. With Russia in Tibet, it may become a second Afghanistan; whereas with British influences predominant at Lhasa, there is no need to interfere with the independence of Nepal as it exists at present<sup>123</sup>. As the complete rupture of negotiations became inevitable, the Younghusband Mission which had proceeded earlier to Sikkim - Tibet border to conduct negotiations with Tibetans, was authorized on October 1, 1903 to occupy the Chumbi Valley across the border and to advance up to Gyantse.

Younghusband, accompanied by a strong military detachment (which included one Gorkha Regiment), crossed the Jelep pass at Sikkim-Tibet border on December 3, 1903 and reached Gyantse on April 11, 1904. The Tibetan Government not only turned a deaf-ear to the British demand to conduct negotiations, but the Tibetans actually attacked the British camp, and as reports poured in that the three great monasteries were further raising troops at Shigatse, London finally gave the green signal to proceed to Lhasa in case negotiations could not be resumed at Shigatse<sup>124</sup>. The mission ultimately reached Lhasa and occupied it on August 3, 1904.

Meanwhile, the British Minister at Peking gave notice of the new British policy towards Tibet to the Chinese Foreign office also<sup>125</sup>.

Likewise, the Russian Government also received assurance that so long there was no third power trying to interfere with Tibetans affairs, the British Government had no intention of annexing or establishing protectorate over Tibet, or in any way controlling the Tibetan administration<sup>126</sup>.

### **1.3.5 Nepal and the Younghusband Expedition**

Chandra Shumsher more than fulfilled his promise. Calcutta declined his offer of troops for the expedition, but did accept his offer of several thousand Yaks and porters for transportation purpose<sup>127</sup>. The Government of India gave Nepal Durbar discretionary powers to move its troops up to Ilam and Khamba -Jong<sup>128</sup> on Nepal-Tibet border and she actually kept on contingent ready at Ilam during the operation<sup>129</sup>. The Nepali Vakil's reports from Lhasa were transmitted to Calcutta by him and these served as the most important source of information as regards the attitude of the Tibetans, which may also explain at the same time, at least partially, some of the misconceptions entertained by various British officials on developments within Tibet. After the

Younghusband mission had reached Lhasa, the Nepali Vakil<sup>130</sup>, in collaboration with a representative of the Bhutan Government<sup>132</sup>, played an important role in bringing about the settlement which was signed on September 7, 1904, between the British and the Tibetans.

Chandra Shumsher, in 1903, had urged Lhasa to seek a peaceful settlement with the British, pointing out that more favorable terms could be obtained before a military expedition rather after it. As early as in September 1901, the Nepalese Premier had enquired from Lhasa about the nature of relationship between Tibet and Russia, and had warned them of the dangerous consequences that would result from any alliance against the interests of the Government of India. When relations reached a breaking - points in the latter half of 1903<sup>131</sup>, he wrote once again warning Lhasa of the folly of their course of action and stressing that Tibet could expect no assistance from Nepal should it continue with that policy<sup>132</sup>.

Thus, Chandra Shumsher interpreted Nepal's obligations under the 1856 treaty as consisting of duty to extend counsel rather than armed assistance to Tibet in case of aggression by a foreign power, at least when Tibet did not act in accordance with its advice. The Dalai Lama sent a letter for help to Chandra Shumsher brought to him by a Tibetan mission to Kathmandu. In reply, Chandra Shumsher only repeated his earlier warning that Tibet was at fault and strongly urged Lhasa to seek a settlement with the British as soon as possible<sup>133</sup>. Dalai Lama's reply to this letter completely denied Tibet's responsibility in the disagreement with the British and pointed out that it was the British encroachment on Tibetans territory that had brought about the dispute. He sought Nepali mediation and asked Chandra Shumsher to send a "well experienced officer" to help settle the dispute or to assist in arriving at a treaty<sup>134</sup>. The latter closed with a pointedly sarcastic comment to the Hindu Nepali Prime Minister, that "Your highness would be the best judge of what would be in conformity with our religious books and conducive to the best interest of the people".

Chandra Shumsher wrote back that it was "already too late" for Nepal to send any one to mediate in the Tibetan - British dispute but that the Nepali Vakil at Lhasa - a man, whom Tibetans distrusted, not without reason, could be of service, if the Lama so desired. To the Tibetan request that Nepal's representative should "try to fix the boundary at the old line fixed by his Majesty the Chinese Emperor and that not an inch of our territory should be taken away", Maharaja Shumsher assured Lhasa that the British "do not covet your country, and therefore have no desire to annex any part of it". He also referred to the report that the Dalai Lama was planning to flee Lhasa at the British approach and urged the Lama to remain in Lhasa and protect his people, for the flee would be "like a captain deserting ship in mid ocean"<sup>135</sup>.

However, by the time the letter reached him, the Dalai Lama had already slipped away<sup>136</sup>. The British were in control of the city and were in the process of negotiations with the remaining Tibetans officials. The Nepalese Prime Minister was cordially thanked by the Indian Viceroy for his "loyal cooperation and help which he rendered throughout the recent operation in Tibet"<sup>137</sup>. For this "valuable support" in the enterprise and also for the improvement he had inaugurated in the recruitment of Gorkhas, the honor of G.C.S.I. was conferred on him in January 1905<sup>138</sup>, but this honor did little to enhance his reputation amongst the Tibetans. The Nepalese representative also was presented with a sword of honor as a mark of appreciation of the Government of India<sup>139</sup>. Major M. Smith, the British Resident in Nepal, had also proposed to this Government to grant a personal salute of 19 guns to the Prime Minister, which he usually received in his capacity as the representative of the Maharaja Dhiraj of Nepal, when he passed through the British territory<sup>140</sup>. Foreign Department, however, decided to reserve this favor for some future date<sup>141</sup>.

### 1.3.6 Lhasa Convention and its Reactions

Negotiations for a settlement started only after considerable delay, since it was almost an one-sided meeting and since the Tibetans delegates were anxious to conclude the matters as early as possible in order to get the British out of their country, they, after initial objections over opening of Gyantse and Gortok as trading -marts and over indemnity clause, finally agreed to all the British terms. A convention between Great Britain and Tibet, popularly known as the Lhasa Convention, was signed at Potla Palace on September 7, 1804<sup>142</sup>. The Convention defined Indo-Tibetan boundaries, placed British trade relations with Tibet upon a satisfactory footing to the Govt. of India, and gave the British a right to exclude foreign influence, if they should so wish<sup>143</sup>. It was also thought that since the British had gained some influence in Tibet, its relations with Nepal would improve<sup>144</sup>. The treaty rendered Tibet to the position of a protectorate and made it impossible for China to wield any influence in this territory. Finally, by rigid control over the Tibetan activities, the possible penetration of Russian influence in Tibet was also forestalled.

Curzon's policy towards Tibet evoked sharp criticism in the British Parliament from the day of the dispatch of the Younghusband Mission<sup>145</sup>. Some criticized his idea of stationing a Resident in Lhasa, while others for his ignoring China. Some others opposed Curzon because the negligible trade in Tibet was not worth the effort<sup>147</sup>. Some even repudiated Curzon's use of the 'alleged' fear of the Russian penetration as justifying the British adventure in Tibet. Such as eventually they agreed, was remote in view of the great geographical barriers between Tibet and Russia<sup>148</sup>. The

Government was also criticized for its acquiescing to the unwarranted policy of the ambitious Viceroy.<sup>146</sup>

By the end of 1904, White Hall itself had become quite disillusioned about the wisdom of the Younghusband's Mission, which seemed to have literally removed the lid of a Pandora's Box, releasing a host of complex problems.

The continuance of the Mission at Lhasa was, apart from its great financial burden, causing great tensions on British relationships with Russia and China. Political situation in India had also become explosive due to Curzon's decision to divide Bengal. This made maintenance of any substantial force outside India increasingly impossible. Apart from all this, the Dalai Lama had made gestures to Urga in Mongolia, where he had established close contact with the Russian officials stationed over there, thereby, seriously endangering the basic objective of the mission to ensure exclusion of Russia from Tibet.

The British Government then began to make attempts to counteract the possible effects of Dalai Lama's presence in an area under Russian influence. The British force was ordered to withdraw from Tibet under much more generous terms to Tibet than those extracted from the latter by Younghusband in 1904<sup>147</sup>. Although there are several grounds to dispute the wisdom of Curzon's "forward policy" in terms of the overall British imperial interests, still it was quite a rational policy from the standpoint of the security of India's northern frontiers.

### **1.3.7 Impact on Indo - Nepal Relations**

The Tibetans developments had a profound impact on the Indo - Nepalese ties as well. They gave rise to thorny questions and problems which led to a long and elaborate discussion in the Indian Foreign Office, necessitating a lengthy correspondence between the Government of India and the Nepal Durbar.

This process involved a review of all the diverse aspects of this relationship - the status of Nepal, the British - Indian - Nepalese relationship in the context of changing British Indian interests. It included a discussion of issues like the Nepalese right to import arms, the Indian Government's right to regulate Nepal's foreign relations - to declare war and peace with Tibet. In short, this was the beginning of a 'Nepal policy' which shaped political developments in future. Nepal Government's cooperation in the British venture generated considerable goodwill and gratitude



for the Nepalese Premier, and Chandra Shumsher tried to use it for solving his long-standing grievances – especially on arms and autonomy questions.

The British Indian Government also wanted to reward Nepal in all possible ways, but their imperialist outlook and strategic consideration constrained them from making any radical change in their policy. This obviously put limits to Nepal's manoeuvrability and the Prime Minister had to content himself with limited gains in this respect – with certain amount of 'liberalisation' of the existing restrictions, for example, on import of arms and warlike stores, rather than their total stoppage.

Thus, while the British Indian Government had flatly refused to allow Nepal any significant acquisition of arms and while British administration had taken exception to the maintenance of two arsenals by Nepal in July 1902, reverse was the case only a year later in July 1903 – when the Tibetan crisis had approached. This time, in 1903, when a request for permission to purchase 2,500 Lee-Metford rifles and some ammunition was made by the Nepalese Prime Minister, the Government of India responded to it by making a gift of 2,500 M.H. rifles to the Durbar<sup>148</sup>. The Foreign Department noted that,

*“Our relations with Tibet have in some respect brought us into closer touch with Nepal; at Delhi the Prime Minister assured the Viceroy that the Nepalese were prepared to cooperate, with reference to limits which, in the interest of the peace and safety of India it may feel necessary to prescribe from time to time.”*

During the Tibetan crises at the dawn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, several considerations were added to the G.O.I.'s concern. The British Indian Government was anxious, in the first place, that Nepal might not be able to acquire arms in a proportion which might conceivably be used to the disadvantage of the British. At the same time, the latter should not be denied its genuine requirements of a modern and thoroughly serviceable army. They were only too willing to use it as a lever vis-a-vis Nepal, should any Nepalese Government choose to go much out of line. Further, the Government of India desired to earn credit for any such imports so as to use it for continuance of the recruitment facilities and, if possible "for liberalisation of trade and commerce" and "breaking of isolation and removing of restrictions placed on the movement of the resident". Of late, a new but most important factor was added to its policy, viz., and the role of Nepal in the frontier-system of the Indian Empire. While these factors would demand a liberalisation of arms restrictions, it was pointed out, in an obvious reference to Tibet, that the Government of India could not ignore the equally important consideration that in the event of the "Nepalese

attacking any nation at peace with the Indian Government", the former will in any undertaking in Tibet, quite recently the Maharaja has offered assistance in the practical shape of Yaks for transport service .... Finally, the Durbar seriously contemplated sending of armed help in case of need"<sup>149</sup>.

In July 1905, the Nepalese Prime Minister again solicited permission to purchase certain amount of ammunition as well as articles for improvement of the machinery in the existing state arsenals in Nepal. While the Government of India sanctioned the purchase of ammunition, it still felt reluctant to relax the restrictions on purchase of the machinery as 'nothing had occurred since the year 1902, which would warrant a change of policy in the matter', they argued. On the hand, referring to the argument advance by the Nepalese Prime Minister that his government needed an increased quantity of arms to keep the state army reasonably efficient, 'having regard to both the wild and unruly character of many of the tribes in habiting Nepal and the danger of attack from the Tibetan side, the Government of India pointed out that: the march of events in Tibet since that year would necessary have relieved the Durbar from apprehensions felt by them of any attack from North. Attention was also drawn to the fact that the security of the Nepal state from foreign forces was assured by the friendship of the British India Government, which had been strengthened and confirmed by the friendly attitude adopted by the Prime Minister during the Indian Mission to Lhasa<sup>150</sup>.

In 1906, Chandra Shumsher again expressed his desire to purchase 5,000 M.H. rifles<sup>151</sup>. The Foreign Secretary felt that, "in view of the great services rendered by the present Prime Minister in the matter of Tibet - services which still continue - as our best information is supplied by the Nepalese Agent at Lhasa through Nepal Durbar", Nepal should be given these arms free of cost<sup>152</sup>. Accordingly, a gift of 4,000 rifles was made to Nepal.

### **1.3.8 Repercussions on British -Nepalese Relations**

The Tibetan crises thus introduced a note of warmth and cordiality in the Indo-Nepalese relationship, which gradually replaced earlier mistrust and suspicion of each other. The policy of "negotiations through mutual concessions" thus yielded place to "mutual frankness and confidence". The developments further opened the most important issue of their mutual relationship - as to whether Government of India had a right to regulate foreign relations of Nepal, including those with Tibet and China. The issue came to be debated in the Indian Foreign office following information sent by the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling that feelings of

Tibetans were very much embittered against the Nepalese, probably because of their assistance to the British Mission in their country, and probably an attempt would be made to butcher the Nepalese nationals.

The Nepalese Prime Minister had at this juncture again revived his offer to move his troops to the border for 'reliving British troops'. He also communicated his desire to re-demarcate the Nepal's border with Tibet. It was pointed out that this action, if allowed, could also enhance the possibility of the Nepalese being embittered by the Tibetan. In view of the possible complications, the Viceroy asked for the advice of the foreign Department. After a thorough review, Russel pointed out that the fact that the Government of India had not recognised it her duty or to their interest to interfere actively in the dispute between Nepal and Tibet in the past had no bearing in the present as Tibet was so entirely excluded from outside influence or interference that it was clearly preferable to leave Nepal to settle its own differences with the Lhasa Government much in the same way as we allow tribes, not under our close control, to arrange matters with their neighbours under similar conditions<sup>153</sup>.

The Foreign Secretary L.W. Dane was also of the opinion that, "at present time, Nepal, though not independent in the fullest sense of the term, is treated like an independent state in most respects and hitherto possessed the right to declare war and make treaties with India." But, he pointed out that,

"The recent events have modified the aloofness of Durbar's attitude to the Government of India, particularly at present time, Nepal occupies the position of an ally. Our object should be to make the relationship one of 'subordinate alliance' - to use a phrase which has a recognized meaning in the history of our dealing with the Native States within India - and to take care that we do not act in any manner which should allow alliance on equal terms .... (this) will be best attained, it seems to me, if we can avoid accepting the direct military aid"<sup>154</sup>.

This view was finally accepted by Col. Ravenshaw, the British Resident at Kathmandu, who communicated to the Nepalese Prime Minister the view of the Government of India in these terms:

"Nepal being a state situated on India's frontier and dependent for much on her, the Government of India would claim to be consulted previous to any action being taken for reparation of injury or settlement of misunderstanding likely to lead to an appeal to arms between Nepal and Tibet"<sup>155</sup>.

### 1.3.9 Chinese and Russian Conventions on Tibet

In the wake of the Yunghusband expedition, the British efforts were directed to the consolidation of their gains in Tibet. The Government at London strongly felt that some consideration should be made to the Chinese Empire in order to maintain overall relations with China proper. Moreover, the British Government had no intention of maintaining troops in Tibet simply for the purpose of enforcing the treaty stipulations. After coming to some agreement with China, the British Government could get the Chinese help in execution of the treaty<sup>156</sup>.

After lengthy negotiations spread over more than fourteen months, a Convention between Great Britain and China was signed at Peking on April 27, 1906<sup>157</sup>. This, at least temporarily, served the purpose of both the parties. The Chinese offered to pay the war-indemnity of Rs. 2.5 million herself on behalf of Tibet was accepted by the British, while Article 3 of the treaty stated that China was not "foreign power" within the meaning of the Article XI of the Lhasa Convention.

Further, the British Government in Article II, engaged not to annex the Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. Thus, while the Chinese were made responsible for implementation of the terms of the Convention, the British also retained a concurrent right to compel its compliance from Tibet. At the same time, the Chinese Government also undertook not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territorial integrity of Tibet, or for that matter, itself to interfere with the internal administration of Tibet. It through Article I of the documents, also imparted its formal sanction to Lhasa Convention<sup>158</sup> of 1904 in its amended form, and text of the said Peking Convention was made an annexure to the new instrument<sup>159</sup>. To China, this meant British admission of her suzerain rights over Tibet. The impact of the two Treaties was, however, far-reaching. In the first place, since concessions concerning Tibet could be made without the previous consent of the British Government, 'Tibet was made de facto, if not de jure, British protectorate'. To say the least, the primary design of the British Indian Government to create a system of buffer-states at its northern frontier was completed with the falling of the only remaining Himalayan state in its line. Tibet was now brought to the approximate equality with Nepal in this respect.

Finally, by showing herself totally helpless to render the necessary protection to one of her main dependents, China exposed her own weakness in face of the British power, a factor which was to have a deep impact on the Nepalese mind. Thus, by demonstrating their power in Tibet, the British had also consolidated their position in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. The old empire, therefore, determined to salvage something from the Tibetan situation<sup>160</sup>.


After settling things with China, the British Government considered the moment ripe for approaching their other contender in the area- Russia - for a similar agreement. During the negotiations that started between the two, the British Government informed the Russian Government that, "in view of the fact that except China, the frontiers of Tibet are co - terminus only with those of the Indian Empire<sup>161</sup>, His Majesty's Government attached importance to the retention in the Article of words recognizing the special interest of Great Britain with regard to the foreign relations of Tibet<sup>162</sup>". The Russian Government in turn, was assured that the British Government had no intention either to remain in Lhasa or to occupy any part of the Tibetan territory. Russia, weakened by its defeat by Japan and by the tremendous upheaval of 1905-06, was more interested in stabilizing its own position in Central Asia than in taking advantages of England's temporary embarrassment caused by Dalai Lama's invitations to Russia to intervene in Tibet.

The Russian Government, in the circumstances, signed with the British, on August 17, 1907, a Convention on Tibet popularly known as Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The high contracting powers recognized as Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The high contracting powers recognized the suzerain rights of China over Tibet. Great Britain stated its special interest in the maintenance of status quo in the external relations of Tibet". To this end, both the contracting parties engaged "to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration of Tibet". They also agreed to deal with Tibet only through the intermediary of Chinese Government and not to seek any concession in Tibet or to require any lien on revenues<sup>163</sup>. The Russian Government, however, had made it quite clear that while it had no designs whatever on Tibet, it could not remain in different if the British should seriously disturb status quo in Tibet<sup>164</sup>.

While the Russian press made very favorable comments about the treaty<sup>165</sup>, opinions were sharply divided in Great Britain and India. Lord Curzon condemned it as the greatest humiliation Britain had ever suffered<sup>166</sup>. Others blamed the Government for bartering away everything obtained by the Younghusband mission<sup>167</sup>.



# CHAPTER 2



## CONFLICT IN HIMALAYAS REGION BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

## CHAPTER 2

# CONFLICT IN HIMALAYAS REGION BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

### 2.1 CHINESE FORWARD POLICY IN THE HIMALAYAS

Eye witness accounts testify to the erosion of the Chinese influence over the Tibetan politics during the period 1903-05. The Chinese Government had watched the crucial developments with utmost concern, but was unable to interfere in any effective manner. The Chinese Amban remained interested but silent and helpless spectator to these events.

Chinese efforts to bring Tibet under their control commenced almost immediately after the signing of the Convention. General Vhou Erh - feng was sent out to Tibet with a Chinese army to accomplish the task. He was met with stiff resistance by the Tibetan monasteries on the way, but he ruthlessly crushed them<sup>168</sup>. By 1909, most of the Kham province had fallen under Chinese control. The control of Central Tibet also had become their target. In 1904, Peking had ordered deposition of the Dalai Lama, who had followed consistently an 'anti - Chinese policy' aimed at assertion of the Tibetan independence, and asked the Panchen Lama to function as regent<sup>169</sup>. But the authorities in Lhasa refused to recognize the legality of the deposition. The Panchen Lama also refused to accept the Regency in such circumstances. This again exposed the intrinsic weakness of the Chinese position in Tibet.

The Dalai Lama had, in the meanwhile, sought the Russian help through Dorjeff in 1905<sup>170</sup>. Except the reassurances about his personal safety, however, he failed to extract any other



substantial assurance from the Czar<sup>171</sup>. The Dalai Lama, therefore, proceeded to China -Tibet border after the withdrawal of the British forces from Lhasa. Meanwhile, the Peking Convention of 1906 and the St. Petersburg Convention held in the following year had consolidated China's position in Tibet and had undermined the authority of the Dalai Lama to a great extent. By these conventions, the two big neighbors had not only recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but their promises to abstain from interference in Tibet had also cleared the way, much to their surprise, for the establishment of the de facto Chinese control over the country. In fact, the British had tried to appease China so as to make it a bulwark against the Tsarist expansion, but China successfully exploited the whole situation to its own advantage. Apart from initiating the military campaign in Eastern Tibet, it hastily dispatched Chang Ying - tang to Lhasa as Assistant Resident with reinforcement 'to set right affairs of Tibet', and also to assert the Chinese overlordship over there<sup>172</sup>. Under these circumstances, the Dalai Lama was left with no alternative but to seek an accommodation with Peking. He arrived at Peking in September, 1908, and tried to obtain the emperor's recognition of the autonomous status for Tibet - but the latter was in no mood to grant it. Instead, the Emperor further invested the Dalai Lama with a humiliating title of 'Our Loyal and Submissive Vice - Regent'<sup>173</sup>.

The Dalai Lama contacted the various European powers including the British Minister Sir John Jordan, the ambassador of the United States of America, and also the Japanese envoy for assistance in restoration of the Tibetans independence, but could merely extract vague declaration of their respective good intentions<sup>174</sup>. In the meantime, the Chinese Emperor and the powerful Dowager Empress expired. It was useless to stay in Peking any more. The Dalai Lama, therefore, marched back to the Tibet without being able to reach any understanding with the Chinese. He finally reached back Lhasa in November 1909. Chou ErhFeng, thereupon, launched a full-fledged invasion of Lhasa. The Dalai Lama ordered the Tibetan officials to resist him<sup>175</sup>. He also sent a petition to the Chinese Emperor directly, urging him to stop the operation<sup>176</sup>. Simultaneously, the Dalai Lama sent telegrams to the United Kingdom, the United States of America and also to other European powers asking them to put pressure upon Chinese to withdraw their troops from Tibet<sup>177</sup>. He even solicited the Nepalese assistance under the 1856 treaty. But once again his efforts went in vain. The British and the Nepalese made it clear that they would do nothing to impede the Chinese advance so long as their respective rights in Tibet were not interfered with. Later on, in face of the British protests, the Chinese Government justified the dispatch of its army to Tibet under the Anglo - Chinese Tibet Trade Regulations of 1908 itself, which had made China responsible for the protection of telegraph lines from the

British Trade marts in Tibet to the Indian frontiers, and declared that their operation was aimed at fulfilling Chinese international obligations. By February, 1910, the Chinese troops had arrived within a striking distance of Lhasa.

### 2.1.1 Chinese Overtures to Nepal

The striking success of the Chinese campaigns appear to have given rise the unrealistic expectations in Peking as to its capacity to adopt its own forward policy throughout the Himalayan region. But China was by no means satisfied merely with the re-establishment of its influence in Tibet in the same way as it had been in the past. The history of the region showed that the forward moves in the area lying in the between Tibet and India had been a prelude to the British intervention in Tibet itself. The renewal of the traditional relationship between these Himalayan Border States and China was an imperative, if its position in Tibet itself was to be safeguarded from future encroachments. Sikkim had already been incorporated in the British Empire in all but name, a fact that China had to recognize in their 1890 agreement with the British. Nepal and Bhutan retained an independent status which was partially circumscribed by the degree of influence wielded by Calcutta in these countries. No wonder, therefore, the Chinese Assistant Resident in Tibet, Chang Yin - tang, urged upon the Chinese Central Government, in February, 1907, to strengthen relations with Nepal: "Bhutan and Nepal are the doors of Tibet. Bhutan is poor and weak and is controlled by the British. Nepal has limited European processes in order to strengthen its armed force which was distasteful to British sentiments, but for every generation it has presented tribute to us regularly. We would send a special envoy to this country, in order to publicize to its people our prestige and beneficence, to explain the necessity of establishing a close reciprocal alliance between them and us to conclude secretly a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between Nepal and Tibet<sup>178</sup>. This suggestion met with the approval of their Central Government. The Chinese Emperor immediately issued "twenty-one points of instruction", which, amongst others, enjoined upon the 'local' Tibetan Government that,

*"As long as such occasion does not arise, by remaining friendly with each other, you will both (Tibet and Nepal) become united as subjects of the great kingdom and all oppression and seizure of territory by other powers will be prevented ... and that Tibet, Nepal and DruckYull (Bhutan) are side by side like the molar teeth in a man's mouth and the subjects of all three are those of one kingdom"<sup>179</sup>.*

When the Nepali mission reached Tibet en route China in 1907, Chang called upon the leader of the mission, Kazi Bhairab Bahadur, and took the opportunity to impress upon the Kazi that, “Looking at the old records, I find his Majesty the Emperor of China compared to parent and Gorkha and Tibet mentioned like brothers of the same community and religious belief, and, as such, Nepal and Tibet united like brothers under the auspices of China, should work in harmony for mutual good”<sup>180</sup>.

On another occasion, on March 20 of the same year, he suggested to the then Nepalese Representative at Lhasa the 'blending of five principal colours' (Mu-ts'se) – the yellow, red, blue, black and green – representing China, Nepal, Tibet and Sikkim – to form a beautiful design'. He also informed the Representative that he would be asserting the Chinese claim in the face of the British opposition<sup>181</sup>. He also expressed his intention to visit Nepal to meet the Nepalese Prime Minister in this regard<sup>182</sup>. The British withdrawal from Tibet and the entire Tibet reeling under Chinese control during this period (1905-10) placed Nepal Durbar into a complicated and embarrassing situation. Nepal had reversed its traditional policy to discourage any direct relationship between the British and the Tibetans during the Younghusband's expedition – rather it had acted as a principal abettor to the opening up of Tibet. In doing so, the Nepalese Prime Minister had been lured by the prospects of regaining influences in Tibet by becoming an instrument through which the British influence would work, and of getting an opportunity of rectifying his country's territories at the cost of Tibet, besides, of course, preserving its traditional rights and privileges in Tibet which otherwise would have been in jeopardy. But the turn of events went contrary to the Nepalese expectations. The Nepalese Premier could not have possibly anticipated sudden change in the British Home Government's policy in the wake of the Young-husband expedition under which the Government of India was compelled to withdraw from Tibet leaving behind whatever little it had gained. The Tibetans, on the other hand, were already quite unhappy with him. Thus, not only his hopes of positive gains in the game were dashed, but he had also to suffer the embarrassment of an unceremonious withdrawal of his ally.

### **2.1.2 Nepal's Response**

These developments, coupled with the commencement of the Chinese military campaign in eastern Tibet, induced Chandra Shumsher to improve relations with China. He, therefore, decided to revive the customary quinquennial mission once again after a lapse of ten years. It was, in addition, likely to soothe the feelings of those Bhardars (the members of the Royal Nepalese

court) also who were opposed to the Nepal extending any help to the British in opening of Tibet from the very beginning. It is to be remembered that a section of the Nepalese politicians had always nourished a basic distrust of the British. Besides, a substantial section of populations held the Tibetan –Buddhism and its institutions in high esteem. Taking all these factors into account, the Nepali Premier wrote to the Chinese Amban, in the fall of 1905, soliciting Peking's permission to dispatch the customary mission to China<sup>183</sup>. Peking was only too happy to seize this opportunity to improve its relations with a very important State to the South of Tibet. As a result, Nepali mission left Kathmandu on August 19, 1906, under the leadership of Bharat Bahadur, to return back only in 1910. While Nepal saw every advantage in reviving its contacts with China, it could not share Chinese enthusiasm to forge an anti-British alliance of the Himalayan States. It was not prepared to enter into any definite political understanding or alliance with China itself which could be interpreted by the British as inimical to their interests in the area.

Thus, when the Chinese Resident in Tibet asked for a loan from the Nepalese Representative over there, the Nepalese Premier rejected it outright<sup>184</sup>. In the face of Chao Erh Feng's march towards Lhasa in December, 1908, the Tibetan Government unofficially expressed a wish before the Nepalese Representative for the Nepalese assistance to improve Civil and military administration of the Country. Initially, the Nepal Durbar instructed the representative not to move in this regard unless approached by the Tibetan Government officially<sup>185</sup>. Again, when in August, 1909, the Chinese Resident of Lhasa asked the Nepal Durbar to supply him on cash payment 500 rifles and ammunition for his troops, the Nepal Durbar expressed its inability to supply them<sup>186</sup>. The Government of India expressed its "sense of appreciation" to the Nepalese Prime Minister "for this correct attitude"<sup>187</sup>.

However, it was not long after this incident that the Chinese approached the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to be allowed to enroll 300 Nepalese mix - breed in the Amban's escort. This request was also turned down by the Durbar and the Prime Minister further instructed his Representative that even voluntary enrollment should be discouraged<sup>188</sup>. The Nepali Representative was again approached for 'symbolic' Gorkha recruitment by the Chinese Resident, which again was rejected<sup>189</sup>. The request was renewed on March 1, 1911, only to be turned down once again<sup>190</sup>.

### 2.1.3 Nepal and the Tibetan Autonomy

Nepal was understandably perturbed by the deepening crises in Tibet. To begin with, it was not disturbed by the inauguration of the Chinese forward policy in its initial stages. It had rather views this as a favorable development, which could be played upon against the British or the Tibetans, as per exigencies of the situation. Nepal would, therefore, prefer a moderate Chinese influence in Tibet to a total effacement of the same from the territory. Tibetan Premier Lonchen Shatra's contention further substantiates this view. During his discussions with Charles Bell, the British Political Officer in Sikkim and an emissary to Tibet, he informed him, at a later date, that during the Chinese advance towards Lhasa in 1910, the Nepalese repeatedly warned them against resisting it and claimed that, "by this bad advice the Chinese troops were able to enter Tibet"<sup>191</sup>. Nepal Durbar, at the same time, could not appreciate a Sino-sized Tibet either. This situation would have been worse than the emergence of an autonomous Tibet, or a Tibet under strong British influence. Apart from the dangers inherent in a 'co-terminus China', Nepal's interests in Tibet would also have suffered in that case. A definite indicator in this respect was already there - in the shape of the "twenty - one points of instructions", on the basis of which the Chinese officials were vigorously trying to re-model the Tibetan administration. These "instructions" stipulated amongst other things, certain radical changes in the existing arrangements of the Tibetan trade - marts, which if implemented, would have had an adverse effect on the Nepalese trade and commerce with Tibet<sup>192</sup>. The Nepalese Government knew it well that if the Chinese succeeded in gaining control over the Tibet, they were sure to abolish Nepalese extra - territorial privileges in that land and to impose all kinds of restrictions so as to harass and injure Nepal-Tibet trade and Commerce. The Chinese Government would also have demanded a reciprocal right to post Chinese officers in Nepal, ostensibly as trade agent's<sup>193</sup>. It is interesting to note how clearly the Premier had perceived the problem in its correct perspective. As we will discuss later on, even during the brief spell of the Chinese control over Tibet in 1906-12 period, the China did try to brush aside Nepalese treaty rights and privileges over there and when China could actually and permanently control Tibet in the fifties, the Chinese Communist Government did abrogate all such treaty stipulations under Tibet - Nepal Treaty of 1856, including payment of the annual tribute to Nepal. That is why the Nepali Prime Minister not only repeatedly declared his government to be in favor of the Tibetan autonomy in quite unequivocal terms, but tried his best to get the status quo restored in Tibet from the very beginning. When the British Resident in Nepal communicated the details of the Anglo - Russian Convention of 1908 to him, he emphasized that the agreement was "*not a fair one to Tibet and it ought to have gone still further and to have guaranteed to Tibet not only the territorial integrity, but also their internal autonomy as against the absorption by China in addition. ... that in ten or fifteen years to come, he doubted*

*if the Tibetans would have any say at all in the Government of their own country ... In that case," he added, "Nepal's course of action would be to ask for the intervention of Great Britain with China to obtain a continuance of her rights."*<sup>194</sup>

As a result, though Nepal was not a party to the Convention, the Indian Government took upon herself the responsibility to protect Nepal's traditional rights and privileges in Tibet and assured the Durbar that nothing prejudicial to its interest would be allowed to take place in Tibet.

Soon afterwards, Tibetan Government, under instructions from Dalai Lama, wrote to Chandra Shumsher requesting him to send instructors to Tibet to train their troops, and also to allow the Tibetan troops to come to Nepal for similar training. It also requested for the supply of arms and ammunition on payment or on loan, so as to resist, if necessary, with arms the Chinese attempts to divest them of the power and authority until then exercised by them unquestionably in the governance of their own country<sup>195</sup>. The Prime Minister, while forwarding a copy of the Tibetan communication<sup>196</sup> to the British Resident, remarked that, "an angry, turbulent, distracted Tibet and co-terminus Chinese frontier will aggravate the responsibilities and emphasis and anxious watchfulness of this government in that quarter", and added that, *"... under any circumstances, the present anxious State of things in Tibet is undesirable, as the continuance of peaceful and orderly government there is of vital importance to this Country which has such heavy stakes there, as it is, I suppose, to the government of India too. The Tibetans seem to be in a way justified in demanding the withdrawal of the Chinese troops now entering Tibet, with a cession of outrages alleged to have been committed by them on the Kham side & the continuance of the status quo without any prejudice to the pre-existing suzerain rights of China. As such, they are deserving of our moral support in their struggle for the preservation of their legitimate rights, but that I consider their proposal for assistance in the shape of arms and men, quite quixotic"*<sup>197</sup>.

The wordings of the letter further revealed that the Prime Minister expected the British Government to exert its pressure upon China to prevent it from overrunning Tibet and overthrowing the powers of the Tibetans to the extent prejudicial to the interests of Nepal in that country. The Maharaja also solicited the Government of India's view on the subject 'so as to reply accordingly' to the Tibetan Government.

#### 2.1.4 British India's Reaction

The British Indian Government had also felt gravely alarmed with these developments, as the Chinese were attempting to subvert Tibet, and Nepal and Bhutan appeared to be the next in the line. The coming into light of the Amban's memorial to the Chinese Emperor on behalf of Nepal Durbar in 1905 in the Imperial Chinese Gazette incensed them greatly<sup>198</sup>. It said that, "I have the honor to observe that Gorkha land is dependency beyond the borders of China and that the tribes have always displayed a loyal devotion in the Throne, further proof of which they now give their anxiety to send the customary tribute<sup>199</sup>."

Major Manner Smith, British Resident in Nepal, was consequently asked to enquire the Nepalese Prime Minister as to what its submissive language connoted. These representations had the desired effect. The next Nepalese communication to the Chinese throne – a note of thanks for entertaining the Nepalese mission sent to it on the return of the mission- was drafted in somewhat altered language, confirming more to modern style of writing and to the realities of the situation. The Imperial Chinese Court's Circular of October 19, 1910, mentioning the letter, however, made it obvious that no exception was taken to the variation made from the traditional form of expression either by the Amban or by the Chinese Government<sup>200</sup>. The conclusion of the Peking Convention of 1906 also had failed to answer the problems of re-adjustment in the aftermath of the Younghusband expedition. The British calculations and expectations from it were, in any case, belied by the course of events that followed in Tibet. They had thought that, by signing the Adhesion agreement? Chinese had acknowledged 'special position' of the British in Tibetans affairs and had, in addition, pledged themselves to secure fulfillment of terms of the Lhasa Convention. But, in effect, Chinese were rather encouraged by it in committing "a series of breaches of the Lhasa Convention", and this, coupled "with the impunity with which they have been enabled to do this", brought about a rapid decline in British influence and authority at the trade-marts in Tibet<sup>201</sup>.

Therefore, when Chang, the Assistant Chinese Amban in Tibet, proposed to play a visit to Nepal in 1907, the British apprehensions of the Chinese designs in the Trans – Himalayan region and they sought to forestall it<sup>202</sup>. The issue was a delicate one, as it implied exercise of control over foreign relations of Nepal. In an intra-departmental discussion on the subject in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, it was pointed out that the Government of India had got no such treaty right and that in the 1856 Gorkha –Bhot (Tibet) Treaty, both Nepal and Tibet had described as having "borne allegiance" to the Emperor of China<sup>203</sup>. It was also realized that if an invitation was asked for by the Chinese, it would be difficult for the Nepalese Prime Minister to refuse it in view of the traditional relationship between two countries. Assistant Secretary

Holland, however, was of the opinion that *a good deal has happened since that date and as Nepal is a State under the suzerainty of British Government, we should be entitled to have an authoritative voice in any fresh arrangements that the State might desire to make with the Tibetans*<sup>204</sup> He, therefore, thought that the best way out was to tell the Chinese Government definitely to forbid Chang from undertaking the project. But the joint Secretary, Clarke, thought it better to devote their energies to the strengthening of the then existing excellent relations with Nepal than making representations to China<sup>205</sup>. The Foreign Secretary, L.W. Dane remarked that the desirability of the Government of India's action in bringing Nepal and Bhutan definitely under the British was being well proved in face of China's project of forging an alliance of Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet. Though he was confident that the things would be all right "as long as Maharaja Chandra Shumsher and the Tongse Pentap (the Dalai Lama) lived", but it would be well to blind both States to the British India, "as closely as possible", in view of China's shadowy claims to suzerainty over Nepal and their action in that direction. As to the question of forestalling Chang's visit to Nepal, Dane also did not favor, asking Chinese about stopping him at that stage, but, *"If there is any sign of his going, and of Minister hesitating to stop him owing to Nepal's mission now on its way to Peking, then China may be required to abstain from these political dabbling in India and to recall Chang"*<sup>206</sup>. It was further decided to take the Nepalese Prime Minister into confidence. The British Resident, Col. Smith, thereupon spoke to Sir Chandra Shumsher 'frankly' that the Government of India was interested in what Chang was doing in Tibet, and had not failed to notice his efforts to identify the interests of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, with his country, as also his wish to extend his influence in Nepal by paying a visit to the country<sup>207</sup>.

### 2.1.5 Nepal proposes Revision of 1815 Treaty

These developments convinced the Nepalese Prime Minister of two things. Firstly, that it would not be possible for Nepal to bear the strains of the situation alone, or, to manipulate a continuance of its rights in Tibet through its own efforts without the help of the Indian Government. Secondly, while the Government of India's involvement might have solved some of its problems in Tibet, it was not going to be one sided affair. Nepal could no longer expect a free hand in its dealings with Tibet or China - acceptance of British guidance in conducting its foreign relations had become inevitable. The growth of the Sino-Indian rivalry in Tibet had exposed his country even more to the British influence and possibility of their trying to meddle with the Nepalese internal affairs in some future date also could not be brushed aside. In an



effort to accept the inevitable with grace, the Nepalese Prime Minister told the British Resident that,

*“... the Nepal Durbar would be prepared under certain circumstances to come to a definite agreement with the Government of India regarding political subordination in dealing with China on the line of Article 6 of Engagement No LIV (Anglo Nepalese Treaty) of 1815 relating to Nepal and Sikkim”<sup>208</sup>.*

The question of advisability of concluding a new treaty on the suggested lines led to a re-examination of the very nature of Nepal's relationship with India, Tibet and China by the Government of India. It was pointed out in this context in the Foreign Department that while such a treaty would have formally and definitely put Nepal into the orbit of Government of India and would have put to an end to the Chinese dabbling with it, it might also lead to complications with China. Further, a complete rupture between the Governments of Nepal and China could possibly mean a cessation of the Nepalese trade with Tibet, which might cause great dissatisfaction against the Prime Minister amongst his own people, unless the State was assured of the British support to Nepal in such an eventually. This meant that the British Government had to oversee Nepalese interests in Tibet. The Assistant Secretary, Holland, felt that though, "from a practical point of view, there is no danger of our suzerainty being questioned,... and that though the Nepalese missions to China had little political significance, their continuance would give to the Chinese excuse for reviving their dormant claim to suzerainty over Nepal. A formal treaty with Nepal would have forestalled all such contingencies"<sup>209</sup>. Then, there was also the question of a quid pro quo. The Foreign Secretary assessed the situation thus, “Probably Nepal would shake herself free of China and place herself in subordinate alliance with us if we gave her modern rifles and batteries, in other words, if we made her strong enough to stand alone. It seems doubtful whether a formal treaty would be of more value than friendly relations, and, at present, I am inclined to think it is better to leave it well alone, or at any rate, to wait until Nepal makes the first move<sup>210</sup>. Accordingly, the Resident was instructed not to move in the matter any further.

### **2.1.6 The Dalai Lama's Flight to India**

As the Chinese control of Tibet continued to stiffen, the Dalai Lama decided to resist the onslaught from a place of safety. In a counter move, while he was somewhere on his way to India, Peking announced deposition of the Dalai Lama for the second time. On April 23, 1910 the

Tibetan 'Kasag' received a Chinese decree announcing the same and urging the 'Kasag' to find a new incarnation in his place. The 'Kasag' once again refused to recognize the Chinese right to do so. The Panchan Lama also, in the circumstances, rejected the offer to resume the regency<sup>211</sup>. As the Tibetan resistance gained strength and the talk about the Dalai Lama's imminent flight out of the country became current, the Chinese approached Jordan, the British Minister at Peking, with the request that China may be allowed a passage to Tibet for 1,000 Chinese troops through India, presumably to forestall the Dalai Lama's escape out of Tibet from that side. The Government of India sharply reacted to the proposal and the Viceroy, on November 22, 1909, telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India that,

“... the sending of Chinese troops to Tibet through India would upset the whole of the North East frontier and would probably throw Nepal and Bhutan, who now look to us against China, into the arms of China, our relations with Nepal would be seriously affected by any such action”<sup>212</sup>. The Government of India thought it of utmost importance to strengthen Nepal's confidence in them. The Viceroy told the Secretary of State, "it is also necessary that we show our border States that we are not afraid of China"<sup>213</sup>. The Secretary of State agreed with the Government of India's assessment and the Dalai Lama was accorded a warm welcome on his arrival at the borders<sup>47</sup>.

The Dalai Lama wrote to Lord Minto, on his arrival to India, that in the face of the Chinese oppression, he had to flee to India in order to consult the British authorities, and added that "I now look to you for protection and I trust that the relations between the British Government and Tibet would be that of a father and his children"<sup>214</sup>. On March 4, 1910, the Dalai Lama visited Minto personally in Calcutta and expressed his hope that Tibet would soon be able to regain its right of direct dealing with India<sup>215</sup>. He also explained to Minto his plan to stay in India until a satisfactory settlement with China was affected<sup>216</sup>. In 1910, he even proposed an alliance with the government of India on terms similar to that stipulated under then Anglo- Nepalese Treaty of 1815. Clearly, Tibet was then looking for a close alliance with India and was willing to throw its lot with the Government of India<sup>217</sup>.

### **2.1.7 Impact of Tibet on British India's Nepal Policy**

The new exigency further enhanced the importance of the issue of the proposed revision of the Treaty. The Foreign Secretary was quite clear that the risk involved in the conclusion of a fresh treaty "was worth the advantage of a fixed relations", as, "the possibility of Nepal coming to some secret agreement with China could not be ignored if it gets Prime Minister of a different

temperament<sup>#218</sup>. As to the British international obligation of restraining Nepal from rectifying borders, it was in the eyes of the Secretary, also not particularly relevant, as even without a formal treaty, China and Russia could hold them bound to restrain Nepal in view of the fact that the Government of India had presented with a large number of arms, and that they were having a resident at Kathmandu. The British resident at Kathmandu, however, did not find fresh treaty advantageous. He, on the strength of his past conversations with the Nepalese Prime Minister, felt that the latter could entirely be trusted to refer all points effecting his country's relations with China or Tibet unofficially to the Government of India even without a specific agreement to do so, and was sure to act according to its wishes on that count. As regard the existing situation in Tibet, "the Nepal Government would welcome diplomatic pressure by the British Government against China for the re-establishment of former Tibetan Government under Dalai Lama"<sup>#219</sup>.

As the Tibetan situation continued to deteriorate, the Prime Minister again, on March 8, 1910, paid a visit to the resident Smith in Kathmandu. He enquired from Smith about the extent to which the Government of India would allow his government a free hand in maintaining their rights in Tibet. Reporting the same to his Government, Smith pointed out that the Prime Minister did not seem to be holding anything in the back, and that he made no mention of a desire for the supply of more armament of any other condition as quid pro quo for the revision of the treaty giving the Indian Government right to regulate Nepal's relations with Tibet and China. He further pointed that, "The Prime Minister in conversation is always quite outspoken, and makes no secret of the fact that in his judgment the only safe policy for Nepal is to maintain the goodwill and support of the Government of India"<sup>220</sup>. Only the next day, the Prime Minister submitted a long memorandum on the subject to the Resident expressing his concern about the repercussions of the Chinese policy in Tibet and asked whether the Government of India would allow Nepal, as in the past, a free hand in redressing its grievances over there, especially in view of the Government of India's two recent agreements with Russia and China"<sup>221</sup> Communicating the same to the Government of India, Smith expressed his confidence that there was no fear of the Nepal Durbar carrying on the secret negotiations with China or of desiring a closer connection with that power at that time, otherwise he would have urged the Government of India to conclude a formal treaty with Nepal to forestall such a possibility. He also hinted at a possible advantage of Nepal's ostensible independent position and of using it "as a lever to press for a enforcement of the Tibetan autonomy"<sup>#222</sup>. Meanwhile, the India office felt concerned over rumors of Nepal moving troops to the Tibetan border during the end of April month. When enquired about the authenticity or otherwise of the rumor, the Prime Minister replied that there was none and that,

"not a single soldier would be moved without the Resident being informed"<sup>223</sup>. While communicating the Prime Minister's reply to the Secretary of State, the Viceroy pointed out that, "It would be difficult to secure present relations as to trade between Nepal and Tibet under the treaty of 1856 without interfering in the internal administration of latter. For the present it would seem better to await overtures from Nepal considering question of treaty. In the event of China being aggressive, there may be advantages in leaving Nepal free to act"<sup>224</sup>.

The Secretary of State for India also concurred with the Government of India<sup>225</sup>. The British Resident was, thereupon, instructed that both the questions raised in the Prime Minister's memorandum should be answered, "... in quite general terms that Nepal's population vis-a-vis Tibet and her right in that country are not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, prejudiced by the conventions with Tibet, China and Russia", and that, "The British Government could not be indifferent spectator of disturbances near their borders, and that in view of their obligations to Russia and China, and of their close and peculiar relations with Nepal, they should expect to be consulted by Nepal before the latter took a line of action which might involve it in any armed conflict with China or Tibet"<sup>226</sup>. As to the Premier's other queries, the Resident repeated the assurance he was earlier authorized to give by the Government of India in communication with the Whitehall, "So long as the Nepalese Prime Minister consults the British Government before committing himself and follows their advice when it has been given, and preserves his present correct and friendly attitude, His Majesty's Government will not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet"<sup>227</sup>.

### **2.1.8 Nepal's Satisfaction at Indian Assurance**

The Nepalese Premier expressed his complete satisfaction over the Government of India's assurance and accepted by the position assigned to his country by the latter. He, in turn, assured back to the Resident that Nepal had no intention to extend its territory by pursuing an aggressive policy, and that if there was any such aspiration about territorial aggrandizement, it was "by rendering such services to the British Government as it was their proud privilege to do in 1857"<sup>228</sup>.

The Government of India found it quite satisfactory and the Secretary of state was informed that it was no more disposed to make any movement in the direction of concluding a new treaty with Nepal<sup>229</sup>. The Secretary of the State also agreed with the decision<sup>230</sup>. Reflecting over the whole series of developments, the Foreign Secretary in the Government of India observed,

*“The Government of India and Whitehall have decided not to move in the matter at least up till overture comes from Nepal; and since Nepal has received all the necessary assurances it needed to face the difficult situation fast developing in Tibet without accepting any formal subordination with the Government of India, it was most unlikely that the Durbar will reinitiate the question of negotiating a new treaty”<sup>231</sup>.*

He, however, was mindful of the warning given by Jordan, the British Resident at Peking, to him recently that the Chinese would do some overt act to establish their suzerainty over Nepal and had advised that a treaty with Nepal should be concluded as early as possible. The Foreign Secretary was also not unaware of the difficulties - that Nepal wanted to get two provinces of Tibet, Kuti, and Kerong to take its borders up to the watershed, &, that its trade with Tibet was of vital importance to its national economy - so much so that "no Prime Minister could long hold his power if the Chinese were able to stop this by imposing prohibitive duties"<sup>232</sup>. It would be a 'difficult task', but not 'impossible' for the British to support Nepal in an armed conflict with China on either of these points. Further, they were bound to Russia to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet. Still he was convinced that the difficulties were not insurmountable and that the Government of India must strengthen their connections with Nepal as the opportunity afforded, and eventually to get a treaty. He pointed out that, "Not only have we (the British Indian Government) 20,000 Gurkhas in our army, but if Nepal drifted towards China, we should have to redistribute our army in India. At present, there is no force to speak of between Nepal and Calcutta". He noticed that the "Maharaja's anxiety had disappeared for the present" and speculated that, "probably the Nepalese have come to some agreement with the Amban" in Tibet. He, therefore, concluded that, "I think that in future we might consult Nepal more than we have done about Tibetans or border politics. This will consolidate our interests and pave the way for a treaty"<sup>233</sup>.

### **2.1.9 The British Indian Government urges to take tough line with China**

This analysis makes it amply clear that while the Whitehall was prepared to allow China practically a complete control over Tibet during the 1907-12 period, they were quite unwilling to allow any Chinese interference in the South of the Himalayan crest in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim<sup>67</sup>. The Government of India, however, felt differently. As Charles bell pointed out, this policy suffered with two fundamental weaknesses. Firstly, these three States covered seven hundred miles comprising only less than half of the Indo-Tibetan border. Secondly, it was felt

that though the, "China might be told that we would not tolerate interference in Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, but seeing us abandon Tibetan interests she was sure to interfere in those three states, whenever, an opportunity presented itself"<sup>234</sup>. Bell cited the Dalai Lama also in his support, who told him that, "the British should keep China busy in Tibet, holding her back there. Otherwise, when the Chinese obtain a complete hold over Tibet, they will molest Nepal and Bhutan also"<sup>235</sup>.

While recognizing its obligations under treaties with China and Russia not to interference in the internal affairs of Tibet, the Government of India felt that "matters will, of course, assume quite a different complexion if, in the course of a struggle for supremacy, the British rights, which should be to include those of Nepal, are impaired"<sup>236</sup>.

The Government of India, therefore, favored a tough line with Peking and wished to intervene effectively in Tibet, but the London Government continued to insist on observing strict neutrality<sup>237</sup>. Foreign Secretary Butler felt that any direct intervention into the Tibetan affairs in the circumstances was out of question, but "the attitude of Nepal creates a situation in which action is not only possible but, I venture, necessary"<sup>238</sup>.

Viceroy Minto fully agreed with Butler, and, pointing out the threat posed to the Indo-Nepalese relations by the Chinese action in Tibet and the restlessness of the Nepalese Premier about it, he again strongly urged the London Government to pressurize Peking to ensure a status quo in Tibet<sup>239</sup>. By this time the British government had realized the gravity of the situation and the need to intervene, if its interests in the region were to be preserved. It then looked for an excuse to do so, in face of its obligations under its Conventions with Russia and China. Nepal, with an ostensibly un-cumbered capacity to assert itself against the Chinese encroachments upon the internal autonomy of Tibet, fitted best with this scheme of things. It was ultimately decided to intervene using Nepal as an excuse. Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State intimated Minto that while 'His Majesty's Government could recognize only the de facto Government in Tibet as the Conventions specifically precluded it from interfering in the internal affairs of the country, no Chinese interference could be allowed in the affairs of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim"<sup>240</sup>.

Simultaneously, Max Muller, the British Charge d' affairs at Peking, was told that the change in the Tibetan situation had assumed great importance and urgency as it was to affect India's relations with the three frontier states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. As delay might create to raise claims in their regard, Max Muller was instructed by Sir Grey to give a clear intimation to China that the British Government could not allow any administrative changes in Tibet to affect

or prejudice the integrity either of Nepal or of the Bhutan and Sikkim. Max Muller was further told to inform the Chinese that the "British Government was prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three states"<sup>211</sup>.

Accordingly, the British Minister at Peking made following verbal representations to the Chinese Government on February 25, 1910,

“Great Britain, while disclaiming any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet, cannot be indifferent to the disturbances of the peace in a country which is her neighbor and is in intimate terms with Nepal, whom His Majesty's Government cannot prevent from taking such steps to protect her interest as she may think necessary in the circumstances”<sup>212</sup>.

A memorandum was served on the Russian and Japanese ambassador's simultaneously, saying that,

*“...in particular they (British Government) are concerned as to the attitude which will be taken up by the Government of Nepal, who have intimate treaty relations with the Tibetan Government and to whom an appeal for assistance has been made by the authorities of Lhasa. His majesty's Government recognize the dangerous situation which would arise if the Government of Nepal yielded to such an appeal, and whilst reluctant to let it appear that they have any wish to interfere in internal affairs of the Chinese Empire, they nevertheless consider themselves compelled to use their influence with the Chinese Government in order to avert so serious a contingency”<sup>213</sup>.*

#### 2.1.10 China Claims Suzerainty over Nepal

In the meantime, on February 27, 1910, Prince Ching, President of the Board of the Tsoungli Yamen (the Chinese Foreign office), replied back to Max Muller's earlier communication. In it, Prince Ching sought to emphasize China's 'suzerain rights' in Tibet and explained that the dispatch of military force had become necessary to fulfill Chinese obligations arising out of the Sino-British Tibetan Trade Regulation Agreement concluded in 1908. He also took great pains to explain the reasons that led to the dismissal of the Dalai Lama. He added that, “the Chinese Government attached utmost importance to the Anglo-Chinese treaties relating to Tibet and assured the British that under no circumstances would the dismissal of the pontiff be used to alter the political situation in Tibet”<sup>214</sup>. The assurances were repeated by the Chinese Government on March 9, 1910<sup>215</sup>. While the British Government appeared to be satisfied with these assurances as far as the Tibetan situation was concerned, it felt deeply concerned about its treaty

right in Tibet, both commercial and political, and its relations with the three frontier states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim<sup>246</sup>. Sir Charles Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, was sent to conclude a fresh treaty with Bhutan, which was signed with the Dharma Raja on January 8, 1910 and ratified on March 24, 1910<sup>247</sup>. The Treaty provided that the Bhutanese Government will be guided by the advice of the Indian Government in the conduct of its external relations<sup>248</sup>. Max Muller, the British Minister at Peking, simultaneously served a written warning on the Chinese Government that, "His Majesty's Government cannot allow administrative changes in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal or of the two smaller States of Bhutan and Sikkim and that they are prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three States"<sup>249</sup>. The Chinese Government protested against the conclusion of the treaty, claiming that Bhutan was Chinese vassal. The Chinese note further asserted that

*"...as far as the Nepalese (are concerned), they are properly (or originally) feudatories of China"*<sup>250</sup>.

The Indian Foreign Office considered the letter of the Prime Minister totally contradicting Chinese claim and other facts and felt that Nepalese stand was correct<sup>251</sup>. The Government of India rejected the Chinese reply as absurd. The Viceroy then wrote to the secretary of State, London, that "we do not consider that the Chinese claims have any validity, and trust that they will be resisted"<sup>252</sup>.

The Whitehall decided to maintain the position taken earlier, that not only the Chinese claims over Nepal were baseless, but that the latter was under the British sphere of influence. As such, Max Muller, rejected the Chinese note and warned the Chinese Government that,

"His majesty's Government cannot allow any administrative changes in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal in common with those of Bhutan and Sikkim"<sup>253</sup>. On being conveyed the British determination, the Chinese Foreign office reply to it in the following words, "... we have the honor to observe that Nepal has forwarded tribute to Peking for years past and has long submitted to vassalage to China"<sup>254</sup>. The Chinese claim regarding Nepal was conveyed to the Nepalese Prime Minister by the Resident. The substance of the Chinese claim might not have been a surprise to Kathmandu. But it was embarrassing and potentially dangerous to allow these claims becoming an issue of public contention between China and the Great Britain. Chandra Shumsher, therefore, "hastened to repudiate", the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Nepal, "with all the emphasis and stress that I (the Prime Minister) could command". Characterizing the claim



as unwarranted fiction and a "damaging reflection on our national honor and independence", he further emphasized that,

“Our relations with China, though of long standing have always been regarded by us of a friendly nature ... The mission that proceeded from this country to China is of the nature of embassies from one court to another and had been motivated mainly by desire to cultivate the goodwill and friendly feeling of the Chinese Government, especially on account of our heavy stakes in Tibet”<sup>255</sup>. Strengthened further with the unqualified Nepalese support, the British Government, thereupon, re-asserted before the Wai-wa-pu that Nepal and Bhutan could not be regarded as Chinese feudatories<sup>256</sup>. It further warned that “... no attempt of the Chinese Government to exercise influence over states too remote from the sphere of direct Chinese interests and in such close relations with the Government of India can possibly be tolerated”<sup>257</sup>.

#### 2.1.11 Chinese Maneuverings

The Chinese Government, on the other hand, made all out efforts at diplomatic front in a bid to win over Nepal. In September, 1910, the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa informed the Prime Minister that, “The Chinese Amban had recommended to Peking that some new honor be bestowed upon the Prime Minister through an embassy in recognition of his role in the Tibetan crisis”<sup>258</sup>. The same news was confirmed by Bell on the authority of the Dalai Lama<sup>259</sup>. Viceroy informed to the secretary of the State of the same, who replied back that,

“The Chinese Mission to Nepal may take its course but the Prime Minister should be advised to consult His Majesty's Government before accepting title or replying to letter, and if either implies Chinese suzerainty, he should be advised to repudiate them”<sup>260</sup>. The Prime Minister, when broached by the British Resident upon the subject, declared that he did not wish to incur any new obligation from the Chinese Government and informed the Resident that he would be instructing his representative in Tibet to forestall such an eventuality. The Resident found that, “*Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumsher is quite clear in his mind that there is no longer any advantage to be gained by the past policy of Nepal of playing - off the Chinese suzerainty against her political connection with the British Government and the protection which she enjoyed therefrom. So far as it may be consistent with the prestige of his own Government, he will readily follow any advice which may be given to him*”<sup>261</sup>. Soon afterwards, the Chinese Amban, in a secret communication to the Nepalese Premier, sought to inform him that: “... a written communication, saying that Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim were theirs, that is of the British, was addressed by the British to Wai-

wu-pu, Johorkhang Home Office at Peking: and the said Wai-wu-pu having written to me (Amban) to enquire as to how matters stood... I have written back to say that Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim ... are ours and not of the British<sup>262</sup>. The Wai-wu-pu also reacted sharply to the British warning against attempts at increasing the Chinese influence in the area lying South of the Himalayan crest. It maintained, in its note of March 31, 1911, that, *“Now both Nepal and Bhutan are vassal states of China as has been clearly proved ... The Chinese Government therefore still adheres to its previous notes and the position as set forth in their previous notes”*<sup>263</sup>.

The British Government totally rejected the note. The new British Minister at Peking, Sir Jordan accordingly replied back to Prince Ching that, “His Majesty's Government are unable to recognize the claim of Chinese Government to the suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan and that they will be bound to resist any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to impose their authority on or, in any way, to interfere in, either of these two (Nepal and Bhutan) states”<sup>264</sup>. And thus, the Century's old 'undefined' relations between China and Nepal were defined by the British. This was also the final rejection by both the Nepalese and the Indian Government of China's 'Shadowy claims' over Nepal. It is to be noted that the two governments were almost in constant consultation with each - other all along and the Nepalese Government acquiesced to Indian Government's move in this direction.

### **2.1.12 Chinese Revolution and the Himalaya Politics**

Soon after this, in 1911, China underwent a mighty democratic revolution. The British Foreign office, which had been quite uneasy over the Chinese claims, seized the opportunity and the Secretary of State for India instructed to the Government of India, on November 14, 1911, to induce Nepal to discontinue the custom of sending missions as "good grounds are afforded by changed situation and general position of affairs in China for deprecating dispatch of mission"<sup>265</sup>. In fact the Indian office wanted a permanent abandonment, but agreed to the Government of India's suggestion that the Durbar be approached initially to suspend it, until the results of revolution in China became clear, and to ask the Prime Minister to take action in this direction only after consulting the British Indian Government<sup>266</sup>.

In fact the Government of India at this juncture was doubtful about the advisability of a permanent discontinuance for a number of reasons, such as it would have been strongly opposed by China, if only on sentimental grounds; the Nepalese losses might have needed compensation, and might have even damaged the latter's trade with Tibet. The Indian officials, including the

Viceroy Lord Harding, however, were unanimous that, "If the Manchu dynasty should fall, the Quinquennial Nepalese Mission should certainly be discontinued"<sup>267</sup>.

In an interview with the British Resident, the Prime Minister expressed his willingness to seek and abide by the Government of India's advice over the issue. To his greatest disappointment and disillusionment, the position of the Nepali traders in Tibet had not improved after the Chinese had assumed direct control over the Tibetan administration. On the contrary, it had gone worst, particularly after the establishment of the imperial Chinese police over there. This development, in-effect, removed the last string of hesitation from his mind about the advisability of throwing Nepal completely towards the British side in the controversy. So, when the Resident sought to confirm the outcome through a written communication to the Prime Minister stating therein that his Government was interested in the question of dispatch of mission, "in view of the peculiar significance which is known to be attached to the missions by the Chinese Foreign office", and, therefore, the Premier was advised not to dispatch the mission until after prior consultations with the Government of India,<sup>268</sup> Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher took the opportunity to express his surprise as to 'how the mission could be taken in quite a different light', specially 'in view of our emphatic disclaimer of any sinister significance to be attached to it, and to reassure the Resident that in this respect the Government of India's advice will be readily 'sought and followed'<sup>269</sup>. Both the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India were, however, not in favor of reopening the treaty question for the time being. Chandra Shumsher's request for ambassadorial status and for revision of the Gazetteer were also politely rejected, ending up his hope of more positive recognition of Nepal's 'autonomy' or independence, at least for the time being. The British, instead, were prepared to confirm Lord Elgin's pledge, made in 1894, that they had "no intention or design of interfering with Nepal' autonomy", without, of course, surrendering their de facto right to guide Nepal in the conduct of foreign policy<sup>270</sup>. The Resident informed Chandra Shumsher that, "Nepal's status lay somewhere between that of an independent Afghanistan and the "feudatory states of India"<sup>271</sup>. The Nepalese premier was, at the same time, reassured that,

*"The British Government will support and protect Nepal in the event of an unprovoked attack from any quarter and so long as the Prime Minister consults the British Government and follows their advice when given and preserves the correct and friendly attitude which has marked Your Excellency's administration, His Majesty's Government will not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet."*<sup>272</sup>.

Taking everything into account, the Nepalese diplomacy during the period of trouble in the areas of its concern had generally been successful. The Premier might not have got all that he wanted, but the developments in Tibet and its decision to identify its interest, in a greater or lesser degree, with the Government of India paid its dividends in the shape of earning goodwill of the British Government of India. As the two Governments worked together for protecting their common interests, a much more mature understanding of each other emerged which removed many ill-founded suspicious and distrust from their mutual relationship. As the Nepalese Prime Minister himself remarked, *“The relations between the two Governments have grown more cordial, frank and intimate, and that their interests have become more closely knit together as with the lapse of time they have understood each-other better”*<sup>273</sup>.

#### **2.1.13 Revival of the British Interest in Tibet**

The developments in Tibet soon reached a critical point again. The 1911 Revolution in China and the overthrow of the Ching Dynasty had an impact on the Tibetan mind too, leading them to raise an armed revolt against the Chinese occupation. It started from the Kham, and by the beginning of 1912, engulfed the entire territory including Lhasa. The revolution was essentially an expression of the Tibetan's aspiration for freedom. In the meantime, vandalism of the Chinese troops stationed at Lhasa had added fuel to the fire. The Chinese forces were compelled to withdraw all along and to gather themselves in Teng-gye-ling monastery near Lhasa. The Tibetans cordoned off the monastery also. Thus, a virtual military stalemate ensued<sup>274</sup>. The British Government felt that it was high time for it to formulate its policy towards China with reference to Tibet. It was deemed important to ascertain the Nepal Durbar's views before taking a decision in this respect.

#### **2.1.14 Nepal Prefers Independence Tibet**

With his usual persistence, the Premier sought to extract every conceivable advantage from this volatile situation and to consolidate the political gains of his apparently pro-British policy. He told the British Resident that the earnest desire of the Nepal Durbar was "to see Tibet restored to its proper status of practical independence", and that Nepal was prepared, "to aid Tibet by all means in its power, which may be approved by the Government of India, to attain that objective". The Prime Minister further urged that if the British Government decided to allow China a free

hand in Tibet, steps should be taken, at the same time to rectify the boundary between Nepal and Tibet, "so that the political frontier may coincide in future with the natural boundary or water-parting of the Sango or Brahmaputra River"<sup>275</sup> "

A.H. McMohan, the Foreign Secretary in the Government of India, agreed with Nepal<sup>276</sup>. He and the Commander-in-Chief were further alarmed over the news of the maltreatment of the Nepalese subjects at the hands of the Chinese during widespread disturbances<sup>277</sup>. Other officials of the Government in the Foreign and Military Departments, however, did not share their anxiety. On the contrary, they felt that, "it is to our advantage that Nepal should be kept uneasy about Kuti and Kerong. It will make her lean more on us"<sup>278</sup>.

### **2.1.15 Tibet Revolts against Chinese Occupation**

The establishment of the Republic in China, however, contributed little to the solution of the Tibetan problem. The new Republic was even less inclined to accept the Tibetan claim for autonomy. The newly elected President of the Republic of China, Yuan-Shih-Kai, issued a 'proclamation' on April 21, 1912, that, "hence-forth, Tibet would be regarded as a province and an integral part of China proper"<sup>279</sup>. A Chinese military expedition to Tibet was also organized to translate it into action<sup>280</sup>. Upon learning the Chinese advance towards Lhasa, the Dalai Lama made an urgent appeal to the British Government to intervene on his behalf<sup>281</sup>. The British Indian Government shared his apprehensions and a series of action followed. An increase in the garrison at Gyantse was made indicating that the British intervention might follow<sup>282</sup>. At the same time, rifles and other munitions was dispatched to Tibet to Strengthen the Tibetan forces<sup>283</sup>. A loan of Pound 40,000 to the Tibetan Government was sanctioned and Sir Jordan, the then British Minister at Peking, was instructed to lodge a strong protest<sup>284</sup>. Consequently, on June 23, 1912, in an interview with the Chinese President, the British Minister Jordan warned the Chinese Foreign office that the British were not going to tolerate any attempt to reduce Tibet, which had independent Treaty relations with the British Government, to the position of a province of China, and that grave complications might ensue if the Chinese expedition crossed the frontier into Tibet<sup>285</sup>. The Chinese evaded a reply for some time. Suddenly, on August, 14, 1912, W.W. Yen, Chinese Vice - Minister for Foreign Affairs conveyed to Jordan the 'message' of the Chinese President, that, in view of the precarious position of the Chinese garrison at Lhasa, he had decided to order an immediate advice into Tibet of the expedition spread out in Szechuan and Yunan at that moment operating in the Szechuan marches<sup>286</sup>. The British Minister remonstrated

and threatened to withhold the British recognition of the new Republic<sup>287</sup>. Thereupon the President of the Chinese Republic assured him back that the communication was unauthorized and was perhaps dispatched due to some misunderstanding. He reiterated his earlier assurance decrying any intention either to incorporate Tibet or to send a force against it<sup>288</sup>.

Though this explanation gave a different complexion to the situation, the British Government thought it ripe to delineate their policy with regard to the status of Tibet in 'definite terms', to obviate any misunderstanding in the near future. Accordingly, Sir Jordan addressed a Memorandum to the Chinese Foreign office on the same day, on August 16, 1912, declaring that while the British have formally recognized the "suzerain rights" of China in Tibet, they have never recognized, and are not prepared to recognize, any right of China to intervene activity in the internal administration of Tibet; that, on these grounds, they, "demur altogether to the conduct of the Chinese officers in Tibet during the last two years", and "to the doctrine propounded in Yuan-Shih-Kai's Presidential order on April 21, 1912"; that they were not prepared to acquiesce in the maintenance of an unlimited number of the Chinese troops in Tibet; and that they, "must press for the conclusion of a written agreement on these foregoing lines as a condition precedent to extending their recognition to the Chinese Republic"<sup>289</sup>. The copy of the memorandum was communicated to the Russian Charge d' Affaires and also to the Japanese ambassador<sup>290</sup>.

During an exchange of views on the memorandum with the Chinese Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs, on December 14, 1912, Jordan further brought to his notice the difference between "suzerainty" & "sovereignty", making it clear that the British Government neither had before nor would hereafter recognize the sovereignty of China over Tibet<sup>291</sup>.

By August, 1912, the resistance movement had considerably consolidated in Tibet<sup>292</sup>. A truce mediated by the Nepalese Representative in Lhasa was signed on August 12, 1912 by the Chinese Commissioner Chung-Ying and the Tibetans<sup>293</sup>. The bulk of the Chinese forces were repatriated to China via India, while Chung-Ying was allowed to remain with a small force at Chumbi valley under the agreement<sup>294</sup>.

### **2.1.16 Tibet's declaration of independence and its aftermath**

In September, 1912, the Dalai Lama returned triumphantly to his capital. Soon after his return, he declared Tibet as independent State<sup>295</sup>. The failure of the Chinese expeditionary force from Szechuan to make any substantial progress towards Lhasa ended the last serious threat to Tibet

for the time being. In December, the remaining forces at Chumbi surrendered to the Tibetans and they were allowed to move to India after they had been disarmed. Nepal displayed great diplomatic finesse throughout this delicate phase.

The Nepalese Vakil had acted as a mediator in the negotiations. While he could assist Tibet in 'ridding itself' the Chinese, the latter also remained totally convinced of the Nepalese goodwill. The Chinese Commander General Chung-Yeh went to the extent of proposing a "Union of Nepal with the five Races of China", comprising of China, Tibet, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, and to rename China as "Nepalese China or so". He further, urged the Nepalese Premier to dispatch a 'special delegation' to Peking for 'order and advice'<sup>296</sup>. Nepal, however, realized well that there was nothing to be gained by aligning with China when it was totally excluded from Tibet and had no strength left to protect its own vital trans-Himalayan interests. Premier Chandra Shumsher, therefore, thought it prudent to demonstrate his loyalty to the British by turning down the offer<sup>297</sup>.

The territorial gains were not forthcoming, but the prestige of the Nepalese Representative was considerably enhanced and the position of the Nepali traders had improved to a great extent. The prospects of emerging as "protector" of Tibet - a status that had eluded the successive Nepalese Government since 1791 - were revived in the Nepalese mind in view of the Government of India's apparent determination to play a neutral and behind the scene role in the Sino-Tibetan dispute<sup>298</sup>.

By January, 1913, the Dalai Lama was able to establish what, to all practical purposes, was an independent government. The Chinese President had, on October, 28, 1912, "restored" the Dalai Lama his old titles and rights and had apologized for the misbehavior of the Chinese troops in Tibet<sup>299</sup>. This was China's last effort to retain at least the overt manifestation of her 'suzerain' rights in Tibet. But these terms were rejected by the Dalai Lama<sup>300</sup>. The Dalai Lama moved to make Tibet's independence more pronounced before the world at large when, on February 13, 1913, he issued a proclamation announcing the termination of all ties with China<sup>301</sup>. The Chinese nationalist sentiment, a powerful factor in both domestic and foreign policy in the post-revolution period, was opposed to concede to Tibet its rightful claim of independence. However, the British support strengthened Lhasa's position and the Chinese had to content themselves with mere protests. The other interested party, Russia, was also not inclined to obstruct the British move as the British in retaliation could upset its plans in Mongolia.

### **2.1.17 Alleged Treaty between Tibet and Mongolia**

In between, news of the conclusion of a treaty between Tibet and Mongolia, on January 13, 1913, was suddenly flashed out. The treaty stated that both powers "having freed themselves from the Manchu Dynasty and separated themselves from China, have become independent States"<sup>302</sup>. China was disturbed by the anti-Chinese provisions of it, while the British apprehended that Russia may not use the alliance for extending its influences over Tibet through Mongolia<sup>303</sup>. They were particularly alarmed by the fact that the agreement was concluded on Tibet's behalf by Dorjeff, who was believed to be behind the Russian intrigues in the area during 1900-04 period. The Dalai Lama appeared to be trying to use Russia against both the United Kingdom and China. The British enquired from the Dalai Lama about it and were able to extract the assurance that Dorjeff had exceeded his powers and that Tibet was not bound by the agreement. To prevent any unfavorable event, the British assured their full-fledged support to Tibet if Dalai Lama withdrew his ratification<sup>304</sup>. China also refused to recognize either the said treaty or Tibet's declaration of independence. Intermittent hostilities between China and Tibet, therefore, continued on the outer rim. Soon these skirmishes developed into an open warfare in the Eastern Tibet, which proved to be much detrimental to the peace on the north-west frontiers of India and to its trade with Tibet<sup>305</sup>. The British Government then proposed to convene a tripartite conference to unravel the tangled skein of the Sino-Tibetan relations and to demarcate clearly the boundary line between India and Tibet<sup>306</sup>. As China expressed reluctance, the Indian Government threatened to conclude a bilateral agreement with Tibet only. The Chinese gave way, and it was decided to hold the proposed Conferences in the coming October at Shimla.

This course of developments was hardly pleasant to the Government of Nepal, which was neither invited to nor consulted about the convening of the Shimla Conference. So, when the Resident informed the Prime Minister about arrangements being brought about by the Government of India for summoning of a tripartite conference amongst the representatives of China, Tibet and India, he, while welcoming it, 'as being calculated to ensure the maintenance of the Tibetan autonomy', made no secret of his anxiety as to the effect which 'direct dealing between Great Britain and Tibet might have in future on the Nepalese rights in the Country. The Resident, however, assured the Prime Minister that the interests of Nepal were being carefully watched by the British Representative and that nothing which could unfavorably affect the Nepalese rights, would be proposed or arranged without due consultation'<sup>307</sup>.

## **2.2 SHIMLA CONFERENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH**



### 2.2.1 The Shimla Conference

The Conference of the Indian, Tibetan and Chinese representatives proposed earlier finally started at Shimla on 13<sup>th</sup> of October 1913. Several proposals and counter-proposals were put forth by the participants, but none was found acceptable to all of them. While the British and the Tibetan delegates were eager to secure recognition of Tibet's autonomy, the nationalist Chinese delegate consistently insisted on the position taken by their predecessors. As the conference dragged on, the British delegate Sir Henry Mc Mohan presented to it a 'final compromise' draft on April, 1914<sup>308</sup>. The draft accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet on the condition that China would in turn recognize and respect Tibet's autonomy and it also included the delineation of the Indo - Tibetan frontiers. The Chinese delegate, Ivan Chen, did not agree even to this and this resulted in a virtual deadlock. Mc Mohan thereupon threatened Ivan Chen that if the Chinese delegate refused to initial the draft "the British and Tibetan delegates would delete Articles II and IV, which are primarily concerned with the interests of China, and forthwith sign it. In such a case, the two countries will not consult China on matters concerning themselves"<sup>309</sup>. Faced with such an eventuality, the Chinese representative Ivan Chen thought it prudent to accept the offer and he, along with the Indian and Tibetan delegates, initialed the draft<sup>310</sup>. The Chinese Central Government was, however, still not prepared to accept the position and Chen was instructed not to sign the formal instrument in any case. Peking stuck to this stand despite the intense diplomatic pressure which Britain brought to bear on it. The Government of India and Tibet, thereupon, ratified the instrument and the stipulation made therein was unscrupulously carried through by both the parties up till 1954-56, where after Tibet lost its independent identity and was absorbed in the Communist China. The clauses affecting China, including those bearing recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet were, however, 'suspended' pending Peking's ratification, which never came. After the Tibetan negotiations at Shimla in July 1914, the Government of India communicated 'unofficially and very confidentially' to the Prime Minister of Nepal, in September 1914, the purport of the Convention signed by the British & Tibetan plenipotentiaries & explained the entire position to him<sup>311</sup>. Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumsher expressed the fear that the Tibetan Government might take advantage of Article V of the Convention to stop dealing with Nepal regarding matters arising out of the existing agreements between the two countries and asked for an assurance that the existing arrangements between Tibet and Nepal would not be affected by the Convention.

The Resident reported this point of view to the Government of India. The Indian Government reassured the Prime Minister of Nepal that, "Nothing in the Simla Convention between Great

Britain, China and Tibet was intended or would be allowed to affect existing agreements or arrangements between Nepal and Tibet". It was added that in the event of the Convention coming into force, the Government of India would be prepared to give the Nepal Durbar an official assurance that the existing agreements referred to were not affected and that they would do their utmost to secure that the interests of Nepal arising from these agreements were in no way prejudiced by the operation of the Convention<sup>312</sup>.

Though the Shimla Convention could not resolve the fundamental problems created by the pursuance of forward policies by the British and the Chinese Governments in Tibet, it, however, made the postponement of a permanent solution possible for a considerable span of time without causing extreme disequilibrium. As a result, the British could successfully exclude Russia and China from this region and could achieve their primary objective of making Tibet an autonomous unit under the British influence<sup>313</sup>. India was established as the focal point of the British geopolitics in the Central Asia; Tibet was now successfully converted into another shield of the Indian empire besides Afghanistan in the West, and in the South of Tibet, Nepal was neatly cordoned off and isolated from all foreign contacts - a fact which was to have a significant bearing upon the growth of Indo - Nepalese relations and on Nepal's status vis-à-vis India. The continued success of this arrangement was dependent on the constant watchfulness and supervision of The British colonial Government. This, in fact, inaugurated an era of unprecedented peace along the entire Himalayan frontier down to the southern foothills, and the major area of instability and conflict shifted to the northern slopes on Tibet - China borders. Apart from the strategic and political considerations, Tibet was now open for trade and commerce - the prospects of which had been alluring the British for a long time past. Tibet too was able to declare its independence, though it remained de facto only in its nature as China had not relinquished her claims of suzerainty over Tibet and the Indian Government, under pressure from London, continued to recognize it, but with the significant condition that China would refrain from any interference in Tibet's autonomy. In other words, Tibet's continued independence depended upon the British enthusiasm to support it and the lack of strength of the part of China to enforce its de jure claims.

### **2.2.2 The Himalayan Settlement and Nepal**

Nepalese gains were mixed. It was relieved of the complications of a co-terminus China and had made its position secure in the event of any uneasy claim of suzerainty by the latter. It had also earned the goodwill of the Government of India which brought a significant change in the British

Indian attitude towards the kingdom and resulted in very significant concessions to Nepal in the following years. Undoubtedly, Nepalese interests and privileges were now secure in Tibet, but for their continuance too it was to depend on the British acquiescence about the same. Nepal had sought and welcomed the British involvement in Tibet in order to exclude the Russian influence from the area entertaining at the same time the idea of becoming the instrument through which the British influence would work in Tibet. The process however resulted in the forging of an Indo-Tibetan alliance putting an end to Nepal's role as an intermediary between the two Governments<sup>314</sup>. This brought about a proportionate decline in Nepal's prestige in Tibet which made it jealous of Indo - Tibetan ties itself and it tried to damage them whenever possible. But there were some other bitter pills also to be swallowed. Nepalese monopoly over trans-Himalayan trade was greatly affected - as Indian traders were to prefer the newly opened Sikkim - Chumbi Valley trade-route to Tibet which was not only shorter and more convenient but was made further secure with the establishment of the British trade agencies all along. Also, Nepal could not ignore the implications of the fact that its foreign contacts had narrowed down to the British India alone. Its hope of taking advantage of any conflict between British India & Tibet by way of rectifying its frontiers, or even increasing its influence over Tibet were dashed. As a matter of fact, the Nepal Durbar soon found itself competing with Tibet for the Government of India's favor. So, if it had to retain its importance in the eyes of the British Indian Government, it would have to discover new areas of co-operation with the latter. This was accomplished indeed through its collaboration with the British in the First World War and the Afghan war as well as in suppression of the nationalist movement in India. The so perceived decline in their prestige made the Nepalese extremely sensitive and cautious about their status, rights and privileges in Tibet and made them more stubborn in their dealings with the Tibetan Government. Tibetans, on the other hand, inspired by the newly aroused spirit of nationalism, felt the prick of the Nepalese extra-territorial privileges, often made intolerable by the overbearing manners of the local Nepalese officials, in their side badly. They also nourished a belief that the Nepalese at heart wished the Chinese presence in their country and preferred them to remain weak. This clash of ego of the two governments was mainly responsible for the periodic tussle on the otherwise smooth surface of the inter-state relationship in this region. This also explains for the seriousness that the occasional Tibetan-Nepalese disputes tended to assume over quite trifling matters. The Government of India was fully aware of the Nepali psychology and tried to avoid any overt move which may offend the Nepal Durbar. It was, however, at times not so easy to do, especially when China had refused to acquiesce in the Himalayan settlement. Such a situation arose soon after the breakdown of the Shimla Conference. Peking's refusal to abide by the Shimla

Convention had increased the fear of Chinese aggression on the eastern Tibetan frontiers. The Tibetan plenipotentiary, Lochan Shatra asked for at least 5,000 best type of carbine or rifles, mountain guns, 26 maxims and machineguns with twenty men to work them and munitions for the same, pointing out that the Tibetans, "rely entirely upon the British Government for aid and protection to enable us to defend our territory and our freedom from foreign yoke"<sup>315</sup>.

Faced with such a situation, the Government of India accepted the Tibetan request for the supply of some armament to enable them to repel any such attacks and presented them with 5,000 old 303 rifles along with 50 lakh rounds of ammunition<sup>316</sup>.

### 2.2.3 Nepalese hear about British aid to Tibet

As the news reached Nepal, the Prime Minister of Nepal expressed grave concern about that, reminding the British Resident that Nepal was decidedly an interested party in the military position of Tibet and claimed that until the British hold over Tibet is strong, an increase in the supply of armament to Tibet might easily be disadvantageous to Nepal<sup>317</sup>. The Indian Foreign office therefore informed the Prime Minister that the gift of arms to Tibet was a meager one and was meant to be utilized in improving its defense against China. It was also added that the Government of India's existing relations with Tibet were sufficient guarantee that the small addition to Tibet's armaments would not be disadvantageous to Nepal in any manner<sup>318</sup>. The Nepalese Prime Minister was not satisfied with this assurance. He pointed out that even if Tibetans meant to use it against China, "the possession of arms alone would hardly enable to cope successfully with a determined China". In an open confrontation with brute force, only an intervention by the Government of India - may be diplomatic only- could save them. Moreover, he thought, that, "a time will come, sooner or latter, when they will patch up their differences". He was sure that the impact of the increase in the armament supply to Tibet would be great in its dealings with Nepal- that Tibetans would become stubborn and difficult to deal with<sup>319</sup>.

The British Resident also partially agreed with the Prime Minister. He suggested that, "the best policy calculated to keep matters smooth would appear to me to be not in encouraging Tibet to further hostilities with China by gifts of arms, but in bringing heavy diplomatic pressure on China to sign and abide by the recently drafted convention"<sup>320</sup>.

While strengthening Tibet up to a certain level was imperative for maintaining the balance in the Himalayan terrain, Nepal, a war-ally, was also not to be antagonized<sup>321</sup>. The Government of India

therefore decided to resolve the dilemma by making a similar arms gift to Nepal too. Thus, the Nepalese serving in India were allowed to take back a part of arms given to them a free gift.<sup>322</sup>

Ascertainment of the nationality of person of mixed Nepalese -Tibetan blood (Kachars) was the source of constant friction as both the Nepalese and the Tibetan authorities claimed jurisdiction over an accused criminal of this category. The confusion can be traced back to the treaty arrangements of 1856, according to which the male offspring of a mixed marriage could opt for either nationality<sup>323</sup>.

A new dimension was added to the problem with the establishment of the Indian trade agencies under the Tibet Trade Regulation Agreement of 1908<sup>324</sup>. All British subjects, irrespective of their nationality or ethnic origin, were to be adjudicated by the British Trade Agent. So jealous and sensitive were the Nepalese about the possible encroachment on their traditional rights and privileges in Tibet that the Nepalese Representative insisted on claiming the unfettered jurisdiction over all persons of the Mongoloid features other than the admitted Tibetan subjects, including the British subjects who may fall under that category<sup>325</sup>. The Nepalese were not prepared to restrict their theoretical jurisdiction in this respect not because of any suspicion or antagonism against the British, but as the Prime Minister had remarked himself, because of the fear that any change in the existing pattern may not lead the Tibetan Government to think that those rights (acquired under the treaty) can be easily flouted or interfered with, thus encourage them to move in that direction<sup>326</sup>.

While the Indian Government could hardly agree to surrender its "indefeasible rights" over its own subject, they did not find it wise to offend the Durbar by an outright rejection of its contention. Instead, the Government of India decided "to go on quietly as we have been doing, and in a little while we shall find that Nepal has digested existing facts naturally, unconsciously and without feeling it"<sup>327</sup>.

#### **2.2.4 Tibet Nepal Tension**

In September 1916, the Prime Minister complained to the British Resident about the "overbearing and slighting disposition" of the Tibetan Government towards Nepal. He mentioned few instances like non-supply of coal to Nepalese legation at Lhasa or the question of nationality of one Lochawa, an accused of murder and theft who was kept under the custody of the Nepalese Agency at Gyantse and incidents of raids on the Nepal border, accusing the Tibetan officials of

taking a line which tended not only to flout or treat with indifference the Nepalese protests, but also to hold out threats even on flimsy pretexts<sup>328</sup>.

He, however, reiterated the Nepalese resolve to protect Nepal's long-established position, rights and privileges in Tibet, to the last man. He also thought it advisable to go ahead with some preparations for an eventuality of war. This he thought necessary, because if once the Tibetans could exclude the Nepalese, their chances of rehabilitating themselves in that country, unlike the Chinese who were bound by ties of religion and race to them, would be remote<sup>329</sup>. The Prime Minister attributed this attitude of enmity towards Nepal to his assistance to the British in 1904-5, and the feeling that Nepal was weak at that time because of lending its troops to India in the world war, subtly suggesting that the British owned something to Nepal for all this.

Concerned about the possibility of an outbreak in hostilities between Nepal and Tibet might eventually involve it also in the middle, the Government of India made queries about the actual state of affairs from Bell, the British Political Officer in Sikkim, and from its trade agents in Tibet<sup>330</sup>. These officers, however, felt handicapped, as they had neither listened to the Tibetan version nor had they visited Lhasa. Their information, however, indicated that the Tibetan Government and people accused the Nepalese of these very faults of arrogance and disregard of their treaty rights.

An analysis of the correspondence between the Foreign Department and the British Political officer, Sikkim, on the subject and the other contemporary accounts indicates that the Tibetan Government had aroused the susceptibilities of the Nepalese officers in Tibet through its endeavors to prevent any infringement of their recently regained independence in the management of the affairs of their own country. Its census operations in Lhasa and elsewhere, which were said to have been undertaken with a view of imposing increased taxation to meet the expanses of the military operations in eastern Tibet, had incidentally raised the question of ascertaining the nationality of a number of persons in Lhasa who were claimed to be Nepalese subjects by the Nepalese Representative but were believed to be their own subjects by the Tibetan authorities. The question had gone beyond the stage of mere verbal discussion and at Shigatse, the Tibetan officials were reported to have adopted strong measures<sup>331</sup>. The root cause of such frictions could will be traced back as pointed out earlier, the Nepal's extreme sensitiveness to the decline in its prestige and importance after the Shimla Agreement, a thing quite inevitable under the circumstances<sup>332</sup>.

In the assessment of the British Trade Agent at Yatung and Gyantse as well as the British Political Officer in Sikkim, however, the Tibetan Government was not likely to adopt my aggressive attitude towards Nepal at that moment and they were sure that in any case the Tibetan Government would consult the Government of India before taking any action of an aggressive intent<sup>333</sup>. The political Officer in Sikkim was further of the opinion that if they should support Nepal in an unjust cause against Tibet, or in a cause which Tibet, for serious reasons regarded as unjust, they ran the risk of driving Tibet into the arms of China or Russia. He also pointed out that if the Chinese power would be reestablished in Tibet, not only would the Government of India have the Chinese menace on its frontiers, but the Nepalese would also entirely lose their position in Tibet. Fortunately for the British, the Nepalese Prime Minister' strongly -worded note sent in the meantime to Lhasa had a sobering effect and the situation cooled down without necessitating an intervention by the Indian Government.

### **2.2.5 The Indian Dilemma**

Though a confrontation had been averted for the time being, still it did not root out the real cause of friction between the two and their relations remained tense for the most of the time, keeping the Government of India worried all the time. Its continued dilemma was how to help Tibet in armament, etc., which was necessary, both to keep its morale up against the Chinese and to stop them from falling into the Russian, Chinese, or the Japanese sphere of influences, without, at the same time, arousing suspicions of Nepal, who, as trusted and loyal friends and of late, a war ally, deserved its best consideration. Nepal had become a martial nation who valued very much the privilege of unrestricted arms import. If the British decided to arm both Tibet & Nepal, there was a real danger of increase in their appeal to arms and the situation would become still more uncomfortable for the Government of India in case both of them decided to fall out.

So when Nepal's request for more arms was being considered by the Foreign Department, some officials feared that the Tibetans would probably be jealous of such an increase in Nepal's armed strength and would no doubt ask for some more weapons on their own account<sup>334</sup>. The Foreign Secretary, however, did not share this opinion, as he presumed that Tibet's fears were only of China on its eastern borders. But the Nepalese attitude was quite different. Therefore, when Tibet asked for machine guns during its encounter with China<sup>335</sup>, the Government of India decided to give at least equal number of them to Nepal also to avoid any misapprehension in the latter's mind<sup>336</sup>. Tibet was, however, given none of the promised guns by the time the Government

of India received a large indent from Nepal<sup>337</sup>. This led Foreign Department to withhold the proposed arms supply to Tibet, at least up till a decision had been taken on Nepal's request. The non-supply of much needed arms, on the other hand, resulted into a sharp decline in the warmth of Tibet-Indian friendship. The Government of India was further alarmed by the news of growing Soviet and Japanese interest in the area. Information regarding arms -traffic between Tibet, Mongolia and Japan were also pouring in<sup>338</sup>.

In view of all these facts, Charles Bell, the British Political Officer at Sikkim, was sent as an emissary to Lhasa to renew his contacts with Dalai Lama and to get in touch with the Tibetan dignitaries. Bell was quite successful in doing so and by this diplomatic skill and "long connection with Tibet" was able "to inspire confidence generally and to put new life into Tibetan Government's waning belief in our (British) goodwill and intentions"<sup>339</sup>. He also confirmed Tibet's arms deal with Mongolia and Japan as well as negotiations then going on between the Kansuch Mission and the Lhasa authorities<sup>340</sup>. As a result of the Mission, Government of India became convinced that "What Tibet wants is either the acceptance of the Tripartite Convention by China or an explicit assurance of help by the Government of India to enable her to develop her powers of self-defense so as to keep China at arm's length". The Viceroy, therefore, recommended to the Secretary of state "to help Tibet to stand on her own. Munitions are her chief and most pressing need, unless we can assist her in obtaining them, the primary instinct of self - preservation will drive her to seek assistance from others". He further added that, "the promise made during the war for the gift of one or two machine guns must be fulfilled ; un-fulfillment of the definite promise would undermine Government of India's relations with that Government"<sup>341</sup>.

## 2.2.6 Nepal reacts to Arms -aid to Tibet

While the Government of India's decision to renew arms supply to the Tibet improved its relations with that Country to a great extent, it evoked sharp reactions from the Nepalese Government as well. At the very outset, Kennion, the British Envoy in Nepal, had drawn the attention of the Government of India towards the possible effect of its intentions regarding arming of Tibet. He had pointed out that "Nepal would take it amiss that she should be less favored than the country she regards as a political enemy"<sup>342</sup>. The situation was further complicated due to an existing dispute between the two Governments over the ownership of certain grazing grounds near the frontiers and over the alleged supply of fuel to the Nepalese Representative and his escort at Lhasa by the Tibetans. Both the parties accused each other for provoking the issue.



Bell, while in Tibet, had noted the seriousness of the tension created over the said issue as well as a general feeling of unfriendliness between Nepalese and the Tibetans. Bell had pointed out that the Tibetan feel that the Nepalese were taking undue advantage of the Treaty and their armed superiority. He found that all but the Nepalese in Tibet obeyed the Laws of the land. Further, the Nepalese Representative always used to treat the Tibetan officials with arrogance and contempt. The Dalai Lama, therefore, had suggested mediation or arbitration by the Government of India. The Nepalese Prime Minister, however, had turned down the offer. This resulted is a statement<sup>343</sup>. In the meantime, the news about India's proposed arms assistance to Tibet broke out to Nepal. True to the prediction of Kennion, the Nepalese Prime Minister immediately lodged a strong protest with the British Envoy at Kathmandu against the same. He complained that "since the Bell Mission to Lhasa", the Tibetan had got "swelled heads" in their dealing with Nepal and pointed out that the Tibetans were receiving arms from other sources also<sup>344</sup>, Chandra Shumsher expressed his indignation over the unfavorable treatment being meted out to his country vis-à-vis the other two neighbors - Tibet and Afghanistan. He reminded the envoy that his government had helped the Government of India in times of need in their military operations both against the Tibetans in 1903-4 and Afghanistan in 1919. Since then, he pointed out, the Government of India had concluded agreements with both entitling them to import arms and ammunition, etc., while it still refused the same privilege to its friend and ally, Nepal. He also handed over a long memorandum to the Envoy informing him of provocations incidents in Tibet and ending with implied threat of his government to go on war with Tibet if the things continued like that<sup>345</sup>. The Envoy considered it, to a great extent, a bluff, "not unnatural in the circumstances". He also informed the Foreign Department that he would be soon giving a very friendly and tactful warning against such an act, the he better not to contemplate anything of the kind, or even suggest it in conversation or in writing, that such an attitude will certainly not induce the British Government to relax the present arms restrictions<sup>346</sup>. Earlier, he had advocated that the political officer at Sikkim should maintain a close personal touch with the Dalai Lama and other leading personalities in Lhasa so that, "our advice, and when necessary, our admonitions, should be addressed to the right person and at the right time"<sup>347</sup>.

The Government of India agreed with the British Envoy<sup>348</sup> that it was natural for Nepalese Government, especially after rendering great service to the British in the past world war, to expect the grant of an unrestricted right to import arms , ammunitions and machinery, etc., to the country. It, therefore, proposed the adoption of a liberal arms policy towards the Kingdom<sup>182</sup>. The Secretary of State, however, felt that, "Nepal would not fail to avail herself of them (arms,

etc.) to the extent of her ability. Any increase in the armament of Nepal must give rise to some uneasiness as regards its relations with Tibet, if not as regards to British India, whatever the present disposition of Nepal Government may be, and importation of machinery for manufacture is even more open to question"<sup>349</sup>.

### 2.2.7 Tibetan situation leads Nepal to demand new Treaty

This predicament of the British Government about acceding to Nepal's chief request had made the Nepal Prime Minister quite restive<sup>350</sup>. The dispatch of Bell mission, and later on, the decision to meet the Tibetan demand for armaments, only added fuel to the fire<sup>351</sup>.

During the course of the discussion, Mharaja Chandra Shumsher admitted that he had earlier, in 1919, declined a new treaty, but added that he had changed his opinion as a result of "further consideration ... and the march of events (he specified the Afghan Agreement and Mr. Bell's visit to Lhasa)". O' Connor added that he had further clarified the matter by asking the Prime Minister that, "I understood from him that the matter about which he was chiefly concerned were those of the importation of munitions and the independent status of Nepal ... He replied it was so". Ultimately led him to review his country's overall relations with India and to demand a fresh treaty replacing the Anglo-Nepalese treaty of 1815 which had so far governed their mutual relationship. Faced with a persistent demand, the Government of India told the Secretary of State that since, "... the His Highness (the Prime Minister of Nepal) has set his heart upon a new treaty, we recognize that a new Treaty will have to be made. For it is a cordial point in our policy to keep him free from any legitimate cause of discontent"<sup>352</sup>.

The Whitehall reluctantly agreed. Discussions were opened within the Government first on the nature, scope and contents of the proposed treaty. Expressing his views on the subject, O'Conner again sought to emphasize the connection between the Tibet-Nepal relationship and the proposed new Treaty with Nepal thus,

*"... Since the policy of arming the Tibetans, whilst refusing to allow Nepal the right to import arms and ammunition, will inevitably tend to aggravate the jealousy and suspicion with which the Nepalese always regard Tibet and they will also be inclined to exaggerate the seriousness of any petty dispute which may arise between the subjects or agents of the two States"<sup>353</sup>.*

Attention was paid to Kenion's earlier warning also in this respect. In his assessment sent to Foreign Department on possible impact of acceding to the chief request of granting liberal arms policy towards Nepal by the Government of India, Kenion had pointed out that,

*“Such addition of its superiority in arms and troops may encourage it to adopt a truculent or provocative attitude towards her neighbor. At the same time, if Tibet was given the facilities, as advocated by Bell, for arming herself and improving her military status, she may also endeavor, sooner or later, to improve her some-what ignominious position vis-à-vis Nepal”.*

He, therefore, suggested that in case India decided to modify their arm-policy towards either or both of them, a definite understanding might be obtained from the party or parties benefitted to submit their dispute with the other for the arbitration of the Government of India<sup>354</sup>. But the Viceroy thought that Nepal set great store to her relations with Tibet because,

*“the Nepal-Tibet treaty of 1856 gives her a very special position in Tibet and wider privileges of trade, more particularly (sic.) than we possess ourselves. We should not indeed be sorry to see this treaty abrogated, if only on account of its awkward recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet and Nepal alike. But any suggestion for its abrogation would almost certainly be viewed by Nepal with suspicion, and a proposal that we should replace it by a treaty giving us control over her relation with Tibet would hardly fail to meet with rebuff. It is the control of her relations with China, and with China only that Nepal has over contemplated surrendering to us. But the removal of all immediate danger from China has removed any willingness, which Nepal may once have had to place its relations with China openly in our hand.”<sup>355</sup>.*

The Foreign department, however, felt that Tibet could not pursue a policy of aggression against Nepal, as it had neither troop as highly trained as the Gorkhas, nor the military equipment's matched to Nepal's. Moreover, it had got China as a hostile nation at its eastern frontier. Nepal also could not afford to do that, as it would result in the loss of friendship of the British Government, with the possibility that the latter may stop the annual present of 10 lakh rupees which the Government of India had started giving them as 'war-reward' since 1859, and the importation of munitions of war from or through India'. He admitted that, "as a matter of fact, Nepal has been handsomely treated in the matter compared with Tibet, who has been treated in rather a niggardly fashion"<sup>356</sup>.

The Government of India then tried to ascertain from the Nepalese Premier whether he would accept, among others, conditions to submit its differences with Tibet to the Government of India

for final arbitration, and to restrict the use of arms to only defensive purposes, if the Government of India permitted Nepal a free import of arms and ammunition to it<sup>357</sup>.

The Envoy reported back that,

*"as regards Nepal and Tibet, the Maharaja said that so long as the latter did not want to tear up the Treaty, which had cost Nepal so much money and so many lives, they had no idea of attacking her; but if Tibet become strong, she would be wanting to denounce the Treaty and on that point the Nepalese would certainly fight as it affected the country's honor"*<sup>358</sup>.

He, "on the strength of the conversation", felt that while Nepal would not be willing to enter into an agreement by which Nepal would lose its right of direct negotiations with Tibet, it would be "willing to give an undertaking to submit disputes arising with that country to the arbitration of the Government of India, and to be bound by the result"<sup>359</sup>.

### 2.2.8 Treaty of Friendship between Britain and Nepal

The negotiations finally culminated into signing of a Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Nepal on December 21, 1923<sup>360</sup>, replacing the hundred- and eight-years old Treaty of Segowlee concluded in 1815<sup>361</sup>. The Treaty acknowledged "independence" of Nepal, both "internal and external". The treaty could, however, become possible only after Nepal had agreed to the insertion of Article III in it, which gave the Government of India a right to intervene to resolve 'any series misunderstanding' between Nepal and a neighboring state (that is Tibet) 'likely to rupture' their 'friendly relations'. Similarly, right to import 'arms, ammunition machinery, defense material or stores' which 'may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Nepal' was conceded to that Government "as long as the British Government is satisfied that the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importation " (Article V).

By May, 1923, relations between Nepal and Tibet worsened again<sup>362</sup> and the Tibetan Government expressed the fear of an armed intervention by the former. The Tibetan Government was also finding it difficult to cope with the 'over-bearing attitude' of the Nepalese Representative Lal Bahadur, and the Nepalese Agents at other places. The Tibetan Premier also pointed out that their treaty with Nepal permitted the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa alone and that retention of the Nepalese agent at place other than Lhasa was un-authorized<sup>363</sup>. The Tibetan Government, therefore, wanted Nepal to recall them. The Prime Minister also solicited the British help by way

of explaining matters correctly to the Nepalese Premier, lest the latter may not be agitated by false and provocative reports of his representative<sup>364</sup>.

As tensions mounted, a suggestion was mooted that the Government of India should intervene. Major, Bailey, Political Officer, Sikkim, and O'Connor, British Envoy at Kathmandu, however, were of the opinion that the Government of India should not interfere, at least at that stage. The Foreign Department shared their view generally and Bailey was asked, instead, to discuss the question further at Lhasa<sup>365</sup>. Their advice proved to be correct, as things were again settled between them after some time.

### 2.2.9 Indian Police Officer in Tibet

After purging the Chinese, the Tibetan Government wanted to re-organize their administrative machinery and the police system on somewhat modern lines and they asked Government of India to help in that. The Government of India accepted their request and sent one Indian Police officer, Laden La, to Tibet, on deputation, as head of the police force at Lhasa. Laden La did a commendable work, but in this process he became an eyesore to the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa, as we find the Nepalese Prime Minister writing to Perceval Landon, a British journalist, who enjoyed the Premier's confidence, complaining that the rights and privileges of Nepal were being violated in Tibet and regretted that Tibetans in this have the support of one whose services have become lent by the Government of India. Laden La, he said, was reported to be taking up cases in his own court in which subjects of Nepal or 'Mongrels', the mixed - blood were parties, and punished then in direct contravention of the treaty and ancient Customs<sup>366</sup>.

Latimore, the Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, presumed this either incorrect or grossly exaggerated, but advised the British Indian Political Officer at Sikkim to enjoin restraint on the Tibetans<sup>367</sup>. Denys Bray, the Foreign Secretary thus replied back to Landon,

*“The Mongrel (that is the mix - breed) question is, of course, a very old one, but Nepal's case rests on Treaty and her rights are therefore secure. As you may imagine Tibet is not backward in her complaints against Nepal, whom she accuses of grossly abusing rights.”*

Bray, concluded his letter with a jocular remark that, “On the whole, I myself am inclined to think that happy are the neighboring nations who have to turn to such trifles for their quarrels”<sup>368</sup>.

The Nepalese Prime Minister, letter on, entrusted Landon the job of conveying to the Viceroy his apprehensions regarding the 'menace to Nepal of an independent Tibet growing in strength'<sup>369</sup>.

This psychology continued to bedevil Tibet - Nepal relations for many years afterwards. This is well illustrated by the case of one Gyalpo, which occurred during 1927-29 period.

#### **2.2.10 India intervenes to solve Tibet- Nepal dispute**

The death of this person (Gyalpo), whose citizenship had caused serious dispute between Tibet & Nepal, ultimately died due to flogging in Tibetan prison. The Nepalese Premier, thereupon wired the Dalai Lama that "extreme consequences" could even then be avoided if a public apology in the terms set by the Nepalese Government for violating the sanctity of the Nepalese Legation is tendered by the Tibetan Government and the officials involved in the 'outrage were punished'<sup>370</sup>. The Tibetans, on the other hand, were justifying their actions.

These developments put the Indian Foreign Department in a difficult position. Nepal was an ally, while pressing Tibetan too much 'for a cause which they considered unjustified' would have alienated them completely. The emergence of the Soviet Socialist Republic with its "aggressive internationalism" was all the more reason for the British Government to keep Tibet in good humor; not only to keep the "roof of the world" out "of the grip of the Bolshevik danger", but also to ward-off the possibility of any such revolutionary political influence filtering through the Himalayas down to their Indian possessions<sup>371</sup>. These considerations had initially led the Government of India to limit its efforts to the making of informal suggestions only. But the Nepalese Prime Minister's latest telegram to the Tibetan Government amounted to an ultimatum, and could easily lead to a war. The Government of India, therefore, decided to act more actively and directly to bring about a reconciliation invoking Article III of the recently concluded Treaty of 1923 with Nepal. The British Envoy was instructed, on September 23, 1929, to convey to the Prime minister of Nepal its serious concern over the developments which might lead to an open rupture between them and to remind the Nepalese Government of their obligations under the treaty. The Government of India as a 'disinterested friend of both the parties', offered its good offices towards securing an amicable settlement and expressed the hope that 'the Nepal Government will take no decisive steps' without giving it full opportunity to assist with its counsel and mediation so far as it lied in its power<sup>372</sup>. Similarly, it tried to explain to the Tibetan also their fault and the need to adopt extremely conciliatory attitude. Faced with the British insistence for an amicable solution on the one hand and Tibetan indifferences to his

demand on the other hand, the Nepalese Premier threw the ball in the Government of India's court by suggesting that the Government of India could do much in getting redress of the Nepalese grievance<sup>373</sup>. The British Envoy in Nepal tried to "dis-abuse" the Nepalese Prime Minister of the idea that the Tibetan Government could be dictated by the Indian Government pointing out to him that the later had to rely on persuasive measures only to diffuse the situation<sup>374</sup>. He also informed the Premier that his Government was already trying its best to persuade the Lhasa Government to come to a reasonable solution<sup>375</sup>.

The Indian overtures and diplomatic pressure seemed to bear fruit when the Dalai Lama telegraphed a conciliatory reply on November 4, 1929 to the Nepalese Government promising detailed letter of apology from the Tibetan Government, his Prime Minister and himself and the Nepalese Government, on their part, agreed to accept an apology directly 'in terms already stated' as fully satisfactory<sup>376</sup>.

### **2.2.11 Arms question and the dispute**

Meanwhile, demands for supply of arms from the Government of India by both the parties as per their requisition of October and July 1929 respectively, i.e., before eruption of the dispute, became particularly pressing. After several reminders to the British Envoy at Kathmandu, the Nepalese Government instructed its Representative in India to approach the Government of India directly. Accordingly, Chander Jung, the Nepalese Representative at Calcutta, met Dens Bray, the Foreign Secretary in the Government of India, on December 11, 1929. Chunder Jung grudged the delay in replying about the Nepalese requisition to arms. Bray, in reply, emphasized that the Government of India intended to induce peace between the two neighbors and as such the requisition put it into great embarrassment. The embarrassment was greater as "Nepal had indefeasible rights under the treaty and Tibet could point to definite promises from us". The Government of India, therefore, decided to go leisurely about it. The Indian Foreign Secretary further pointed out that, in the interest of peace, it was all the more important that the Tibetan Government should remain amenable to its advice and he made the Nepalese Representative to concede that the chances of the same would have lessened considerably if Tibet found that the Government of India was supplying munitions to Nepal in such a large quantity as it had asked for<sup>377</sup>.

While the dispute was still unresolved, Chandra Shumsher expired, and Bhim Shumsher, his brother, succeeded. Daukes, the British Envoy to Nepal, reported that Nepal's attitude appeared to be stiffening, partly as a result of accession of the new Prime Minister and partly owing to

Lhasa's silence. Both sides were said to be making preparations for war and both were pressing for ammunitions.

The Government of India were indeed in favor of meeting the Nepal indents in the last resort, but the Whitehall, with the disarmament conference sitting in London, was not prepared to accept it. As the situation appeared to be drifting dangerously towards war, the Government of India decided to implement its earlier decision that, in discharge of their obligations under Article III of the Treaty, it should intervene more actively and exert its influence and good offices in a way which might induce the parties, in case the direct negotiations failed, to accept or even to seek its mediation.

Accordingly, it was decided to send Laden La to Lhasa as an emissary of the Government of India with a special letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Dalai Lama<sup>378</sup>. The substance of this letter was conveyed to Nepal also.

Simultaneously, the Government of India once again took the opportunity to impress upon the Secretary of State how pressing the Nepalese demand for arms was becoming and expressed their opinion that any attempt to avoid a reply to them any more would certainly risk arousing Nepal's suspicion on their sincerity and good faith. The Government of India, in the meantime, proposed to emphasize upon the Nepalese Government the necessity of exhausting all peaceful means and, in particular, of awaiting the result of the Landon La's mission to Lhasa before giving its attention to the increase of armament. It also sought the authority of the British Foreign Office to undertake the arbitration, should the discussion turn to it, as they had already mentioned this to the Nepalese Government<sup>379</sup>.

The new Nepalese Prime Minister submitted a long memorandum to the British Envoy mentioning that the third clause of the Treaty of friendship between Great Britain and Nepal of 1923 evidently contemplated such a situation 'and now, in this hour of trial, Nepal is desirous to know definitely what might be expected from her friend's efforts, so that she may forge ahead, if need be, as she cannot and will not take lying such affront, insult and threat from the Lhasa authorities'. The Prime Minister further reminded that once before when Nepal had found its friend, the British, entangled with this very northern neighbor, it, even under very trying circumstances, did render the British active help in some way or the other. "Would it now be too much to expect that her requisition for arms and ammunition will be favorably met by them, he asked pointing out further that Nepal's enquiry with him about is was over two months old. He also expressed his belief that Nepal would not be given cause to think that the Tibetan friendship



has found favor in the eyes of its friend more than its own traditional friendship. The Prime Minister strongly urged the Government of India to give to her at least a definite reply which might dispel the anxiety felt on that count and, if need be, 'give her an opportunity to try and secure those (from) elsewhere', of course under the guidance of the Indian Government.

### 2.2.12 Nepal's Veiled threat

This was followed by a veiled threat that in the eventuality of an actual war, inconvenience and difficulties were likely to be caused and in that situation, Nepal "naturally expects that her friend would not mind whatever shortage in recruiting, etc., for the British Army might result under such strain<sup>380</sup>. The contents of this memorandum were communicated to the Secretary of State immediately<sup>381</sup>.

Though the Laden La' aforesaid mission to Lhasa was almost finalized, the Government of India, in the light of these developments, doubted that the contents of the proposed letter itself would be sufficient for the purpose. It, therefore, presented before the Secretary of the State the draft of a second letter to be sent afterwards to Laden La for delivery to the Dalai Lama in the event of the letter proving to be obdurate. The Government of India also proposed to authorize Laden La to offer a mediation, either in the sense of continual good offices, or, if acceptable, arbitration, provided the latter was acceptable to Nepal also, before delivering the second letter. The Government of India felt that it was "unlikely that this will be accepted by the Dalai Lama, but we should be in a better position to approach Nepal, whose extreme sensitiveness over any suggestion of our seeking control over its Foreign policy makes us at the present juncture reluctant to broach the subject".

In the event of the Dalai Lama turning down the suggestion, that Government of India proposed to inform him, through the second letter, that they deserved merit for so for restraining Nepal and that they had certain obligations towards Nepal under article V of the treaty which they would be bound to fulfill under those circumstances and that the Government of India would henceforth feel absolved of its promises to provide Tibet with munitions, which were made to strengthen its defenses against the Chinese<sup>382</sup>.

The secretary of state, however, felt that,

*“Any war between Nepal and Tibet would place us in most difficult position and although I appreciate the importance of avoiding breach of our cordial relations with Nepal, we should be*

*exposed to severe outside criticism if the government of India supplied either party with munitions requisitioned since commencement of dispute and obviously intended for use of such a war."*

He particularly resented the covert threat of the Nepalese Prime Minister's letter, adding that the, *"Tone of memorandum summarized in your telegrams no. 88-5 (serial No. 135) seems almost to indicate that the Nepalese Government may imagine that they can take advantage of your present internal difficulties. His Majesty's Government considers that time has come to take a somewhat firm line and that you should do nothing which might encourage Nepal in any such operations"*<sup>83</sup>.

Analyzing the British obligation under the Treaty of 1923 in this respect, he further pointed out that,

*"...the provisions of article V of Nepal treaty are merely that the Nepalese Government shall be free to import arms from or through India. His Majesty's Government considers it undesirable that the present moment you should give any promise yourselves to Nepal to supply arms specified in large abnormal indent referred to in your telegram"*<sup>84</sup>.

### 2.2.13 Government of India moves to avert war

Meanwhile, on January 24, 1930, the British Envoy in Nepal informed Government of India of reports confirming that- preparations of war were in full swing and that troops were being mobilized, some of them being dispatched in small parties to Tibetan border. When inquired about, the Nepalese Premier substantially confirmed them as a precautionary measure so that "they may not be caught by surprise". He asserted that Tibet was far more formidable than it earlier was and having expelled the Chinese out, it then wanted to deal with Nepal in the same way.

The British Envoy, in reply, impressed upon the Prime Minister 'the grave nature of the move', and added that it may paralyze the Government of India's efforts at Lhasa. He also reminded him of Chandra Shumsher's promise to abstain from any aggressive action until every avenue of settlement had been explored. After a lengthy discussion, the Premier "definitely and specifically" promised not to mobilize or make any other move of this sort unless and until efforts for a peaceful settlement had failed, and that too, after informing the Government of India<sup>85</sup>. The Viceroy thanked the Prime Minister for the assurance, adding that *"by continuing to display*

*patience and forbearance, Nepal will win appreciation of my government, His Majesty's Government and throughout civilized world".* He further pointed out that its military position would surely not be impaired by the delay -the whole thing being a flattering complement to the ego of the Ranas<sup>386</sup>. Still, the Government of India felt that consistent refusal to supply arms at this stage may surely effect Indo - Nepalese relationship. It once again sought to impress upon the Secretary of State the importance of maintaining its cordial relations with Nepal, rather strengthening them at the beginning of the new Prime Minister's regime and proposed to make at least a conditional offer to Nepal about the supply of arms and ammunitions to soothe their ruffled feelings over the issue.

The British Foreign office, however, continued to maintain that by so doing, it would be exposing itself to the criticism for violating Article II of the Covenant of the Law of Nations if hostilities ensued and if its action were to be challenged, as it might well be, by China<sup>387</sup>. The Whitehall, therefore, was not prepared to make even the conditional promise of supplies while the dispute remained unsettled. It considered that the only effective way in which the Government of India could help Nepal was by way of offering good advice and by exerting strong pressure on Tibet. While partially approving the Government of India's proposed message to Nepal, the Secretary directed it to add that,

*"While, therefore, they (the Government of India) will of course do nothing contrary to their obligations under Article V of Treaty, they hope Prime Minister will not press them to supply arms themselves at present juncture. Meanwhile they are redoubling their efforts to induce Tibetan Government to give satisfaction and they trust that Prime Minister will receive in a conciliatory spirit any overtures which Tibetan Government may make"*<sup>388</sup>.

In between, telegram was received by the Prime Minister of Nepal on January 27, from the Tibetan Council, enquiring from him whether the apology was required by telegram or by letter. The Prime Minister telegraphed back that the apology should be communicated by letter and expressed gratification at the action of the Tibetan Government<sup>389</sup>.

The probable explanation of this Tibetan volte-face, as indicated by the telegram, may be two-fold. Firstly, the Tibetan Government might have, by then, realized that Nepal was in earnest and was ready for war. This might have reminded them their military weakness vis-à-vis Nepal. Secondly, the Tibetan Government was under the impression that the Government of India was behind Nepal and they, therefore, wished to avoid its intervention. Hence to appear acting spontaneously, the Tibetan Government made the offer before Laden La could arrive at Lhasa.

The Government of India, under these circumstances, thought it even more important that Laden La should proceed as per schedule<sup>390</sup>

Accordingly, Laden La reached Lhasa on February 16, 1930. He was received with great courtesy. He had a meeting with the Dalai Lama on February 21, 1930, and in this meeting, he delivered the Foreign Secretary's letter and presented before him the Government of India's views on the subject. While thanking Government of India, the Dalai Lama informed Laden La that a letter of apology had already been dispatched to the Nepalese Government by his ministers. He, however, assured the Government of India that he would certainly follow its advice and would see that Tibet did not go to war with Nepal<sup>391</sup>.

However, as feared, the text of the said letter of apology was not such as to satisfy Nepal<sup>392</sup>. It was apparent that the letter would not be accepted by the latter. At this juncture, the Government of India itself formulated a moderate draft and presented it before the Tibetan Government for their acceptance. It was with great difficulty that Laden La was, on March 6, 1930, able to persuade the Tibetan Government to draft a letter of apology on the lines suggested by the Government of India<sup>393</sup>. On the other hand, the British Envoy at Kathmandu exerted himself in full to soften the Nepalese Premier. The letter was received by the Nepalese Government on March 19, and was accepted as satisfying its requirements and the matter was closed by it. While communicating the same to the British Envoy, the Maharaja pointed out that in accepting the letter he has further waived his demand that the letter was to be signed by the Tibetan Prime Minister also, though that was an integral and important part of their demand<sup>394</sup>. While these peace efforts were going on, the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa informed his Government on February 24 that the Tibetan Government, on receiving the news that the Nepalese troops have arrived at the frontier, had sent for their mounted troops from Kham and that the Nepalese subjects were not being permitted to leave Lhasa<sup>395</sup>. The Nepalese Premier immediately enquired the Dalai Lama whether the same was true<sup>396</sup>. Laden La was immediately instructed by the Government of India to prevent from taking any ill advised and hasty action which might precipitate matters and to advise the Tibetan Government that the Government of India entirely believed the Nepal Government's assurances in this respect and was satisfied that peace would remain unbroken if Tibet did nothing rash<sup>397</sup>. It was later on discovered that the said restriction was universal and were put into force for the detection of a big theft of jewels from the Potla temple. Thus, the timely intervention of the Government of India's diplomatic machinery at both ends, especially with the Nepalese Premier, prevented the matters to take a dangerous turn<sup>398</sup>.

Laden La's mission to Tibet was surprisingly successful on the whole. It not only brought about an amicable settlement of the Tibeto-Nepali dispute, but it also inspired new warmth into the Indo-Tibetan relationship. Laden La also succeeded in fetching an invitation for Col. Weir, the political Officer in Sikkim, to visit Lhasa. Weir soon visited Tibet and stayed for about ten weeks at Lhasa. Although no important decisions were reached, the visit toned up the Indo-Tibetan relations generally<sup>399</sup>. This new found warmth, in turn, strengthened the hands of the Government of India vis-à-vis Nepal. Weir had reached to the conclusion that the prospects of real friendly relations ever existing between Nepal and Tibet were very bleak. He found that the Tibetan Government considered that the Nepalese Representative and the Government adopted an unnecessarily high-handed and arrogant manner in any mutual negotiations, and added that, "I am afraid this feeling will never disappear until the two countries test each other's strength in actual war"<sup>400</sup>.

In the circumstances, the Government of India thought it expedient to complete, as soon as possible, the supply to both Nepal and Tibet the munitions already promised, and thereafter to avoid any further commitment in that respect. This would, it was thought, obviate both the risk of it being obliged to supply war-like material to either country at a time when relations between them were openly strained, and the equally embarrassing alternative of having to refuse to discharge its obligations towards them at such a time. The Government of India simultaneously tried to soften the attitude of both the parties towards each- other diplomatically by pointing out to Tibet quietly and in general terms that the practice of flogging, etc., is viewed with much horror by the civilized world, and by reminding the Nepalese Prime Minister that the Tibetans, 'the strange dwellers in the clouds', can scarcely be expected to regulate their affairs in accordance with ordinary practice<sup>401</sup>.

#### **2.2.14 Revival of Chinese Interest**

The dispute was thus settled and the Government of India continued to be successful in maintaining peace in the area at least to the extent that no major crisis developed up till the eclipse of the British power from India.

The Chinese Government, however, could not reconcile to the total elimination of its influence from the region. It remained equally alive to every development in the area and tried to make use of any tension or friction occurring in the area to re-introduce its influence. As soon as Chiang Kai-shek could establish his Government at Nanking, he dispatched one Yangon Dzasa as his

emissary to the Tibetan Government. Dzasa reached Lhasa in late 1930s to receive an unprecedented welcome. Laden La was then staying in the Tibetan capital. The Dalai Lama informed Laden La that Envoy had delivered a message from the Nanking Government to the effect that unfortunately for over the past twenty years, Tibet and China had forgotten each other, and that it was the time for them to forge new ties forgetting and forgiving the past. "As from time immemorial they have been members of the same house", the Dalai Lama was requested to return to his old fold and to make Tibet one out of the five nations in the Chinese Republic<sup>402</sup>. The Chinese emissary's reporting of the Gyalpo incident was also quite interesting. He telegraphically informed Nanking about the 'existence of a feud between Tibet and Nepal', and added that the Nepalese Government had, on February 26, 1930, dispatched 9,000 troops towards Tibet and the Tibetan Government was also sending troops to guard its frontiers. He further opined that the Nepalese action was prejudicial to the Sino-Tibetan relations<sup>243</sup>. The message was intercepted and detained by the British telegraph office due to its 'alarming nature'.

While not inclined to detain it further, the Government of India suggested to the Whitehall to inform the Chinese Government the real state of affairs<sup>403</sup>. The Secretary of State, however, did not think it desirable "as such a course might be regarded as the recognition of their (the Chinese) right to interest themselves in the dispute"<sup>404</sup>. In an interview about the Tibetan - Nepalese dispute published in the *China Weekly Review*, a spokesman of the "Committee on the Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs" of Nanking Government pointed out that,

"The British know only too well that when China is unified and has a strong central Government, she would never forget Tibet and her frontier problems and would probably take up the problem at once; thus, the British might be deprived from all chance. Further, the recent Indian Revolution, which in our eyes is only the direct result of the self - determination of the oppressed races in the world, is looked upon by the British as a 'communistic uprising'. Should the British not quickly get control of Tibet, it seems to the British that once the communistic influence of the Russians is allowed to come down from Siang Kiang, the British Government of India is sure to be ruined". He concluded that for all these reasons, the British were trying to exploit the incident to their advantage and that they were instigating Nepal - "a British protectorate" - to invade Tibet<sup>405</sup>.

### 2.2.15 China's Overtures to Nepal

The Nanking Government was equally mindful of the importance of Nepal. In May, 1930, Pave Sun, Councilor of the Committee of Mongolian and the Tibetan Affairs, and Daniel J. Lee, the English Secretary, were dispatched 'on a friendly mission to Kathmandu' for 'renewing the relations' between the two countries<sup>406</sup>. The Chinese Government in fact was seeking a greater recognition of its vested interest in Tibet. Later on, Lee quoted the Prime Minister of Nepal as saying to him that "Tibet has blocked our way to China" and inferred that Tibet was largely responsible for the breaking of relation between Nepal and China<sup>407</sup>. This assessment gave the Chinese Government fresh hopes and it appeared to be preparing a new strategy from the region. Few months afterwards, in October, 1931, same Daniel J. Lee was sent to Calcutta as Chinese Consulate General in India. Immediately after taking over his new charge, Lee paid a visit to Kathmandu 'to confer Chinese titles on the Prime Minister as a mark of honor'. Counsel General, Chang Ming was treated with marked honor during his visit. The Counsel invested the Prime Minister with the rank of General in the Chinese army and awarded the first-class Ting decoration together with the title of 'Liu Chun Shan Chwang'. The investiture ceremonies closely followed the procedure observed at the Durbar held on the occasion of bestowal of British titles."<sup>408</sup> During his stay in the Nepalese capital, the Counsel General called on the British Envoy also. In the course of private conversation with the Counsel, the British Envoy in Kathmandu gathered the impression that the real object of his appointment to India was his mission to Nepal<sup>409</sup>, and that he had no expectation of remaining in India after the Nepal trip. This further confirmed the Government of India's suspicion that the endeavor was meant to do spade work for establishing regular diplomatic relations with Nepal.

Meanwhile the Dalai Lama passed away. This presented the Chinese Government with the desired opportunity. A Chinese Mission was immediately dispatched to Lhasa under the leadership of Huang Mu -Sung, apparently to represent the National Government of China in the ceremony of offering sacrifices to the late Dalai Lama, but actually to re-establish the Chinese influence in Tibet and the Government of India tried to ascertain the exact nature of the honor with the help of their Minister at Peking who informed them that the Chinese Government had, at least on two occasion in the past history, conferred the title of "T'ung Ling ping Ma Kuo-Kanwang Hsien", which according to Wade's system of interpretation, could be interpreted as "Commander -in-Chief of the Forces (and) Valiant Prince" to Jang Bahadur and Chandra Shumsher. The Pao-ting, was, however, a 'military decoration of recent origin', if possible, to attempt for reposting of the Amban and to undermine the British influence there.<sup>410</sup> The delegation reached Lhasa on May 24, 1934, and received a Tibetan guard of honour before its

entry into the city. The Nepalese Representative also wanted to meet it before its entry into Lhasa from the yew yards further where the guard of honor was drawn. The delegation donated Rs. 50,000 to various monasteries and received a favorable reception there. The Chinese also called on the Nepalese Representative and offered him two rolls of silk and some cloisonné<sup>411</sup>. While returning to China, Huag Mu -sung, the leader of the Chinese delegation, paid a visit to Nepal also. According to the Nepalese Government, it was a private pilgrimage to some Buddhist shrines in the valley. The British Minister, however, felt that the visit was not without some political and diplomatic significance<sup>412</sup>.

### 2.2.16 Indian concern over Chinese overtures

These developments in the Sino-Tibetan relations added to the concern of the Government of India which was already suspicious of growing Chinese interest in Nepal. In fact they were more worried about its possible bearing upon the Indo-Nepalese relations. Williamson, the British Political officer in Sikkim, argued that, "If matters go further than this and if the real autonomy of Tibet is threatened, we may be forced to take diplomatic action to fore-stall China". He, however, realized that "In view of the impossibility of taking any other kind of section (as Whitehall would not sanction anything more than that in any case) it was doubtful whether our protest will have any effect"<sup>413</sup>. It was also decided to obtain the British Envoy's assessment as to the impact these Sino-Tibetan developments were likely to have on Nepal and its relations with India<sup>414</sup>.

The British Envoy, Daukes, however, did not see anything so alarming. With his experiences, he felt confident that, "any Chinese pretention to a vague suzerainty over Nepal will be immediately repudiated and that the Quinquiniel mission to Peking will never be resumed". He further added that, "There can be no doubt that the Government of Nepal fully realized the danger to her position in Tibet from a powerful China"<sup>415</sup>. He, however, emphasized that, "a good understanding between Nepal and Tibet was in the best interest of both countries and strained relationship between them for many years which culminated in the Gyalpo case in 1929-30 was much to be deplored"<sup>416</sup>. Daniel J. lee, on the other hand, alleged in his article published in the China weekly Review that,

*"It is the opinion of the Nepalese Prime Minister that the position of Nepal is rather secluded, having very little to do with the outside world. Whether Nepal could be benefited from having a legation in a foreign country or not remains to be seen".*



So the establishment of a Nepalese legation in London is considered an "experiment", "should a legation be considered necessary", the Prime Minister allegedly told Lee during the course of an informal conversation between the two at Kathmandu, "a second legation would be established in Nanking". Lee, however, felt that if the Chinese Government could take the initiative in establishing a Chinese Legation in Nepal, the Nepalese Government would not hesitate to reciprocate the gesture by establishing a Nepalese legation in Nanking without waiting for the result of the "experiment of their London legation". He further pointed out that "with the Chinese influence in Tibet, the relation between Nepal and China would become more important. Under the circumstances, it is high time for the Chinese Government to officially approach the Nepalese Government for an exchange of diplomatic officials which will prove to be great benefit to both the parties"<sup>417</sup>.

But Nepal had by now realized that a China plagued by internal dissensions and an aggression from Japan after 1932, could not exert any pressure for or against Nepal<sup>418</sup>. Consequently, the said Chinese delegations failed to secure from Nepal any great recognition of China's locus standi in Tibet<sup>419</sup>. In-fact, the Nepalese authorities politely refused to re-open official intercourse with the Chinese Government<sup>420</sup>. On being approached by the British Envoy in Nepal about the issue, the Nepalese Premier Judha Shumsher made it clear to him that, "while a Chinese legation in Nepal was perhaps possible in the future, it was a remote contingency which was not under consideration at the present time"<sup>421</sup>. Soon after, World war -II broke out involving all the powers interested in the area -Great Britain, China, Russia and Japan. Nepal was a staunch ally of Great Britain and the British India was equally involved. Tibet, on the other hand, pleaded neutrality on the ground of it's being a monastic Buddhist State. This marked a virtual freeze of international interest such as finding an alternative route of supply to China from India via Tibet in face of the Japanese advances in the South Asia and South-East Asia. China was further constrained from reasserting its old position in Tibet and in making any advances southward by its desire not to offend Britain, its chief war-ally. The Government of India thus faced no difficulty in maintaining their dominance in the region. This resulted in decade of comparative peace in the region, undisturbed by any major dispute, until the Indian independence and the withdrawal of the British imperial power from the sub-continent.



# CHAPTER 3



## INDIA'S EFFORT TO SAVE TIBETAN AUTONOMY FROM CHINESE ONSLAUGHT

## CHAPTER 3

# INDIA'S EFFORT TO SAVE TIBETAN AUTONOMY FROM CHINESE ONSLAUGHT

### 3.1 INDIA'S NEPAL POLICY IN WAKE OF CHINESE OCCUPATION OF TIBET

#### 3.1.1 Independent India opts for 'status quo'

The post-world war era brought to India its Independence for which the Country has been fighting for more than a half-Century. The British Indian Government yielded place to the independent Government of India committed to the cause of emancipation of other peoples anywhere in the World, particularly in Asia. However the geopolitical and strategic determinants remained unaltered even though the transfer of power has been affected. So, to begin with, it decided to continue the same policy- especially in the strategic border lands in the Himalayan region with suitable modifications in the years immediately preceding Independence.

However, with the partition of the mainland, its immediate attention had shifted from the North-Western to the North Central Himalayas. The British Government in India had considered it essential to have a foothold in Tibet for their strategic and defense needs. The Government of India also tried to maintain its historical relations with Lama - land uninhibited by any third

power. This, in other words, meant an autonomous Tibet under moderate Indian influence. Indications of this attitude were discernible even before the power was formally transferred to the Indians by the British. In the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi on March 18, 1947, for instance, the Tibetans were invited as full-fledged members along with the Chinese and the Nepalese. Although the Chinese delegation did not contest the Tibetan participation, George Yeh, the Director of European Affairs of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attached to the delegation as an observer, protested against Tibet being depicted outside the Chinese boundaries in the map displayed in the Conference Hall<sup>422</sup>. As the Government of India was prepared to recognize China's de jure suzerainty over Tibet, the correction was undertaken, though most reluctantly, in face of the repeated Chinese protests. But it was equally clear that it did not propose to go any further. The British Indian Government had always laid emphasis on the Tibetan autonomy including that countries' right to enter into direct diplomatic relations with India and the views of the Government of Independent India were no different. Captain Sathe was dispatched to Kashgar in Sikkim as Indian Counsel without any previous consultations with the Chinese Government<sup>423</sup>. The keen interest of the Government of India in Tibet was also evinced by the fact that it decided to retain the services of E.H. Richardson, the British Trade Agent in Tibet<sup>424</sup>. It was alleged that Richardson was much involved in the Tibetan politics and the Chinese Ambassador in India had suggested to Nehru to dispense with his services<sup>425</sup>. When Similarly, Tibet was depicted outside China in a map that was shown in a film entitled "Kashmir" before the members of the diplomatic corps in New Delhi in the autumn of 1948. The Chinese Ambassador, Prof. Lo Chia-lun, lodged a written protest against the same. "After having been urged several times", noted the Professor, the Government of India replied back that the film was not the production of the Indian Government, which would however, "pay attention to this matter henceforth". The map in the film, however, according to Prof. Lo Chia-lun, remained uncorrected, *ibid*, p.195. The Government of India remained undeterred by this criticism and continued to maintain the usual diplomatic Richardson's service were retained, the Government of India came in for severe criticism in *jen-min Jih-pao*, which went to the extent of saying that, "The retaining of Mr. Richardson's services demonstrated the collaboration of Nehru's reactionary Government with the British imperialism"<sup>426</sup>.

### 3.1.2 Ties with Tibet

The Government of India remained undeterred by this criticism and continued to maintain the usual diplomatic ties with Tibet. The Tibetan delegations were entertained in India and the

Tibetan passports were also duly accepted upto the year 1957<sup>127</sup>. The British with their persistent efforts, patience and diplomatic skill, had transformed the hostile Gorkhas into trustworthy allies and had made Nepal an effective buffer State between India and China. With this accomplishment, the British had considerably increased their trade with the Himalayan region. Close and cordial relations with Nepal also allowed them to extend their influence in the neighboring Himalayan Kingdoms of Sikkim and Bhutan. The British had also succeeded in monopolizing the conduct of Nepal's foreign relations in real terms. This achievement was all the more striking, as the Gorkhas did not resent it. The British policy towards Nepal was one of the tactful management of a proud, sensitive, freedom-loving nation. It was based on the correct assessment that the Nepalese would not grudge the real loss of independence in external affairs provided an appearance of sovereignty was kept up and any interference in their domestic affairs was avoided. Throughout the period of the British rule in India during the twentieth century, Nepal, though independent in international law, had acted willingly as a subordinate partner of the British Indian Government.

Although the independent India inherited all these agreements, the new Government did not wish to continue the Imperial Legacy in diplomatic relations. At the same time, Nehru, the chief architect of the Indian Foreign Policy, was actually conscious of the fact that the existing pattern of the Indo- Nepalese relations had emerged out of at least two centuries of close contacts between the two Governments and was conditioned by the dictates of national security and important geopolitical considerations. In fact neither Nepal nor India could discard entirely the existing relationship. On the eve of the Indian Independence, the existing relationship provided the only basis on which the two Nations could start developing a new pattern of their relationship. This, of course, had to be re-adjusted and re- interpreted in terms of the swiftly changing politico-economic and strategic realities in the Asian continent.

### **3.1.3 Ranas try to placate Indian Government**

The Ranas in Nepal faced a difficult challenge. Their unqualified support to the British, especially in the suppression of the liberation movement in India, had earned for them little goodwill amongst the rank of freedom - fighters. The Rana regime had hitherto enjoyed immunity from internal dissensions and intrigues against it being engineered by the Nepalese based in India. The sympathetic British regime was then yielding place to a Government which considered the Rana rule as out-dated and tyrannical. It was obvious to the Ranas that isolation

could no longer be considered as an effective policy to protect their country's independence, which they identified with the survival of their own regime.

This coincided with the revival of interest on the part of Chiang Kai-shek's Government, which after the war, moved to consolidate the Chinese position in the Himalayas by dispatching a mission to Nepal, in December, 1946 apparently for investing Chinese titles, etc., on the newly inaugurated Prime Minister, Padam Shumsher, following the old Imperial tradition and picking up the thread left over by the Lee Mission of 1931<sup>428</sup>. The Mission was readily received and was given a red carpet treatment. Issue of common interest including establishment of diplomatic relations were reportedly discussed. It was followed by a Nepalese mission to Nanking in April 1947<sup>429</sup>. Nothing substantial could, however, come out of the process despite the best efforts of both the parties concerned.

Initially, Nepal might have seen little advantage in forging diplomatic ties with China as long as it was excluded from Tibet and more so, because it might have caused repercussions on its far more important relationship with India and Tibet. The uncertain future of Chiang-ki Shek's regime might have been yet another important reason against such a step. It is equally possible that the increasing intensity of the civil war in China by the time of the Nepalese Mission's return-visit to Peking had suspended Chiang-ki Shek's own interest towards such a move.

All circumstances taken together convinced the Ranas that China could no longer be used as an adequate means to counter weight to the independent Government of India. The Communist victory afterwards further dampened the prospect of an alliance with China. So the classic theme of balancing its Southern neighbor, India with China, the northern one, was substituted with the policy of establishing and strengthening contacts with western powers having an interest in the area, especially with the United Kingdom and the United States of America<sup>430</sup>. Working on the new strategy, the Ranas sought International recognition for their regime through extension of diplomatic contacts<sup>431</sup> on the one hand, and on the other, they tried to win the friendship of the new Government of India.

Working on the new strategy, the Ranas sought International recognition for their regime through extension of diplomatic contacts,<sup>10</sup> on the one hand and on the other, they tried to win the friendship of the new Government of India. Thus, Nepal readily accepted Indian invitation to attend the Asian Relations Conference on the eve of Indian Independence in 1947, as an opportunity to demonstrate its own sovereign status. Speaking at the Conference, General Bijoya Shumsher talked of "Indissoluble Indo - Nepalese ties"<sup>432</sup>.

Later, Mohan Shumsher, while elaborating on the Nepalese policy in his speech delivered at the occasion of his inauguration (at SindhuYatra ceremony) , the new Prime Minister stated that, “Our relations with India, a country which has emerged through Independence, should be neighborly and as between two sisters such a pure and friendly relationship had existed and it will always be our effort to strengthen it and make it more happy....In the present time, it is neither wise nor possible for any country to remain completely detached from the worldwide developments. Therefore, we have also adopted the policy of searching friends and establishing diplomatic contacts with various countries<sup>433</sup>. In the execution of this policy, on July 12, 1947, the Nepalese Legation in London and the British Legation in Kathmandu was raised to the status of an Embassy<sup>434</sup>. A Goodwill mission with the United States of America was exchanged in 1946<sup>435</sup>, resulting in recognition of the Nepalese independence by the United States on April 21, 1947,<sup>436</sup> and an Agreement of Friendship and Commerce was signed on April 25, 1947,<sup>437</sup> and finally ambassadors were exchange in February, 1948<sup>438</sup>. Nepal also applied for the membership of the United Nations in 1949<sup>439</sup>. It is interesting to note that in past it had neither sought the membership of the League, nor of the United Nations. The Nepalese effort to diversify its diplomatic contacts was primarily motivated by its desire to balance the dominant influence of India. The engrossment of the Chinese Government in the Civil war and later the emergence of the Communists to power there had rendered it impossible for the application of the old balance of power strategy under which India was played against China and vice versa.

#### **3.1.4 Free India and Nepal**

The attitude of the Indian Government was, however, not as hostile as Ranas might have feared. It signed with the Ranas, on November 9, 1947, 'stand - still' agreement whereby as a successor to the previous Government , New Delhi recognized the terms of relationship existing during the pre - independence period, and agreed to retain them<sup>440</sup>. This meant that the provisions of the 1923 Treaty was to continue to remain in force and that India was also to continue to recognize the sovereign and independent status of Nepal. Simultaneously, a tripartite agreement was signed between India, Britain and Nepal, which divided existing Gorkha regiments of the Indian Army between India and the United Kingdom. Further, the recruitment of the Gorkhas to the Indian Army was to continue and the Government of India undertook to meet the Nepalese needs in the areas of defense production, civil supplies and training military personnel<sup>441</sup>. The Ranas, on their part, took a number of steps to facilitate the process of accommodation and to establish themselves as valuable allies to the new regime in India. The Gorkha solders fought against



Pakistan in Kashmir in 1947 - 48<sup>442</sup> and the ten battalions of the Nepalese Army were dispatched to perform garrison duties in India during the police action against in Nizam of Hyderabad<sup>443</sup>. The Government of Nepal promised similar help to the Government of India in future also<sup>444</sup> and the Ranas at numerous occasions expressed their solidarity with India. While the Ranas were not prepared to accept the Indian suggestions to introduce domestic reforms, they were quite ready to assuage the Indian feelings in some more vital matters of security and strategy. It has been pointed out by at least one Western scholar, that the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, had urged at one time that the Border States of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim should accede to India on the same basis as the rest of Indian Native States<sup>445</sup>. The said scholar, however, has not placed any evidence to substantiate his claim, which appears to be at best his surmise only. Rose has alleged that, for some time after 1947, a 'basic inconsistency' existed in the attitude of the Indian officials over whether the border states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim had been independent prior to 1947-48, or a de facto part of the British Indian Empire, and has cited Nehru's description of Nepal's independence as "formal" in his speech before the Indian Parliament on 6 December 1950, in support of his argument. Still more interesting is his observation pointing out the 'same inconsistency' in the thinking of the Nepali intellectuals themselves, who, on the one hand, vehemently criticized the Ranas for their alleged subservience to the British, while on the other hand, with equal vehemence insisted that Nepal has always been independent and never recognized British "paramouncy". Perhaps the person, who had the most clear understanding of Nepal's Independence and its significance to India was Nehru himself. He, in most unambiguous terms, recognized Nepal as a sovereign and independent Nation<sup>446</sup>. At the same time, he was conscious of the "indissoluble" ties of race, religion, culture, history and geography. He talked repeatedly of the 'special relationship' between India and Nepal and advocated for it the role of a partner and an ally. He has said as early as in 1946, as the Vice - President of the interim Government, that, *"Nepal is an independent country, so far as we are concerned. If, in future, Nepal chooses to have some kind of close Union with India, we shall welcome it"*<sup>447</sup>. One can easily find several references to Nepal in the Constituent assembly debates, where its sovereign Independence was recognized<sup>448</sup>. Nehru's observation in the Parliament in this regard is most significant. He further stated that: - *"We have inherited both good things and bad from the British. Our relations with some of our neighboring countries developed during an expensive phase of British Imperial policy"*. Nepal was an independent country when India was under British rule, but strictly speaking, her Independence was only formal. That test of the independence of a country is that it should be able to have relations with other countries without endangering the Independence. Nepal's foreign relations were strictly

limited to her relations with the Government functioning in India at that time. That was an indication that Nepal's approach to International relations was a very limited one. When we came into the picture ... we went further in this respect than the British Government had done and Nepal began to develop other foreign relations. We welcomed this and did not hinder the process as the British had done<sup>449</sup>.

A free India thus rejected the imperial policy of the British to keep the Himalayan Kingdom sealed off from the outside world and supported its candidature for United Nations' membership in 1949<sup>450</sup>. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, and also the Foreign Minister, was at the same time a democrat to the core and was naturally interested in the flourishing of democracy everywhere, especially in the neighboring lands. He was, therefore, sympathetic to the cause of democracy in Nepal and his thinking is reflected in his Nepal policy during the period 1947-48. The interplay of concern for the Indian strategic interests and sympathy for democratic movement in Nepal explains the ambivalences of the Indian attitude towards the anti-Rana movement between 1947 and 1949.

### **3.1.5 Anti -Rana' Movement and India**

When India achieved Independence, the Rana oligarchy in Nepal had completed its hundred years. By and large Nepal remained passive and quiet during the period of British rule in India. Though internally it was simmering with discontent. The tyranny of the Rana regime was obviously an anachronism in the middle of the twentieth century and inspired by the freedom movement in India, a similar movement spurt out for the liberalization of the polity in Nepal.

To begin with, an organization with the name of Gorkha League was formed in India in 1921 to organize Nepalese against the Rana regime, but it was not allowed to function by the British Government in India who were quite responsive to the protests from the Ranas. In 1931 and 1935 respectively, three clandestine organizations named Prachand Gorkha, Nepali Nagrik Adhikar Samiti and Praja Parishad were formed within Nepal, but their resistance to the regime proved abortive<sup>451</sup>.

Under these circumstances, several young Nepalese students concluded that the eclipse of British power in India was necessary to weaken the Rana stronghold in Nepal. A number of these young men gravitated towards the Indian National Congress and into the 'Quit India Movement' of 1942<sup>452</sup>. The Koirala brothers, both of whom were destined to become Prime Ministers of Nepal,

S.P. Upadhyay and Dr. Regmi were prominent amongst those Nepalese who courted arrest during the movement<sup>453</sup>. By the time they came out of the prison, the end of the British rule was in the sight.

The politically conscious Nepalese now began to think about organizing themselves to carry on a struggle for democracy in Nepal. Some prominent Nepalese activists met in Varanasi in October 1946 to form the All-India Nepalese Congress with the active support and blessings of Indian Socialist leaders like Jai Prakash Narayan, Ram Manohar Lohia, Shibban Lal Saxena, as well as some Congress leaders. In January, 1947 a Conference was held in Calcutta where this organization was renamed as Nepali National Congress<sup>454</sup>. Tanka Prasad Acharya, then in jail in Kathmandu, was elected as its president. Soon afterwards, a general strike, the first ever in the history of Nepal, was organized in the Jute mill in Biratnagar. The strike was followed by countrywide satyagraha and a number of Nepali Congress leaders were arrested. During this phase almost all political quarters/ parties and groups in India supported the movement. Socialists were particularly vocal in their support<sup>455</sup> and Shibban Lal Saxena, an Indian Member of Parliament from Gorakhpur, was even arrested by the Nepalese police for participating in the Satyagraha within the Nepalese territory.

The Indian sympathy and support were understandable, because apart from the ideological affinity, the Nepalese Congress leaders had suffered for the Indian cause and, in the process, had established close and cordial contacts with important Indian leaders. The Indian National Congress leaders were no less sympathetic to the democratic aspirations of the Nepalese, but being members of the ruling party, they exercised some restraint in public.

This, however, did not inhibit Nehru from exerting moral pressures on Mohan Shumsher to secure the release of Koiralas and to effect a settlement with the democratic elements<sup>456</sup>. Speaking on December 6, 1950, when internal developments in Nepal had reached a crisis, Nehru outlined the background of the Indian approach towards developments in Nepal:

“Three years ago, we assured Nepal of our desire that she should be a strong, Independent and progressive country .... in the nature of things, we stood not only for progressive democracy in our own country but also in other countries. We have said this not only to Nepal, but it has consistently been a part of our policy in distant quarters of the world. We are certainly not going to forget this when one of our neighboring countries are concerned<sup>457</sup>. Continuing in the same vein, he revealed that: *“We pointed out in as friendly a way as possible, that the world was changing rapidly, and if Nepal did not make an effort to keep peace with it, circumstances were*

*bound to force her to do so. It was difficult for us to make this clear because we did not wish to interfere with Nepal in any way. We will need to treat Nepal as an independent country, but, at the same time, saw that unless some steps we are taken difficulties might arise*<sup>58</sup>.

The Government of India's advice did have an impact on the Nepalese Government and a Reform Committee was appointed to suggest administrative changes. Indian constitutional experts were invited to draft a constitution which was promulgated on January 26, 1948<sup>59</sup>. Padam Shumsher's 'liberal' approach was not tolerated by the leading faction and he was forced to abdicate in favour of Mohan Shumsher on May 26, 1948, who reversed the entire process of seeking an accommodation with the Government of India on the point. The Nepalese National Congress was banned and New Delhi was understandably frustrated. As Nehru was to remark a little later; "our advice, given in all friendship, did not, however, produce any result"<sup>60</sup>.

This lament makes it obvious that the Government of India was not prepared to risk its existing relations with Nepal, which were quite satisfactory ever since the Treaty of 1923, for the sake of ideology as long as a Nepalese Government remained responsive to the Indian National interests. The Indian policy towards Nepal throughout this period (1947-49) was marked by a good deal of complacency as, in the absence of any threat from the North, it appears that the 1923 arrangement and the existing relationships with Nepal were considered sufficient to protect Indian interests in the region by the Government of India. India's own ambassador to Kathmandu was accredited only in December, 1947. Till then, the British ambassador had looked after the Indian interests. No Indian dignitary visited Nepal during 1947-50 period, and references to Nepal were seldom made in public speeches.

### **3.1.6 Implications of Communist Victory in China**

Indian disinterestedness towards Nepal was, however, transformed into a most lively involvement and its policy underwent a fundamental change in response to the developments in China, having important repercussions on Tibet. The attitude of the Chinese communist was quite predictable as far as the issue of Tibet was concerned. The Party had declared, as early as in 1922, that it would "liberate" Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang and unify them with China<sup>61</sup>. During their advance across the Chinese mainland, the Kung-ch'uan-tang (Chinese Communist Party) further reiterated in unequivocal terms the claims of their her predecessors and those of the Nationalist Government by declaring that Tibet was an integral part of China and that it would be "liberated from the imperialist", that "the Chinese people will not permit any part of the Chinese territory,

however, small, to remain outside the Chinese People's Republic<sup>462</sup>. The Communist People's Political Conference, held at Peking in July, 1949, adopted a resolution that Tibet would be retained as part of the People's Republic of China. Un-nerved by the repeated Chinese proclamations against their Country's freedom, the Kasaq (the Tibetan cabinet) reiterated its complete independence and expelled all the Chinese traders and diplomatic personnel's alike, from the country saying that Tibet did not want to get involved in the Chinese civil war<sup>463</sup>. In fact the move was motivated by the instinct not to leave any trace of Chinese presence within the territory lest that could be used to justify any Chinese claim of subsequently. But the Chinese alleged the hand of Richardson and the Indians in the same<sup>464</sup>.

There Communist counterparts also alleged that the move was inspired by 'foreign agents' in Tibet and insisted that the Tibetan people were anxiously awaiting their 'liberation' from oppressive colonialism and reactionary exploitation<sup>465</sup>. Radio Peking again went on air on September 10, 1949, to warn the Tibetans that this "liberation" would be affected very shortly with the use of the People's Liberation Army<sup>466</sup>. The Vice Chairman of the Chinese Republic and the commander -in- chief of the Army, Chu, declared before the People's political Consultative Conference that, "the common program demands the waging of the revolutionary war to the very end, the liberation of all territory of China, including Formosa, the Pescadores, Hainan and Tibet<sup>467</sup>.

On October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1949, China was proclaimed the People's Republic. By the end of the year, on December 30, 1949, India had recognized the new Communist regime. The propaganda to "liberate" Tibet, however, continued unabated. The threat was given in a far more concrete form when on January 1, 1960, on the New Year's Day, Chu enumerated "liberation of Tibet" as one of the basic task of the People's Liberation Army for the year<sup>468</sup>.

The Tibetans had neither the military strength nor the material resources to defend the integrity of their country against a determined China. The Tibetan Government had perhaps hoped that pressure of friendly countries and big powers might yet persuade the Chinese to differ their decisions. When Tibet was planning to dispatch diplomatic missions to India, United States of America, Nepal and United Kingdom, to seek diplomatic support, the Peoples of Republic of China issued a stern warning:

***“If the Lhasa authorities send out illegal mission to engage in the splitting and traitorous activities, the Central People's Government of China will not tolerate such traitorous activities of the Lhasa***

*authorities. Any country receiving such illegal mission will be regarded as harboring hostile intentions towards the Republic of China*<sup>69</sup>.

The new regime demonstrated its will to subjugate Tibet by occupying Tachien lu , the traditional gateway to Lhasa, by Chinese Army in March 1950. A large scale program of building roads from China to Tibet was started simultaneously<sup>70</sup>. These developments in Tibet were of vital significance to the Indo - Nepalese relations. In fact the maintenance of peace and order along Indian and Nepalese Northern border was inextricably bound up with the existence of Tibet as an independent country. The emergence of China as a strong Communist Nation with the resolution to usurp Tibet posed an immediate threat to the status quo in the Himalayas. Thus the entire northern frontier of India, which had in past posed no security problem, was to become active and subject to serious dangers.

### 3.1.7 Chinese view of India

While no one was in a position to predict what China would actually do in the vast intermediary area, it was clear that the new Chinese regime was not going to acquiesce into the existing arrangements and understanding ipso facto. A constant conflict and competition between India and China on ideological plan was also inherent in the situation. The prevalent mood of the Communist world was one of aggressive militancy. Stalin had rejected non - alignment, and Mao had also ridiculed the concept by stating that,

*“The forty years’ experience of the Sun Yat -Sen and the twenty eight years’ experience of the Chinese Communist Party have convinced us that in order to attain victory and consolidate it, we must incline to one side. .. There can be no exception to this rule. It is impossible to sit on the fence, naturally it is merely a camouflage; a third road does not exist.”*<sup>71</sup>

All instructions from Moscow to the Indian Communist Party underlined the need and importance of overthrowing the 'reactionary' Nehru Government and they are also emphasized the significance and relevance of the Chinese experiences for India in this respect<sup>71</sup>. The Indian Home Ministry assessed that the occupation of Tibet by the Communist would impart a great strategic advantage to the Communist world. It was not likely that the Chinese would respect the international conventions in their drive to attend their objectives<sup>72</sup>.

The statements that the Chinese chose to make at this time are remarkable for their complete contempt of the Indian Government. The Indian Independence was dismissed as a 'national

betrayal<sup>173</sup> and Nehru was described as a "running dog of the British imperialism".<sup>54</sup> An editorial further and lumped him Chinese experiences for India in this respect<sup>172</sup>. The Indian Home Ministry assessed that the occupation of Tibet by the Communist would impart a great strategic advantage to the Communist world. It was not likely that the Chinese would respect the international conventions in their drive to attend their objectives<sup>173</sup>.

The statements that the Chinese chose to make at this time are remarkable for their complete contempt of the Indian Government. The Indian Independence was dismissed as a 'national betrayal'<sup>174</sup> and Nehru was described as a "running dog of the British imperialism"<sup>175</sup>. An editorial further and lumped him together with Bao Dai, Syngman Rhee and Chiang kai -shek, amongst the "dreads of mankind"<sup>176</sup>. In July, 1949, following Tito-Stalin conflict, Liu Shao-chi, who had by then become Chairman of the People's Republic, classified India among the "colonial or semi-colonial" territories. He further urged that, *"Of course the Communists in other colonial and semi-colonial countries such as India, Burma, Siam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Indo-China, South Korea, etc., must for the sake of their National interests similarly adopt a firm and irreconcilable policy against National betrayal by the reactionary section of the bourgeoisie specially to the big bourgeoisie, which has already surrendered to imperialism. If this were not done, it would be a grave mistake."*<sup>177</sup>

The same rejection of non-alignment was echoed by the Vice-Chairman Liu Shao-chi also. See Liu Shao-chi, "The Two Great Camps in the World of Today and the Path of the national Liberation Movement", International and Nationalism, (Peking n.d. but written in 1948), p. 32 the bourgeoisie especially to the big bourgeoisie, which has already surrendered to imperialism. If this were not done, it would be a grave mistake"<sup>178</sup>. Liu Shao-chi's pronouncement about India, was followed by a series of similar a Mao, while replying to a message of greetings from the Communist Party of India, expressed the hope in 1949 that,

*"India certainly will not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and emerge in the socialist and people's Democratic family"*<sup>179</sup>.

The Chinese antagonism towards Indian Government is partially explained by the fact that the new Chinese Government considered India a major impediment in the execution of its designs in the region. The Chinese repeatedly declared that Tibet had to be liberated from the 'stranglehold of feudalism' and saved from 'the imperialist intrigues'. The insinuations were clear, as apart from Nepal, India alone had maintained diplomatic ties with Tibet. The Communist

publications and propaganda during the period alleged that "the Anglo-American designs for the annexation of Tibet were being carried out through the hands of Nehru"<sup>480</sup>.

### 3.1.8 Nehru's policy towards people's China

The Nehru Government adapted a two-pronged strategy to meet the Communist Chinese challenge. It sought to move closer to the new Chinese regime by attempting to allay their fears about India's alleged "expansionist" ambition. Not only it recognized the new regime within two months of its formation but became the chief exponent of the Chinese cause in the United Nations, leaving apart the Communist bloc. Simultaneously, it, together with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, began consolidating its defenses in the North.

The Indian representative, Harishwar Dayal, was soon able to conclude a fresh treaty with Bhutan modeled after the existing one, on August 8, 1949, whereby the Bhutanese Government undertook "to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations"<sup>481</sup>.

Peking saw in it Indian designs against Tibet and the result was unleashing a refresh propaganda war. The People's Daily claimed that, "the Nehru Government cannot deny that it has send men to Lhasa ... since the Nehru Government has announced its suzerainty over Bhutan and declared that Tibet had never recognized Chinese suzerainty", the writer argued, "will it not declare suzerainty over Tibet?" and asserted that, "the Nehru Government has no legal right to announce its protectorate over Bhutan. The United Nations should examine the matter"<sup>482</sup>.

In retrospect, it seems that the Government of India had lost no time in visualizing the implications of a Communist victory in China for her own defenses. According to the revelations made by former Chief of the Indian Intelligence Bureau, the Government had been alerted against the danger of infiltration as early as in September, 1940<sup>483</sup>.

However, it was realized that no security measures could be anything near perfection unless control had been gained over the passes between Tibet, on the one side, and Bhutan and Nepal, on the other. The whole situation was rendered more explosive because of the extremely unstable conditions along the whole span of Nepalese frontier with Tibet. The Indian concern about the state of affairs in Nepal was understandable. It shared an open border with the latter. If once Nepal is over-run militarily or politically, there remained nothing to defend the Indian plains in between. Since Nepal by itself would hardly be able to withstand any determined bid



against it from the North, the Government of India looked forward to a constant and close cooperation with Nepal on the subject. Thus when asked as to whether the Nepalese Government feels the necessity of maintaining a close coordination with the Indian Government so far as external affairs are concerned, by a member of the Constituent Assembly on November 28, 1949, Nehru expressed the views of the Government in categorical terms, "what the Nepal Government feels we do not know, but naturally it is desirable for such co-ordination to exist". The Indian Premier also informed the house that the Nepal had sought India's support for membership of the United Nations and that the Government of India had "promised to give whatever support was possible"<sup>484</sup>.

In mid-1949, coinciding with the Communists rise to power in China, the Government of India expressed its desire to conclude fresh treaty with Nepal in place of the existing ones inherited from the British and retained through the standstill agreement of 1947. It was thought necessary to take note on the new exigencies and to re-fashion the relationship between the two countries. C.P. N. Singh, who assumed office as Indian Ambassador in Nepal in mid-1949, initiated negotiations soon afterwards<sup>485</sup>.

### 3.1.9 Nepalese View

The Ranas in Nepal themselves were quite perturbed about the developments in Tibet and when the Indian Ambassador approached the Nepalese Government, he found them quite willing to co-operate in the matters of defense, security and strategy. As a result, Waryam Singh, the Deputy Director General of the Intelligence Bureau, was dispatched to Nepal, to negotiate the establishment of check - posts on Nepal - Tibet border with the Indian assistance<sup>486</sup>. After some consideration, the proposal was accepted by the Nepalese Government and check - posts were subsequently opened in September, 1950, jointly manned by the Indian and Nepalese staff<sup>487</sup>.

In the last week of November, 1949, with Bijoya Shumsher, the Nepalese Prime Minister's son and the Director General of the Foreign Affairs Department of Nepal, was deputed to discuss the terms of the proposed treaty with his Indian counter -parts and the drafts were exchanged. The terms could not, however, be finalized. Apart from differences on other issues, the major obstacle was New Delhi's continued insistence upon the liberalization of the Rana regime<sup>488</sup>.

The Nepalese Congress leaders were quite disturbed by the prospects of close cooperation between the Ranas and the Government of India. D.R. Regime tried to express a thinly veiled threat by warning the Government of India that if it adopted,

*“A policy of helpful cooperation with the Ranas on the plea of counter - acting Communist infiltration from North, the Nepalese people in frustration, would be compelled to seek support from their northern neighbor in their struggle against the Ranas”<sup>489</sup>.*

B. P. Koirala adopted a different and more positive strategy to influence the Government of India. He assured the Government of India that the alternative democratic Government would offer them an even greater support on the issue and proposed adaptation of joint Indo - Nepalese defenses and common foreign policies<sup>490</sup>. On 15h February, Nepalese Prime minister Mohan Shumsher paid a visit to India. Considerable importance was attached in India to the Nepalese Prime Minister's visit. The comment made by the Hindu's correspondent in New Delhi may be taken as representative piece of Indian public opinion<sup>491</sup>. It pointed out that with,

*“Tibet particular written off as lost to the Communist tide sweeping from China in the East, disruptive elements would try to take advantage of the presence of communists on the borders and the commentator urged upon the Government of India to maintain Nepal as an independent buffer state”<sup>492</sup>.*

It is true that the Government of India also attached considerable importance to the visit of the Nepali Prime Minister, but it seems that Mohan Shumsher understood the Indian motivations only partially. Mohan Shumsher appeared to have presumed that India was primarily interested in its own security against Pakistan and China, and wished to ensure for itself the continued Nepalese support and that it depended considerable for its security "on brave Gorkha soldiers." In a speech made at Varanasi en route Delhi, he said, "we shall give assistance to India whenever she needs it and come to her succor when she is in danger"<sup>493</sup>.

While India desired Nepal's support, but the Government of India doubted very much the capacity of the autocratic Rana regime to face the new challenges. It was believed that they would be unable to mobilize their masses to counter the threat of militant Communism without affecting socio - economic reforms. The Indian Foreign office was of the view that only a democratic Government could do so. Nehru, however, failed to convince the visiting Prime Minister about the necessity of democratization of the Nepalese polity, nor could the draft of the treaty be finalized. Nehru found it necessary to re-emphasize the geo-political factors governing the Indo

- Nepalese relations at the time of presenting the budget demands for the external affairs Ministry on March 17, 1950,

*“Geographically Nepal is almost a part of India although she is an independent country. Recently the Prime Minister of Nepal visited India. We welcomed and conferred with this distinguished personage and it was clear that in so far as certain developments in Asia were concerned, the interest of Nepal and India were identical. For instance, to maintain one point, it is not possible for the Indian Government to tolerate an invasion of Nepal from anywhere, even though there is no military alliance between the two countries. Any invasion of Nepal would inevitably involve the safety of India .... We have accordingly advised the Government of Nepal in all earnestness to bring themselves in line with democratic forces that are stirring the world today. Not to do so is not only wrong but also unwise from the point-of-view of what is happening in the world today”<sup>494</sup>.*

The progress of negotiations between India and Nepal remained slow and it was only in April, 1950 that Bijoya Shumsher came to New Delhi to finalize the draft of the new treaty. The Nepalese delegation made it clear that it was prepared to accept all terms offered by India, if it did not insist on political reforms in Nepal. The Indian, side on the other hand, laid considerable emphasis on this issue. The stalemate remained unresolved and the Nepalese team went back to Nepal. At this juncture, twin developments made the Indians more inclined to conclude the Treaty with Nepal urgently. One of those was the growing interest of the Western powers in the region and the Rana Government's willingness to accommodate them<sup>495</sup>. Those were the days of Cold War. Nepal had become for the West a part of the first line of defense against ‘Communist expansion’. Signs of Western interest in the region were becoming increasingly obtrusive. It was reported in the beginning of 1950 that the British had completed aerial mopping of all the valleys of Nepal and the American Scientific Mission (Ripple Geological Mission) had surveyed the valley in Eastern Nepal and the walled-off Western Valley off the Karnaliriver<sup>496</sup>. In early 1950, the Nepalese Government had sought both British and American aid in terms of capital equipments for road- building, electricity, supply, wireless - communication, mining and irrigation projects<sup>497</sup>. In light of all this, the consternation of the Indian Government and their haste to conclude a treaty with Nepal was but natural. The statement of the Indian Prime Minister immediately evoked a sympathetic response from M.P. Koirala, the then President of the Nepali National Congress, who said: "We know that there is no danger of foreign aggression in Nepal, at least in the near future. But an ideological invasion has already begun which will lead to international complications in our country. The effective safeguard against this form of aggression

is the introduction of democracy without any delay". The Hindu, 20 March 1950. Communist expansion<sup>498</sup>.

## **3.2 CHINESE MOVE TO ANNEX TIBET AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS**

The other factor that had even more decisive influence over the Indian Government's attitude was the continuous mounting of threat to the Integrity of Tibet. On May 22, 1950, Peking Radio broadcast a program for the liberation of Tibet<sup>499</sup>. These developments seemed to have impressed upon the Government of India the need to reach quick agreement with the Ranas before China could overwhelm Tibet and extend its ambitions to Nepal. It was, therefore, decided to conclude the treaties even without securing 'liberalization'. Accordingly, the two treaties of Peace and Friendship and Trade and Commerce were signed in Kathmandu on July 31, 1950 and within no time, the two governments rectified them.<sup>500</sup>

### **3.2.1 Indo-Nepalese Treaty of 1950**

The new treaty of peace and friendship was though largely modeled after the 1923 treaty, was an improvement on the same in certain respects. The new treaty sought to recognize Nepal's independence in fuller terms. Second article of the treaty categorically stated that "The two governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments". The obligatory character of the provision was emphasized by replacement of the phrase "agree to inform" with "undertake to inform". The scope was also widened by introducing the phrase "likely to cause any breach" in the place of "likely to rupture" of the previous treaty's third Article.

Article 3 provided for the "most favorite clause" in the field of diplomatic relations and Articles 6 and 7 of the new Treaty provided for the grant to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other, "the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature", were innovation, aimed at developing relationship between the two countries at mass level. Article 5 of the new treaty was a major gain for Nepal, as in it Nepal Government was able to throw-off restrictions on the import of arms, ammunitions and war like materials to Nepal which were there in Article 5 of the old treaty,<sup>501</sup> a concession for which latter Government had-been striving hard during the

British days. The new article envisaged that, "The Government of Nepal shall be free to import from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal". "The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement was, however, to "be worked out by the two governments acting in consultation". Article 9 and 10 provided that the treaty will 'come in force' from the date of putting signature on the instrument and 'shall remain in force' until terminated by either party on one year's notice. No less important were the letters exchanged at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, as the two governments had then "agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange of letters", which were kept secret until 1959. The contents of these letters reveal acute awareness of the two governments of the implications of the developments in Tibet and their willingness to put a common stand in time of need. Thus, carrying further the stipulation made in Article 2 for mutual consultations, it was declared in the first Para of the letter that,

*"Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor and to deal with any such threat, the two Governments shall consult with each other and devise effective counter-measures"<sup>502</sup>.*

One can well mark the influence of security considerations pointed out by the Indian Intelligence Bureau in September, 1949 before the Government of India and also the interim views of the two committees constituted for examining the defense and security problems of the two countries in face of the Tibetan subversion under the chairmanship of the Indian Deputy Defense Minister, Major General Himmat Singh ji, and Major General Throat respectively in formulation of the said provision, which was to provide a legal basis for any future Indo-Nepalese joint ventures in defense and security such as the establishment of check posts etc. Still more significant was the revival of an old provision of the Anglo-Nepalese Treaty 1814, in para 5 of the letters, forbidding either Government from employing any foreigner whose activities may be prejudicial to the security of the other- through, unlike the previous one, the obligation was now made bilateral. Again, the seemingly unrestricted right of importing arms etc. in Nepal conceded to for the first time in the history of Indo-Nepalese relationship was conditioned by Para 2 of the letters. It envisaged that "Any arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal that the Government of Nepal may import through the territory of India shall be so imported with the assistance and agreement of the Government of India". (Emphasis supplied).

The Article 5 itself envisaged that "The procedure for giving effect to this (arms importation) arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments" and though no formal restriction appears to have been put forth by the Government of India in this respect, "by tacit agreement the source from which arms would be obtained (i.e. India) later became a part of the working arrangement between the two countries"<sup>503</sup>. Regarding equal treatment for nationals of the other country provided in Article 7 of the treaty, cognizance was taken of the fact that, "it may be necessary for some time to come to afford the Nepalese nationals in Nepal protection from unrestricted competition". However, "The nature and extent of this protection" was to be "determined as and when required by mutual agreement between the two Governments".

The later provision explains the continuance of the traditional restrictions on Indians along with the other foreigners in many matters in Nepal and the enactment of certain land reforms legislation under which no foreigner is to enjoy the right to own land over there, which applied to Indians also<sup>504</sup>. Further, Para 4 of the said letter made it obligatory for the Nepal Government to "give first preference to the Government or the nationals of India in regard to the development of the natural resources of, or of any industrial project in Nepal"<sup>505</sup>. The insertion of this provision might well have been motivated by the keen interest of the Indian Government in the Nepalese development projects as well as to allay such apprehension as might have been caused in India by rumors of the alleged intentions of the sponsors of British aerial surveys, or, of the Ripley Geological Exploration Mission referred to earlier. India could use it to prevent any third country's (including China's) machinations in the kingdom against the security interests of India.

### 3.2.2 Nepal's Reaction to the Chinese Moves

Nepalese reaction to the developments is well brought out in a remark of R.K. Shah, the former Foreign Affairs Minister of the Government of Nepal<sup>506</sup>. Commenting on the stipulation to meet jointly any "foreign aggression" contained in the letters exchanged and allied provision, he pointed out later on that,

*"Since in the existing circumstances the potential aggressor could have been only China, it is clear that Nepal, instead of having an independent policy towards the new China, was at least to begin with tied to Indian foreign policy and defense system"*<sup>507</sup>.

An overall assessment of the treaties reveal that the Ranas could well read India's concern for the security needs in Nepal and by accommodating them fully on that score, they tried to impress

upon the Government of India that they are reliable friends of India and responsive to the latter's national interest, and thereby to silence it on the question of 'liberalization'. Their failure to win the whole-hearted or unqualified support of the Government of India in the ensuing struggle was not due to any fault in their diplomatic strategy, but because of their persistent resistance to even moderate political reforms, which convinced India of the incapacity of the Rana regime to perceive and arrest adverse trends and challenges from the North.

Further, though in the face of the worsening situation in the North, India had to contend with a treaty of friendship without getting any satisfaction from the Ranas over the issue of liberalization of the autocratic form of their Government and on undertaking essential socio-economic reforms, it had left a bitter taste, which was well exploited by the Nepali exiles in India. B.P. Koirala tried to convince the ruling Congress Party that economic reforms were impossible under the Rana regime, and that a people's revolution was a necessity. At the same time, he sought to assure India that this could be done without destroying the viable administrative instrumentality of the state or jeopardizing stability of the kingdom – a chief concern of the Indian Government in wake of the developments in the North. He emphasized that,

"...Nowhere else in the world is a mighty economic revolution contemplated with practically no attendant upheavals as in Nepal. The number of people to be adversely affected by the change - over will not exceed a few hundred"<sup>508</sup>.

The Nepalese nationalist opposed to the Rana regime felt frustrated at the conclusion of the Treaty as it seemed unlikely that after achieving this accommodation of interests, the Government of India would be inclined to pressurize or persuade the Ranas to liberalize their rule.

This brought all such splinter groups of Nepalese dissidents together. With the objective of strengthening the movement, the Nepalese National Congress and the Nepali Democratic Congress merged together on April 9, 1950, to form the Nepali Congress<sup>509</sup>. The effort were made to have further unity talks with the Nepali Communist Party on an anti - Rana plank. Finally, the move resulted in a conference of all the Nepalese dissidents at Bairagnia (India) on September 26 - 27, 1950, where after being convinced that the non - violent methods would not work in the prevailing circumstances, they resolved to organize an armed revolt against the Ranas in August, 1950<sup>510</sup>. The date had to be postponed because of the difficulties in procuring sufficient number of arms. At this moment, the Nepali Congress announced publicly that it stood for the establishment of full democracy under a constitutional monarchy in Nepal, that, "it favored the

closest friendship with the India and would not tolerate the penetration of Nepal by foreign influence, political, economic or military<sup>#511</sup>.

### 3.2.3 China's moves in Tibet and Indian Reaction

The conclusion of the Indo-Nepalese Treaties appear to have given impetus to Chinese activities in the Himalayan region. On August 5, the new China News Agency circulated statement by General Liu Po-Chen, the Chairman of the South-West China Military Affairs Commission and Commander of the Second Field Army, in which he declared that the Chinese army would soon enter Tibet and drive out 'the aggressive influence of British and American imperialists' from the country<sup>#512</sup>.

### 3.2.4 Indian efforts to save Tibet

Naturally New Delhi felt greatly disturbed. The Indian Ambassador in Peking, Sardar K M Panikkar, in several meetings & discussions with Chinese Premier Chou En - lai, expressed the hope that the Chinese would follow a policy of peaceful settlement with Tibet. He summarized the outcome of his discussions thus,

*"The Premier, however, replied that while the liberalization of Tibet was a 'sacred duty', his Government were anxious to secure their ends by negotiations and not by military action"<sup>#13</sup>.*

No authentic record of what actually transpired in these meetings is available. However, later on, the Chinese in their reply dated November 16, 1952, to the Indian Note protesting the violation of the Chinese promises given to the Indian Government to honor Tibetan autonomy and not to use force to settle the issue, the Chinese chose to remind the Government of India that,

*"According to the provisions of the Common Program, adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the relative autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of the Chinese sovereignty", and alleged that "this point was recognized by the Indian Government in its aide memoire to the Chinese Government dated August 28 this year"<sup>#14</sup>.* This aide memoire is nowhere available on the records, published either by the Chinese Government or the Government of India, though the official contradiction of the said reference has also not appeared in the published correspondence. It may, however, be safely assumed that a



considerable amount of the confusion about the Chinese meaning and definition of the term "regional autonomy" persisted in India and elsewhere.

The Note further claimed that: *“On August 31, 1950, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Indian Government through Ambassador Panikker that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was going to take action soon in West Sinkiang according to set plans, and express the hope that the Indian Government would assist the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet so that it might arrive in Peking in mid-September to begin peace negotiations”*. In early and mid - September, the Chinese charged Affairs, Shen Chien, and later Ambassador Yuan Chung-hsien, in both in person, told the said delegation that it was imperative that it should hasten to Peking before end of September, otherwise this said delegation should bear the consequences and be responsible for all the subsequent events resulting the delay<sup>515</sup>.

On September 13, 1950, the People’s Daily made a violent attack on the Government of India following the conclusion of Indo - Bhutanese Treaty on August 8, 1950, declaring it as a threat of future subversion of Tibet<sup>516</sup>.

In the meantime, in September, the Tibetan delegation started negotiations in New Delhi with the Chinese Ambassador in India over the future relationship between Lhasa and Peking. On September 30, i.e., on the eve of the first anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese People’s Republic, when the talks were still going on, Chou En-lai declared in Peking his Government’s determination "to liberate the people of Tibet and stand on guard at the Chinese frontiers". The last round of inconclusive talks that opened very next day in New Delhi soon broke -off, because the Chinese Ambassador refused to commit himself and insisted instead that the delegation should proceed to Peking for the settlement. The Tibetan delegation accordingly left Delhi for Peking through Calcutta.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet was not now far off. On October 7, 1950, while the delegation was in Calcutta on its way to Peking, the process of so called "liberating" Tibet began. Without any forewarning or ultimatum, some 40,000 Chinese soldiers broke into Tibet and on September 7, cross the Dre Che river, which the Tibetans claimed, had "for long been the boundary of Tibetan territories, at a number of places"<sup>517</sup>.

“In quick succession", to quote from Tibet's complaint to the United Nations, "places of strategic importance such as, Demar, Kamto, Tunga, Tshame, Rimochegoty, Yakalo and Markhan, fell to the Chinese. Kham defences were wiped out and soon Chamdo was over-run on October 19.

The Tibetan army was destroyed and large part of 'outer Tibet' was occupied. Lhodzong fell on 2<sup>nd</sup> October and similar was the fate of all major eastern passes into Tibet<sup>518</sup>. Now nothing remained to stop the Chinese from pouring into Lhasa and coming right up to the Indian Borders.

While rumors of the Chinese invasion were appearing in the Indian Press since long, no official confirmation was forthcoming from Peking. The Indian Government also was kept in dark. "Visits and representations to the Foreign office," (of China)", moaned Panikkar, "brought no results. The WaiChiaopu officials were polite but silent .... The only information I was able to bring out of them was that certain pacificatory measures were being taken in West Sikiang, that is on the borders of Tibet proper"<sup>519</sup>.

Later on, in its note of October 28 also, the Government of India made it a point of complaint that "we have received no intimation of this (the Chinese military action in Tibet) from your Ambassador here or from our Ambassador in Peking"<sup>520</sup>. However, the Chinese Government in its note referred to earlier (of November 16, 1950), refuted that "in mid-October, Chinese Ambassador Yuan again informed the Indian Government of this. Yet still owing to external instigation, the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet fabricated various pretexts and remained in India"<sup>521</sup>.

In any case, it was on October 25, 1950, that the Peking radio announced that the process of 'liberating Tibet' had begun<sup>522</sup>. The New China News Agency also publicly announced that, "A political mobilization directive had been issued ordering the Chinese liberation forces to advance into Tibet to liberate three million Tibetans from the imperialist aggression, to complete the unification of the whole of China and to safeguard the frontier regions of the Country"<sup>523</sup>.

Earlier, New Delhi had already presented Peking with a "Memorandum on the Problem of Tibet" through its Ambassador, Panikkar in Peking, on October 21, 1950. In this memorandum, Panikkar pleaded with the Chinese that such action in Tibet would not be in China's own interest or in the interest of world peace and might prejudice China's application for its membership to the United Nations<sup>524</sup>.

This memorandum has been severely criticized by some scholars on the ground that it appealed to the Chinese self-interest rather than to press India's case on the basis of its established rights in Tibet<sup>525</sup>. The Indian entreaties fell on a deaf ear and on October 25, 1950, Radio Peking officially confirmed the Chinese armed action. The Government of India reacted by handing

over a protest note to the Chinese Foreign Minister, deeply regretting that the "Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution to the problem of their relations with Tibet by force", despite their repeated assurance to it to the contrary<sup>526</sup>. Peking broke its silence to inform the Indians, through an extremely candid reply dated October 30, 1950, that, *"The People's Republic of China would like to make it clear; Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory, the problem of Tibet is extremely the domestic problem of China. The Chinese People Liberation Army must enter Tibet liberate the people and defend the frontiers of China"*. It was further made clear that 'no foreign interference will be tolerated', and this communiqué, for the first time, officially charged that the Indian attitude was affected by the foreign influences<sup>527</sup>.

The Government of India realized that the time had come to take stronger line. In their reply to the Chinese note on October 31, they draw the Chinese attention to the Indian interest in Tibet. It was made clear that India had no political or territorial ambition in Tibet, but certain rights had grown out of usage and agreement which are natural among neighbors with close cultural and commercial relations<sup>528</sup>.

### 3.2.5 Sardar Patel's Anxiety on Chinese Moves

Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister of India, communicated to Nehru, in a long confidential note, the implications of the Chinese move in Tibet. He pointed out that:

*"We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided .... The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different .... That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century"*<sup>529</sup>. He also pointed out that if a Communist subversion is attempted, either in India or Nepal, or in India through Nepal, the guerillas could safely find their rear in Tibet as a result of the Chinese take-over of the Country<sup>530</sup>. Such a possibility would be checked only through a well - guarded defense, not only on the Indian frontiers, but on the Tibetan - Nepalese frontier as Well<sup>531</sup>.

Sardar Patel appears to have written this letter in the context of a long note prepared by the Intelligence Bureau in face of the Chinese invasion of Tibet on November 3, 1950, entitled 'On the New Problems of Internal and Frontier Security' posed by the Chinese occupation of Tibet. The note had pointed out the same thing that the possibility of guerilla finding a rear could be

checked only through a well- guarded defense not only on the Indian frontiers but on the Tibetan-Nepalese frontier as well<sup>532</sup>.

It, therefore, suggested that the possibility of the Nepalese Government accepting India's assistance to ward-off dangers from the north should be probed. Nepal might be encouraged to seek the Indian Army's help in training its army and to accept assistance in guarding the frontiers<sup>533</sup>. To the great concern of India, it was found at this juncture that no Nepalese defense post existed on the rugged mountains and on the most of the difficult terrains on the border - in fact the Government of Nepal did not even know how many passes existed between Nepal and Tibet<sup>534</sup>. Almost unlimited scope for infiltration existed on these frontiers. In any case, Nepal did not possess the means to resist any Chinese penetration into their Country. Sardar Patel, therefore, recommended that immediate political and administrative steps ought to be taken to strengthen the Himalayan border line between Tibet and India and the arrangements should further include Nepal.

The Indian Cabinet, while accepting the twin reports of the Intelligence Bureau and of Sardar Patel, appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Himmat Singh ji, the then Deputy Defence Minister of India, to make an in-depth study of the reports and to assess the defense needs on that basis and further to recommend concrete measures to accomplish the task. This Committee, popularly known as the Himmat Singh ji Committee, also referred to by some scholars as "North and North - Eastern Border Defense Committee", included the representatives of the Home, External Affairs, Defense and Communication Ministries also<sup>535</sup>. The said Committee then appointed a sub-committee under Major-General Thorat as its Chairman to access the security needs of Nepal and that country's requirements of Indian assistance.

The sub-committee submitted its report to the parent Committee in August, 1951 and the parent Committee in turn presented its final report to the Government of India in September 1951. Among other things, the Committee recommended that the Nepal Government should be persuaded to survey it's frontier and passes with Tibet, establish check posts wherever necessary, extend its effective administrative control to the remote areas, improve the road - system and to reorganize its Army on modern lines. It stressed the fact that the defence of India was not possible without the defense of Nepal<sup>536</sup>. The Cabinet of the Government of India approved the recommendations and the Indian Foreign Office then moved to achieve these objectives.

The strategy, however, meant considering Nepal and India as one unit so far as defense requirements were concerned and as such it called for the existence of a friendly, imaginative

and accommodating Government in Nepal responsive to the security needs of India together with its own on a bi-lateral plan.

While India was the busy in evolving its own answer to the first gathering clouds deterioration situation/ strategic milieu on the Tibetan plateau, view the political/ internal developments in Nepal to suddenly headed towards a crisis almost simultaneously.

### **3.2.6 Nepalese King Seeks Asylum in India**

We have noted in the foregoing chapters that since the rise of Jung Bahadur, the real power of the state vested into the hands of Rana Prime Minister (who was called Maharaja) and King (Maharajadhiraj) was relegated to a position of a mere titular head. King Tribhuwan Bir Bikram Sah Dev, however, developed sympathy for the democratic movement and the anti - Rana uprising staged by the Praja Parishad during 1935-40 period in the Kingdom was supposed to have the blessings and tacit support of the King<sup>537</sup>. The position of the King of Nepal used to be one of a palace - prisoner and the Ranas tried to keep him isolated from the world outside. King Tribhuwan, however, managed to acquire knowledge of new political trends and developments through books which he used to procure secretly through his personal associations. During the brief spell of his treatment in Calcutta in the year 1947, he established contacts with the newly formed Nepali National Congress and was able to maintain them afterwards also<sup>538</sup>. He is also said to have had several meetings in disguise with the two Indian Ambassadors in Nepal, Sardar Surjit Singh Majeethia and C.P.N. Singh<sup>539</sup>. Because of his desire to free himself from the clutches of the Rana Prime Minister's and to restore the power and prestige of the King and also impelled by the ideas of freedom and democracy inculcated through books, he became keen to end the Rana hegemony in Nepal.

In the meantime, on 29 September 1950, the Rana Government claimed to have unearthed a plot to assassinate the then Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher by the supporters of the Nepali Congress<sup>540</sup>. King Tribhuwan refused to sign death- warrant for the alleged plotters which strengthened the Rana family's belief of the King's complicity in the conspiracy. Greater restrictions were placed on him and his movements were completely curbed. Apprehending a Rana plot against his life, the King, using one of his rear outings, took the drastic step of driving into the Indian Embassy at Kathmandu on November 6, 1950, along with the Crown Prince, Mahendra, and other members of the Royal family excepting his three years old grandson, Prince Gyanendra<sup>541</sup>.

The Monarch then pleaded for an asylum in India and requested the Indian Ambassador C.P.N. Singh to arrange his visit to India for medical treatment<sup>542</sup>. The King refused to see officials sent by the Prime Minister of Nepal and turned down the latter's appeal to return to the palace. The Nepalese Prime Minister lodged a strong protest with the Indian Ambassador and demanded the King back. On India's refusal to do so, the Rana Government announced the deposition of the King and enthronement of Prince Gyanendra in his place on the following day.

Violent demonstrations were staged by the Ranas outside the Embassy threatening removal of the king even by force. Undeterred by threats and pressures, the Indian Government refused to recognize the new investiture and decided to accord all facilities to the King to come to India<sup>543</sup>. Accordingly, two special Dakotas of the Indian Air Force were sent to Kathmandu to bring the King and his family to India, much against the wishes of the Rana Government, which, however, reluctantly granted the permission<sup>544</sup>. The King landed in New Delhi on November 11, 1950 where he was received with all honours due to the head of a sovereign state<sup>545</sup>. According to the Nepali revolutionaries, it was decided in their Bairagnia Conference itself that during the Dushehra celebrations, the King would be kidnapped and brought to the safety in India and the act was to be followed by insurrection by the Nepalese Congress workers within Nepal. But the dramatic move by the King precipitated their action. A Conference of the Congress workers was hurriedly summoned in India to devise a new plan. Consequently, as soon as the King reached India, the Congress volunteers crossed into Nepal from nine points from bases in India in an effort to capture firstly the district headquarters falling in their way, then the reigns of Kathmandu Government itself by force of arms. They met with initial success too.

A significant victory was achieved through the capture of Birganj, the second biggest town of Nepal, where the Nepali Congress workers seized the Government treasury also. A rival government was announced immediately<sup>546</sup>. The Koirala brothers brought rupees 35 lakhs so obtained to New Delhi to hand it over to the King. The Government of India, however, impounded the money. Then, to the North from Birganj, the Nepali Congress forces marched up to Amlekhganj and to the West, they could capture Butwal and Nautanwa. Meanwhile, angry demonstrations were held in Kathmandu and in other cities in support of the King and for a moment it appeared that a violent upsurge might engulf the country.

The Ranas, however, reacted sharply. After the said 'deposition' of the King from thrown, they further moved to obtain the recognition of the new King from the nations with which they had diplomatic contacts, namely, India, Great Britain and the United States of America<sup>547</sup>.

### 3.2.7 Reaction in India

The Indian Government had never hidden its sympathy for the cause of democracy in Nepal. It had in the past expressed its view in the most unequivocal terms that peace and stability in that Country, so vital to India's own security, would be safeguarded only if the Ranas would relax their autocratic rule and introduce badly needed reforms to satisfy the people and to develop their stake in guarding the Country against any threat from the North. Its advice was then ignored, and the Government of India, impelled both by considerations of international code and expediency, did not choose to press the Rana Government to the extent of exposing itself to the charge of interference. But now threat from the North by way of the Chinese occupation of the Tibet was not a matter of conjecture, it had become a reality. Out of the two shields of India's northern defenses - an autonomous Tibet and an independent but if a firm ally Nepal - the first had fallen apart and the threat to other had multiplied, especially when it was weakened by political disorder and discontent.

Thus, the coincidence of the King's asylum in India followed by revolt against the Rana regime in Nepal with Tibet's subversion by the Chinese presented itself before the Government of India not only an opportunity, but a compulsion to act decisively. Comments by statesmen, newspapers, and high officials in India during the period reflected the impact of the Tibetan developments over the Indian mind in formulating their response and determining their attitude towards the Nepalese crisis. Reflecting the anxiety of the Indian people over the question of security of Nepal in the context of the Tibetan subjugation, the Hindu pointed out, only a day ahead of the King's action, that the advance of the Communist forces into Tibet had doubtless focused,

*"... attention on the internal political situation in the independent State of Nepal ... Although the question of internal freedom could not obviously find a place in the Treaty between two independent countries, the Government of India did not fail to urge on the rulers of Nepal that such reforms were overdue. While the Nepalese Government accepted the seriousness of the Indian advice, no concrete steps whatever had been taken to carry out the advice"<sup>548</sup>.*

Later, when the King's action was a matter of hot debate, the Indian papers again pointed out the necessity of viewing the situation in the perspective of developments in Tibet. The Statesman, for instance, in its issue of November 9, 1950, that is two days after King's action, spotlighted editorially the dangers to which Nepal had been exposed following the Chinese invasion of Tibet and to the relevance of orienting India's Nepal policy in that context<sup>549</sup>. Pointing out the danger

in the situation, the Socialist Party leader Dr Ram Manohar Lohiya warned that, *“While it is already aflame, let us not forget Nepal. Between the corruption and tyranny of the present Government of Nepal and the chaos of the Soviet camp, there luckily stands the wall of the Nepali Congress. Further delay is dangerous and the people of India must lend their active support to the Nepali struggle for democracy”*<sup>50</sup>

Sardar Patel also, in his letter written to Nehru on the following day, i.e., on October 7, 1950, pointed out to him that:

“Let us also considered the political considerations on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our Northern or North - Eastern approaches consists of Nepal, Bhutan... From the point of view of communications they are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration.

Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime, based almost entirely on force; it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In the circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed, and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and exterior line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgment, therefore, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating”<sup>51</sup>.

Two days later, he made a public reference to the developments in Nepal and told the audience that, "In that country, the Raja (King) has sought sanctuary in the Indian Embassy and that those who are wielding real power today in Nepal do not accept the Raja as the head of the State. They have installed the Raja's three-years old grandson on the gaddi; they want us to accept this position". "How can we do so?" he asked the gathering, and further emphasized that internal feud in Nepal had laid India's Northern frontier wide open to outside danger. It was imperative, therefore, for the Indians to be well prepared to meet any challenge from any quarter, he warned<sup>52</sup>. Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, another senior Cabinet colleague of Nehru and top advisor on foreign policy, commented on November 11, that,

“Although we cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal, we have to take cognizance of any discontent that arise there. Nepal is India's neighbor and any crisis there may endanger India's freedom...It is amazing that in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century naked autocracy should reign



supreme in any part of the world. It is unthinkable and intolerable. There is not even one Indian who today does not sympathize with the cause of the Nepalese people.”<sup>553</sup> Thus, when the Nepali Congress prepared a plan of action to offer active resistance in Nepal, the government of India welcomed it as a method to pressurize the Ranas into conceding political reforms, but it recommended that only non-violent tactics should be employed and that the scope of objectives of the struggle should remain well defined and restricted, aiming at reforms rather than violent revolution which might threaten anarchy, in a world, the "middle way" should be followed. The Nepali Congress leaders found it impossible to launch a mass Satyagraha in the existing circumstances and persisted in its preparations for an armed Revolution. As Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, the Central Cabinet Minister and a close confidant of Nehru, was said to have been kept informed of the Nepali Congress 'hunt for arms', it may be inferred that finally the Government of India might have decided to 'look the other way' when the Nepali Congress decided for a change in tactics, provided that the position of the Government of India was not "compromised" and the "middle-way" still remained the guiding course.

### 3.2.8 Indian Government Solicits "Middle Way"

At the official level, however, the Government of India followed a very cautious policy which, adjudged by norms of international behavior and the mutual relationship existing between the two countries, can only be called neutral and diplomatically correct. The Indian Government made it known that it respected the independence of Nepal and that correct international conduct would not be sacrificed for the sake of political expediency<sup>554</sup>. At the same time, Presidential Address in the Parliament did stress the point that it was also the purpose of India to see the Nepalese people “achieve political and economic progress”<sup>555</sup>.

It was also pointed out in New Delhi that the Government could hardly ignore public sentiments for the Nepal’s democratic movement as well as the incongruity of the existence of an autocratic state "sandwiched between Communist regime and Republican democracy"<sup>556</sup>. The Government of India made it further known that their advice to the Rana Government was "inspired by common dangers ahead" and was for the "good of both countries"<sup>557</sup>.

While the treatment the King received and the statements made by various Government functionaries made it amply clear that the Government of India's sympathies were with the Nepali Congress, it refused to be involved in any way or to help in the arms -traffic required for the action, both before and after the King's asylum and assured the Nepalese Government that

Indian territory would not be allowed to be used "as a base of operations for hostile actions against Nepal".

Armed attacks by Nepali Congress "Mukti Sena" had apparently come more as surprise than as gratifying to the Government of India. Following the Nepal Government's complaint, the Indian authorities put a bar on Nepali rebels using the Indian railways for transporting armed men and equipment and imposed a ban on flights over Nepali territory by all Indian airlines, including the Himalayan Aviation which had earlier taken part in the action and was owned by a Nepali citizen.

As a result of all this, and more so because of their inherent weakness such as lack of an efficient and well trained personnel, adequate resources and a unified command, the Nepali Congress offensive appeared to be losing ground. By November 22, it had almost collapsed. But this could not, by itself, solve the crisis. Hostile demonstrations were continuing in Kathmandu and the revolutionaries were preparing for a second offensive.

One of the most important determinants of the situation, however, was the consolidation of the Government of India's diplomatic support behind King Tribhuvan, and thus by implication, behind the anti-Rana movement in Nepal. The attitude of the British Government was obviously sympathetic to the Rana regime and initially it was willing to recognize the Child-King, but ultimately refrained from doing so because of the fear of an open rupture with the Government of India over the issue.

The Government of India stood its ground over the issue, and a reaffirmation of their continued recognition of the King and support to democratic forces was made by Maulana Azad in his speech of November 11, 1950<sup>558</sup>. On November 22, the Press Trust of India reported that the Government of India had informed the British Government that it would not recognize the Child King and that:

"New Delhi feels that the restoration of 'normal conditions' by stamping out a limited and ill-planned insurrection cannot be taken to indicate the stability of the present regime. Disaffection on the part of the majority of the people against the admittedly autocratic and feudalistic regime had by no means disappeared"<sup>559</sup>.

The Nepali scene soon witnessed a new upsurge in the revolutionary movement and Biratnagar and several other towns in the Nepali Terai region as well as a large area in eastern hills fell to the revolutionaries. Further, coinciding with the Nepali Congress onslaught, the warlike Kirats in eastern Nepal also revolted to proclaim establishment of an independent Republic over an area

of 6,000 sq. miles<sup>560</sup>. This was an ominous sign as the territorial integrity of Nepal itself was being threatened and it could stimulate similar trouble or in other parts as well, particularly on Tibet-Nepal borders, where inhabiting communities had always enjoyed maximum autonomy and were, at best, under tenuous administrative control of the Kathmandu Government.

This, coupled with the momentum that the revolutionary tide had gathered without a well-organized command, considerably enhanced political instability within the Kingdom and threatened complete anarchy over there in the near future. Such a situation, in turn, posed a danger to India's own security and impelled the Government of India to intervene and to assume more active role as a mediator to settle the scores between the Ranas on the one hand and the King and the Nepali Congress on the other.

### 3.2.9 The Tibetan Perspective

Amidst the mounting crisis in the Indian - Nepalese relations came the Chinese reply to the Indian note of October 31, 1950. In their reply, dated November 16, the Chinese Government asserted that,

“Tibet it is an integral part of Chinese territory and that the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government”<sup>561</sup>.

Although nothing substantial came out of the Indian remonstrations, it seems that the Government of India decided not to pursue the matter further. Panikkar commented: "Both parties had made their point of view and we are content to let it rest there"<sup>562</sup>. According to B.N. Mullik, the then Director of Intelligence Bureau of India, the Government of India acquiesced in the Chinese position at that time, as it felt that this concession to the Chinese view point regarding Tibet would restrain them from making further encroachment into the Himalayan region and attempting an accelerated subjugation of Tibet. A hard and determined Indian stand on Tibet, it was thought, would only serve the purpose of increasing the Chinese suspicion about the Government of India's intention in Tibet<sup>563</sup>.

Possibly, the Government of India was also worried that if the situation in Tibet worsened further, it might heighten the existing international tension. As Professor Norman Palmer has pointed out, India was,

*“... sub consciously or unconsciously forced on the side of the Communist regime by the fear that the Korean war was going to be used, or, at least the threat was there, that it may be used as an instrument by the US, to reopen Chinese civil war and perhaps a general war would result”<sup>64</sup>.*

As a matter of fact, Nehru had referred to the possibility of a world war breaking out within the next fifteen months, in a public speech made in Bombay on November 7, 1950<sup>65</sup>. Thus, India declined the Tibetan request to sponsor its case in the United Nations. Lhasa then preferred a direct appeal to the President of the Fifth Session of the United Nations Assembly, on November 7, 1950, asking the world body to intercede on its behalf and "restrain Chinese aggression"<sup>66</sup>.

When the Steering Committee of the United Nations General Assembly met on November 24, 1951 to consider El Salvador's request to put the Tibetan appeal on the Agenda<sup>67</sup>, the Indian representative, Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, is reported to have told the Committee that,

*“He had no desire to express an opinion on the difficulties which had arisen in between China and Tibet, but would point out that, in a latest note received by his Government, the Peking Government had declared that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo, a town some 480 kilometers from Lhasa. The Indian Government was certain that the Tibetan question would still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China”<sup>68</sup>.*

This, coupled with equivocal attitude of the British, finally lead to the postponement of the consideration. Tibet, however protested against the postponement and reiterated that it would accept any decisions which the United Nations would take<sup>69</sup>.

The negotiations were not resumed after their breakdown in New Delhi, in fact the Tibetan delegation was at this stage instructed by Lhasa to stay in India itself and not to proceed in Peking. Instead the Dalai Lama appointed a three member delegation to present the Tibetan case before the United Nations. The delegation had only reached India on its way to the Lake Success, when the Steering Committee had taken the decision not to discuss Tibet. By trying to cultivate China, even at that stage, Nehru was merely trying to retain whatever was left of the Indian status in the Himalayas. While he was primarily motivated by the desire to preserve the integrity of India, and protect its security interest, he was also inspired by his concern of the maintenance of the world peace. Nehru might also have hoped to win a brief respite and to use it for consolidating the Indian position in the Himalayan States.

With Tibet written-off, the Government of India's emphasis shifted from "outer - buffer" to "inner - buffer" with Nepal occupying a pivotal place. India was now appeared to be prepared to relinquish Curzon's "forward policy" of treating Tibet as India's outer defense line. With a favorably disposed China, it was hoped, India would get time & opportunity to unite all the border lands south of Tibet into one defense unit without a hazardous and unpredictable military operation.

Meanwhile, with the flight of the Nepalese King to India, full - fledged armed struggle against the Rana regime had begun in Nepal under the leadership of Nepali National Congress. In a draft policy statement issued by the Communist Party of India's Polit Bureau, on November 15, 1950, the Communist indicated that they were thinking of continuing armed struggle till the "liberation" of the Country. This exhortation was addressed to their comrades in Nepal<sup>570</sup>.

### **3.2.10 Nehru delineates co-relation between Tibet & Nepal Developments**

India's concern for Nepal appears to be the major reason, if not the sole one, responsible for softening of India's stand on Tibet. The debate in the Indian Parliament on Nepal reflected the impact of the Tibetan developments over the minds of the Indian statesmen and policy-makers. Delineating India's steps towards the internal developments of Kingdom, particularly the present one, Prime Minister Nehru pointed out that,

“Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal has become still more acute and personal, because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet. Besides our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we were also interested in the security of our own Country. From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course, they are no longer as impossible as they used to be but are still fairly effective. The Himalayas lie mostly on the northern border of Nepal. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principle barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security. The recent developments have made us ponder more deeply over the Nepal situation than we had done previously<sup>571</sup>. He further added that,

*“We desire a strong and progressive Nepal. In fact, our chief need... is peace and stability .... Having said that, I should also like to add that a return to the old order will not bring peace and stability to Nepal”<sup>572</sup>.*

These considerations of peace and stability remained uppermost in Nehru’s mind and the Indian policy was to prevent any "major upheaval" & to tread a "middle path" which would ensure the progress of Nepal along with introduction of some democratic advances without "total uprooting of the ancient order"<sup>573</sup>.

Several other prominent members of the parliament belonging to different political parties revealed the similar concern for the Tibetan developments and viewed happening in Nepal in that context. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee said:

*“It is perfectly true we are interested in Nepal. It affects our security to a very considerable measure ...we must have a strong and stable Government in Nepal, which has the backing of the people at large ... if by any chance, the civil war continues in Nepal, it is not India that will benefit, it is China through Tibet which may play havoc in that part of Asia”<sup>574</sup>.*

Acharya J. B. Kriplani rejected Nehru’s plea for following a middle path and just greater awareness: *“I say today there is no middle path between tyranny and democracy... If democratic forces are defeated in Nepal, the Communist forces are alive there and they are underground and soon we may find that people's China sent an army of liberation in Kathmandu. It will be no time then to talk of the old line between Nepal and Tibet”<sup>575</sup>.*

Referring to the biting Chinese criticism of the Indian interest in Tibet, H.N. Kunzru pointed out that, *“Indeed it is a warning to us and we should take steps immediately to strengthen our own position so that we may support all those, whose security depends on us... we have to be ready to support Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh”<sup>576</sup>.*

Shibban Lal Saxena emphasized that, “if autocracy continues any longer, that country is sure to give way to Communism soon”<sup>577</sup>.

He was supported by S.N. Mishra, who said that, *“Any indecision and wavering in regard to Nepal is certainly harmful for India ... Nepal and India, from larger considerations of defense and strategy, must always be considered as one unit ... The democratization of Nepal is an urgent necessity”<sup>578</sup>.*

An overall analysis of this debate reveals that there was unanimity in linking the developments in Nepal with those in Tibet. Notwithstanding the differences on how best the Indian interests could be served there, the overwhelming majority of the members were in favor of supporting the democratic movement in Nepal. The Government of India therefore continued to exert diplomatic pressure 'patiently' but firmly on the Rana's to seek accommodation with King Tribhuwan & the democratic forces. Feeling concerned with the Rana's efforts to seek support from the foreign powers, especially from the Western nations, Nehru was forced to restate bluntly India's special relationship with Nepal: *"Frankly, we do not like and shall not brook any foreign interference in Nepal. We recognize Nepal as an independent Country. We wish her well. But even a child knows that one cannot go Nepal without passing through India. Therefore, no other country can have an intimate relationship with Nepal as ours is. We would like every other country to appreciate the intimate geographical and cultural relationship that exists between India and Nepal"*<sup>579</sup>.

In fact it was a warning to the Ranas as well that they should not bank much upon any external support and that if they do not agree to a moderate solution, a total uprooting of the system might have to be forced upon them. Further, in accordance with the statement of policy over the issue in the Parliament in unequivocal terms, the Nepalese negotiators were presented with the memorandum drawn by the Government of India for the consideration of the Nepalese Government. The memorandum envisaged,

1. the convening of an elected constituent assembly at the earliest opportunity to draft a new constitution;
2. the formation of an interim government with "popular" representatives; and c-the continuance of King Tribhuwan as the Monarch of Nepal<sup>580</sup>.

The Nepalese delegation returned to Kathmandu on December 9 with the memorandum, but without any specific assurance on it given to Government of India. Soon, the second offensive was launched by the Nepali Congress and it was able to capture Biratnagar, the only industrial town of Nepal, as well as Khailali, Kanchanpur, Jhalpa, Bhojpur, Chainpur, Bingla and Khotang in between December 15 and 30, 1950<sup>581</sup>.

### 3.2.11 Indian Memorandum to the Ranas

A fierce debate had ensued amongst the Ranas themselves over whether to accept or to reject the Indian proposals right after the Memorandum was received by Kathmandu. The younger section and less favored branch of the family wanted their acceptance, while others, especially Mohan Shumsher, were still adamant & were not willing to accept them.

Ultimately, the Nepalese Government chose to acknowledge the Indian Memorandum promising a thorough consideration of it on December 19 only, by which date a large section of the eastern and western hills had already fallen to the Nepali Congress forces. Meanwhile the Chinese army continued their advance, though at a slow rate, in Tibet despite the Indian protests<sup>582</sup>. That Tibet would be overrun within weeks was becoming obvious and the Tibetan Government had to agree to send a delegation to Peking to sign an agreement as dictated by China. Afterwards, on December 26, newspapers reported a full - scale invasion of Tibet<sup>583</sup>. As the situation in the Himalayas deteriorated fast, and internal turmoil in Nepal attained alarming tones, Nehru again returned to the subject in Parliament on December 21, 1950 making his warning clearer,

*“... I explained how our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal had become greater and more immediate, as our own security was affected by the recent developments there. We were anxious that there should be peace and stability in Nepal. At the same time, we felt that introduction of substantial political reforms was essential for this purpose...”*<sup>584</sup> He then give out the contents of the Indian Memorandum of December 8 and Nepal's reply to it, where in the letter, the Nepal Government pleaded for time to reach a decision. While maintaining that the Government of India had no wish to hustle the Nepalese Government, he gave out the reason that led him and his Government of feel worried about the time factor, *“... We cannot ignore the fact that delay in a settlement is likely to make the situation worse. The world situation, unfortunately, has grown darker since we discussed international affairs earlier this month. It is our firm conviction that the longer political reforms are delayed in Nepal, in the greater the danger to Nepal's security and internal tranquility...”*<sup>585</sup>. He once again emphasized that India will continue to recognize King Tribhuwan and no deviation was possible from this stand. King Tribhuwan also endorsed the Indian proposals on December 22, 1950 in the first ever public statement made by him after his arrival at New Delhi<sup>586</sup>. Faced with all these developments, the Nepalese Government finally choose to reply to the Memorandum two days later, i.e., on December 24, 1950. Therein it agreed to form an interim government with popular representatives and to constitute an elected assembly within three years<sup>587</sup>. But Mohan Shumsher was still adamant over the recognition issue. However, General Bijay Shumsher and N.M. Dixit



where dispatched to New Delhi next day, on December 25, 1950, to work out the settlement on that basis. The talks between them ended on January 1, 1951, making it clear again that India would not alter its demand to restore King Tribhuwan to his throne<sup>588</sup>.

### 3.2.12 Ranas Yield : Tripartite Agreement

India, on the other hand, made its susceptibilities on the issue known to the British and American Governments. Some even maintain that Nehru had threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth if London would recognize the Child King, while he was in London in January, 1951<sup>589</sup>. It had by then become clear to the Ranas that London and Washington were not prepared to break away with India over the issue.

Further, internal situation took alarming turn when Nepali Congress scored the aforesaid victories as mentioned earlier. In early January they faced with the sudden desertion by the garrison at Palpa, which was pivotal to the frontal strength in Western hills. Pressed hard from all corners, the Rana Government was left with no alternative but to capitulate. Thus, on January 7, 1951, the Nepalese Government accepted the Indian suggestion in its entirety<sup>590</sup>. A declaration to that effect was made on January 8, by Mohan Shumsher at Kathmandu<sup>591</sup>.

The announcement was welcomed by Both King Tribhuwan<sup>592</sup> and Nehru, who expressed the hope that all attempts at violent effort will cease<sup>593</sup>. The Nepali Congress and other rebel leaders were not satisfied with the announcement as it "fell for short of their aspirations, because they had "aimed at the liquidation of the feudal regime and the establishment of full democracy in Nepal"<sup>594</sup>. They were, therefore, initially unwilling to terminate their revolutionary movement, just when it appeared to be on the verge of success<sup>595</sup>.

The rebel – leaders, however, agreed to accept the compromise solution after their talks with the Indian leader<sup>596</sup>, except Dr K.I. Singh and his followers, who branded the compromise as a betrayal of the revolution and diffuse to lay down arms<sup>597</sup>.

Thereafter tripartite talks began in New Delhi in the first week of February between the King, and the Nepali Congress and the Ranas under the guidance of the host government. It ended into an agreement whereby a new cabinet comprising of 5 each from the Ranas and popular leaders with Mohan Shumsher as Prime Minister was finalized. The King Tribhuwan returned to Kathmandu on February 15,<sup>598</sup> and the new cabinet was sworn in on February 18, 1951<sup>599</sup>, marking the end of the Rana era from the Nepalese history<sup>600</sup>.



# CHAPTER 4



## **GROWTH OF INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONSHIP IN WAKE OF CHINESE AGGRESSION IN TIBET**

## CHAPTER 4

# GROWTH OF INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONSHIP IN WAKE OF CHINESE AGGRESSION IN TIBET

### 4.1 THE ERA OF "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"

#### 4.1.1 Independent India opts for 'status quo'

With the conclusion of tripartite agreement amongst the Ranas, the King and the Nepali congress, a new era was ushered in the history of Nepal marking the end of the Rana-autocracy and the introduction of a democratic system in the country. This break with the past did not, however, mean that Nepal had overcome the challenges posed by severe political crisis. Great socio-economic challenges on the home front continued to influence the politics of Nepal and its relations with India.

The country had just emerged from a wild upsurge and law and order was yet to be restored completely. The, the anti-Rana movement had been mainly directed by the rebels based in India and there was no political party existing in Nepal which could claim a mass base or country-wide organizational net-work. The collapse of the dictatorial Rana regime also brought to the forefront a host of adventurist aspirants for power. It is not surprising that during this period manipulations and intrigues played an important role and ideological considerations were relegated to the background.

What made matters worse was that there was no administrative machinery in Nepal which could assist the new rulers in absorbing the strains of the transitional period. Existing Government

servants owed their jobs to patronage rather than to their merit and lagged both the imagination and expertise necessary to discharge even basic duties in the newly introduced democratic set-up in the country.

The means of transport and communication were primitive and the national economy was in a bad shape - there was no industry and the national budget system was unknown to the Government<sup>601</sup>. Even the army was ill -equipped, ill-paid and ill-organized and was hardly equal to the task of guarding the country's difficult northern frontiers. In short, the new Nepalese Government was faced with the gigantic task of modernizing the country for which it lacked both resources and necessary infra-structure. This was the state of affairs in which the era of "special relationship", as Nehru termed it, between India and Nepal began.

The contradictions inherent in the tripartite Agreement manifested themselves very soon. While even a homogenous cabinet would have found the task of transforming the mediaeval Nepal into a modern extremely difficult, the situation was quite desolate for the coalition Government. In fact the compromise had been accepted, both by the Ranas and the Nepali Congress, under the pressure of the Indian Government. The two parties remained bitter and irreconcilable to each other. While the Ranas interpreted it as a respite to prepare for regaining the lost power, the Nepali Congress viewed the accord as nothing more than a stop gap arrangement and was waiting for an opportunity to deliver a fatal blow to the Ranas.

Meanwhile, some Ranas had formed the "Gurkha Dal" in a bid to regain power. Bharat Shumsher, grandson of the Defense Minister, Babar Shumsher, became leader of the Dal. On April 9, 1951, the Home Minister, B.P. Koirala, openly accused the Dal of fomenting anarchy in the Country. He got its President, Randhir Subba and General Secretary, Bharat Shumsher, arrested on April 22, 1951. Their followers, including army officers, raided the jail, secured their release, and then stormed on the residence of the Home Minister. The Home Minister's bodyguards opened fire 'in self - defense', killing two and injuring many persons<sup>602</sup>.

The Nepali Congress in retaliation demanded first the resignation of Babar Shumsher, and afterwards the formation of an all-Nepali Congress ministry<sup>603</sup>. Finding the King favorably inclined towards the Nepali Congress, the Premier Mohan Shumsher pleaded that as the coalition was formed through the mediation of the Government of India, this issue should also be decided by them. This was accepted by the Nepali Congress. Consequently both the groups congregated in New Delhi to have a parley from May10, 1951 onwards<sup>604</sup>.

#### 4.1.2 Opposition sees China as Counter-balance to India

On the other hand, those politicians who were not represented in the "Delhi -Settlement" and were not included in the cabinet, opposed both the Agreement and the New Government tooth and nail from the very beginning.

Most vocal amongst them were Dr. D.R. Regmi, President of the Nepali Congress, T.P. Acharya, President of the Praja Parishad, and Dr. K.I. Singh<sup>605</sup>. They advocated the overthrow of the "Tribhuvan-Rana-Koirala Coalition"<sup>606</sup>.

The internecine disputes affected Nepal's relations with India in another way also those opposed to Kathmandu regime began to explore an alternate source of external support to counter-balance India. The Communist party of Nepal had been openly pro-China and had taken pro-Peking stance from the very beginning. The Party had organized itself into various fronts-youth, student, women, and labor formed certain socio-cultural organizations. These and other groups working under their influence were reported to be busy in discovering "historical links" with the 'Mongoloids' in the North rather than the 'Aryans' in the South, and the affinity of the border people with the Tibetans was exploited in full<sup>607</sup>. The Times, in its April 21, 1951 issue, observed that *"... there is a party in Nepal which dislikes the present connection between Delhi and Kathmandu and would prefer to build up a Mongolian -Tibetan national movement linked to Sikkim, Bhutan and countries north of the Himalayas rather than to India"*<sup>608</sup>.

The tirade was, by no means limited to the Communists alone. Soon after, other opposition leaders also started clamoring for establishing diplomatic relations with the Peking Government. Commenting upon the possible repercussions of the Tibetan developments over Nepal, Dr. D.R. Regmi, observed even as early as in February that: *"We do not regard the People's Government of China as an imperialist power and occupation of Tibet as a threat to Nepal..... I consider the Chinese People's Government have been anti - imperialist throughout and Nepal has nothing to fear from them"*. T.P. Acharya too demanded opening of diplomatic relations with China, with a view to counter-acting India's influence in Nepal. He was prepared to cooperate and form a united front with like-minded persons, organizations and parties for the purpose.

Meanwhile, law and order situation assumed dangerous proportions<sup>609</sup>. As pointed out earlier, Dr. K.I. Singh, had declared the settlement as a "betrayal" of the revolution and refused to lay

down arms. He and his 300 odd followers were alleged to have let loose a reign of terror, 'loot, dacoity and murders in western Nepal', which was affecting the border districts of Uttar Pradesh on the Indian side as well<sup>610</sup>. The havoc created in the border areas was such that Nepal's Minister for Food and Agriculture, B.M. Sharma, could not cross the border after his visit to Lucknow on April 3, 1951<sup>611</sup>. Potentially more troublesome and more dangerous movement was developing in eastern Nepal adjoining its borders with Tibet, where the authority of the Kathmandu Government was almost non-existent. As early as in February 1951 itself, four lakh Kirat tribals were reported to have proclaimed the formation of an independent Kirat state over there (in an area of 6,000 sq. miles). The separatist movement was said to be gaining in strength day by day amidst these unsettled conditions<sup>612</sup>.

### 4.1.3 Tibetans Crisis Deepens

These developments in Nepal were disturbing to the Government of India, particularly in face of further deterioration in the Tibetan situation. The Indian Government was rebuffed in its efforts to mediate, and it was apparent that the Chinese were moving ahead with a well-thought out plan of subjugating Tibet. While total annexation remained the aim, it was to be achieved through gradual tightening for control leading to direct rule of the Country by China. But much work was to be done by China before that – an infra-structure of road-links, airbases, etc. was to be built to support a 'military occupation' and sustenance of a direct rule. Simultaneously, "Mao's" Panchen Lama was to be re-inducted in the Tibetan polity. His power and authority was to be increased so as to use him as a counter-weight to the Dalai Lama in the interim period. Tibetan youth were to be indoctrinated and weaned away from Lamaism. Then, to ensure a docile population, Peking planned to dilute the population by mass importation of Chinese laborers and farmers<sup>613</sup>. Mao-tung himself had dropped the hint about the same before a visiting Tibetan delegation in Peking in 1952<sup>614</sup>.

The Chinese were, however, well aware of the importance of the Dalai Lama's attitude in this respect. Centuries of experience must have revealed to them that Peking during the imperial history could make its suzerain authority felt in Tibet in any meaningful manner only when some viable and intimate relationship had been established between the Chinese and the Tibetan God-King, the Dalai Lama. The failure of the new regime in their attempts to incite a rebellion against the Dalai Lama and his regime by encouraging internal dissensions in early 1950 must have reinforced the argument<sup>615</sup>. The only alternative, though fraught with grave doubts, – was an

outright military conquest to be followed by a socio-political–ethnological transformation of the Country for which, again, time was required to fulfill the essential physical conditions.

The importance of the Fourteenth incarnation of the Dalai Lama was enhanced by his investiture to the full reigning powers on November 17, 1950, two years ahead of the traditional age for a Dalai Lama to assume them. This was done by the Kasag (the Tibetan National Assembly) with the concurrence of the priesthood, mainly to provide their Country with a ruling–incarnation of God in their hour of the gravest national emergency<sup>616</sup>. The Communist strategy, therefore, included an accommodation with the Dalai Lama, at least at the initial stages.

Working on this count, the Chinese tried to win over Thubten Jigme Norbu, the Dalai Lama's eldest brother and Chief Lama of the Kumbon Monastery-cum-Governor of the Tibetan border province of Chamdo, who had fallen prisoner to them after their conquest of the area, to win-over the Dalai Lama. It was explained to him, according to his own version which also is corroborated by the account of the Dalai Lama, that the Chinese plan meant complete annexation of Tibet. Initially Norbu rejected the overtures, but as the Chinese approach grew more and more threatening, he decided to use tact. He agreed to go to Lhasa and to attempt persuading his brother to welcome the Chinese troops as 'liberators' of Tibet<sup>617</sup>.

#### 4.1.4 Tibetan Counter -Moves

Norbu reached Lhasa on December 8, 1950, where he informed the Dalai Lama of the Chinese strategy and warned him against permitting the Chinese forces to enter the capital. By this time, all hopes of any outside assistance had been shattered and with the fall of Chamdo practically nothing had remained to defend Tibet militarily. The Tibetan Government could well realize that their options were closed and that they were bound to seek some understanding with the Peking regime. An emergency meeting of the Kasag was immediately convened, which also took note of the fact that the Dalai Lama figured prominently in the Chinese strategy. The Kasag, therefore, decided to dispatch a delegation to Peking in compliance with the Chinese demand, but only after the Dalai Lama had left Lhasa and had reached at a place of safety near the Indian border making it possible for him to seek asylum in India at the time of need<sup>618</sup>. After some hesitation, the Dalai Lama finally left Lhasa on December 18, 1950, along with his personal entourage and a staff of leading state officials, allegedly under pressure from the local nobility and against the advice of the ecclesiastical branch of the hierarchy, and reached Yatung on January 3-4, 1951, located within an hour's flight from the Indian frontier<sup>619</sup>.



Before leaving the capital, the Dalai Lama appointed two Prime Ministers, Logan Toshi, one of the high monk official, and Lukhangwa, "a veteran and experienced lay administrator". He gave them full authority and made them jointly responsible in his absence for all state affairs, with the need to refer to him only "matters of the very highest importance"<sup>620</sup>.

The Provisional Government offices were set up at Yatung immediately<sup>621</sup>. A part of the Tibetan treasury was taken by the Dalai Lama with him and deposited in Sikkim and he sent his brother, Norbu, on to Calcutta to make advance preparations for establishing a Government in exile, should it become necessary.<sup>622</sup>

Peking had earlier decided to ignore the investiture of the Dalai Lama on November 17, 1950, resorting to a legalistic view best suited to their purpose that he had not attained the legal age of eighteen. It also tried to minimize the value of the Dalai Lama. The Min-tsu Yen Chiu (Nationalities Research) commented about his flight to Yatung thus:

*“A handful of reactionaries in collusion with the imperialists and foreign expansionists abducted the fourteenth Dalai Lama to Yatung whence they planned to take him to a foreign country and await the outbreak of World War-III before returning”<sup>623</sup>.*

The Chinese government, however, did consider it important to prevent the Dalai Lama from leaving Tibet and getting beyond their reach<sup>624</sup>. To this end, the Peking Government, through threatening propaganda, exerted considerable pressure on India, leaving no room for doubt that they would consider the admittance of the Dalai Lama in Indian territory as a hostile act.

China's warning seemed to achieve its purpose. While the Government of India did grant political asylum to the Dalai Lama, it made it clear that the Government of India would not welcome him nor support him in the formation of a Government in exile against the Chinese<sup>625</sup>. The Dalai Lama was sure to take cognizance of New Delhi's departure from the traditional policy of the earlier British Indian Governments towards Tibet and China. The first official act, however, the Dalai Lama undertook after setting in Yatung was to nominate a Tibetan team to negotiate with Peking<sup>626</sup>.

#### 4.1.5 Sino-Tibetan Negotiations

The willingness of the Dalai Lama to come to terms with the Peking Government as expressed through dispatch of mission for peace talks brought change in the attitude of the latter. If the

credentials of the mission were to be accepted, the Dalai Lama's authority was to be accepted too. The Chinese Central Government, therefore, found it convenient to recognize the Dalai Lama's investiture and assumption of the ruling power now, with a retrospective effect, that is, since February, 1951. On May 28, 1951, the People's Daily also came out with praise for the Dalai Lama for altering the "past erroneous policy of the Tibetan Government"<sup>627</sup>.

Under the terms conveyed to the Tibetans, through Norbu, the Chinese had demanded immediate dispatch of a negotiating team to China overland via Kham province. The route was specified because Chinese persisted in their belief that the earlier delegation sent via India was held up by the machination of the Government of India. This was obvious from their note to India dt. 30<sup>th</sup> October, 1950<sup>628</sup>. Although this was factually wrong, because the delegation stayed back in India as per instructions of the Lhasa Government itself, the Chinese, on their part, might have seen, in the language of the Indian Note of October 31, 1950, a confirmation of their belief<sup>629</sup>. Even after the Tibetan delegates had reached Peking and formal discussions were initiated there on April 19, 1951, the main bulk of the Chinese expeditionary force continued to advance and eventually reached within 150 miles of Lhasa, where it halted<sup>630</sup>, waiting for the conclusion of the conference with Tibetan delegates, then in session<sup>631</sup>. Apart from the fact of China's military preponderance in the field, which put the Chinese side on the conference table in a dictating position, the Chinese Government further managed an immensely advantageous situation for itself by arranging to deal not with a single united Tibetan delegation sent by the Dalai Lama, but with three distinct Tibetan factions, more or less at odds with each other, thereby providing the Chinese with ample scope for diplomatic maneuvering and political bargaining.<sup>632</sup>

#### **4.1.6 Tibet's Shadow on Indian Diplomacy in Nepal**

The entire show, thus, was so stage-managed as to leave little doubt about the outcome of the Peking negotiations in the minds of the Indian statesmen<sup>633</sup>. This, in turn, served only to re-emphasize the need for securing Nepal as a strong, viable and progressive nation equal to the task of defending its political freedom and territorial integrity from any possible threat from the North, enabling it to provide an effective bastion to the Indian defenses as well.

The domestic milieu of the kingdom during the post-revolution period was, however, least assuring in this respect. It became apparent to the Government of India that under the circumstances, it was impossible to attain the transformation of Nepal at desired pace through self-help only, and that India would have to shoulder the responsibility of assisting Nepal in the

same, howsoever thankless the job may be. India worked on the premise that: (a) The successful functioning of the interim Government, because it genuinely believed that smooth transformation to democracy was possible only through a 'middle-course' which alone could impart political stability to the kingdom and ensure the restoration of law and order in the country - without which no take-off, either in the economic progress or in the area of defense, was possible at all, (b) The creation of a vibrant administrative and economic infrastructure in the country, and, (c) The improvement in the efficiency, living standards and logistic capabilities of the brave Gorkha army.

Ideological considerations such as the democratic functioning of the Government were there, but, viability, stability and peace in the kingdom were still more important. In fact it was argued at Delhi that without these pre-conditions being fulfilled, any strengthening of the democracy itself was not possible.

That is why when the Rana - Nepali Congress coalition ministry, being not able to control Dr. K.I. Singh's followers by itself, asked for the Government of India's help,<sup>634</sup> the latter readily dispatched four companies of the Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary to help the Nepalese troops in mopping - up operations<sup>635</sup>. The operation lasted less than a week<sup>636</sup> and Dr. K.I. Singh was captured along with 357 of his followers on February 20, 1951, with large quantities of arms and ammunition and looted property<sup>637</sup>. Dr. K.I. Singh was lodged in Bhairwa jail, from where he made good his escape very soon.

In order to remove any misunderstanding about this assistance, Nehru informed the Indian Parliament that though it was the Indian policy not to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Nepal, the two governments had agreed in the past to undertake joint - action when criminal activities took place on a large scale. He made it a point to explain that the Indian police had entered the Nepalese territories for the said joint - action only on the request of, and with the permission of the Nepalese Government. He also emphasized that the help was sent exclusively for the suppression of criminal gang which had no political significance at all<sup>638</sup>.

Similarly, to salvage the administrative mess of the Singh Darbar (Nepali's Secretariat), the Government of India dispatched two advisors to work - out a detailed plan for the administrative re-organization in Nepal in April, 1951. They were withdrawn after ten months, "upon completion of their work"<sup>639</sup>. Three months later, a high powered mission was sent to Kathmandu to tender advice on the same<sup>640</sup>. On the political plane also, the Government of India tried to help in smooth working of the coalition Government. That is why Nehru accepted the thankless

job of a mediator, when it ran into heavy weather following the cabinet crises over the issue of the Gorkha Dal revolt. The entire cabinet reached New Delhi on May 9, 1951, and talks between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress started the next day<sup>641</sup>.

#### 4.1.7 Cabinet Crisis: Nehru's Firm Attitude

By this time the Tibetan negotiations in Peking had reached critical stage. Members of the Tibetan delegation were being subjected to intense pressure to accept Peking's terms. A ready-made ten-point draft was presented to them and the Chinese insisted that the Tibetan delegates must agree to it. Finding the draft almost unbearable, the Tibetan representatives put up maximum resistance to it. While hard - bargaining was going on about securing the status of a sovereign nation for Tibet, the Tibetan delegation was reportedly not allowed to contact its government in order to receive instructions from the latter<sup>642</sup>.

Meeting with the Rana and Nepali Congress ministers in this background, the Indian Premier impressed upon both sides the supreme need of exercising restraint and maintaining unity so that they may work together for their country's all round development. A press note was issued by the Ministry of External Affairs on May 10, 1951, declaring that complete agreement had been reached on the Nepalese ministerial crisis at a joint meeting of the Nepalese Ministers with Nehru the same afternoon<sup>643</sup>. The note said that,

*"there was complete agreement that the Nepalese cabinet should work in a cooperative and progressive spirit for the political development and economic prosperity of Nepal."*<sup>644</sup>

The formation of an Advisory Assembly of forty persons, a kind of mini- parliament, was also agreed upon. It was decided to hold further discussions in this regard in Kathmandu to evolve a viable political apparatus and to determine what changes were necessary to ensure stability and progress<sup>645</sup>. Later on, a statement was issued in Kathmandu on June 3, 1951, by the emergency committee of the Nepali cabinet. It warned "the elements creating lawlessness and attempting to disrupt the Country's unity and disturbing relations with a friendly foreign country"<sup>646</sup>.

#### 4.1.8 Sino - Tibetan Agreement Signed

The Peking negotiations, in the meanwhile, ended on May 21, 1951, and without bothering to inform the Dalai Lama or Lhasa, Peking Radio announced the signing of a seventeen - point

agreement with the local Government of Tibet on the "peaceful liberation" of the Country, on May 23, 1951<sup>647</sup>. The Chinese propaganda described it as a "brilliant achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung in settling a very intricate domestic nationality question"<sup>648</sup>. "Unity has been achieved between Dalai Lama's forces and the Panhen's forces and the Central Government", declared Mao-Tse-tung on the banquet arrange in honour of the signing ceremony,<sup>649</sup> in an obvious attempt to dilute and confuse the issue by making it a two to one alignment putting the Dalai Lama in the minority.

Dalai Lama, however, claimed in 1959, when he arrived in India to seek asylum, that the "consent of the (Tibetan Government) was secured under duress and at the point of bayonet". He asserted that his representatives were compelled to sign the agreement under the threat of further military operations against Tibet. "We ... decided to abide by its terms and conditions in order to save my people and country from the damages of total destruction", he added<sup>650</sup>. From all evidence available, it is clear that the agreement was not arrived at through fair and free negotiations<sup>651</sup>.

While the Chinese attitude appeared to be a bit flexible about the question of Tibet's future domestic order, there were no negotiations at all over her relationship with other states. The Chinese simply dictated it to,

"Resolutely break away from imperialist influences and actively help the People's Liberation Army March into Tibet; that all external affairs be restored to the Central People's Government for centralized handling; and that the existing Tibetan troops be reorganized step by step into the People's Liberation Army"<sup>652</sup>.

The Dalai Lama formally agreed to it after a gap of three months, that is, only after the vanguard units of the People's Liberation Army had reached Lassa, bears further proof that the Agreement was an imposed one<sup>653</sup>.

The agreement, however, had far-reaching consequences. Few important provisions of the document, therefore, need mention here. Through the very first article, the Tibetan Government undertook "to unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet"<sup>654</sup>. It further took upon itself, vide Article 2, the task of assisting "...the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the National defense". This later point clearly violated instructions given to Nagapo by the Tibetan Government that in no case, the delegates were to agree to the further advance of the Chinese forces in Tibet<sup>655</sup>. It was further stated in Article 8 that the "Tibetan troops shall be

reorganized by stages into the People's Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defense forces of the People's Republic of China".

In other articles, Lhasa agreed to the establishment of a Military Area Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army and military - administrative committee on the plateau to ensure the implementation of the Agreement. It acquiesced in principle, to a proposed programme of future socio - economic 'reforms' in the region and promised loyally to aid the Chinese in 'freeing' Tibet from all imperialist influences. In return, the Central Government undertook to preserve the existing administrative system in Tibet, granted the area "regional autonomy" within the Chinese state and bound itself not to in anyway modify the titles, rights, privileges and powers of the traditional Tibetan officialdom, on the sole condition that the Panchan Lama, then residing in exile in China, would be established to the status, functions and powers of the second highest office of the Country (Article 5). This meant the status, functions and powers "of the Ninth Panchen Ngoertelai when they (the Dalai and Panchen Lama) were in friendly an amicable relations with each other" (Article 6)<sup>656</sup>. Article 14 of the Agreement was of particular concern to India and Nepal. It is stipulated that,

*“The Central People’s Government shall control the centralized handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading regulations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty”<sup>657</sup>.*

Thus, by a clever combination of threats, limited use of armed forces, skilful pressure and propaganda and divisive techniques aimed at confusing and disturbing the united front of Tibetan resistance, Peking succeeded in paving the way for the imposition of its heretofore 'constitutional fiction' of suzerainty over Tibet by means "other than prolonged warfare and costly conquest"<sup>658</sup>. On the other hand, the very choice of methods and the conclusion of the 1951- pact served to provide Tibet with a quasi-constitutional character which officially recognized its special status vastly different, in principle at least, from that of the other border regions, were the Communists had of late established Chinese control by outright military occupation.

#### **4.1.9 Impact on India and Nepal**

The cumulative effect of the Sino-Tibetan agreement amounted to a total negation of whatever status Tibet may have had in the international community and the withdrawal of the Tibetan

question from the diplomatic arena. It also implied that if the Chinese interpretation of the document were to prevail, the undisputed most - favoured nation position of India and the extra - territorial privileges of Nepal could no longer be sustained. The newly defined relationship between Peking and Lhasa went much beyond their historical Patron- Priest relationship, or even the claim of liberal or inclusive type of suzerainty over Tibet. China claimed, and at times enforced its 'over lordship' over Tibet when it had the power or need to do so in the past through force - but even then it recognized Dalai Lama as Tibet's supreme ruler & never interfered with his administration. It interfered only when Dalai Lama's authority was under challenge, & its interference was limited to restoration of his authority. Even then, China never interfered with Tibet's independent relationship with its neighbors & it did not encroach upon the historic rights enjoyed by third parties, especially India and Nepal, in that Country. But now China has moved to convert its benevolent over- lordship into sovereignty over the Country. The Government of independent India, like previous British Indian Government, recognized the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but emphasized, at the same time, upon the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy and the need to resolve the issue through peaceful means.

The Chinese Government tried to allay India's apprehensions regarding future Chinese designs in the Himalayas in general and about the traditional Indo-Tibetan trade and culture relations in particular.

Thus, when broached upon the subject informally by the Indian Ambassador at Peking on September 27, 1951,

*"Premier Chou En lai expressed his anxiety to safeguard in every way Indian interests in Tibet on which matter there was no territorial dispute or controversy between India and China"<sup>659</sup>.*

Again, in February 1952, when the Indian Ambassador gave a statement of the existing Indian rights in Tibet, "Premier Chou En- lai replied that there was no difficulty in safeguarding the economic and cultural interest of India in Tibet"<sup>660</sup>. On autonomy question also, apart from including Article 3 in the Agreement acknowledging Tibetan People's right of exercising natural regional autonomy and promising in earlier referred Article 4 that they "will not alter the existing political system in Tibet",<sup>661</sup> Mao himself took the opportunity to assure a visiting Tibetan delegation in Peking on October 8, 1952, that, "In the Tibetan region the problem of the division of land does not exist now. Whether or not land should be redistributed in the future, the Tibetans will have to decide by themselves,"<sup>662</sup> Similar statements were made by other important Chinese dignitaries also, to allay the Tibetan fears and apprehensions, from time to time.

Similarly, the Chinese Prime Minister and other officials on many occasions made statements to mislead the Indian authorities about their real intentions<sup>662</sup>.

The Government of India also appeared to believe that even if Chinese wanted to attempt a complete occupation of Tibet, it would not be an easy matter for them in the absence of the means of transport, communication and supplies, especially in view of the stiff resistance the Tibetans were likely to put up in their rugged terrains<sup>663</sup>. Nehru was also doubtful about the success of any ulterior Chinese design in Tibet. His perception of history had revealed to him that 'during the last one thousand years China had never really been able to subdue Tibet, though on many occasions in the past the Tibetans had succumbed to Chinese military pressures' and he was doubtful that they would be able to do it even then<sup>664</sup>. In view of these perceptions, and apparently believing that China would abide by the terms of the Agreement, Nehru also approved the accord.

Despite the efforts of both the Indian and the Chinese Governments to 'soft peddle' the issue and the consequent understanding between the two, their areas of geo-political interest continued to overlap in the intermediary Himalayan border lands. This conflict of interest had been responsible for the Indo-Chinese rivalry during the British period, and it was now likely to be accentuated, rather than subdued, in the absence of a concrete understanding and definite settlement of the outstanding issue between them.

#### **4.1.10 The Strategic Position of Tibet**

The Tibetan plateau not only constituted a center for political action throughout the Central Asian territories adjoining it, but, in the nuclear era, could easily be converted into strategic base for bomber squadrons and missile - launching pads aimed at neighboring countries. As such the Chinese Central Government desired nothing short of total control of the Tibetan highland. The lands laying south of it were regarded by the Peking Government as an 'area of interest' or 'buffer' where the Chinese influence was to be extended primarily to secure its Tibetan occupation and to take the 'forward - line' of the Chinese defense to the borders of the intermediary kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan, & Sikkim with India. In other words, while the Tibetan frontiers with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim as well as North East Frontier Agency and Laddakh regions of India constituted 'inner -line' of the Chinese defense, its 'outer -line' of defense was identified with the frontier of these states with India. When the exigencies of International Communism and the need of "liberating" those lands from the "colonial", "feudal" or "imperialistic" influences was added



to the old notions of geopolitics, the Chinese Government saw in these Himalayan states an "irredentist region" needed to be regained as soon as possible. Further, these states could be assigned an offensive role also. They could be used as possible bases for the subversion of India in future.

Viceroy Curzon, on the other hand, had visualized the Himalayan border lands of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim (along with Indian border state of Jammu and Kashmir and Assam) as an inner-line of defense for India – to be protected by a co-terminus Tibetan buffer region. While the new Government of India repudiated all British Imperialistic notions in its foreign policy, it found it difficult to ignore the geo-political realities<sup>665</sup>. Strategically speaking, passing of Tibetan piedmont into the Chinese domain was potentially most dangerous to India. The party holding the plateau was bound to have an advantage over the other side located in foot-hills or plain even in a conventional flight, – leaving apart its possible use as a missile base<sup>666</sup>. Political dimensions of the threat, as discussed earlier, were of no less consequence<sup>667</sup>. The rivalry for control in the intermediary Himalayan region was therefore inevitable. Because of the constraints put by the prevailing circumstances upon the two sides in early fifties, each one of them was compelled to remain content with strengthening its position in its major area of interest, while conceding similar opportunity to the other. Thus, while China claimed exclusive and sovereign rights in Tibet, it did not make any overt attempt to claim a locus standi in the areas south of the Himalayas. As the time has shown, China's passive policy towards south of Himalaya at that point of time was primarily a posture adopted to enable it to consolidate the gains of its conquest in Tibet. It continued to look with eager eyes for a favorable opening to advance its interest and influence in the independent Kingdom of Nepal & to claim Sikkim at a suitable moment, without, as far as possible, alarming or antagonizing the New Delhi Government.

India, on the other hand, while conceding suzerain position to China in Tibet, moved forward with full vigour to assert its exclusive rights in Bhutan and Sikkim and "special interest" in Nepal, which, in substance, meant almost exclusive relationship with the kingdom in matters relating to defense of Nepal and to most favored states<sup>668</sup>.

At the same time, aware of the likely repercussions of any annihilation of the Tibetan autonomy over Nepal and its implication to Indo – Nepalese relations, the Government of India tried to render every possible assistance to Tibetans in maintaining their autonomy. The nature of this assistance, however, remained limited to the use of diplomatic efforts- probably because of, as Maxwell and Mullik have pointed out, the impossibility of any other type of assistance in the

circumstances<sup>669</sup>. Thus, with the stiffening of the Chinese control over Tibet, India's concern for Nepal also deepened and its efforts to strengthen the viability of that Country picked up momentum in the same ratio.

The Sino-Tibetan Agreement of May 1951 and the accompanying developments in Tibet, therefore accentuated the need for consolidation of the "inner- line" of the Indian defense, the frontier line to the south of Himalayas. While an aggression against India was hardly anticipated, the vulnerability of Nepal worried Government of India the most. It, therefore, decided to offer more assistance to the Nepalese Government not only in the realm of economy, public administration, development and defense - but sometimes even in bringing a political reconciliation amongst warring political parties & groups. In the peculiar situation of the kingdom, however, these gestures on the part of India gave those politicians who were out of power a handle to launch an anti -Indian diatribe by accusing it of controlling the Kingdom and interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal. While the Government of India realized the constraints, it appeared to conclude that it could not, at the same time, afford to leave Nepal on the mercy of subversive and inimical forces.

#### 4.1.11 Nehru's Visit to Nepal

Thus, after playing a decisive role in solving Nepal's ministerial crisis<sup>670</sup>, Nehru decided to pay a three day goodwill visit to the kingdom on the latter's invitation within three weeks of the signing of the Sino- Tibetan Agreement, perhaps to clear the air and to consolidate the Indian position over there, apart from having an exchange of views on the Tibetan situation with the King, the cabinet and other politicians.

On the eve of his departure to Nepal, Nehru stated that,

*"...by the nature of things, geography and the rest, India's relationship is far more intimate and important to Nepal than with any other country. If any other country is in any sense in conflict with India, naturally we will not like it"<sup>671</sup>.*

His assertion and public references in Nepal also reflected India's anxiety about securing Nepal's viability in the context of Tibet on the one hand and of dispelling any doubts and charges of Indian interference in the Kingdom on the other. He took pains to explain that the Indian assistance in the all-round development of Nepal and its concern about the state of affairs therein was nothing more than a genuine interest of a friendly neighbor and was not to be misinterpreted

as "interference" as was being made out by those Nepali politicians who were out of power. Unruffled by a 'black - flag demonstration' organized by a handful of members of the opposition parties at his arrival at Kathmandu<sup>672</sup>, Nehru emphasized the need for closest co-operation amongst the two traditional friends, bound together with the ties of history, geography and culture.

"The difficulties inside and outside Nepal and changing face of the world make co-operation between the two countries necessary", he pointed out while replying to a welcome address presented to him by fifteen Nepalese organizations<sup>673</sup>. Earlier, addressing a mammoth public meeting in the Capital on the day of the arrival, he impressed upon the gathering, in an obvious reference to the development in Tibet that, "The disturbed conditions in the world have straightened our resolve to help you maintain your freedom, because you have been our traditional friend. If some of you feel that India wishes to interfere in your affairs, then that would be a wrong notion. Firstly, because this would be contrary to the fundamentals of our national policy, and secondly, because it is in our own interest to honor your independent status"<sup>674</sup>.

He explained that he gave advice to the Nepalese leaders, *"Not in my capacity as the Prime Minister of India, but as your comrade and friend... If you want our advice, help, or expertise, we shall give these to you, but we do not wish to interfere in your affairs"*<sup>675</sup>.

In fact visualizing the political and ideological nature of the challenge to which Nepal would be exposed as a result of submergence of Tibet into the Communist China, Nehru strongly advocated for a rapid, but peaceful, transformation of the Country. He had perceived well that the expansion of China to the northern borders of Nepal was going to sharpen the conflict of ideologies-- democracy and Communism -- in the Kingdom very soon and, therefore, he took upon himself to caution his neighboring people about the inherent threat. He urged Nepalese leaders & people to work for bringing necessary socio-economic changes in the Country as fast as possible to improve the lot of the common man, but emphasized at the same time that, "If we try to bring about these changes through violent means, the human values would be destroyed; weakness will creep in; and the independence of your nation will be endangered ..."

In his farewell message, Nehru re-emphasized the supreme need of Indo - Nepalese cooperation in the field of defense and gave out rationale of his thinking in the following words: *"Neither India nor Nepal wants to wage war or go with hostile intent to any country, but we are both determined not to permit anyone to interfere with our liberties. The Himalayas are guardians and sentinels of India and Nepal and their white capped peaks welcome friends and are a warning*

*to those of hostile intents. With these common and perpetual guardians, the fate of India and Nepal is linked together*<sup>676</sup>.

#### **4.1.12 In - fight Continues: A Coup Attempted**

Neither Nehru -inspired Agreement, nor his visit to the Kingdom could really end anti- India propaganda by those who were out of power. Nor could it develop a team - spirit between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress factions in the cabinet, which was reconstituted on June 10, 1951<sup>677</sup>. Laboring hard under inter-party strains, the reconstituted coalition cabinet finally collapsed on November 12, 1951, marking an end to the experiment in coalition between the forces of change and the status quo<sup>678</sup>. The first entirely non - Rana Ministry, comprising a both Nepali Congress and independent members and headed by M.P. Koirala as Prime Minister was sworn in on November 19, 1951<sup>679</sup>. The choice of M.P. Koirala as Prime Minister surprised many - though he was the President of the Nepali Congress, his half-brother B.P. Koirala possessed more dynamic personality and was much more popular leader amongst the Party and the masses. The latter obviously felt cheated and his followers felt restless over the situation. As a result, the ministry, from the very beginning, worked under heavy intra-party strains<sup>680</sup>. The tussle that ensued over the demand of M.P. Koirala resignation from the party post ultimately ended up in the resignation of the Koirala Government on August 10, 1952<sup>681</sup>.

The Nepalese political scene was burdened with frequent changes in government, insurrections, mushroom growth of political parties, fractional fights, unscrupulous manipulations and unprincipled alliances to gain power. All this contributed to the steady deterioration in the law and order situation and encouraged fissiparous tendencies. The atmosphere was highly suited for adventurism and it soon culminated in one of the most daring adventures undertaken in the kingdom - again by the desperado leader, Dr. K.I. Singh.

After his second capture, Dr. Singh was lodged in the Singh Darbar jail with some other secessionist leaders like A.P. Kharel and Ram Prasad Rai, who wielded considerable influence among the eastern wing of the Raksha Dal, guarding the prison. The Dal, and especially the eastern wing, had by that time become quite restive and disaffected. These circumstances gave an excellent opportunity to the 'Robin Hood of Nepal' to strike. From his Singh Darbar jail, on the night of January 28, 1952, Dr. Singh tried to stage a coup d' etat with the help of Raksha Dal. The Dal men freed all prisoners and in quick succession seized the radio station, airport, treasury and the Singh Durbar (the secretariat building of Nepal). Dr. K.I. Singh, in a personal interview

given to the author later on in July 1969 at Kathmandu, claimed that 'the whole of Kathmandu was under his thumb that night'. He further told that he then submitted a 'charter of demands' which, amongst other things, demanded that Nepal should establish diplomatic relations with other countries on the basis of equality and no 'special -ties' with any particular country, and the formation of an all-party Government, including the Communists but excluding the Gorkha Parishad<sup>682</sup>. These demands had earlier been made by pro- Communist elements also. The King, however, refused to negotiate with a rebel and asked him to surrender. Seeing the army units encircling the Singh Darbar, or, as he himself has claimed, because of his respect for the Institution of Monarchy and visualizing the possibility of Indian troops rushing in to help the Kathmandu regime, he decided to flee to Tibet<sup>683</sup>. The fact that he had not touched that treasury and still was able to distribute huge sums of money to his followers (Raksha Dal men) gave rise to the speculation that some influential group in Nepal, or as alleged by others, some foreign power was behind him.

The Nepalese Government approached the local Tibetan Government for Dr. Singh's extradition. In his press conference of February 9, 1952, the Nepalese Home Minister Surya Prasad Upadhyay confirmed it and further expressed his belief that, "they (the Tibetan) will accept our request."<sup>684</sup> But this hope was belied and instead, Dr. Singh and his followers moved from Shigatse to Lhasa for a "long stay" and there from they were shifted to the "Chinese Main Land" on December 5, 1952, and finally to Peking on April 25, 1953, to find a safe asylum<sup>685</sup>. It is believed that Lhasa had agreed to surrender him to Kathmandu, but the extradition could not take place because of Peking's intervention. Speculations were rife as to DR. K.I. Singh's political links and the Chinese motive in providing him the asylum<sup>686</sup>. An important section of political opinion in India and Nepal thought him to be a 'Communist agent', or at least backed by the Chinese and pro- Chinese elements in the Kingdom<sup>687</sup>. Even those who did not agree with this opinion, apprehended that the Chinese would try their brain - washing techniques upon him to use him to organize a Gurilla - type of "people's struggle" in Nepal. This notion was strengthened from his portrayal as "people's leader" & by offering him facilities over their radio by the Chinese Government. The apprehensions remained most lively at least until he had moved to Peking in 1954- a safe distance from the Nepalese border<sup>688</sup>.

#### **4.1.13 Tibet's Dilemma**

The last clause of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement stipulated that it shall come into force immediately after the Tibetan Government's signature and seal were affixed over it, implying thereby that it would be operative only after the Dalai Lama's seal was put on it. The document was produced before the Dalai Lama on July 14, 1951<sup>689</sup>. The Dalai Lama, according to his own narration, found himself caught in a dilemma. Finding the Agreement difficult to accept, he preferred to seek sanctuary in India rather than to become an instrument of the Chinese rule in Tibet in the future<sup>690</sup>. On the other hand, he thought that his duty to stand by his people at the hour of crisis and to try to lessen the impact of the Chinese occupation needed him to return to his capital.

In the meanwhile, Peaking was reported to have exerted maximum pressure on the Government of India to refuse such an asylum to the Dalai Lama. A Chinese "Advisory Delegation" under Chang wu, the newly appointed Chinese "Commissioner and Administrator" of Civil and Military Affairs in Tibet", quickly flew to Calcutta,<sup>691</sup> where he sought to contact Norbu, whom the Chinese suspected of arranging asylum details for his brother. The Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi also reached Calcutta simultaneously to try to track down Norbu. An agreement was sought with him with a combination of threats and promises<sup>692</sup>. Chang later on proceeded to Yatung to meet the Dalai Lama on August 8, 1951, where the Dalai Lama sought clarification on future relationship between the Tibetan 'Local Government' and the Chinese Central Government. Chang, in response, is believed to have assured Dalai Lama of the Chinese intention to respect the Tibetan autonomy and the Dalai Lama's status and rights in full<sup>693</sup>.

Considering all aspects of the problem, the Dalai Lama decided to return back and he reached Lhasa on August 17, 1951, 1951<sup>694</sup>. He, however, did not confirm the Agreement at that time. The Chinese Government continued with its propaganda aimed at raising the bogey of "foreign intrigue" in Tibet, mentioning for the time being the United States as the key-operator. Lowell Thomas's visit to Tibet in 1949,<sup>695</sup> circulation in Kalimpong of copies of a book on top- secret military briefings for American troops on Tibet in 1950, which were alleged to have been recovered from the captured radio operator, and the escape of Norbu to America in July 1951, were used as a pretext by the Chinese to justify a more rigorous policy<sup>696</sup>. The Chinese Government claimed that it was compelled to take quick action in order to forestall "foreign intervention" and to discourage possibilities of "counter - revolution" by the Tibetan exiles in India<sup>697</sup>.

#### 4.1.14 Chinese Maneuvers in Tibet

Soon, on September 9, 1951, the vanguard units of the People's Liberation Army 'responsible for implementation of the Agreement' arrived at Lhasa, while the main body remained at its Outskirts<sup>698</sup>. On October 26, three thousand troops entered Lhasa under the command of General Chang Kuo-hua and another contingent of similar number emerged over there subsequently on December 1, 1950<sup>699</sup>. The Kasag, under these circumstances, ratified the Agreement in September 1951<sup>700</sup>. The Dalai Lama, who was avoiding ratification of the Agreement, also sent a telegram to Mao Tse-tung, on October 24, 1951, supporting the Agreement<sup>701</sup>. Earlier, a large number of troops had started marching into Tibet from north-west also in the beginning of August 1951. Small Tibetan garrisons at Rudok and Gartok were soon overtaken and a quick move of the Chinese armies towards Shigatse not only closed the western passes to India but threatened to cut the main route to the South of Lhasa. Soon, Chen or Heho in the North was over run on November 4 and Shigatse was occupied by November 24, 1951. The army reached Gyantse on November 29, 1951<sup>702</sup>. As the Chinese troops advanced into Tibet, they were directed by Peking to undertake the construction of two major roads to link Tibet with China -- the Sinkiang -Tibet and the Chingai-Tibet highways from Lhasa, with the help of the "work personal" also entering Tibet<sup>703</sup>. That two highways were to meet at Zamsar, from where the Sebang -Tibet road was later on extended southward to Shigatse, and through Gyantse, to Phari, the nearest town from the mouth of Nathu La, on the old carvon pass leading to Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim, which is only 40 miles on the Indian side of the border. These constructions were completed by December 1954<sup>704</sup>.

Peaking Radio in November 1951 claimed that the Chinese army engineers had completed a highway from Sinkiang province in China over 15,000 feet high Brahmaban Mountain and over some of the roughest terrain in the world. Large supplies of goods were pouring via this route into Tibet. Top Chinese officers and troops, including cavalry, were reported to be converging at Gyantse, ostensibly to take security measures for the Panchen Lama's impending arrival at Shigatse, as also to establish check- posts on the Indo-Tibetan trade route at Yatung and along Tibet's entire southern frontiers with India<sup>705</sup>. "With the occupation of Tibet's second largest town (Shigatse) and the concentration of troops in Eastern and. Western Tibet, military control of the whole of the Tibet was virtually established," commented the Statesman on November, 27, 1951<sup>706</sup>, and added that, "the establishment of check- posts along Tibet's southern frontier with India, Nepal and Sikkim, was now expected to be "a matter of days"<sup>707</sup>. The prediction became true when, on March 13, 1952, the Chinese troops entered Yatung, fifty miles from the Indian

town of Darjeeling, after having set up guards and check- posts along the trade route from Gyantse to the Indian border covering a distance of 295 miles<sup>708</sup>.

Rapid strides were made in the direction of integration of Tibet's armed forces into the Chinese army within the next few months. The Tibetan Military District of the People's Liberation Army was created early in 1952. The Chinese General Chang Kuo was appointed at its Commander, while two Tibetans, the ubiquitous Nagpoo and Rabashi were designated as his assistants. All other high officers were Chinese. In February 1952, Tibet Military Area and the Chinese Liberalization Army had been successfully completed. Headquarters was established in Lhasa and within days, the Headquarters announced that the integration of Tibetan units with the Chinese Liberation Army had been successfully completed<sup>709</sup>.

Soon, by April, the Chinese started with their plan of systematic diminution of the Dalai Lama's power and status and asserting their own authority, through subtly<sup>710</sup>. They forced the Dalai Lama to dismiss his two co - ruling Prime Ministers, Luangwa and Losand Tashi, alleging that they were uncooperative and were inciting the people to disobey the occupation Agreement<sup>711</sup>. He was compelled to do it under the threat "of their execution with trial, because they had in all honesty and sincerity resisted unjustified usurpation of power by the representatives of the Chinese Government in Tibet", revealed the Dalai Lama in his press conference referred to earlier at Mussoorie on 20<sup>th</sup> June, 1959<sup>712</sup>.

On April 28, 1952, the Mao's Panchen Lama made his entry into Lhasa at the head of the People's Liberation Army and was in July 1952 installed at the Tashi - lunpo Monastery in Shigatse<sup>713</sup>. Then a series of efforts to alter the governmental structure of the country to enlarge the Panchen Lama's domain and authority and simultaneously, to erode those of the Dalai Lama where initiated<sup>714</sup>. "They (the Chinese Communist) did not lose any opportunity to undermine my authority and sow dissension among my people", told the Dalai Lama at the above mentioned press conference. A significant step in this direction was achieved by establishing People's Political Consultative Conference" designed to replace Tse-phang (the ecclesiastical court), Yig-Tsang and other departments of the Tibetan Government<sup>715</sup>.

On economic front also, a beginning was made with the opening of a branch of the People's bank of China at Lhasa to take over the economic administration of the country. The Chinese soon moved to capture Tibet's commercial life also. After establishing the People's Bank of China at Lhasa, subsidiary offices of the People's Bank of China were opened in Shigatse and Gyantse; and soon their operations began to exert considerable influence over domestic Tibetan



commercial activities<sup>716</sup>. The headquarter for newly constituted state - owned Tibet Trading Company<sup>717</sup> was inaugurated simultaneously at Lhasa, and by 1952, all Tibetan commercial firms and all sales of the Tibetan products to China were being handled through the Peking operated General Tibetan Commercial Cooperation. All- out efforts were made to make Tibetan region economically dependent on the interior of China and to make the jam-min li or people's currency, issued by the Peking Government, the legal tender<sup>718</sup>.

#### **4.1.15 Indo- Tibetan Relations Revised**

In the area of external relations, the Chinese ordered to the Lhasa Government to dissolve its Foreign Affairs Bureau and instituted in its place "Lhasa Foreign Affairs Office" of the Chinese Central Government "to dispose of all Foreign Affairs of the Tibet area". This, coupled with the Chinese control of trade and commercial activities of the country, had a direct bearing on both India and Nepal<sup>719</sup>.

However, once Tibet had accepted Chinese, 'suzerainty' or 'sovereignty' by ratifying the Sino-Tibetan Agreement, it was clear that India also would be required to re- adjust its position vis-a-vis Tibet. Article 14 of the Agreement had already stipulated that "henceforth external relations of Tibet shall be the exclusive concern of China". Diplomatic feelers, therefore, were thrown by both sides towards the follow up measures to that end in the beginning of 1952<sup>720</sup>. Thus, in July 1952, before his final departure for India at the end of his tenure as Indian Ambassador, Panikkar had had a 'very long and cordial' discussion with the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, wherein he thought the issue was resolved satisfactorily. Recounting his impression of the talks, Panikkar wrote,

“The Tibetan issue was simpler. Chou En -lai recommend the legitimacy of our trade and cultural interests in that area and suggested that the Political Agency at Lhasa, an office of dubious legality, should be re- regularized by its transformation into an Indian Consulate General in exchange for a similar Chinese office in Bombay. This I had been authorized to accept. So far as our other posts and institutions were concerned, some of them like the telegraph lines, military escorts at Yatung, were to be abolished quietly in time, and the trade agents and the other subordinate agencies brought within the framework of normal consulate relations. These were to be taken up as and when the circumstances become ripe”<sup>721</sup>.

The main issue of our representation at Lhasa", concluded Pannikkar, "was thus satisfactory settled and I was happy to feel that there was no outstanding issue between us and the Chinese at the time of my departure"<sup>722</sup>.

Panikker's initiative was followed up by the Indian Charge d' affairs in China, T.N. Kaul. He informed that the Chinese Government attached much importance to the trade agencies, as also to the trade marts and the pilgrim traffic and hoped that these would continue till the matter could be discussed. The Chinese Premier issued a clarification of his July 1952 talks with Panikker, which revealed that the Chinese in the meantime had changed their stance and were no longer inclined to recognize that India had any rights, whether trade or economic, in Tibet; there by dragging India to negotiate the whole issue de novo<sup>723</sup>.

While the issue of the trade agencies at Tibetan towns of Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok with escorts of Indian troops, trade-marts and the right to carry on trade at other places, maintenance of posts and telegraph services between Sikkim and Gyantse, rest houses and pilgrims traffic were not taken up by the Chinese as per Indian proposal, the latter agreed to the conversion of the Indian Mission at Lhasa into a Consulate in exchange for a Chinese Consulate in Bombay.<sup>724</sup>

Accordingly, the sixteen years old Indian Mission at Lhasa was converted into a Consulate - General under the jurisdiction of its Embassy in Peking on 15<sup>th</sup> September 1952, in exchange for a in exchange for a Consul General for China in Bombay<sup>725</sup>. All trade missions in Tibet were similarly placed under Indian consul General's control. Thus, most of the old Indo - Tibetan conventions and treaties lapsed ipso facto with these changes. Further, the change in the judicial character of India Mission in Lhasa marked the end of the brief period of political co-operation between India and Tibet on the basis of equality and sovereign integrity. It also marked India's unequivocal acknowledgement and recognition of both the de jure and de facto sovereignty of China in Tibet.

Why did China not discuss other allied issues simultaneously? Nothing on record is to be found explaining the Chinese attitude. Probably, the Chinese had no intention to accept Indian position ipso facto or to concede anything substantial to India on these counts. But, at the same time, they did not wish to antagonize India's completely as they still needed India's assistance to pull their chestnuts out of the fire in Korea. Also, Chinese were not as yet firmly entrenched in Tibet. Therefore, these issues were kept in animated suspension for almost a year by the Peking Government.

Coinciding with the return of peace in Korea in 1953, the Chinese objected to the dispatch of fresh Indian troops to replace the escort guards at the Gyantse and Yatung. They seized the wireless set of the Indian Trade Agent at Gartok and prevented him from proceeding to the trade marts at Rudok and Taklakot. Further, the Chinese authorities did not allow the Indian Political Officer in Sikkim to visit Lhasa, except on a Chinese visa<sup>726</sup>. Nehru, in August 1953, sent a message to Chou En -lai expressing surprise and regret over these happenings. He said that the Government of India was anxious to reach a final settlement of all pending issues, since the time had come for them to be settled to the mutual advantage of both parties<sup>727</sup>. In his reply, Chou En lai justified these Chinese actions. He emphasized that the relations between the two governments 'in this area had to be built up a new through fresh negotiations' and suggested Peking as a venue for the talks which were proposed to take place in the month of December, 1950<sup>728</sup>.

#### 4.1.16 Implications to Nepal

The developments on the Himalayan plateau were born with important consequences for the Kingdom of Nepal as well. Ever since the Communists marched to victory in China and initiated the implementation of their plans of "liberating" Tibet in support of their purported "historical claims", the Nepalese Government felt scared rather than happy to find in China any prospective counter - weight to India offering an opportunity to revive the old theme of Prithvi Narayan Shah's foreign policy. Who could be sure of the precise limits to these "historical claims" of the Communist China which was, at the same time, pledged to redeem its "lost territories" and to "liberate" the Asian people<sup>729</sup>. After all, Mao Tse-tung himself had listed Nepal as one of the "dependent states" that the British had snatched away from China and which it would like to reclaim; and this position he had not cared to alter till then<sup>730</sup>. While the Rana oligarchy would have found co-existence with an aggressive Communism incompatible, the situation was not better even for their predecessor democratic governments or for the monarch himself. Peking had refused to accept the bonafide of the non-Communist governments in Asia & had encouraged Communist parties in the so - called "colonial", "semi-colonial" or "federal" lands, to wage relentless war against these regimes and leaders of the "bourgeoisie democracies" the "national betrayers", until final "liberation" of their respective people was achieved<sup>731</sup>. This doctrine was accepted to by almost all the Asian Communist parties. The Communist Party of India also, in November 1959, prescribed to its "comrades in Nepal" the "armed Guerrilla struggle" advocated by China as the "principle form of struggle". The Polite Bureau of the party felt that,

*“The Nepali people, militant by tradition, inspired by the victories of their Liberation Army of China on their borders, might in a short time take to this gorilla form of struggle due to the several reasons”<sup>732</sup>.*

Now with the subjugation of Tibet, China had expanded up to the undefended borders of Nepal, promising a safe rear to any such guerrilla war-fare. When Chairman Mao tse-tung, sent a message to the Nepalese Communist Party in the summer of 1951, a deep apprehension was caused in the Nepalese mind about the Chinese designs on the Kingdom in the context of the then prevailing temper of the Communist world. The message said: “After the liberalization of Tibet, the Chinese People and the Nepalese people will unite in closer solidarity in the common struggle for the sake of defending Asia and the world peace”<sup>733</sup>. Refusal to hand-over Dr. K. I. Singh to the Nepalese Government and giving him the status of a "People's Leader" in asylum, appeared to them to be a concrete proof of such a scheme of things. Confronted with the reality of a co-terminus China as a result of Chinese occupation of Tibet, a thing which was merely a matter of conjuncture before 1950, the newly formed democratic government of Nepal might have apprehended a threat to their Country's territorial integrity, political freedom, and democratic polity. The New York Times in its December 13, 1951 issue, reported about the continuous Chinese Communist infiltration into Nepal from Tibet and quoted the Nepalese Premier M.P. Koirala as saying that Gorkha units had been posted along the Himalayan passes to stop it. The Nepalese Inspector General of Police also reportedly confirmed to its correspondent that the Communists from Tibet had been slipping through the towering mountain passes connecting the two Himalayan countries and they were attempting to subvert the Nepalese population in the loosely defined border area<sup>734</sup>.

There is hardly any doubt that the Chinese occupation of Tibet had morale - boosting effect on the Communist in Nepal. At the end of July 1952, fourteen Communists were arrested in the border Doti and Jumla region of north-west Nepal while returning from Tibet with "important documents", which showed that contacts with the Chinese communists in Tibet had by then been established<sup>735</sup>.

#### **4.1.17 Nepal's Stakes in Tibet**

Then there was the question of the Nepalese position in Tibet. Besides India, Tibet was the only country with which Nepal had international relations in the past. Due to its superiority in arms

and trade, the Nepalese were the gainers vis-à-vis Tibetans in this relationship. A large number of the Nepalese population had permanently settled down in Tibet, while simultaneously retaining their Nepalese citizenship<sup>736</sup>. The Nepalese had also been enjoying special rights and almost extra-territorial privileges in their trade and commerce with Tibet;<sup>737</sup> a thing of considerable significance to the country whose only trade and commerce with the outside world, besides India, was with Tibet<sup>738</sup>. This trade accounted for the wealth of Kathmandu Valley and particularly of its Newar community<sup>739</sup>. It is to be remembered that while Nepal's trade balance with India was in the latter's favor - and the imports were rapidly increasing,<sup>740</sup> its trade with Tibet was more export-oriented and was definitely advantageous to Nepal<sup>741</sup>. It was also a question of national pride for Nepal<sup>742</sup>. If Chinese were to become masters of Tibet, there was every likelihood of their rejecting its extra-territorial rights and might harass Nepali traders. They would have definitely tried to make the Tibetan trade China-oriented rather than Nepal or India-oriented, as was the case till that time<sup>743</sup>. This had already happened in the past during the brief spell of the Chinese rule over Lhasa in 1909 - 12 period<sup>744</sup>. In fact rumor to the effect that China had instructed Nepal to withdraw its diplomatic mission from Lhasa was already in currency in the country during the 1951-52 period. The arrival of the Nepalese Vakil posted at Lhasa back to Nepal on home leave in the winter of 1951-52 added substance to them. At one point it was so widely believed that the Nepal Government had to officially contradict the rumor to assuage the ruffled feelings of its people<sup>745</sup>.

#### **4.1.18 Nepalese Reaction**

In these circumstances, any Nepali Government would have wished and worked for an autonomous Tibet, and even if it could not help Tibet in maintaining that status, it would have tried to keep its relations with the Lhasa independent of the Chinese control. Its stakes, if not greater, were in no case less than those of India in the maintenance of the Tibetan autonomy - a stand which India advocated and insisted upon in the beginning, but 'abandoned' later on. The Nepalese Government's anxiety over the fate of its position in Tibet after the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951 was evidently great, but it preferred to wait and watch rather than to try to readjust its relationship with Tibet by establishing liaison with the People's Government of China. M.P. Koirala, the first non - Rana Prime Minister of Nepal, therefore, decided to maintain the position taken by his Rana predecessors in this regard. He declined the Chinese proposal to inaugurate diplomatic relations with the new Communist regime<sup>746</sup>. His government, however,

heaved a sigh of relief when an advance party along with the Dalai Lama's letter,<sup>747</sup> and later on, the customary Tibetan tribute mission itself, arrived at Kathmandu on March 7, 1952,<sup>748</sup>. The large party accompanying the emissary of the Dalai Lama indulged in the usual large scale purchasing for the Tibetan Government including a particular variety of rice for the Dalai Lama<sup>749</sup>. Again, in reply to the traditional communication from the Nepalese Government to the Dalai Lama upon appointment of M.P. Koirala as prime minister a week later, the Nepalese Vakil At Lhasa received a personal message from the Dalai Lama saying that,

*"I have every hope that there will be no hindrance to continuing the age old relations between my Government and yours. I pray to God that our relations may become stronger than ever"<sup>750</sup>.*

This appeared to have kindled new hopes in the Nepalese mind that after all the Tibetan Government or the Chinese might not be contemplating to abrogate the existing arrangements and the traditional relationship between Tibet and Nepal, at least in the immediate future. It is, however, more plausible that these gestures were motivated by Lhasa Government's desire to strengthen Tibet's bonds with Nepal in the vain hope of preserving at least one symbol of their country's autonomy - the enjoyment of the independent relationship with its neighbor and to maintain, if possible, its outlet to the world. It appears that the Chinese at that stage wanted to keep Nepal in good humor.

The Nepali Government was so much encouraged by these gestures that it was reported to be contemplating of raising the rank of its Vakil at Lhasa to that of an ambassador<sup>751</sup>. On May 3, 1952, M.P. Koirala stated at his press-conference that Nepal's friendly relations with Tibet had been in no way affected by the Chinese occupation of that Country and that the Chinese authorities in Tibet had established very cordial relations with the Nepalese representatives over there<sup>752</sup>. As to the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the Prime Minister maintained that neither of them had taken initiative in that regard. Avoiding the issue, he pointed out that the formal relations with the foreign states were conditioned by financial considerations and Nepal, being a small Country, was at the moment not in a position to maintain embassies in all countries<sup>753</sup>. In his party's general conference held at Janakpur in the same month, he advocated close relationship with India and rejected the idea of any immediate opening of diplomatic relations with China. The conference also endorsed his policy<sup>754</sup>.

King Tribhuvan's speech on July 4, 1952 further gives valuable clue to the Nepalese thinking on this count,

*“Towards the northern border our traditional relationship with Tibet remains as it was. We have our good wishes to the Central Government of the People’s Republic. We have good relations with the Chinese officers in Tibet. We have friendship and cordiality with Tibet. There has been no change in the traditional relationship despite political change there”<sup>755</sup>.*

The Nepali optimism regarding Tibet was, however, not to last too long. By the end of 1953, China unilaterally moved to abrogate all Gorkha-Bhot Treaty stipulations. In December 1953, all joint Tibetan - Nepalese courts meant to hear cases involving the citizens of the two countries in their mutual dealings and other matters of shared jurisdiction were abruptly closed and taxes were imposed on the Nepalese traders who were hitherto exempt from them. Further, the Dalai Lama was instructed by the Chinese to stop payment of the annual tribute to Nepal<sup>756</sup>. Non - arrival of the tribute and the other steps caused deep concern in Kathmandu. The timing of the Chinese action against the Nepalese and Indian position in Tibet well synchronized with the convergence of Chinese troops all over the country giving them a firm military grip over the territory. Thus, the People’s Government managed successfully to present both the neighbors with the fait accompli, compelling them thereby to negotiate on the former's terms.

The Nepalese Prime Minister lodged a strong protest with the Dalai Lama over the matter<sup>757</sup>. The Dalai Lama's office replied back that his protest and the allied correspondence "for anything relating to Tibet" should be addressed directly to the Mai Chie pu (the Foreign Office of the People’s Republic of China)<sup>758</sup>. The Nepalese Government was reluctant to do this. By implication, the Nepalese Prime Minister seemed keen to keep his Country’s relationship with Tibet out of Chinese control at that time<sup>759</sup>.

#### **4.1.19 Chinese Overtures to Nepal**

Coinciding with their moves in Tibet abrogating the Nepalese and Indian rights administratively, in the spring of 1954, the Chinese themselves brought another and more definite proposal before Nepal suggesting that the letter's relations with Tibet should be "regularized against a proper perspective"<sup>760</sup>. The suggestion, however, went unheeded and Nepal continued to maintain its earlier stand up till the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954. In his speech on the Democratic day of Nepal on April 5, 1954, the Nepalese Prime Minister re-iterated that his country’s relationship with Tibet was "independent of Chinese control" and added that, "our political and cultural relations with Tibet coming down since ancient times are good"<sup>761</sup>.

An enquiry about the non-dispatch of Tibet's tribute mission to Nepal was made by the Nepalese Government with the Tibetan Government as late as on the day of the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement in Peking on April 29, 1954<sup>762</sup>. Discussing Tibetan - Nepalese relationship, Dr. D.R. Regmi, the visiting Nepalese Foreign Minister, informed newsmen in New Delhi on May 7, 1954 that, "The treaty negotiated under Chinese auspices (the Tibeto-Nepal Treaty of 1856) still regulated Nepal's relations with Tibet"<sup>763</sup>.

The Nepalese reluctance in establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China during 1951-54 period was a natural corollary of its appreciation of the critical situation in the Himalayas. While the Chinese appeared to be eager to cultivate Nepal right after the signing of the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951, Nepal's reluctance to rush through the issue was only matched with that of India's over the issue. China also deemed it fit to condition its moves towards Nepal with India's willingness about the same during this critical period. Panikkar records that in February 1952:

*"Before I left, Chou had raised this question and had also indicated that he would welcome our good offices for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Nepal. I told him that the position in Nepal was a little confused and uncertain and that it would be better to wait for a time before taking out the matter. Chou En-lai promised to discuss the whole thing again with me before long"*<sup>764</sup>.

The Government of India appears to have taken the view that Nepal should not hustle into the matter and should wait at least until China's design vis-a-vis the Himalayan states became clear and until India itself had established its relationship with Tibet and China on the satisfactory footings. Advice to this effect might have influenced the thinking of the Nepalese Government, but Nepal's own judgment appeared to be no different. It had not even recognized the new Chinese Government while almost all other countries of South Asia had done so by 1952. Had the Nepalese Government insisted upon formerly recognizing the new Peking regime and on establishing diplomatic relationship with it, it would have been difficult for the Indian Government to object, particularly when they themselves had recognized it. Despite domestic political pulls and pressures, the Nepalese Government continued to maintain this posture up till the conclusion of the Sino-Indian treaty on Tibet in April 1954. The latter event, however, substantially altered the situation.

We thus find a subtle divergence between the stands taken by the two governments about the status of Tibet vis-a-vis China and, by implication, on the nature of their own ties with China and



Tibet. To begin with, Nepal's approach towards the Communist China was skeptic, emanating from its desire to keep the latter off from its relations with Tibet. While India, by the September 1954 Agreement with the People's Government of China over the status of their mission in Tibet, had abandoned its position held by the previous Indian Governments coupled with its right of direct relationship with Tibet, and had thus implicitly accepted China's sovereignty over that Country, Nepal appeared to question the same when its Prime Minister declared that his Government's relationship with Tibet was 'independent of China'.

## **4.2 GROWTH OF INDO NEPALESE CO-OPERATION**

### **4.2.1 The Community of Interest found**

Despite this slight nuance in its approach to the problem, the conclusion of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement and allied developments inspired the Nepalese Government to move closer to India and to lean on it even more. It wanted to save as many of its persisting rights and privileges in Tibet as were possible. At the same time, it did not wish to expose the Country to any possible Chinese designs in future. But the Country by itself was not in a position to bargain from a position of strength. The Nepalese objectives could be achieved only with Indian co-operation and assistance. A joint Indo - Nepalese strategy would have best suited to the purpose. In fact, the provision regarding mutual consultation and action in 1950 Indo- Nepalese Treaty had contemplated such a situation. Tibet had International contacts only with India and Nepal - and both of them were interested in the maintenance of the Tibetan autonomy - though at times differing in details. Both Governments appeared to be working on the same wave-length at that moment and a real community of interest between the two governments was therefore, found with regard to the developments on their northern borders.

This community of interest accounts for their willingness to co-operate in the matters of defense and foreign policy rather than the reason alluded by some scholars, such as 'the big-brother's pressure on the smaller partner' to accept its definition of Nepalese interests ipso facto. Almost all persons who held office during the 1951-52 period generally agreed with India's assessment of China and shared the Government of India's apprehensions regarding security and allied problems posed to Nepal by the emergence of China as the sovereign head of Tibet.

This included the urgent need felt by Indian Government to impress upon their Nepali counterparts for developing a strong and viable polity in Nepal. It was realized by Nepali

Governments of the time that their interests were mutual in this regard. This was also a reason why Nepalese Government at that time perennially relied upon the advice and even the mediation of the Indian friends and officials in their political struggle. That is why they sought latter Government's assistance in controlling illegal activities in the remote parts of their Country, which were often accessible only through India. The Nepalese Government took invocation for Indian help at critical junctures only as a call for help to a friendly neighbor, not as foreign interference in its internal affairs.

The Government of India also had explained that domestic peace in Nepal and the nature of that country's friend and enemies were of vital concern to its own security. While the Government of India tried its best to avoid involvement in the Nepalese day today politics, it did not hesitate to assert on the vital questions of security and defense. Nehru's utterances in a Press Conference on February 28, 1952, give valuable insight into India's policy in this regard. He told the news men that,

"We have taken particular care not to interfere. We have given advice when it is sought. Their Prime Minister has come here on two occasions; the King was here some time back. Naturally when they come, we discuss matters and give them advice - naturally in two matters into matters more particularly in which we are closely associated, that is, matters of foreign policy and defense. Not by any formal agreement. We have no Alliance of that kind, but simply because both these matters are common to us, consultations occasionally take place when necessary"<sup>765</sup>.

Similarly, all the Nepalese politicians including those who had clamored against the alleged 'Indian interference' during the period, look towards India to arrest adverse development in the north and found in it a guarantee against any threat from that side. This is well demonstrated by the statements of B.P. Koirala, the President of the Nepali Congress and former Home Minister (who later on became first elected Prime Minister of the kingdom) and T.P. Acharya, President of the Praja Parishad. Addressing a Press Conference at Kathmandu on September 16, 1932, B.P. Koirala ruled out the possibility of a 'communist invasion' of Nepal, except in the event of an internal uprising, "since China was unwilling to antagonize the Indian Government",<sup>766</sup>

T.P. Acharya also, while advocating for the opening of diplomatic relations with China, tried to dispel Nepalese fears on that count by saying that, "we fear no attack from China because China knows that to do so will antagonize India"<sup>767</sup>.

However, on October 23, 1932, when the political situation in his Country and in Tibet was simply chaotic, B.P. Koirala declared that Communists was "not a remote danger" in Nepal. He accused the existing regime of "creating a congenial atmosphere for community by shelving all land reforms initiated by the former Government" and claimed to have information that the Communist were planning to occupy a small mountainous area in order to begin guerrilla warfare, and that there was "a continuing stream of traffic" over the passes into and from Tibet.

The Nepalese and the Indian perception of their own national interest thus coincided with each other which, in turn, inspired closest co-operation between the two governments. The period between 1950-54, therefore, witnessed a phase of "special relationship" between the two neighbors in practice. Consultations upon mutual problems were frequent, number of high dignitaries, state officials and politicians visiting the other country touched a new mark, and a number of joint - ventures were undertaken in almost every walk of Nepalese.

#### **4.2.2 Nepalese Government seeks Indian assistance in defense**

Soon after the formation of the first popular government in Nepal on November 16, 1951, its Prime Minister M.P. Koirala paid a visit to New Delhi to discuss the overall situation with the Indian leaders. The Hindustan Times reported that he would be discussing Tibetan situation in New Delhi on the eve of his departure<sup>768</sup>. His talks with Nehru, which were spread over to 150 minutes,<sup>769</sup> were believed to have covered a long range of subjects - beginning from the security needs of Nepal to the economic planning of the kingdom as well as the multi-dimensional nature of the threat from the North which had converged Indian and Nepalese interest into one, namely the building of a strong, united and progressive Nepal, and this tended to knit military planning with political and material advancement schemes together in the kingdom. The Nepalese Government accepted soundness of the Indian advice for establishing a network of check-post along with the Tibet - Nepal frontier. The proposal initiated by Waryam Singh Mission to Kathmandu in 1951<sup>770</sup> was this time revived by the Nepalese Prime Minister<sup>771</sup>. The agreement arrived at thereafter made the Indian wireless operators responsible for building and maintaining radio - communication between the sensitive border areas and the capital, Kathmandu and they passed on coded message about the 'movements' and 'activities' in these areas to the Governments of Nepal and India through the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu, because the Nepalese army at that time lacked both the trained personnel and the equipments to carry out that vital function<sup>772</sup>.

These Check-posts were established in Gumshe, Mustang, Namcha Bazar, Jam Bzar, Jhula, Jhumshe, Clang Chung, Pushu and Setu Bash<sup>773</sup>. The other issue that figured prominently between the two Governments was the military preparedness of Nepal. Dr. K. I. Singh's attempted coup in January 1951 had exposed the inefficiency and weakness of police and military organization in the kingdom and served only to re-emphasize the immediate need of its complete overhauling and re-organization<sup>774</sup>.

Only a few weeks later, on February 23, 1952, the Government of India, through a press communiqué, announced its decision to dispatch a Military Mission to Nepal "at the request of the Government of Nepal" to assist it in the training and reorganization of the Nepalese Army. The communiqué further informed that,

*"The mission, which will consist of 20 officers and men in the first instance, is scheduled to leave for Kathmandu on February 27<sup>75</sup>. Later on, it may be strengthened if the Government of Nepal considered this necessary. A Major General of the Indian Army will be the head of the Mission<sup>776</sup>.*

Replying to a question about sending of military advisers to Nepal, in a press conference held in New Delhi on February 28 1952, Nehru told that:

"Recently we had a request- it was when the Prime Minister of Nepal came here two or three months ago, we discussed various matters and came to agreements, purely informal agreements. Among them was a desire for us to help them to reorganize their defense forces. In pursuance of that wish of theirs, we have sent a small mission .... This mission will investigate and report to the Nepalese Government as well as to us to what steps should be taken to that end"<sup>777</sup>.

The report was prepared by mid-induced April 1952, and joint discussions were held afterwards between the Nepalese delegation, which included Defense, Finance and Home Ministers of Nepal, on the one hand and the Government of India, on the other<sup>778</sup>. The report of the said Indian Military Mission (1952) it revealed the impact of the Tibetan developments in inducing a collaboration on defense matters between India and Nepal:

"The defense of the northern frontiers assumed increased importance after the Raksha Dal revolt in January 1952 and when it was learnt that the leader of the revolt was seeking shelter in Tibet and possibly plotting for a better organized rebellion, the Government of Nepal were requested to take urgent measures towards reorganization and training of their army on modern lines<sup>779</sup>.

### 4.2.3 Identity of Views

The similarity of approach of the two governments is marked. While the Government of India, on the basis of Himmat Singh Ji Committee recommendations and other reports, was eager to "persuade" the Nepalese Government to seek Indian Military assistance in strengthening its defense and security system to 'ward off' any danger from the north, the Nepalese Government themselves asked for such a help. This fact is well borne out not only from the said press communiqué of February 23, 1952, but from various utterances made by both the Nepali and Indian statesmen at that time<sup>780</sup>.

Explaining the significance of India's venture in improving the Kingdom's military strength, the Nepalese Government told its people in reply to the criticism hurled by some politicians at the Indian Military Mission that,

*"Our independence is a very scared thing to us. But we must have a modern and well-equipped army if we are to protect our newly-born democracy from internal and external dangers. We, therefore, appreciate the help extend to us by India for the purpose"*<sup>781</sup>.

M. P. Koirala declared in his Kathmandu press conference, on June 3, 1954, that there were certain geographical compulsions which demanded closer relations between India and Nepal<sup>782</sup>. Answering to the criticism of certain political parties about the presence of the Indian Military Mission and Indian Advisors in Nepal and on the conclusion of the Kosi Agreement, he pointed out that for the development of both the countries, mutual goodwill and affection were absolutely necessary. He further asserted that the Indian Military Mission had come to train and re-organize the Nepalese Army "at our own request made during the coalition Government in 1951"<sup>783</sup>.

King Tribhuvan also told the nation the same thing in his message of April 14, 1952. He also called upon his countrymen, specially the army personnel, not to lend ears to any malicious propaganda in that respect<sup>784</sup>.

### 4.2.4 Re-organization of Army: Joint Ventures

Factually, speaking, there was ample justification for the Nepalese Government to invite and Indian Military Mission to assist it in the reorganization of the Nepalese army. The accounts of scholars and political commentators on the then existing state of affairs in Nepal are revealing. A western scholar pointed out that the Army's "inefficiency or virtual non- existence was simply

demonstrated during the Communist revolt in Kathmandu in January 1952<sup>785</sup>. Another scholar noted that:

“There was practically no discipline and no training in the army .... The officers usually came from the Rana family. They received their commission as a matter of privilege, not achievement”<sup>786</sup>.

The state of affairs at ground level can well be gauged from the fact that as late as in 1952 over there, the Nepalese soldiers did not even have barracks or uniforms. There was no regular course of training<sup>787</sup>.

The Mission got down to its work in right earnest immediately and brought forth striking results. The superfluous 'generals' and 'colonels' were either done away with or were reduced in status as per their capacities. The strength of the army itself was reduced from 25,000 ill - organized, ill-paid and undisciplined soldiers to 6,000 properly trained men. The salary of soldiers was increased from Rs. 6 to 30 per month with free rations<sup>788</sup>. Thus, while the numerical strength of the Nepalese Army was reduced, its striking power and the logistic capability was substantially increased.

The army re-organization or increasing of the martial strength of the Country was not enough. Civil peace and orderly development were equally important for the Kingdom to exist as an independent and viable entity.

The situation on ground in Nepal was, however, quite the reverse. In March 1953, a new plot was discovered involving forty-one top officials, who wanted to 'overthrow' the Government<sup>789</sup>. In the wake of mounting agrarian unrest in the Terai area, landless laborers fell out in June 1953 in Biratnagar district, where the Nepali Congress had launched campaign against the payment of rent and taxes. The law and order situation had seriously deteriorated over there. Some leading Nepali Congress workers were arrested on June 12, 1953, and troops had to be flown to reinforce garrison at Biratnagar and to other parts of the Terai to restore peace. In July 1953, fresh violent disturbances broke out in Dhangiri district on the borders of India. Under the leadership of Bhim Dutt Pant, who was described both as a Communist and the follower of K.I. Singh, 700 armed insurgents raided the police station at Brahmdeva Mandi and looted the Government's treasury. On July 8, 1953, they managed to capture the town of Billauri<sup>790</sup>.

Soon, the situation assumed such threatening proportions that the Kathmandu Government was left with no alternative but to request India for a joint mopping up operation. It is to be

remembered that the nature of the rugged mountainous terrain in those areas is such that at places it is much easier to approach one part of the Nepali Tarai from the other by crossing through Indian Territory rather than through the Nepalese territory. The Government of India agreed to the proposal and troops were rushed from Kathmandu to the disturbed area through Indian Territory<sup>791</sup>

After high level discussions between the Nepalese and Uttar Pradesh Provincial Government Officials of India, members of Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed constabulary again crossed into Nepal to join the Nepalese troops in the operation. In an encounter with the constabulary on July 20, 1953, twenty rebels were killed, fifty injured and twenty others were arrested<sup>792</sup>. Bhim Dutt Pant himself was killed in an accidental gun duel with the Nepalese troops near Dundelhura district on August 23, 1955<sup>793</sup>.

It will be pertinent to point out here that for most of the time the army, whose training was supervised by the Indian Military Mission, was carrying out the work of police also, because police force was ill-trained, ill-equipped and 'volatile' and was known to have political sympathies. Observes of the Nepalese politics felt that 'even the top officials were not averse to working against the regime, should an adventurer appear on the scene with reasonable chances of success'.<sup>794</sup>

A re-organization of police was therefore of utmost importance. Here again the Government of India came forward and a senior Indian police officer was sent to supervise the job for some time<sup>795</sup>.

#### **4.2.5 Administrative Reforms**

The law and order was a part of this general problem of administration. For the successful functioning of the newly emerging democratic polity, an organized, efficient, impartial and well-trained bureaucracy was a must. However, as pointed out earlier, there was all around demoralization in the services. Though some spade work was done by the two Indian experts in this respect, they felt that more concentrate suggestions were needed to create a new infrastructure<sup>796</sup>. A Nepalese Ministerial delegation consisting of Subarana Shumsher, Finance Minister, S.P. Upadhyaya, Home Minister and Kaiser Shumsher, Defence Minister along with Bijaya Shumsher, Nepal's Ambassador to India, and a few high Government officials visited India for the purpose in April 1952 and discussed with Indian Prime Minister and other senior officials as to "how India can best assist the Government of Nepal in re-organizing its civil

administration and in the economic development of the country". As a result of the discussions, it was decided to dispatch three or four Indian administrative experts to discuss matters with their Nepalese counterparts and to "make a survey of the requirements of Nepal and make recommendations"<sup>797</sup>.

Subsequently, a three member commission headed by N.M. Buch, a senior member of Indian Civil Service, was dispatched to Kathmandu in May 1952<sup>798</sup> to study the existing organization of the civil administration in Nepal in the various departments, both at the centre and the districts, and to make recommendations for its a re-organization,<sup>799</sup> as well as "to assess the requirements of the Nepal Government of Indian officers to help them"<sup>800</sup>. The Commission "tried within the limited time at their disposal to cover the whole range of administration as far as possible"<sup>801</sup> and submitted its detailed report to the two governments on the reorganization of Nepalese administrative set-up containing 143 recommendations and suggested a code of conduct and administrative rules and procedures, following the Indian Secretariat Manual with some modifications to suit the Nepalese conditions<sup>802</sup>. The Report was "accepted in principle."<sup>803</sup> and it provided the basis for the re-organization of the Nepalese Secretariat in 1953<sup>804</sup>.

The Indian experts also helped in preparation of the interim Government Act of Nepal - 1951, which provided the legal frame-work to the newly inaugurated political order in the Kingdom<sup>805</sup>.

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nepal was created in December 1952, after the model of the Supreme Court of India<sup>806</sup>. It was again an Indian attorney deputed to Nepal who became the first Attorney General of the Kingdom. A senior I.C.S. officer on deputation from the Government of India also served as King Tribhuvan's Private Secretary<sup>807</sup>.

In keeping with the desire of the King, Indian Government again sent the Chief Election Commissioner Sukumar Sen to aid and supervises the difficult job of the preparation of the maiden electoral roles in the country<sup>808</sup>.

Nepal's major deficiency in trained technical personnel was sought to be removed by India through its offer to impart the Nepalese nationals training facilities in India under the Colombo Plan. The number of Nepalese students trained by India in various spheres during the 1950-1960 period was 1401, which accounts for 63.9 percent of the total number of the Nepalese students trained abroad during the decade<sup>809</sup>.

In 1951, India had offered 2 scholarships for their purpose, but the number swelled to 76 by 1954, and by 1955, totaled to 118<sup>810</sup> training facilities in India under the Colombo Plan. The



number of Nepalese students trained by India in various spheres during the 1950 -1960 period was 1401, which accounted for 63.9 percent of the total number of the Nepalese students trained abroad.

#### 4.2.6 Economic Assistance

Indian assistance to Nepal was not confined to the defense and bureaucratic re-organization alone. It also included economic and technical assistance. India's willingness to assist Nepal in their economic and all -round development was hinted at by Nehru right after the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of May 1951, in the course of his public speech during his visit to Kathmandu. In his public speech at Tundikhel Maidan of Kathmandu, on June 16, 1951, he had remarked that, "... if you seek our help in, say, technical or other sphere, we will do our at most to be useful to you, but we never want to interfere"<sup>811</sup>. The Nepali Congress-Rana coalition Ministry, however, was too busy in their internecine quarrels to think of national development projects. But the developments in Tibet inspired in them a new sense of urgency and direction. Soon after the formation of the new non-Rana cabinet, Prime Minister M.P. Koirala paid a visit to India in January 1952 to explore the possibilities of the Indian aid for Nepal's economic development. On the suggestion of the Government of India, he had discussions with the Indian Planning Commission which advised the Nepalese Prime Minister to formulate a comprehensive developmental plan rather than to go for stray projects<sup>812</sup>. The Nepalese Government concurred with the view and the Nepalese Ministerial delegation visited New Delhi in April 1952 in pursuance of this decision<sup>813</sup>. After detailed discussions between the visiting Nepalese Ministerial delegation with the Indian Prime Minister and some of his colleague ministers and concerned officials, it was agreed to that a small group of Indian officials should visit Nepal to examine the existing administrative system in-depth and to make recommendations on the same, as also "one or two Indian experts of the Indian Planning Commission should visit Nepal to study available surveys and project reports and suggest measures for the preparation and implementation of a co-ordinated programme of development"<sup>814</sup>.

The Government of India agreed in principle to give financial help to Nepal in the shape of a loan for furthering the economic progress of Nepal. Amongst the various projects specifically discussed, the Government of India agreed "to finance improvement of the Kathmandu Air-strip" on a priority basis. The Nepalese Government also asked for financial help to construct road from Rexaul to Kathmandu and the Kali Hydro- Electric Project. Although these proposals were

not concede to immediately, the Government of India assured to give them its serious and urgent consideration<sup>815</sup>. Afterwards, King Tribhuvan himself paid a visit to New Delhi in September 1952, during which he discussed the Nepalese situation with Nehru<sup>816</sup>.

A team from Indian Planning Commission visited Kathmandu in June 1952 and produced a preliminary report. The report pointed out that any comprehensive development plan for Nepal could not be attempted satisfactory at that stage because of the lack of basic data. It, therefore, suggested that the main emphasis should be on collection of the basic data and survey of important resources of the country<sup>817</sup>. A month after M.P. Koirala's visit, Nehru, in his press-conference of 28 February 1952, pointed out that,

*“One of the immediate needs, of course, is communications- a road to Nepal from India as well as roads within Nepal. It is highly important, and we promise to send engineers another help for the purpose”<sup>818</sup>.*

Accordingly, work was started on the Tribhuvan Rajpath and Gauchar Air-strip by the Indian Army engineers almost immediately. The Rajpath was largely completed in 1955 with an approximate cost of the 7 millions in Indian Currency, which, along with the maintenance expenditure, was borne by the Government of India as a grant to Nepal under the Colombo Plan<sup>819</sup>.

#### **4.2.7 M.P. Koirala's Visit to India**

The Nepalese Prime Minister, M.P. Koirala visited New Delhi again between July 19 to 22, 1953, to discuss India's assistance to Nepal. As a result of his discussions with the Indian leaders, Indian Government committed itself to assist Nepal in its irrigation projects to the tune of Rupees 10,000 lakhs for the coming five years in the shape of grants in aid. The Government of India also agreed to lift the embargo on imports of duty paid foreign goods to Nepal by air from India. Further, the excise duty realized in India on Indian and foreign goods imported into Nepal through India was to be transferred to the Nepalese Government and the commodities were to be sent to Nepal directly under a certificate<sup>820</sup>. This was likely to increase the latter's revenue from Rupees 3,00,000 to Rupees 40,00,000 lakhs. The Nepalese Prime Minister further informed in his press conference held at New Delhi on July 25, 1953 that a formula had been worked out between the two governments for creating the Nepalese State Bank and for the co-ordination of exchange of their currencies<sup>821</sup>. Following these talks, Indian Government aid to Nepal witnessed a steady rise

during 1951 -56, touching the mark of Rupees 70.7 million in Nepalese currency in 1956, apart from other types of assistance and offered to the latter<sup>822</sup>. The Nepalese Prime Minister further informed in his press Further, the exercise duty realized in India on Indian and foreign goods imported into Nepal through India was to be transferred to the Nepalese Government and the commodities were to be sent to Nepal directly under a certificate. This was likely to increase the latter's revenue from Rupees 3,00,000 to Rupees 40,00,000 lakhs. The Nepalese Prime Minister further informed in his press conference held at New Delhi on July 25, 1953 that a formula had been worked out between the two governments for creating the Nepalese State Bank and from the co-ordination of exchange of their currencies<sup>225</sup>. Following these talks, Indian Government aid to Nepal witnessed a steady rise during 1951 -56, touching the mark of Rupees 70.7 million in Nepalese currency in 1956, apart from other types of assistance and former offered to the latter.<sup>226</sup>

#### **4.3 INDIA'S EFFORTS TOWARD STABILITY IN NEPAL**

It is just clear that Indian efforts during the period were directed at establishing a viable system of defense and administration in Nepal which may solve the problems that were affecting latter's over all development & economy, thereby enabling it to achieve certain amount of socio- political stability along with progress in the Kingdom. But despite India's all sincere efforts and assistance to supplement the indigenous efforts, the Nepalese Government failed miserably on both the counts. While the King appeared to be reluctant to rule directly, the current political leadership felt far short of dedication and acumen required for the task.

Major participants in the struggle against the Ranocracy were then struggling for a seat in the cabinet or the premiership, rather than for any ideology or programme. The intra-party & inter-party rivalries marred the progress so much that the then Crown Prince Mahendra felt called upon to denounces the lack of achievement during the last four years of democracy in his broadcast to the nation on the eve of National Day of Nepal on February 19, 1955<sup>823</sup>. The Nepali Congress, which could claim to be the party nearest to the people and enjoying mass- following, was incapacitated in the leading the Country or the government due to the internecine quarrels between the two Koirala half-brothers. Describing the state of affairs, The Pioneer wrote editorially,

“Bribery and intrigue have been rampant in a scale undreamt of even in the old 'feudalist' Nepal. The writ of Kathmandu has ceased to be operative even in the capital itself. Law and order have met with spectacular collapse. Banditry is now almost a recognized profession. The currency has caved in as a result of manipulation by interested persons”.

The paper further suggested that the Crown Prince should rid himself “of venal Ministers” and make an “incisive and deep probe into the ills that have crept into the administration”<sup>824</sup>.

Apart from the worst administrative conditions, nothing was done to improve the land - tenure system to alleviate the pitiable condition of the peasantry. Unchecked exploitation of the poor peasants was the order of the day<sup>825</sup>. Economy of the country as a whole had so completely collapsed that the exchange ratio between the Indian rupee and the Nepalese rupee fell from 100:105 to 100: 180 within two years<sup>826</sup>.

#### **4.3.1 The growth of anti-Indian feelings : Their roots**

This was the last thing that the people had expected out of the 'Revolution'. On the other hand, the suddenness of change from oligarchic regime to democracy accompanied with promises of better life by the leaders of the revolution, as well as abrupt exposure of the populace to the outside world after at least a century of complete isolation, had in itself sparked-off a 'revolution of rising expectations' among the Nepalese people. The socio-political and economic progress was not able to keep pace with this rise in people's expectations. The inevitable consequence was the generation of large scale frustration amongst the masses. Some scapegoat, some outlet for the rising tide of nationalism - a corollary of the political change - was needed, and India appeared to be an ideal target. The very fact that India was instrumental in bringing about the change and the very presence of large scale Indian influence in the Country made it the ready object of criticism. The communists and certain 'left - out' parties and persons had, from the very beginning, opposed the 'Delhi -deal' and had denounced what they called the 'Indian imperialism'. They were soon joined by all those who felt aggrieved with the changes. Through the overthrow of the Rana autocracy was welcomed by all sections of the Nepali society, the realization that the Indian Government had been able to play such a pivotal role into what might be considered as the internal affair of Nepal which even the British rulers in India had not been able to play made some sections, specially the palace-coterie, apprehensive about India's role in the future also. The all pervasive influence of India in social, cultural, economic and political arena made the Nepali elite further apprehensive lest their separate national identity might merge

into India. Nepalese businessman had also all long resented the presence of Indian businessmen and matters worsened with certain restrictions imposed on Nepal by the Indo-Nepalese Trade and Transit Treaty of 1950. The opposition propaganda further whipped-up claustrophobia in the minds of the Nepalese. They also began to feel that India can, if it is so wishes, always throw an economic strangle -hold over their landlocked country and can force it to submit. Thus, the popular feelings towards India as a savior and helper prevailing in February 1951 soon yielded place to protests against its pueorted "hegemonial" attitude and so called "interference" in Nepal's demestic affairs. The attitude and the type of diplomacy Indian Ambassador, C.P.N. Singh practiced also helped in increasing Nepalese suspicion. He was charged to have become the 'real ruler' of Nepal<sup>827</sup>. Even M.P. Koirala, in whose favour C.P.N. Singh influence was supposed to have worked, told the author that Singh had manipulated the entry of B.K. Mishra in the coalition cabinet. He was believed to be behind every important decision taken by the government in the Kingdom<sup>828</sup>. N.M. Dixit, the then Foreign Secretary of Nepal and close associate of the last Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher, summed up his reaction in a interviewer in the following sentence: "Our Maharaja (P.M.) was Shree Teen (three), the King Shree Panch (five) and your C.P.N. was Shree Saat (seven) Sarkar"<sup>829</sup>. C.P.N. Singh was accused of having involved himself too much into the internal politics of Nepal right from ministry -making and cabinet decisions down to the "district board level politics" -- by attending its cabinet meetings an governors (Baba Hakim) conferences<sup>830</sup>. A rumor was afloat to the effect that he had kept troops in the Embassy to 'force his directives', if need to be, on the Nepalese Government and people. In any case, even if the charges about Sing's style were true, it cannot be constructed as India's policy towards the Kingdom. Perhaps what allowed C.P.N. Singh the alleged latitude of action was the key -role played by him during the 'revolution' and the inherent contradictions in the working of the first Rana -Nepali Congress coalition requiring 'constant Indian advice and prodding'. The 'lack of effective institutional control' over the ambassador of the newly formed Ministry of External Affairs in the Government of India could also have been a factor<sup>831</sup>.

#### **4.3.2 The official Viewpoint**

As far as the approach of the two governments towards various problems facing the Kingdom and towards developments on their borders with Tibet was concerned, they felt that close cooperation between the two countries was an essential condition for the viability and rapid development of Nepal. At this point, a subtle divergence of approach& attitude towards the Kingdom's mutual relationship with India is apparent between the Nepalese government and a

sizable section of their people. Nepalese King and politicians had solemnly solicited India's help to break the Rana monopoly over state power. During this struggle, a personal relationship had developed between the Nepalese and Indian statesmen as a result of their close contact and cooperation. When their struggle was over and Nepal opted for the democratic polity - an innovation in the case of the Kingdom, it was natural for the King and the politicians to look towards India in case of difficulty.

They saw no compromising of their country's sovereignty in seeking and obtaining not only material assistance and technical advice from India, but advice from Indian friends on political problems as well- the latter being well-wishers and a bit more experienced in the experiment of democracy. Delivering his broadcast to the nation on the Nepalese New Year Day, King Tribhuvan appealed for the closest cooperation of his people for furthering and cementing the Indo-Nepalese friendship. He pointed out that "help from friendly nations like Britain, United States of America and Switzerland was being accepted gladly, but major foreign aid was expected from India"<sup>832</sup>. At another occasion he asserted that: "Our friendship with India extends some pre-historic times and there is nothing bad about our seeking Indian aid"<sup>833</sup>. To King, therefore, it was sharing of the experience with a similarly placed friend rather than latter's dominance or interference.

Nehru also took the Nepalese statesmen's eagerness to "seek advice" as quite "natural"<sup>834</sup> and refused to interpret it as something derogatory to Nepal. But it did hurt the ego of the people newly freed from an authoritarian rule who perhaps took it as indicative of a servile attitude on the part of their politicians. Soon opposition to the alleged Indian dominance crystallized itself into definite anti-Indian sentiments.

### **4.3.3 Indian Aid Program and Nepalese Domestic Politics**

The anti-Indian sentiments were aroused and exploited in full by those politicians against whom this influence worked, in the first place, and by the those who were opposed to the Kathmandu Government itself either because they were left-out or because of their vested interests, in the second place. They included otherwise diametrically opposed groups - the Rana and the Communists.

While the Rana resentment over the loss of power was natural, the Nepalese Communists used anti-India propaganda to divert public attention from their own subversive activities and the

Chinese atrocities in Tibet, which affected Nepal also. The Nepalese communists were openly anti-Indian and their main aim was to strengthen China's position in the South of the Himalayas<sup>835</sup>. T.P. Acharya's attitude in this respect has already been discussed. Later on, B.P. Koirala, having been denied his due place in the Nepali Congress government, led the Nepali Congress also to join the bandwagon of anti- Indian propaganda. In fact in their eagerness to secure economic progress and political stability in Nepal, the Government of India got involved in the Nepalese domestic politics. Those who became victims of administrative and military re-organization --and their number was significant-- readily joined the anti -India chorus. They and the frustrated politicians thought that the Government of India was responsible for their losses rather than their own government. Even those moves, which were aimed at strengthening the state and were solely for Nepal's benefit, were also not spared. In fact they were seen as adding substance to the charge of interference.

Thus, the association of Indian advisers with governmental work was decried as the administrative take-over of Nepal by India. The fact that these advisers were at times invited to attend cabinet meetings was taken as a solid proof of the fact that the Country was 'sold out' to India. The Jatiya Jantantrik Morcha, a coalition of communists and Praja Parishad, had already declared the Nepalese Government a "puppet" of Nehru Government, the proof of which was found in the fact that, "In every Department the Nehru Government has stepped in to interfere, and the appointments of all Ministers, including that of the Prime Minister, are made by the Nehru Government"<sup>836</sup>.

Soon Nepali Congress and the Nepali National Congress followed the suit. In December 1951, Bal Chandra Sharma, a prominent Nepali Congress leader, accused that the Indian officers were going for beyond their powers<sup>837</sup>. In 1953, Nepali Congress came out with a formal resolution demanding the withdrawal of both Indian advisors and military mission, in the interest of the so-called "healthy relations between India and Nepal" and for "thwarting the attempts to foster misunderstanding between the peoples of the two countries". The resolution further added that: *"The experiment of the last two years and particularly the last eight months, during with the participation of foreign adviser's has been maximum, has not proved very happy. There are enough educated and experienced Nepalese who are capable of carrying out reforms in our mode of administration"*<sup>838</sup>.

The General Secretary of the Nepali Nation Congress, R.K. Shah, termed the Indian advisers as suspects<sup>839</sup>. Nehru, however, on February 28, 1952, dismissed any speculation to the effect that

the withdrawal of the first two Indian advisors was because of agitation by some people, including B.P. Koirala, against Indian interference. He held that "some of these small groups criticize the Government or talk about the Indian interference. I do not think they want to be taken into the Government"<sup>840</sup>. He admitted in May 1953, in reply to a question in the Indian Parliament that "a section of the public opinion considered the extension of the loan services by India as a direct interference in the internal administration of Nepal"<sup>841</sup>. He, at the same time, maintained that a much larger section held a contrary opinion<sup>842</sup>. He, at the same time, maintained that a much larger section held a contrary opinion.

Similarly, the short-term top administrative assignments, such as Inspector General of Police or Attorney General, granted to Indians to reorganize the structure from the bottom "agitated the Nepali Government servants who feared that Indians might soon monopolize the key posts in the Government"<sup>843</sup>. Commenting on such propaganda, one Nepali scholar aptly remarked:

"Countries like Japan, Turkey and Pakistan relied upon foreign aid and had a large number of British and foreign advisers. But none of these countries lost their independence. Even then we are afraid that we will lose our independence due to the presence of one Ambassador and three advisers (India). This is due to lack of self-confidence among us, resulting from lack of development and progress. Political parties are responsible for this"<sup>844</sup>.

In fact, India suffered from the failure of the Nepalese leaders to give the country an efficient administration and to improve lot of the people. Indian road-building and air-port construction programmes also came under fire. While the one American scholar tried to allude political, economic and military motives on the part of India,<sup>845</sup> a section of the local politicians and newspapers misrepresented it as being intended to destroy the kingdom's ancient invulnerability and aimed at facilitating India's control over the country.

#### **4.3.4 Joint defense ventures under fire**

Joint defense ventures also came into criticism. Nepalese and Indian collaboration in manning of the Tibet-Nepal border check-post and in the Gurkha recruitment, specially the former, came to be an object of vehement criticism on the ground that it compromised sovereignty and independence of Nepal. Even after assuming premiership, T.P. Acharya quibbled that though "it was morally bad" for the Gorkhas to serve in foreign armies", but admitted that there were "certain practical difficulties involved in any decision for stopping such recruitment". He also conceded



that when the Agreement on recruitment of the Gorkhas for the Indian and British armies would expire in 1958, its renewal might be on the basis of the existing terms<sup>846</sup>.

The most criticized step in this direction was also the presence of the Indian Military Mission in Nepal. To the public, it hurt their national pride. Psychologically, the very idea of plainsmen (Madhesis) 'teaching Gurkhas how to fight' was unbearable. It militated against the long-earned reputation of the Gurkhas as gallant fighters – the universally recognized and loudly acclaimed trait of their nation – for which every Nepali had been proud of for the centuries. Thus anything said against the Indian Military Mission was bound to receive public acclamation.

On the other hand, the politicians, who were in opposition, feared that the efforts of the Mission were likely to consolidate the position of the Government and thus increase its capacity to meet the political challenges as well. They, therefore, chose to exploit the public sentiments in full on the issue. Once the campaign was triggered off, it became a question of losing one's popularity if one did not support the wave. Thus, the Indian move was misrepresented as being aimed at placing the Nepalese army under its own control. To quote from the dissertation of a Nepalese scholar, the Mission "came to be regarded as an Indian occupation force and highly emotional speeches were made against India"<sup>847</sup>.

Although the request for dispatching of the Mission was initially mooted by the Nepali Congress during its partnership in the 1951- Rana Nepali Congress coalition ministry, yet after the B.P. Koirala- M.P. Koirala clash and the withdrawal of Nepali Congress from the second ministry, the party under the leadership of B.P. Koirala denounced Indian Military Mission's presence "as irritants to the Nepalese people". It also demanded its immediate withdrawal so as to "stabilize close relations between the two countries and defeat evil attempts of the opportunist elements aimed at damaging these relations"<sup>848</sup>. Addressing the Nepali National Day Celebrations in Varanasi on February 8, 1953, Ganesh Man Singh, a former Nepali Congress Minister and top party leader, accused that:

“The Indian advisors and military personnel in Nepal have become arrogant and are behaving just as American conquerors behaved in Japan. They are inefficient and devoid of morality”<sup>849</sup>.

The other partner of the 1951 coalition, the Gurkha Parishad, admitted that the Mission had done useful work. But it also joined the clamor by adding that "because of the intolerable and discourteous words towards Nepal and the Nepali people it had become unpopular and should be withdrawn"<sup>850</sup>.

The Nepali National Congress Bulletin further described the Mission as a "foreign army" brought to Nepal to deal with the domestic situation under a "secret pact" with the Government of India<sup>851</sup>. The same was properly contradicted by the Government of Nepal<sup>852</sup>. The General Secretary of the Nepal National Congress R.K. Shah has also declared that:

*"The continued presence of the Indian Military Mission has created a suspicion among the general public that the Mission may have a purpose other than one for which it was originally called"*<sup>853</sup>.

He, however, maintained that he had no objection to the continuance of the Mission provided the Nepali public was convincingly told about the progress made by it<sup>854</sup>. T.P. Acharya applied different tactic to condemn the Mission. He explained that they would not have opposed the Mission had it been headed by a Gurkha officer of the Indian army<sup>855</sup>.

#### 4.3.5 Both Governments remain firm on Co-operation

However, neither of the two governments, the Nepalese or the Indian, was deterred or influenced by this anti-India campaign nor the Indian assistance continued to flow unabated. At the height of the tirade against the Military Mission, the Nepalese Monarch cautioned his soldiers and officers not to listen to lose talks about the Indian Military Mission. He urged them instead to help and co-operate with it to the fullest in the reorganization of the army. Discounting any Indian motive behind the gesture, he made it clear that, "our well-wisher and neighbor India has sent the Mission at our request"<sup>856</sup>.

Similarly, the Nepalese Premier M.P. Koirala also dismissed the idea of any deterioration in the Indo-Nepalese relationship. He asserted that, on the contrary, they were very cordial. He declared that the Indian Military Mission was subjected to "fantastic propaganda", such as it was openly being said that in the guise of military advisers and trainers, thousands of troops had come to Kathmandu. When this mischief could not be sustained, the critics had started saying that thousands of troops had come from India to Pokhra district in West Nepal. He described all such talk as utter "nonsense"<sup>857</sup>. The attitude of the Government of India was also firm. When in the Rajya Sabha a member, S.M. Majumdar, asked the Government that whether it was a fact that large section of public opinion in Nepal has expressed resentment against the presence and certain activities of the Indian Military Mission there, Nehru replied back with an emphatic 'no'. He, however, added that, "Certain persons in Nepal, at one time, asked for the recall of the

Indian Military Mission. They did so apparently to arouse feelings against other parties in Nepal", and that "even they recognized the good work the Mission was doing and later changed their attitude". He also informed the house that:

*"They (the Mission) have done a considerable part of this work (that is the training and reorganization of the Nepalese army) to the satisfaction of the Nepal Government and their work has been generally appreciated by the people in Nepal. They are continuing this work and will return when they have completed it"<sup>858</sup>.*

Nehru, on another occasion, also pointed out that the bogey of Indian interference was raised only by interested persons, and received a hearing only by a limited number of the Nepali people. It was natural in the circumstances of the Country which had just come out of the medieval age and had experienced extremely radical changes. In this connection he referred to the emphatic denials made by the Nepalese Prime Minister himself of any such allegations and the acknowledgement he had made to "India's help in making a democratic Nepal".

On February 28, 1952, while replying to a newsman's query about B.P. Koirala's opposition to Indian help, the Indian Prime Minister remarked that:

*"So far as B.P. Koirala is concerned, he assured me on numerous occasions, if I may say so, that he wants India to help in every way. For from objecting to Indian "interference", he wants Indian help in many ways in Nepal"<sup>859</sup>.*

The Government of India's point of view when was perhaps most ably represented by its Secretary - General in the Ministry of the External Affairs, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, who had been dealing with the Nepalese affairs for a long time. He described it thus: "There are, among political parties, persons who misrepresented India's programme of aid as inspired by selfish political motives, but the real cause of this unfriendliness is the frustration of their political ambitions. Because they cannot secure for themselves the reins of government in Nepal, India is made the scapegoat of their disappointment and malice. The fact that some of those who once wanted the administration to be practically run by Indian national, covertly or overtly join in such accusations against India, is itself a proof of the insincerity of the charges"<sup>860</sup>.

He further added that India's role, in an uneasy period of internal political rivalries, had been strictly advisory. It was an example not common in world politics, of a big neighbor helping a small one to work out its salvation peacefully<sup>861</sup>. Bajpai's statement, by and large, describes in real state of affairs. Earlier, in June 1954, when virulent anti - Indian campaign was in full swing and

Indian Parliamentary delegation was maltreated, the Nepalese Prime Minister retorted on India baiters by declaring that:

*“We almost believe now that some foreign agency is abetting and inciting Nepalese.... Why are not Americans and European experts, now in Nepal, being criticized by these very people? Why are all guns of the India baiters turned only against the Indian assistance to Nepal?”<sup>862</sup>*

He further asserted boldly and plainly that, "There should be no mincing of words. Our relations with India have been and will always be more intimate than any other country"<sup>863</sup>.

#### **4.3.6 Tibetan Factor Behind Double Talk of Nepalese Leaders**

Perhaps a more convincing reason for the said behavior of the Nepalese leaders may be discerned from the impact that the developments in Tibet had made on Nepalese polity and indeed on the Indo-Nepalese relations. Almost every responsible Nepali leader and the Government perceived well the threat posed by the deteriorating Tibetan situation to the Country's security and to the Nepalese national interests in Tibet. They also recognized in their hearts & mind, the urgent need of Indian cooperation in meeting out of the challenges effectively.

The mass, on the other hand, were in complete ignorance of such a threat, mainly because the Nepalese Government had all along been studiously denying any friction with Tibet or China and had been pretending to maintain "cordial relations" with the Chinese authorities in Tibet. The Government did so because it thought that any public assertion of its apprehensions about China might make any retention of the existing Nepalese trade - rights and privileges still more difficult. Further, it could have created panic amongst the people in addition. As the people could not be told about the real situation for various reasons; they could hardly grasp the desirability of such extraordinary moves in the areas of defense and development and they had therefore become most sensitive towards such ventures. In such a situation, it was most convenient for a Nepali politician to join anti - Indian clamor and earn some popularity, at least temporarily. But once inside the Government, those very politicians who were encouraging these ant-India sentiments (when they were out of the government) could very well see and feel the compulsions of the international situation and therefore began to loud the necessity and desirability of the continued, and at times expanded, Indo - Nepalese co-operation in almost every walk of their national life.

#### 4.3.7 Tibet Behind the 'Inner - Contradictions' of Indian Policy

It cannot, at the same time, be denied that on pure ideological plain, the Indian policy towards Nepal suffered from what appeared to be some inner- contradictions. The foremost amongst them had been India's perception about the nature of its relationship with Nepal.

Nehru and the Government of India appeared to have taken pains to emphasize that it treated Nepal as a fully sovereign country and respected its territorial integrity and nationhood. This in theory implied that India accepted that country as a completely free agent to charter its own course, both in international and internal matters. Indeed, the Government of India scrupulously denied on its part any desire, much less an effort, to interfere with the affairs of Nepal.

On the other hand, it also continued to emphasize publicly and with equal vigor that so far as Indian security interests were concerned, it considered the Indian line of the defense as running through the southern slope of the Himalayas, by- passing the independent territory of Nepal, virtually identifying it with that of Nepal's own border with Tibet.

Not that Nehru or the Government of the India was unaware of the problems inherent in their approach, especially when exceptions were being taken to it. But they were compelled to stand by their position because of the exigency of the situation that was fast developing on the two country's northern burden in Tibet.

Nehru tried to remove any misunderstanding and misapprehension about the Indian intentions or 'designs' vis-à-vis Nepal by explaining India's vital security interests in the Kingdom in their geo-political prospective. But what happened in actuality was that his explanations made the confusion worst confounded, instead of removing it. For instance, in his speech in the Parliament on December 6, 1950, he declared that the free Indian Government had inherited a relationship with Nepal that was formed in the "expensive phase of the British Imperial policy" which left Nepal only 'formally' independent, because Kingdom's "foreign relations were strictly limited to her relation with the Government functioning in India at the time" and that after independence, the Government of India, "went further in this respect than the British Government had done and Nepal began to develop other foreign relations"<sup>864</sup>. But he warned at the same time that, "we do not like, and we do not propose to like, any foreign interference in Nepal". He declared that "we recognize Nepal as an independent country" and assured that he and his country "wish it well", and in the same breath claimed that by the facts of geography, culture and other allied factors, "no other country's relationship with Nepal can be as intimate" as of India<sup>865</sup>. On the following day, when objection was raised to his description of Nepal, he explained before the Parliament

that, "A country can be completely independent as Nepal has been; but if it has no foreign relations, it does not count in the comity of nations in the way an independence country does"<sup>866</sup>.

The Indo-Nepalese relationship can therefore best understood in the context of Tibet. Had Tibet continued as the natural buffer zone, India would not have been bothered about Nepal's external relations. But when, in its judgment, a potential danger to India and Nepal was developing on the two Country's northern frontiers because of the ominous developments in Tibet, the Government of India felt obliged to claim a special relationship with the Kingdom. Nehru, however, went at some length to explain that his claim did not emanate from any imperialistic notion or hegemony design, but was simply a product of the primary instinct of self - preservation. As the dictates of the geo-politics in the region had made it "sink or swim together" for India and Nepal, he pleaded for transforming the close socio- cultural -religious - ethnic and economic relationship existing between the two neighbors since time immemorial into a virtual defense alliance, entitling the Government of India to have a say in Nepal's foreign relation and in the domestic affairs in so far as they affected its position vis- a -vis Tibet and China. Because the letters exchanged at the same time of the conclusion of the 1950 Treaty to this effect were kept secret, Nehru's utterances in public created some confusion in the minds of the Nepalese people. One may venture to think that the Government of India should have either chosen to disclose the mutual defense arrangements already entered into or should have satisfied itself simply with emphasizing the geographical and socio-cultural nature of the Indo- Nepalese ties and closeness between the two countries that had persisted for centuries and was sufficiently expressed in maintaining such a long open border between themselves. Anyone who could cross into Nepal through its border with Tibet-China, could easily enter into India through Nepal's open border with India.

Similarly, While India professed its commitment to the cause of democracy in Nepal, the working of its diplomacy over there was soon found to be actually strengthening the institution of monarchy, which was bound to have its adverse after- effects, as witnessed during King Mahendra's regime. This again finds its explanation on the developments in Tibet, which were primarily responsible for the shift in emphasis of the Indian diplomacy towards Nepal from pure ideological considerations to the defense exigencies, which needed stability in the Kingdom in the first place, & relegated its concern for democratic functioning of the Nepalese Government in its classical sense to the second place.

Indian Govt. knew well that Nepal had been under Rana autocratic Govt. for more than a century which did not allow any sort of political activity over there & political democratic opposition to it by young Nepali students was mainly based & operated from Indian soil & could muster some support in Teri region adjacent to Indian border, to begin with. But even though kept captive by his Rana Prime Ministers who called themselves as ३ Sarkar, the Monarch, designated as ५ Sarkar, was highly respected, rather adored, throughout the length & breadth of Nepal including Tibetan border region. King Tribhuwan was a non-controversial figure loved by the populace. Even Ranas deem it fit to rule in his name. It was King Tribhuwan's flight to India via Indian Embassy that led to revolution. People had come out in large number in his support even in Capital Kathmandu, Ranacentre of power. It was Indian firm recognition of him as Monarch which led Ranas to agree sharing of power with Nepali Congress, contrary to their previous refusal to Indian proposal even for moderate political reforms.

In the circumstances, Indian leaders appeared to be of the opinion that full democratization of the system, may be under constitutional monarchy, may take some time & working in coalition may impart opportunity of gaining of experience of running government to the democratic leaders

That is why, from the very beginning Indian efforts have been directed at bringing moderation in the Nepalese politics -which was considered necessary both for a peaceful and orderly transformation and for the future of democracy in the country. Thus Nehru tried his level best to bring about a re- conciliation between the Ranas and the Nepali Congress leaders during the days of the coalition Government and, later on, between the two factions of the Nepali Congress itself.

Indian leaders outside the Government but held in high esteem by the Nepali Congress men , particularly Jaiprakash Narain and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, also tried to effect a re-approachment between the Koirala half-brothers. But when all these efforts failed miserably and the first Nepali Congress Ministry also collapsed in 1952,<sup>867</sup> the government of India became convinced that the 'throne' was the only institution capable of achieving some degree of political stability and economic progress. The political parties operating in the Kingdom appeared to be "too volatile" to be dependable agent of modernization. It was one of the better ironies of this period that the trend towards concentration of power in the throne and the corresponding diminution of the role played by political parties were initiated with considerable reluctance by King Tribhuwan on the advice of the Government of India itself<sup>868</sup>. The emphasis on stability was

to cause the irreparable loss to the growth of the democracy and was to militate against the Indian position in the Kingdom itself in the near future, but it was considered for the moment, best in the security interest of the India and Nepal.

This attitude of the Government of India is reflected in its alleged advice to the King to rule, for the time being, with the help of advisory body or directly instead of inviting a political party to form Government after the fall of the Nepali Congress Ministry in 1952. If there is any truth in the story that the Indian Ambassador backed the appointment of M.P. Koirala as the first non-Rana Prime Minister by-passing his much more in charismatic, popular and dynamic brother B.P. Koirala, it can also be attributed to the ambassador's or more appropriately the Government of India's over-cautions policy and avoiding any risk of the Nepalese politics at critical ginger of history.

The Socialist party connections and his volatile nature compared with his radical pronouncements might have made B.P. Koirala a less dependable ally in the eyes of the Indian statesman. M.P. Koirala was more likely to provide the Government of India an "essential adjunct to its overall Himalayan policy, the structural guarantee of Indian friendship with Nepal"<sup>869</sup>. Alternatively, the apprehension that B.P. Koirala's uncompromising attitude in politics might run parallel to the Indian efforts for moderation in the internal politics of the Kingdom might have weighed against him.

#### **4.3.8 Tibet Conditions Nature and Scope of Indian Diplomacy in Nepal**

One is also confronted with the question as to why India did not stop giving aid , advice and assistance to Nepal, if it had 'no ulterior motive', and if by doing so she was simply becoming a scapegoat for all the act of wrong, commission and omission of the Nepalese politicians. One may well ask why it continued to buy unpopularity when it could have improved its position just by becoming a passive spectator. After all, this spite the assertions about the Indian end official spokesman of Nepal that the masses in general did not approve the anti - Indian tirade, the Government of India could not have been unaware of the dangerous potentials of such a campaign especially when an apparently more attractive alternative was fast emerging to their North. Merits of the anti -India campaign apart, results of the Kathmandu Municipality elections held on September 2, 1953, in which the band Communist Party had emerged as the largest group with five seats and 50 percent of the total votes to its share had established the fact that whosoever might have triggered-off the campaign and whosoever had contributed to it or lead it,



the advantage of the same was being reaped by the extremist elements only. It cannot further be denied that the results of the election were, at least partly, affected by anti-Indian feelings. It also indicated the possibility that the anti - Indian sentiment might in future become a major factor in the Nepalese politics.

Even the Government of India had apprehended it right from the beginning was clear from various statements issued by its spokesmen from time to time and from the great care Nehru took to dispel such notions during his visit to Kathmandu Valley in 1951, though it did not publicly admit it. Obviously, they could not have been unaware of the excellent opportunity they were offering to the elements inimical to India by dispatching the Indian Military Mission to Nepal and sending its wireless operations to man the northern check-posts in an already poisoned atmosphere. Even afterwards, When every Indian step in the direction of offering assistance to Nepal was being misconstrued, why it did not withdraw its advisors, mission and experts, as the Nepali Congress has pleaded for, to remove 'irritants' from the Indo-Nepalese relationship? During the course of an interview with the author, B.P. Koirala tried hard to explain the rationale behind the Nepali Congress's demand for the withdrawal of the Indian personal and emphasized that it steamed out of their sincere wish to strengthen the Indian position in Nepal by depriving anti- Indian elements of their favorite propaganda tools.

Again, the Tibetan factor provides the answer for the attitude adopted by India. In fact India by 1952 had found itself caught into a vicious circle. The defense of Nepal had to be strengthened and its economy revived in order to enable it to meet the Chinese threat squarely before the latter was fully and finally settled in Tibet. This was not possible without a liberal, broad - based and extensive foreign assistance. In the prevailing circumstances, the Government of India undertook joint defense measures with Nepal and poured Indian assistance into Nepal for creating a viable system. But the fruits of their efforts could not reach to the lower rung of the Nepalese masses due to the lack of appropriate infrastructure and because of the corruption and inefficiency of the Nepalese political leadership. This caused frustration amongst the people which began to curse the much talked about Indian 'interference' for their difficulties. Taking note of the situation, the Indian leaders, who have been one-time comrades of the Nepali leaders, tried to assist Nepal in developing a sober, moderate and progressive political leadership by using their influence and good offices for bringing reconciliations and rapprochement amongst the warring factions, persons and parties in the Country. This induced them to offer political advice to their old friends every now and then.

The efforts of the Indian statesmen and their hopes were specially directed towards the Nepali Congress. That is why the Indian leaders - both inside and outside the Government - held parleys with its rival factions and tried their best to forge unity in their ranks. Their efforts, however, did not bear fruits. Instead, it only give other parties big handle in their anti - Indian propoganda. These other parties tried to brand the Nepali Congress as an 'Indian agent'. In its eagerness to disown such a charge, the Nepali Congress leaders often went to the other extreme of leading the anti -Indian campaign themselves.

Frustrated with the performance of the Country's political leadership, the Government of India tried to supplement the failures of political leadership by offering direct advice on political and administrative matters to the Nepalese Palace and by assisting it in creation of the requisite infrastructure through direct and active Indian participation in the vital sectors of the Government. This exposed it to the charge of interference in the internal affairs of Nepal and of harboring imperialist designs against the Kingdom. While the Government of India understood the situation and the implications of its policy, it felt helpless as it found itself placed on the horns of a dilemma of assisting Nepal and thereby continuing to be the target of the misguided nationalist outpouring in the shape of anti -India campaign, or, of throwing off that Country at the mercy of the circumstances by withdrawing itself from the scene, and thereby exposing the strategic Kingdom on its borders to the imminent danger of the Chinese Communist subversion, or else risk a possible state of anarchy - the latter situation would have again served the interests of China. Its withdrawal would also have imparted China an excellent opportunity to enter into the Kingdom and to extend its influence to the South of Tibet,<sup>870</sup> besides opening its own open borders with Nepal to the risk of Chinese Communist infiltration through Nepal.

The Government of India opted for what it thought to be the lesser evil of continuing to assist Nepal actively to strengthen its own defenses. But its every efforts in this direction strengthened anti - Indian sentiments and gradually lead the Nepalese elite to look for the opening of the other alternative by establishing diplomatic and other contacts with China, primarily to counter-balance the 'all pervading' Indian influence in the Country.

#### **4.3.9 China Perceived as a Counter-Balance**

The demand to establish contact with China thus gained momentum with the growth of anti - Indian sentiments in Nepal. Initially it were the Communist Party and the Praja Parishad who demanded it, but they were soon joined by Dr. Regni and his Nepali National Congress. Dr.

K.I. Singh was already believed to have included the demand in his 'Charter of demands' submitted to the King during his abortive coup in 1952. The Nepali Congress Working Committee also passed a resolution in June 1951 urging a friendship treaty with China.

The Chinese Government on its part was more than eager for "regularizing" Tibet's relations with Nepal in the perspective of its newly acquired sovereign status in that country. The Chinese seemed to clinch the issue by unilaterally abrogating Nepalese privileges in Tibet in 1953, causing a severe blow to the Nepalese traders and residents in that territory. But the Nepalese Government continued to avoid facing the issue up till 1954, when both internal and external situations compelled it to take a decision. Internally, as pointed out earlier, the clamor for regularizing relations with China and Tibet had attained an all - time high pitch. Extremely, it was the conclusion of the Sino - Indian Agreement on April 29, 1954, that made it incumbent upon Nepal to take action, on the same lines.



# CHAPTER 5



## AFTERMATH OF ABSORPTION OF TIBET IN CHINA

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### AFTERMATH OF ABSORPTION OF TIBET IN CHINA

#### 5.1 INDIA-NEPAL & CHINA- AFTER CHINESE OCCUPATION OF TIBET

##### 5.1.1 Sino - Indian Agreement on Tibet

The Sino - Indian Agreement on Tibet was signed on April 29, 1954 at the end of what appears to be four months of hard bargaining<sup>871</sup>. It covered regulation of trade and pilgrims traffic between India and Tibet and fixed the number and location of trade agencies which each of them were to have within the territory of the other<sup>872</sup>. By an exchange of identical notes on the same day, further details were spelled out and arrangements set in motion for the withdrawal of Indian military escort from Yatung and transfer of the rest houses and posts, telegraph and telephone installations which the British Government had handed over to its successor Indian Government, to the Government of the People's Republic of China<sup>873</sup>.

In the notes these facilities were envisaged to be handed over on the payment of a "reasonable price". The following day, however, the Government of India communicated to Peking that it will be transferring "postal, telegraph and telephone installations together with equipment operated by India in Tibet" "free of cost and without compensation as a gesture of goodwill"<sup>874</sup>.

Thus, India abandoned all the privileges that had accrued to it in Tibet partly as a result of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the Shimla Convention of 1914, and partly as a result of the goodwill that was built up between the two countries during the last four decades and a half when the Tibetan Government had found it difficult to get along with the Chinese, without any quid

pro quo. Whatever facilities of trade India was allowed to retain were there in return for new and substantial facilities gained by China in India on the basis of reciprocity and mathematical parity. The most important part of the Agreement, however, was its preamble. It enunciated Panch-sheel or the Five Principles of International behavior, namely mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non -aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence - which were to to guide relations between the two signatories.

Still more important was the phrase used to describe the status of Tibet. For the first time in the history of the three countries, the expression "the Tibet region of China" was used in place of "Tibet" or the "Autonomous Region of Tibet". This was the first and final official renunciation of the Indian recognition of Tibet as a separate country.

The fact of the recognition of Tibet, the only area where India and Nepal came into contact with China, as a part of China and the implications of the Panch-sheel as the code of conduct taken together, debarred India even from expressing moral sympathy for the Tibetan people or from taking any meaningful action to help Tibet. Henceforth anything which India would have liked to do to alleviate the sufferings of the Tibetans was to be constructed as interference in the internal affairs of China. Technically, the Government of India was now precluded from raising the Issue of the Tibetan autonomy in the United Nations or in any other world forum - even if the understanding given by China on this score in return was to be given a complete good bye.

Nehru, according to the then Director General of the Intelligence Bureau of India, however, thought that, "With the last vestiges of suspicion against India removed, China might adopt a reasonable attitude and the Tibetan autonomy could yet be saved in substance and India's own interests safeguarded"<sup>875</sup>. The Indian Prime Minister, according to the Director, also felt that the Tibetans hated the Chinese and would never submit to them, that very nature of the Country rendered its inhabitants tough and hardly, and it would be impossible for the Chinese to colonize them<sup>876</sup>.

As far as China was concerned, the Agreement was hailed for ending the "remnants left by British Aggression against China" and for establishing "India-China relations" "on a new basis"<sup>877</sup>. Generally speaking, the Agreement was received favorably in India. No doubt, Indian special position in Tibet was bid a good bye without any quid pro quo, but it was done "without any mortification or regret ", because India, as Nehru had declared in the Parliament and elsewhere, did not wish to seek "extra -territorial" advantages in any country<sup>878</sup>. When China was taking upon itself to

protect the pilgrim traffic and the trade routes between India and Tibet, there hardly remained any need or justification for retaining military pickets etcetera and while "obsolete" rights and privileges were abandoned, India's "vital trade and cultural interests" were "safeguarded by putting them on a more stable basis"<sup>879</sup>. Satisfaction was expressed over inclusion of the phrase "mutual non-interference", China had committed itself not to meddle with India's internal affairs even on ideological pretexts<sup>880</sup>.

The Agreement, particularly its reference to "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity", was taken as an implicit recognition of India's frontiers with Tibet, since Nehru had reiterated time and again that the traditional frontiers of India, as demarcated by Mac Mohan line, were well known and beyond any challenge<sup>881</sup> and no exception was taken to it by the People's Government of China. "Where was the need", asked the Hindustan Times for instance, "to raise the border-line question all over again?" and asserted that, "The reference to the territorial integrity in the preamble of the Agreement clearly proved that China was expected to have respect for India's stand on the boundary"<sup>882</sup>. Prime Minister Nehru, while presenting the text of the Agreement before the Lok Sabha, emphasized that the important thing about the agreement was the permeable, which, "though not formally stated as such, but practically speaking" was an agreement not to commit "aggression on each other"<sup>883</sup>. This, in his opinion, meant that India,

*"Which have now almost above 1800 miles of frontier, would live in terms of peace and friendliness and should respect each - other's sovereignty and integrity, should agree not to interfere with each - other in any way, and not to commit aggression on each other"<sup>884</sup>.*

In a circular addressed to the presidents of the Pradesh Congress Committees in his capacity of the President of the Congress Party, Nehru retorted back to the criticism made in certain quarters by saying that, *"It is said: how we can put faith in such declarations? In International Affairs, one can never be dead certain and the friends of today might be enemies of tomorrow. That may be so. Are we then to begin with enmity and suspicion and not give any other approach a chance? Surely it is better, with nations as with individuals, to hope for and expect the best, but at the same time to be prepared for any eventuality"<sup>885</sup>.*

There were, of course, some long objectives involved in a positive approach to the Sino-Indian friendship. The international situation also had eased a bit by that time following the agreement on the termination of hostilities in Korea the Geneva Conference move of 1954 and, later on, the Geneva Summit of 1955. It was thought that China, tired of constant wars since the inception of the new Republic, very much desired a spell of peace allowed by these developments. After



his return from China - visit in November, 1954, Nehru asserted before his press conference that he was:

“Convinced that China, entirely for its own sake, wants peace and time to develop its Country, and thinks in terms of at least three or four - five years plans, with fifteen or twenty years’ time to lay the foundations of a socialist state. So this question of aggression, internal or external, has to be seen in the context of the Chinese not desiring to get entangled”.

About the fear of an "aggression" or 'sub-rosa' activities of China, he felt that:

*“One can really judge all these things in the general approach by a country. If the approach of one country is friendly, it normally follows that nothing remains to be done. If it is not friendly, then things are different.”*

He, therefore, thought that friendship with China, if it could be achieved at a reasonable price, was the best guarantee for securing a peaceful frontier in the circumstances<sup>886</sup>.

The event further coincided with Pakistan's signing of the U.S. - Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Pact, the SEATO and the Baghdad Pacts. India was taken aback. Nehru decided that by persuading Pakistan to join them, the Western Powers had brought the cold war to "India's door steps"<sup>887</sup>. This further created a limited community of interest between the two countries - in making a common cause against the U.S. efforts at attempting for the in-roads in Asia.

The agreement, therefore, was mostly welcomed as heralding a new era of understanding between the two great nations of Asia at a time when it was needed the most. In fact it initiated a phase of immense cordiality, at least apparently, between China and India which found expression in "Hindi - Chini - Bhai - Bhai" slogan then renting high in the air.

This is, however, not to suggest that the Agreement was not criticized at all. While some political parties like Praja Socialist Party and Jan Sangh condemned it outright as being born out of 'a sin',<sup>888</sup> the others were skeptic about the genuineness of the Chinese professions of friendship towards India and were of the opinion that India, "by letting China do what it will with Tibet", and "by allowing a useful and natural buffer" to fall to ground, had exposed itself to great risk<sup>889</sup>. The Pioneer thought it "a pity" that the terms 'territorial integrity' was not clearly defined, and opined that a 'clear unequivocal undertaking' should have been obtained from Peaking that "old claims would not be revived" and that "agreed map of China" would be prepared<sup>890</sup>. A meeting of the Praja Socialist Parliamentary Party passed a resolution condemning the Agreement and

severely criticized Indian Government for not consulting the representatives of Nepal and Tibet before signing the same and for its failure to obtain an agreement on the boundary between India and China<sup>891</sup>. The Thought urged that, "The Government of India will do well to insist on a clear definition of the Indo-Tibetan boundary line. Needless to say, this should include the boundary line between Nepal and Tibet. (Emphasis added)"<sup>892</sup>

Even when Sino-Indian negotiation were in their concluding phase, the Government of India was enjoined upon in the Parliament to "consider the advisability of lodging a protest to the Chinese Government for including Nepal and Bhutan in their maps, as being within Chinese territory."<sup>893</sup>

### 5.1.2 Implication for Nepal

The utmost concern, however, was expressed, both by the supporters and the critics of the Agreement, about its possible repercussions on Nepal and on that Kingdom's relations with India. Voicing this widespread concern felt in the country, the Pioneer, for instance, wrote that it was to be devoutly hoped that Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim would not "succumb to the threats or cajolery of their more powerful neighbor on the north"<sup>894</sup>. While admitting that the emergence of a "strong and united China" had made it impossible for the Government of India to "maintain the old Balance of power which the British had left behind", the Tribune maintained that in the case of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, "the position was entirely different", that, "their security is part of our security. We cannot afford Communist infiltration in these states"<sup>895</sup>. The Hindustan Times's "Insaf" (pen - name for its editor Durgadas ) asserted that the, "lesson of the Agreement was that Nepal had become" the special sphere of India's responsibility and pointed out that:

"... With Tibet gone Red, India is exposed on the north eastern frontier. Nepal is the gate through which infiltration can take place.... In a world, Nepal assumes special position as a bastion of democracy in this sub-continent"<sup>896</sup>.

The agreement was of the great consequence to Nepal as well. For it, the disappearance of Tibet meant facing a co-terminus Communist China- with all its implications and possibilities. Once, however, India recognized Tibet as an integral part of China, it became obvious that Nepal also will not be able to sustain its extra-territorial position in that territory for a long and that it will have to re-orientate its relations with China.

On its part, the Chinese Government had already stepped up its indirect pressure on Nepal to do so by abrogating rights and privileges of the Nepalese citizens in Tibet unilaterally. A definite suggestion from China to the effect that Nepal's relations with Tibet should be re - fashioned against the perspective of changed situation there, came during the last phase of the Sino-Indian negotiations in Peking, in the year 1954<sup>897</sup>. At that juncture, the Government of India also appeared to have advised Nepal to face the question of their country's relations with China with "foresight and realism"<sup>898</sup>. It further suggested Nepalese Government not to insist upon holding onto untenable claims and encouraged the latter to normalize and re-fashion its relations both with Tibet and China. The Government of India's approach was that Nepal should not shrink its international responsibilities, and that, from a long - range point of view, it would be better for the Kingdom to live with china on friendly terms rather than to arouse the Peking Government's suspicion and distrust<sup>899</sup>.

While the Nepalese Government itself was realizing the need for opening a dialogue with the people's Government, it hesitated lest its initiative might not turn out to be diplomatically unsound, especially when the new Peking regime had still not repudiated the age-old Chinese claims of suzerainty over Nepal declared by its predecessor Governments<sup>900</sup>. The question of boundaries was also there. Indeed maps had appeared under the new regime showing large parts of the Nepalese territory as falling within China<sup>901</sup>. The results of the Sino- Indian negotiations further acted as a deterrent. As professor Levi observed,

*“It (the Sino-Indian Agreement) set a bad precedent for Nepal and made the Government even more reluctant to enter into negotiations with China. But Chinese created circumstances and Indian pressures proved irresistible”<sup>902</sup>.*

### 5.1.3 Nepalese King Visits India : Consultations on Tibet & China

The Nepalese King Tribhuvan and Foreign Minister, Dr. D.R. Regmi, rushed to India on May 1, 1954, only a couple of days after the conclusion of the Agreement, to hold high level discussions over the situation. They had prolonged discussions with the Indian Indian Prime Minister and other dignitaries. These talks concluded only on May 6, 1954. Regmi's various statements and utterances during the visit confirm that the Government of India had advised the Nepalese Government to revise and remodel its relations with Tibet and China according to the exigencies of the new situation. During his press conference of May 5, 1954, Dr. Regmi

welcomed the Agreement between India and China on Tibet, saying that he was glad that it was based on equality and mutual friendship. "The Agreement did not affect Nepal directly", Regmi added, but admitted that, "we will soon face the same question. We have treaty relations with Tibet. We stand for friendship with China"<sup>903</sup>. In reply to further queries, he declared that so far as Nepal was concerned, the 1856 treaty<sup>904</sup> "negotiated under Chinese auspices" still regularized its relations with Tibet<sup>905</sup>. He also disclosed that the Tibetan issue had become very delicate since Tibet had stopped the annual tributes of Rupees 10,000/- , but maintained that "we are not at all disturbed by it".

He concluded by saying that his Government would take up the question of its relationship with China very soon<sup>906</sup>. He was much more specific on May 8, when, while answering about the prospects of any modification of Nepal's relation with Tibet and its relations with China, he declared that:

*"So far we have not been formally approached by the Chinese. If they approach us, we will do the right thing at the right moment. For the present, we want to be on friendly terms with the Chinese and we will not do anything that will go to create embarrassment to either side"<sup>907</sup>.*

While overtly maintaining that it has nothing to fear from China and that its relation with that Government were friendly, the apprehension of the Nepalese Government entertained on this score may well be gauged through certain steps it initiated almost immediately after the conclusion of the Sino - Indian Agreement to strengthen defense and security arrangements all along the Tibet- Nepal frontier.

Coinciding with the statements of its Foreign Minister in New Delhi, T.P. Acharya, the Home Minister of Nepal, announced in Kathmandu, on May 4, 1954, that his Government proposed to establish police-posts in the Himalayan region<sup>908</sup>. According to him about 100 police officers were to appear before a screening committee "to be examined for educational qualifications, physical fitness, integrity and efficiency" for the purpose<sup>909</sup>. India also lent out technical personnel to man the posts and the necessary wireless equipment to help them maintain contact with Kathmandu<sup>910</sup>. The fact that several official missions were "studying the border region and establishment of military headquarters" in various parts of the country, the creation of checking - points along the Tibetan border manned by carefully screened police officers equipped with radio and the building of strategic roads,

“...made it amply clear that the Nepalese Government was considering at least the possibility of complications with the northern neighbor and was trying her best to prevent any infiltration of communist agents from that side of the border”<sup>911</sup>.

The next month, on June 25, Chou En-Lai visited India on his way back from Geneva to consolidate the gains. This climaxed the "Hindi - Chini Bhai - Bhai" spirit. He was given a welcome unprecedented in the history of the independent India<sup>912</sup>. He, in turn, made repeated professions of eternal friendship with India and made a strong plea for Afro - Asian solidarity and pan-Asian<sup>913</sup>. Chou En-Lai also tried to allay apprehensions about Chinese ideological infiltration or subversion in the neighboring lands for the furtherance of International Communism or in support of the doctrine of liberation<sup>914</sup>. Addressing a press - conference in New Delhi on June 27, 1954, he specifically declared that,

“The rights of the people of each nation to national independence and self -determination must be respected. The people of each nation should have the right to choose their own state - system and way of life, without interference from other nations. Revolution cannot be exported”<sup>915</sup>.

Further, in answer to a question on positive proposals for increasing cooperation among Asian nations, the Chinese Premier re -emphasized the five principles of the Sino - Indian Agreement on Tibet and appealed for their applications 'in a wider sphere in Asia', which could 'increase cooperation among Asian nations’<sup>916</sup>.

The joint communiqué of the Indian and the Chinese Premiers issued on June 28 at the end of the visit also re - iterated the theme of peaceful co-existence between different social and political systems" that existed in the various parts of Asia and the world<sup>917</sup>.

The Nepalese Foreign Minister, Dr. Regmi expressed his feelings of satisfaction over the trend of events,

"I welcome the statement of the two Prime Ministers at New Delhi that the Treaty on Tibet should serve as a model for other countries”<sup>918</sup>.

This, and almost all other statements, issued by the Nepalese statesmen during this period on their country's relations with China betray their apprehensions also. They repeatedly emphasized "Panch Sheel" as the possible basis of Nepal's relationship with China - because it implied the recognition and respect for the national sovereignty, independence and equal status of the Kingdom and ensured 'non - interference' in its internal affairs on ideological or any other

pretext. But they were still not sure whether they should merely refashion their relationship with Tibet or should go for establishing diplomatic ties also with China. The said confusion is reflected in Dr. Regmi's denial of the press reports to the effect that "Kathmandu was considering 'normalizing' relations with Peking"<sup>919</sup>.

#### 5.1.4 Chinese Overtures to Nepal: the Indian View

The Chinese Ambassador at New Delhi at this stage is said to have conveyed his Government's willingness and reciprocity of the Nepalese intent to establish diplomatic relations with China to the Nepalese Ambassador at New Delhi<sup>920</sup>. Later on, Chou En-Lai made a public gesture to Nepal in this direction by declaring before the first People's Congress in China, on September 23, 1954, that his government was prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations with Nepal<sup>921</sup>.

Welcoming the gesture, the then Nepalese Prime Minister, M.P. Koirala said,

*"We welcome the Chinese Prime Minister's desire to establish normal relations between China and Nepal. China is our neighbor, and our relations with that country are historical. We shall give serious consideration to the question"*<sup>922</sup>.

At this juncture the Government of India appeared to have slightly changed its stand. The Indian prime Minister is said to have advised his Nepalese counterpart not to be stampeded into the matter and to wait a little before talking a concrete step in the direction of establishing diplomatic ties with China<sup>923</sup>. What prompted Nehru to retract from his earlier position can easily be guessed. The Government of India was well aware that its understanding with China on Tibet still remained vague on many counts, while the delicate balance of power in the Himalayan region had been disturbed. This had many grave implications for the countries on the southern slope and the Government of India was alarmed at the unfolding of some of its dangerous possibilities soon after the conclusion of the Agreement.

By now Nehru's theory of impossibilities of a permanent occupation of Tibet by Chinese had started crumbling. His expectation that the conclusion of Sino -Indian agreement will remove all suspicion out of the Chinese mind - who might, as a result, allow Tibetans a room to maintain their autonomy in substance - also did not seem to materialize. In fact, the Indian Government had by that time received many reports of widespread discontent in Tibet, confirmed further by

the fact of the continuous influx of refugees into India from there under the pretext of pilgrimage<sup>924</sup>.

The then Director of the Intelligence Bureau of India, after making an on the spot survey of the border population, informed back to Nehru that the news of unsettled conditions in Tibet was making these population greatly agitated and that their uneasiness had considerably increased after the conclusion of the Sino-India Agreement<sup>925</sup>. In between, the exiled Tibetan leaders, including the Dalai Lama's elder brother, the former Prime Minister of Tibet and the leaders of the Tibetan Trade Delegation of 1950 also jointly addressed series of appeals and memorandums to the Government of India describing the ruthlessness of the Chinese in Tibet and pointed out its likely repercussions on the Himalayan borderlands<sup>926</sup>.

Then there was the question of securing Country's northern frontiers. Although the Government of India could claim that by signing the said Agreement China had at least impliedly accorded its recognition to the existing Tibet-India border,<sup>927</sup> such an 'implied recognition' was no substitute for a formal agreement or to a definite declaration by China to that effect. Chou En-Lai, on the other hand, had made it quite clear at the time of the negotiations that there were bound to be many issues between India and China and that the conference could only take up those issues which were 'ripe for settlement'<sup>928</sup>. The Indian delegation had satisfied itself merely by re-iterating that, all pending questions had been communicated to the Chinese Government and that it hoped that they would be settled amicably<sup>929</sup>.

The Indian view was that "so far as the Government of India were concerned, the boundary was well known and beyond dispute, and there could be no question regarding it"<sup>930</sup>. There was, therefore, no need to include the question of borders in the agenda on its part.

The Chinese, on the border hand, kept their options open by taking up the position that only questions 'ripe for settlement' were being taken up and that there was no outstanding border problem between India and China<sup>931</sup>.

This situation was obviously fraught with grave risks. The Chinese Premier's statement was open to sinister meanings. In fact the Chinese Government had, in July 1954, already objected to the patrolling of Indian troops on the border areas of Uttar Pradesh – claiming certain patrolled part of it as falling within the "Tibetan Region of China"<sup>932</sup>. The new maps published by the People's Republic during the period also continued to show large and important chunks of Indian Territory as Chinese<sup>933</sup>. Similar was the case of Nepal<sup>934</sup>.

Thus any understanding on Tibet was incomplete until the Government of India could obtain a "formal abjuring" of the Chinese claims against them<sup>935</sup>. Of equal importance was the question of evolving a new and agreed equilibrium in the Himalayan region. Since the agreement had established China's paramountcy over Tibet, India required clear and explicit recognition of its interests and special position in the region south of the Himalayan slopes, including Nepal. Though China appeared to have accepted India's primacy in the Himalayan region as well as its 'special position' in Nepal, this acceptance also remained quite vague and one depending on Sino-Indian goodwill and exigencies of the international situation rather than on any explicit arrangement or undertaking. Thus, China never contradicted Nehru's repeated assertions about the validity of McMahon Line and India's special relationship with Nepal, but it did not formally accept his stand either. The Chinese intentions towards Nepal were, therefore, to be clarified and other pending issues between China and Nepal including Nepal's 'mystery man' K.I. Singh's return to the homeland, were to be solved before initiating any dialogue between the two countries. Nehru expected to sort out these issues with Peking government during his forthcoming visit to China in October 1954, and as such he advised Kathmandu to wait till his return from China.

### **5.1.5 Move to Co-ordinate Nepalese Foreign Policy with India**

Another reason for Nehru's aforesaid advice was probably his desire to put India's arrangements with Nepal on defense and foreign affairs on a firmer institutional basis before the latter plunged into the swift and unpredictable diplomatic currents of the Chinese waters. This desire is reflected in the aide memoire he is supposed to have handed over to the Nepalese Foreign Minister, D.R. Regmi, at the conclusion of the talks held in May 1954 between him and Dr. Regmi during latter's aforesaid visit to the New Delhi<sup>936</sup>. The text of the draft instrument was first published by a Nepali Weekly, Jhyali, in its July 8, 1958 issue. The accompanying newspaper report alleged that Dr. D.R. Regmi was responsible for initiating the move. Dr. Regmi, however, emphatically denied this<sup>937</sup>.

The aide memoire as published in the paper contained following provisions:

- 1) "There should be close and continuous contact between the two governments in regard to their foreign policies and relations, in so far as they affect each other.



- 2) In any matter under consideration by the Government of India which may relate to Nepal, the Government of India will consult the Government of Nepal.
- 3) The Government of Nepal will likewise consult the Government of India in regard to any matter relating to the foreign policy or relations with foreign powers, with a view to a co-ordinate policy.
- 4) In particular, in matters relating to the relations of Nepal with Tibet and China, consultations will take place with the Government of India.
- 5) The Government of India agreed to arrange that whenever the Government of Nepal wishes, Indian missions abroad will undertake to represent the Government of Nepal and to look after Nepalese interests.
- 6) All foreign missions of the Government of India will be instructed to give all possible help and assistance to Nepalese nationals.
- 7) The two Governments will from time to time exchange information relating to foreign affairs and relations with foreign powers in so far as they affect each other<sup>938</sup>.

In fact the aide memoire only put in black and white the understanding reached upon between the representatives of the two Governments during their Delhi-talks. Further, it was a reiteration and confirmation of the previous agreements and the understanding prevailing between the two Governments for a pretty long time. In substance it embodied their expressed desire for a co-ordination in foreign policy matters in so far as they affected each - other. This is substantiated by the fact that soon after the talks and the handing over of the aide memoire, Dr. Regmi publically accepted and emphasized the desirability of such a step without mentioning the move specifically. He declared before his press conference of May 8, 1954 at New Delhi that:

“Nepal's foreign policy is very similar to India's. We, being very close to each other, have to face similar problems, difficulties and dangers, and thus we will have to adopt a similar policy on many issues. To discuss foreign policy relations with friendly nations, the Foreign Ministers of India and Nepal will continue to have mutual consultations<sup>939</sup>”.

Nehru was more clear and specific when he informed the Indian Parliament, on May 18, 1954, that,

“Now since these changes have taken place in Nepal, we have been brought in fairly close touch with developments there. We have often discussed these things and it has been very clearly agreed to between us, and only the other day, about less than four weeks ago when His Majesty the King of Nepal and some ministers of the Nepal Government were here, it was again reiterated that the foreign policy of Nepal Government should be coordinate with the foreign policy of India. That is so: there is general agreement and even consultations with each other<sup>940</sup> .

The proposal generated a heated controversy and increased the intra-governmental tensions in a heterogeneous cabinet then in office in Nepal. It was felt by some that the absence of the Nepalese Prime Minister in the delegation which visited India in the wake of Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet had allowed Regmi to play an exaggerated role. Prime Minister M.P. Koirala and other ministers felt that Regmi had tried to improve and consolidate his position within the government through this stroke. This led the Nepalese cabinet to suggest some amendments which rendered it unacceptable to the Government of India<sup>941</sup> .

The Anti-Indian feelings prevailing in the Kingdom might also have played some part in it. Nehru’s statement in the Parliament that Nepal’s foreign policy should be coordinated with that of India had sparked off a new series of heated protests in Nepal. For instance, Randhir Subba, a Gorkha Parishad leader, remarked that:

*“It is to be desired that the foreign policies of India and Nepal should be co-ordinated, not that Nepal’s foreign policy should be co-ordinated with that of India”<sup>942</sup> .*

The statement appears to have climaxed the anti-Indian campaigning , and barely a week later, when, on May 28, 1954, six -member Indian Parliamentary delegation visited the Nepalese capital, it was greeted with hostile crowds all along its way from the airport to the city raising slogans against alleged Indian 'interference' in Nepal<sup>943</sup> . The demonstration is believed to have received support from almost all political parties of Nepal -overt or concealed, active or “moral”<sup>944</sup> .

### 5.1.6 Aide Memoire in Cold Storage

The Government of India, after receiving suggestions to the effect that India should take Nepal into confidence, (a) with regard to its foreign policy and matters connected with foreign powers in all and not only with those relating to the Kingdom alone and (b) in all matters affecting Sino-

Indian relations, preferred to keep quiet over the issue, probably waiting for a better opportunity such as a change in the ministry when the suggested amendments could either be softened or dropped altogether<sup>945</sup>. As the future events were to move in a different way, the opportunity never manifested itself and no follow-up was made by the Government of India, letting the aide memoire move to freeze down automatically.

Though the move, as suggested earlier, cannot be said to be an innovation - rather it was an extension and formalization of the spirit of Indo -Nepalese Treaty of 1950 and the letters exchange there with, one may still ask as to why the Government of India moved the proposal at all, especially in the face of then current anti - Indian campaign in Nepal, risking a refusal? One answer may be that the aide memoire went further than the treaty and the letters. While the letter required each party to inform the other in case of "any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighborly state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments" (Article 2), the aide memoire covered almost every aspect of the Nepal's external relations.

Why then, these arrangements were not entered into with the Rana Government themselves? The issue of foreign policy co-ordination must have been under consideration even during the time of Rana regime. We find Nehru thinking on these lines as early as November 28, 1949, when he declared before the Indian Parliament that, "... it is desirable for such co-ordination of the foreign policy (of Nepal with India) to exist"<sup>946</sup>.

The Ranas also had accepted this position in the Treaty itself -- though a bit short of the changed requirements. The pro-West orientation of the Rana Government and the probability of a demand for quid pro quo in the shape of an assurance from the new Government of India that it will continue to support its regime against any people's movement like the British Indian Government had been doing might have made the Indian Government reluctant about proposing the present form of alliance with it. We have already discussed the reasons for which the Government of India was reluctant to support the Rana autocracy, which included its disbelief in the latter's capacity to meet squarely the challenge from China that was developing fast in Tibet. A Sino-Indian Agreement sealing-off the Tibetan autonomy and recognizing Tibet as an integral part of the Communist China necessitated equally clear statement on the part of India defining and asserting its position in the south Himalayan region. The way Tibet was subjugated had alarmed India about the fate of Nepal.

While the Government of India advised the Nepalese Government to regularize relations with its northern neighbor, it was no less worried about the possible implications of China getting an uninhibited opening in the strategic Kingdom. It, therefore, wished to enter into an agreement with Nepal which would allow it to maintain a close liaison with the Nepalese Government on the eve of the latter's entering into formal diplomatic relations with China. This would have enabled the Government of India to preclude and forestall any inimical move on the part of China against Indian interests without exposing it to the charge of interference in the Nepalese affairs.

It will be relevant to point out in this context that India's relations with the other two Himalayan Kingdom's of Sikkim and Bhutan had already been put on a formal Institutional basis allowing the Government of India to keep a vigil over there and thereby forestalling China from making any inimical move in these territories. But Nepal, the most important and yet most vulnerable link in its defense system, happened to be a fully sovereign independent state and India could not have logically claimed a 'special position' in the Kingdom's dealing with China in normal times in absence of any formal agreement of the sort. The post - Rana governments were most friendly with the Government of India, and any formalization of the understanding prevailing between the two governments on foreign affairs would have considerably strengthened India's hands in its dealing with China. It would have precluded China on any future date to take a unilateral step in Nepal at the back of India or against the Indian security interest.

Then, in the face of anti - Indian campaigns and in view of the possible repercussions of the impending Chinese entry into the Kingdom, it was considered wise to bind Kathmandu with a formal arrangement also.

It would, however, be wrong to presume, from the disapproval of the move, that the Nepalese Government sought any departure from the close understanding thitherto prevailing between it and the Government of India in the field of defense and foreign policy. In fact it remained very much the same, and without formally committing to any institutionalized approach, the Nepalese Government continued to be guided by the Indian Government on the issue of opening dialogue with China. Even after the freezing aide memoire business, Prime Minister M.P. Koirala publicly accepted the desirability of co-ordination between the policies of Nepal and India in the sphere of international relations<sup>947</sup>.

Indeed he visited Nehru in Calcutta on October 15, 1954, on the eve of Nehru's departure for Peaking, obviously to entrust him with the responsibility of ascertaining and assessing Chinese

views and intentions about their future relationship with Nepal and about the problems pending between the two. When asked by the press about the contents or agenda of his proposed meeting with Nehru, he avoided a direct reply by saying that "anything might come up during the meeting". However, when specifically asked to express his views on Sino - Nepalese relations, he declared that Nepal was eager to refashion its relations with China provided there was a suitable opportunity for such negotiations<sup>948</sup>.

### 5.1.7 Nehru visits China : understanding on Nepal

Nehru visited China from October 19 to 30, 1954. During this trip, various problems causing concern to the Government of India and Nepal were apparently discussed. While attending a reception given in his honor by the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai at Peking, Nehru could, for the first time, meet the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. Nehru spoke to the Dalai Lama, but as the occasion was quite a formal one, it was reported that politics was excluded from their discussions<sup>949</sup>. Nehru also chose to complain to Chou En-lai about China's cartographic claims against the Indian Territory since 1950. According to Nehru's version of the conversation, Chou dismissed the offending maps as reproduction of the "pre-liberation" maps which China had had no time to revise<sup>950</sup>. The latter official Chinese version, however, maintained that Chou En-lai had "made it clear that the boundary had yet to be delineated", but had assured at the same time that China would not make changes without a survey or without consulting the countries concerned<sup>951</sup>.

The Chinese version of the Nehru - Chou talks came out only in 1960. It is fair presumption, therefore, that Nehru did not receive an impression that China intended to press its cartographic claims. Chinese leaders had also assured at that time that their creed of International Communism need not come into their dealings with their neighbors, that they meant to follow "non-interference" policy in letter and spirit and were hoping for a "co-existence" with different systems, particularly with India and other Himalayan Kingdoms<sup>952</sup>.

The other major issue, "the question of Nepal's relation with Tibet and China and India's special position in Nepal," also received attention. It was believed that Nehru was able to receive a specific assurance from the Chinese on this count too. His utterances at the press conference held at New Delhi on November 13, 1954 that is ten days after his arrival back to India tended to suggest that at least some understanding has been reached between the two countries over the

issue. When a correspondent remarked that the Prime Minister was reported to have achieved "two concrete results" from the trip: first that China had agreed that Nepal was in "India's sphere of influence" and second, that China would start diplomatic relations with Nepal, Nehru replied back that,

"I am sorry many statements that have appeared in the press about my visit to China have been far from accurate. Sometimes they may have a grain of truth, but so far as Nepal is concerned, it is a well-known fact -- and it is contained in our treaties and other engagements with Nepal -- that we have special position in Nepal-- not interfering with their independence, but not looking with favor on anybody else interfering with their independence either .... India's special position in regard to foreign affairs of Nepal was recognized and that it is an admitted fact. As far diplomatic relations between Nepal and China, that is a matter which the Nepalese Government no doubt will deal with in its own way"<sup>953</sup>.

When a direct question was put to him as to whether China recognized India's special position regarding Nepal, Nehru's answer was quite vague. He replied that, *"I did not ask them to recognize anything. I do not want anybody's assurance or guarantee of my position. I am quite happy about it"*<sup>954</sup>.

However, the whole tone of his statement and re-assertion of Indian position without invoking any objection by the Chinese made it clear that at least an implied recognition and some understanding was there. As a matter of fact, the Government of China showed great consideration to Indian sensitivity regarding Nepal throughout this period. To begin with, the Chinese People's Government moved through the Government of India in the matter of establishing diplomatic relations with Nepal and even after direct negotiations between China and Nepal were resumed, the Indian Government was kept well informed of the developments. For at least a few years to come, China did not assert its own interest vis-à-vis Nepal. During this period, the Chinese ambassadors, who were concurrently accredited to Nepal and India, did not mention Nepal independent of India in their public or private utterances, even inside Nepal. As late as in 1956, when the Nepalese Premier visited China after conclusion of the Sino - Nepalese Friendship Treaty, he found even Mao Tse -tung and Chou En - laitoasting for the health of King Mahindra and 'to the solidarity of friendship among China - Nepal and India'<sup>955</sup>.

Another incident may be cited to elucidate the point. Dr. K.I. Singh had received an asylum coupled with a 'hero's welcome' in China<sup>956</sup>. To Nehru, he was no more than a "freebooter who tried to seize power and failed"<sup>957</sup>. That Peking did not remain indifferent to the Indian

susceptibilities on the score was made clear by the fact that Singh was denied<sup>958</sup> broadcasting facilities by the former immediately after Nehru had taken up the matter with the Chinese Government during his visit to China<sup>959</sup>. The Nepalese perception of these matters was no different. Rishi Kesh Shah, a former Nepalese Foreign Minister, commented that,

“The Nepalese acquired feeling that the Chinese Government consulted with the Indian Government in every matter relating to Nepal. There was even suspicion that China and India might have struck a deal as to their respective areas of influence at that time when India relinquished certain privileges and interests in Tibet, which she had inherited from the British<sup>960</sup>.”

### **5.1.8 Koirala consults Nehru: Sino - Nepali Negotiations Begin**

Soon after Nehru's return from China, M.P. Koirala visited him in Darjeeling<sup>961</sup>. It is obvious that all issues concerning Nepal's relationship with China were discussed in details and views were exchanged during this Nehru - Koirala meeting. Nehru apparently advised Koirala to open a meaningful dialogue with China on establishment of the diplomatic links and on other allied issues. Nehru's remark in his earlier referred press conference at New Delhi, which was only ten days after his meeting with Koirala, that, "As for diplomatic relations between Nepal and China, that is a matter which the Nepalese Government no doubt will deal with its own way<sup>962</sup>", indicated that the fundamentals and the timing had already been sorted out. This view is further strengthened by the fact that the negotiations between Nepal and China actually began next month through their ambassadors at New Delhi<sup>963</sup>.

No agreement could, however, be reached through these negotiations, as they were seriously hampered by the internal development in Nepal. This beginning was soon followed by a cabinet crisis at home resulting in the resignation of M.P. Koirala from the premiership of Nepal in January 1955. King Tribhuvan's health also deteriorated towards the worst and he eventually expired on March 13, 1955. This proved to be fatal for the lingering negotiations as well.

While talks between Nepal and China on official level were abruptly broken, a movement on political level was launched for establishment of ties with China by a section of Nepali politicians. This was the main plank of T.P. Acharya's anti - Nepali Congress politics in the period that followed the overthrow of the Rana regime in Nepal. Soon, a small but rapidly expanding group of politicized Nepalese got intrigued as to what the possible effects of China's presence directly to the North of the country could have on Nepal's vastly more important relations with India. A

Nepal - China Friendship Association was established in Kathmandu in August 1954 by the supporters of close Sino - Nepalese ties, which, following the above mentioned developments, urged immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with China through a resolution passed in December 1954<sup>964</sup>.

Thus, by the beginning of 1955, a national consensus over the issue appeared to be emerging fast in Nepal, the thread of which was to be picked up by the new Monarch, King Mahendra, who found it most suited to his own political strategy.

### 5.1.9 King Mahendra's Foreign Policy Innovations

King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev's accession to the throne heralded a new era in Nepal's external relations. He was quite a different man than his father, both as a person and as a King. He had inherited no Indian obligation, gratitude, or personal friendship with the Indian leaders and had been resenting Nehru's patronizing attitude. He wanted to assert Nepal's independent identity on the international plane without being fettered by India's guidance or claim of "special relationship". He appeared to be of the view that with the corresponding "cutting down" of the Indian influence, the Kingdom stood to gain in the statehood.

This would also mean an augmentation of King's own role in the Kingdom. This led him to re-orientate his country's foreign policy by establishing relations with all countries - thus allowing influence of each one to offset the influence of others - and thereby securing the maximum flexibility in managing his country's international relations. The extension of the Chinese authority in Tibet after the lapse of at least four decades was perceived by him as an independent variable which could be utilized effectively as a counter to India's then dominant influence inside the Kingdom. The old theme of balancing each of the neighbors against the other was this time revived as a basic operating principle in Nepal's foreign policy - making.

China enjoyed singular importance in his calculations from the angle of domestic politics also. The King had a passion for wielding power personally and unlike his father, the new Monarch assigned a pivotal and active role to the Throne in controlling and fashioning the destiny of his country. He scorned democracy - at least in the form and manner it was working in his country for the preceding four years. He made no secret of his disgust for politicians and political parties in general<sup>965</sup>.



India could have become a stumbling block in his scheme of things. He could very well visualized that India would throw its weight in favour of maintaining a democratic polity in Nepal whenever it would get an opportunity to do so. During the course of paying a glowing tribute to the memory of King Tribhuwan in Lok Sabha soon after his demise, which was also the moment of welcoming inauguration of the King Mahindra's new regime. Nehru seized the opportunity to hint at India's commitment to the development of democracy in its neighboring land,

“Nepal had suddenly become an independent country which, we might well remember, was not so when there was the British rule in India. The people got a large measure of our democratic freedom, without the apparatus to exercise that freedom, or the machinery for it. They had many difficulties. His Majesty the late King was always some kind of an anchor, and he used his authority wisely in trying to soothe the people and bring them together. Both the old King and the present new King declared, and with sincerity, their desire to promote democratic institutions in Nepal, and I have no doubt that the new King will persist in that desire and try to give effect to it ... Above all we would send our good wishes to the peoples of Nepal in the great adventure of building up their country on a democratic and prosperous basis”<sup>966</sup>.

In the circumstances, elimination of the Indian influence from the political scene of the country appeared to be imperative for any effective assertion of the Crown's absolute authority. The King employed two fold political strategy to achieve this object - firstly to widen the area of Nepal's external relations, especially to cover China in it, and, secondly, to lessen the country's dependence over India. In order to create proper atmosphere for this shift a campaign to malign India's image and to undermine its position in the Kingdom by encouraging anti - Indian elements was undertaken apart from simultaneously introducing China into the scene as a potential rival to India in every possible sphere.

By establishing ties with China, the King was also likely to build for himself an image of a statesman 'free' from the influence of the Government of India and he would have thus satisfied the national ego. The Monarch would also have won favor with the Nepalese traders and settlers in Tibet as whatever advantages they could expect to retain there in future would have been only through the goodwill of China.

Further, he could steal a march over the previous governments and politicians who were all the time demanding establishment of ties with China but were unable to actually do so. International and regional situation also seemed ripe for such a move. India's failure to secure autonomy of Tibet, which Nehru had been consistently advocating, too had a deep impact on King Mahindra's

thinking. He must have calculated that by the same logic he would be able to force the Government of India to abandon their 'patronizing attitude' and claims of a 'special position' vis-a-vis Nepal once China had entered the scene. It was also a matter of national interest -- if India could retreat from its stand on Tibet, who knew if the latter would be able or willing to protect the Nepalese interest in the case of need. It was better to deal with Peking regime directly and obtain its goodwill rather than to depend solely on India's help.

#### 5.1.10 China welcomes Nepalese Overtures on Tibet

The Chinese anxiety for cultivating Nepal and regularizing the latter's relations with Tibet only coincided with those of King Mahindra's. By 1954, Chinese military occupation of Tibet was almost complete and the Chinese Government tried to introduce direct rule in Tibet following the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement. First success in this direction was achieved when it was able to force the Dalai Lama to sign an Agreement with it on March 9, 1955 reorganizing the Chinese governmental administration in Tibet through establishment of "Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region"<sup>967</sup>. After this accomplishment, it gradually moved towards what by all accounts appears to be its real plan -- the total integration of Tibet with China. This new drive to bring about a "socialist transformation" of Tibet took the form of increased pressure on Tibetan institutions to make certain fundamental changes.

Simultaneously, attempts at "Sinocisation" of Tibet were made by encouraging an influx of Han settlers from China's overcrowded lowlands to the sparsely populated highlands of Tibet. Chairman Mao had already stated in 1952 about the pressing need to raise Tibet's population to ten million in the near future<sup>968</sup>. The New York Times reported that between the years 1954 and 1956, about 5, 00,000 Chinese emigrants had been settled on the plateau (Tibet) under the auspices of the Central Government<sup>969</sup>. The heightening of the Chinese pressure on Tibet coupled with their efforts to undermine its age-old Tibetan institutions and the authority of the Dalai Lama resulted in increased resistance from the people<sup>970</sup>. The year 1955 witnessed massive rebellion by the turbulent Khampas against the Chinese Communist rule which, for some time, endangered their control of the area and threatened to block their access to the central Tibet from the east<sup>971</sup>.

The severe Tibetan resistance and the international situation led the Chinese Government to differ the timing of their operation of absorbing Tibet into China and to make a change in the

techniques adopted for the purpose. But the Chinese had no intention to abandon the plan itself. On the other hand, it added to their eagerness of performing the fete as soon as possible. It, at the same time, made the Chinese Government all the more alive towards the geo-political realities of the situation. As the troubled areas bordered with India and Nepal over a long range of rugged mountains and difficult terrain, the working out of a modus Vivendi with the two neighboring Governments was an imperative for the Chinese Government for any effective quelling down of the Tibetan mass - uprising against its occupation. In the probable event of a more wide-spread and fierce rebellion breaking - out as when Chinese were to make a more serious and vigorous attempt to transform Tibet into a province of China, it might not remain possible to curb that without closing a possible guerilla retreat to and from the adjacent territories of India and Nepal and without cutting down their supplies from the border populace which have always been under the religious authority and deep - rooted influence of the Dalai Lama. This, in turn, required a firm Chinese military control of not only Tibet but of certain intermediary patches in between the eastern corners of Tibet and China falling within India or Nepal. Alternatively, the Peking should have receive an active support and cooperation of the Indian and Nepalese Government in the task. But, in view of pro - Tibetan attitude of these two countries, latter was a difficult proposition. Then, China must capture these strategic parts of the Indian Territory, Especially in the Aksai Chin area. This meant that a clash with India some day or the other over territorial issue was inevitable. In both events, however, a minimum understanding with Nepal was a must for achieving any success in the Chinese Himalayan plans.

The Chinese Government adopted a three -pronged strategy to meet its end in Tibet during the year 1955-56. To begin with, it went for the suspension or relaxation of the "Sinocisation" or Communist transformation programme in Tibet, at least, for some time to come, in order to pacify the Tibetans, thereby creating a favorable and conducive atmosphere for undertaking meaningful negotiations with Nepal. Secondly, it continued to cultivate India and to conduct the Sino - Nepalese negotiations in such a way as not to arise Indian suspicion. Lastly, it made rapid strides in consolidation of Chinese military position in the Indo- Tibetan and Tibetan- Nepalese border areas. The Chinese military and strategic calculations included those Indian territories also which were considered necessary for future military operation in Tibet.

It is in this context that Mao Tse -tung announced in 1956 that the Chinese cadres were being withdrawn temporarily from Tibet and that the Lhasa Government would exercise the de-facto autonomy granted to it under the 1951 Agreement<sup>972</sup>. Also, in early 1956, Chinese took up building of a permanent all weather strategic road, later on claimed to be "the highest highway in

the world" from Yeh Cheng in the southern part of Sinkiang province of China to "Ko-ta-lie or Gartok on the Tibetan plateau, which crossed deep into Ladakh area of India"<sup>973</sup>. In pursuance of the plan, Chinese troops undertook occasional probing inside India as well. It began with the violations of the Indian territory at Bara Hoti and Damsen in Uttar Pradesh provisions of India in 1955, to be followed up by crossing of the area three times over the Shippi pass in the Himachal Pradesh in 1956. Further, a Chinese armed party camped well inside Indian Territory near Milang in Uttar Pradesh. All this precipitated an unpublicized but serious boundary dispute between India and China along the western Tibetan border near Nepal --Tibet -India tri - junction.

These developments served to enhance Nepal's value in the eyes of China. The Chinese Government, therefore, expressed its regrets that the talks between the Nepalese and Chinese ambassadors in New Delhi regarding diplomatic relations could not achieve results<sup>974</sup>. Naturally when the Nepalese Ambassador, General Shobag Jung Thapa, met the Chinese leaders and discussed with them the matter during the Bandung Conference in April 1955, he found China only too willing to resume the negotiations<sup>975</sup>. In the Conference also Nepal, reiterated its support to the Five Principles (Panch Sheel) of 'Peaceful Co-existence' as a basis for international behavior and mutual relationship between the two countries<sup>976</sup>. Chou En - lai, in response, promised in private as well as in his speech of April 19, 1959 delivered before the Conference that China had no intention of subverting its neighbours on any pretext<sup>977</sup>.

#### **5.1.11 Sino - Nepalese Diplomatic Ties inaugurated**

These informal contracts were soon followed by the dispatch of a formal Chinese negotiating team to Kathmandu under the leadership of General Yuan Chug -Sien, the Chinese Ambassador to India, on July 26, 1955<sup>978</sup>. Negotiations began the same day in Kathmandu, the Nepalese team being led by the Principal Royal Advisor, Gunjan Singh and M.P. Thapa, a known leftist, acting as an unofficial advisor<sup>979</sup>. For the first two days talks centered round Nepal's treaties with Tibet concluded under the auspices of China in 1972 and 1956 respectively.

Nepalese politicians reacted to the King's efforts to steal a march over them with reservations. B.P. Koirala, the President of the Nepali Congress, in a press statement issued on July 27, 1955, welcomed the visiting Chinese delegation, but pointed out that,

“We cannot help feeling that these negotiations would have immensely gained in their meaning and purpose, if they were to be conducted and finalized by a government of popular character”<sup>980</sup>.

D. R. Regmi remarked the next day that only a popular ministry could give the necessary backing to such talks.<sup>981</sup>

It was soon realized that the question of refashioning Nepalese position in Tibet was quite tough, which needed both tact and leisure to tackle with. The King, however, appeared to be keen to establish relations with China at the earliest so as to counter-balance the Indian influence. Some important members of the Nepali Communist Party suggested to the author during their interviews with him that the King wanted to keep India out of the picture and, therefore, thought it prudent to come to an early conclusion about the first point at least. As a consequence, the two parties were able to announce within a week, on August 1, 1955, that Nepal and China had agreed to establish diplomatic relations between them<sup>982</sup>. The exchange of envoys was to be at the ambassadorial level. The Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi was concurrently to be accredited to Nepal and the Nepalese Ambassador in India was similarly to be accredited to China<sup>983</sup>.

Few things about this agreement are worth noting. The agreement implied Nepal's formal recognition of the new Peking regime and of Tibet's status as a part of China. In the words of Sardar Gunjan Singh, the leader of the Nepalese team, "Nepal had no more direct relations with Tibet ... and Nepal did not propose to bypass China in any matter on trade relations with Tibet"<sup>984</sup>. At the moment, Nepal preferred to go only for diplomatic relationship --leaving more complicated issues like its position in Tibet for future settlement. Also, for the time being at least, the contacts were to be kept at a low key - they missed political overtones and were limited to cultural and economic sphere only. The reason for the Chinese to do so might have been to assure India that they had a very limited interest in the Kingdom.

Though India was not a party to the negotiations, still both the parties acknowledged its importance. This was made obvious by the fact that both the parties had refrained from opening a resident embassy in each other's territory and had instead preferred to work through their existing ambassadors in India. This arrangement was continued even after the conclusion of Sino-Nepalese Friendship Treaty in 1956 under the stipulation made in the Notes exchanged along with the treaty<sup>985</sup>.

The leader of the Chinese delegation, General Yuan was almost immediately accredited as Ambassador-designate, and he presented his credentials to King Mahendra on August 3, 1955.

This adds substance to the speculation that the King was in a hurry to keep India out of his negotiations with the Chinese – which would have been difficult to do if the accreditation was delayed. The Envoy was warmly received. He, in turn, in a nation-wide broadcast on Radio Nepal on August 6, urged that both countries, "sharing an extensive border", should maintain the closest bonds of friendship<sup>986</sup>.

The forgoing of the formal ties was welcomed by almost all political parties in Nepal. Besides the Communists and the Praja Parishad, B.P. Koirala and leaders of the Nepali National Congress also welcomed the agreement<sup>987</sup>. Dr. D. R. Regmi, while welcoming the agreement, urged that other problems, including Nepal's trade with Tibet, should also be settled<sup>988</sup>.

#### 5.1.12 Reactions in India

The response in India was also favorable. In fact there was nothing new about it. The earlier inconclusive negotiations for the purpose were undertaken with full concurrence and, indeed, on the advice of the Government of India itself. Replying to a question in the Lok Sabha, Nehru welcomed the Agreement between India's two friendly neighbors<sup>989</sup>. Reaction in the Parliament, however, were mixed. The views expressed by The Hindu on the agreement perhaps most closely reflected India's general assessment of the situation. It commented that,

*“The recent decision of Nepal and the People’s Republic of China to normalize their relations and exchange of diplomatic representatives seems to have provided another cause for concern among a section of the members of the Parliament. There is speculation weather this friendship may not result in infiltration of the Chinese into Nepal and upset the balance in the northern border of India. Informed circles here, however, do not entertain any anxiety over the new development. With China's hands full with problems of domestic and international importance, it is felt that it would be several decades before she could turn her attention to the south-west.”<sup>990</sup>*

The paper also referred to the general feeling in the New Delhi diplomatic circles that the Chinese had always appreciated India's special position in Nepal which manifested itself well in the fact that they kept the Government of India continuously informed of the development during the negotiations<sup>991</sup>. Moreover, Sino-Indian relationship had by then entered into an extremely cordial phase following the signing of the Panch Sheel Agreement. The Government of India, therefore, hardly felt any immediate danger on that count. It was, however, not the content part of it but the way in which Nepalese Government had conducted the affairs that might

have caused concern to the Government of India about the new Ruler's intentions and strategy in the conduct of his Kingdom's foreign policy.

Shortly after the signing of the pact and probably as a direct result of it, the King granted a royal pardon to Dr. K.I. Singh on September 11, 1955, who entered into Kathmandu on the September 13, 1955, to receive an unprecedented welcome in the capitol. Dr. Singh, however, to the great surprise of many, advocated for closer ties with India and cautioned the Country about plunging into the Chinese waves<sup>992</sup>.

As a shrewd statesman, King Mahindra could also visualize the limits to his maneuverability in the field of foreign policy, at least in the beginning. India's influence was still a dominant factor in the Kingdom and it still retained many cards up to its sleeve. An added constraint was China's own willingness to recognize India's special position in Nepal and its reluctance to arouse Indian apprehension about China's design in the territories lying to the south of Tibet. The King could read in between the lines of Chinese reluctance in opening of a residential embassy in Nepal and in its ambassador's invariable reference to India whenever he happened to mention his Country's friendly ties with Nepal, even inside the Kingdom. In fact the Chinese maintained this attitude till the first cracks on the wall of Sino-Indian friendship became apparent in 1957.<sup>993</sup>

Internally also, the King had yet to consolidate his position and it would have been foolish to completely antagonize the Government of India when his "direct rule" had become a common target of almost all the political parties<sup>994</sup>.

He, therefore, considered it necessary to track southward a bit to allow a worried Government of India time to adjust to his innovations in the field of foreign policy.

### **5.1.13 King Mahindra's Visit to India & Its Aftermath**

Soon King Mahindra undertook a six-week long extensive state -visit to India from November 6 to December 18, 1955, primarily to assuage the ruffled feelings of his neighbour by reassuring India of his Kingdom's continued close relationship with it despite China's entry in the Nepalese horizon<sup>995</sup>. Conscious of the fact that the public opinion in India favored continuance of democracy in Nepal, he told his host that,

“We are further striving hard to make democracy in Nepal a reality and thus complete the task which was taken up by my late lamented father”<sup>996</sup>.

Apart from public receptions and visits to various places and plants, a frank exchange of ideas with the Indian leaders also took place during his visit. No authentic record is available as to what actually transpired between him and Nehru and other leaders, but apparently the visit did make an impact on his mind. It also strengthened his resolve to provide his country with a strong leadership, which in his assessment, could have been given by him alone. A clue to his thinking is found in his address to the Nepalese people at Tundi Khel ground in Kathmandu at his arrival back, on December 19, 1955. He declared that,

"if I can put into practice all that I learnt and saw in India, my visit there can be said to be a success", and then emphasized the need for unity and a strong leadership 'like that given by Nehru in India' in his own country<sup>997</sup>.

It was also widely believed in the informed circles of Kathmandu that Nehru suggested to him to revoke his direct rule and install a popular ministry, without of course naming any particular person who would head it. The King must have realized then, more than ever, the subtle connection between domestic politics and the foreign policy in the case of his Kingdom at the least. His actions following his visit to India, therefore, reflect a radical re-orientation of Nepalese foreign policy. In his first surprise move after the return, the King appointed Tanka Prasad Acharya, a proclaimed leftist and the leader of a small political party, Praja Parishad, as the Prime Minister of Nepal, on January 27, 1956<sup>998</sup>. Acharya was well - known for his anti - Indian diatribes and pro- Chinese leanings.

Perhaps King Mahindra had aimed at killing many birds with one stone. By then, he appeared to have finalized his blueprint of the Kingdom's future relationship with Tibet and its role between the two neighbors. India had till then dominated the scene. China was to be introduced more substantively to become a counter- weight. Tanka Prasad would have been the best available instrument to execute this policy; he had been arch - enemy of India's special position in Nepal and an advocate of an equally close relationship with China. As such his appointment was definitely an open challenge to the Indian claim of a special relationship with Nepal.

Thus, by installing a popular ministry, the King followed the Indian advice alright; but, in spirit, he successfully reacted to what he considered Nehru's patronizing attitude and indirect 'interference' in the Nepalese politics. It was also meant to serve as a pointer to New Delhi to take note of the changed attitude of the King.



On domestic plane also, the move was a double -edge sword. As the King was well aware of the growing strength and popularity of the Nepali Congress, he attempted to combat it by installing Tanka Prasad as the Prime Minister. Through this stroke of his policy, the King was able to silence the growing demand for a popular ministry, while in fact he retained all powers in his own hand<sup>999</sup>. T.P. Acharya was leader of a very small group and was bound to depend solely upon the mercy of the King for maintaining his position<sup>1000</sup>.

#### 5.1.14 Acharya propounds "Equal Friendship" : India adjusts

Acharya hinted at the impending change in the foreign policy pursued till that date in his very first press conference at Kathmandu on January 29, 1956, just a couple of days after he took oath of his office. He declared that his government would expect help from all friendly countries, "like India, China, Britain, U.S.A. and France", and was also willing to accept it from Russia or other countries if the "aid is unconditional and without any strings"; and that it would also endeavor to develop "direct trade relations with foreign countries"<sup>1001</sup>.

His pronouncements in the conference made it crystal clear that he equated India with China, and his advocacy of "equal friendship with all" clearly militated against the concept of any "special position" for India in the Kingdom. His willingness to accept the Chinese and other assistance further made it apparent that he wanted to lessen his country's dependence on India. His announcement about developing direct trade relations with the other countries further indicated that economic ties with India would not remain that strong during his regime. In fact Acharya was soon to raise the question of revising Trade and Transit Treaty with India signed in 1950.

It may be pointed out here that it will be both misleading and unfair to blame T.P. Acharya alone for those policy innovations. It was done undoubtedly with the full approval and concurrence of the King and his advisors, though with a different purpose. While it is unlikely that the King and his advisors were favourably disposed towards the Communist China as such, their primary impulse was to weaken India's pre-eminent position in their Country by making deal with China<sup>1002</sup>. The Prime Minister, factually speaking, remained only a tool in the hands of the King.

Obviously these developments were not to the liking of the Government of India<sup>1003</sup>. T. P. Acharya's appointment must have come as a painful surprise to the Indian leaders. There was nothing striking about the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. What was novel was the language employed by T.P. Acharya when he began to describe Nepal's foreign policy as

based upon "equal friendship" with India and China, and moved to make it the fundamental operative principal replacing their existing "special relationship" with India.

This was reversal of the India's established position in the Kingdom, hitherto recognized and accepted by the successive Nepalese and other governments of the world alike. Nehru had never made a secret of his opposition to the extension of any "foreign influence" in Nepal, and of his desire to keep this strategically vital Kingdom free from cold war tensions. But this time the Government of India preferred to maintain a discrete silence. Reasons were obvious. Theoretically, India had itself advised Nepal to refashion its relationship with China and Tibet. Moreover, any overt or covert effort to discourage Nepal on question of cultivating relations with China could prove to be detrimental to the emerging pattern of Sino-Indian friendship so strenuously sought to be achieved by Nehru. It would have been all the more awkward in view of the fact that China had not so far challenged India's special pre - eminent position in Nepal and had also expressed its willingness not to raise any historical claim against the sovereignty of the Kingdom<sup>1004</sup>.

The Indian Government, therefore, saw nothing particularly ominous in it for Indian security requirements so long as Sino-Indian relations remained friendly. But it did decide to reorient its policy towards Nepal in the light of these new developments. First of all, it set out to remove irritants from their mutual relationship with the extent it was possible without endangering fundamental objectives. Thus, all Indian advisors from the administration of the country were withdrawn by the middle of 1954<sup>1005</sup>. Whatever technical experts still remained there, were put under the Director of Technical Aid of the Government of India. Further, the future administration of the Indian aid program was transferred to the care of the Indian Aid Mission in Nepal in place of the Indian Planning Commission or the concerned Ministries of the Government of India. It was also announced that Indian Military Mission had completed the reorganization work and that it was at this time going through the training program of the Nepalese Army, adding that it was scheduled to come back to India as soon as the same was done<sup>1006</sup>.

It is to be noted that C.P. Singh, declared by a western scholar as "undoubtedly the one man, who symbolized the Indian intervention in the internal affairs of Nepal", was recalled in late 1952 and his successors, B.K. Gokhale and Bhagwan Sahaya, took care not to give occasion for any such complaint. Indeed their diplomatically correct attitude considerably lessened the criticism directed against the Indian Embassy and by 1955, it had virtually ceased to exist<sup>1007</sup>.

Again, when the new King went for a direct rule dissolving the popular ministry, Government of India and leaders of the ruling party in India refrained from making any comment. While Government of India expressed its willingness "to help Nepal, to the best of her capacity, in all spheres of nation - building activities"<sup>1008</sup> during King's visit to India, it scrupulously avoided making any open and crude reference to the need of democratization in Nepal or the 'special position' of India in the Kingdom. Further, throughout the six weeklong visit of the King, nowhere did Indian statesmen/ spokespersons recite their previously flavored theme - security, stability and democracy in relation to Nepal. The changing mode of reference to Nepal in the annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs is another illustration of the Government of India's growing cognizance of the Nepalese susceptibilities. From 1951 to 1953, Nepal was categorized under 'North -East Frontier' section of these reports. In 1953 - 54 and 1954-55, it appeared in the section entitled, "India's Neighbors" along with the Bhutan and Sikkim. From 1955-56 onwards, it was separated from the other two Kingdoms and was placed in the section of "States with Special Treaty Relations" with India<sup>1009</sup>.

Finally, the Government of India exercised considerable resistant and exhibited foresight and maturity on the issue of appointment of T.P. Acharya and the innovations introduced in the conduct of the Kingdom's foreign policy by observing complete silence and by swallowing the bitter pill in a sportsman fashion without expressing any overt resentment over the developments.

The new Prime Minister practiced his policy with vigour and skill. On April 15, 1956, Acharya lifted ban on the Communist Party of Nepal, which in turn offered most vocal support to his diversification policy in the field of international relations in general and to his China - policy in particular<sup>1010</sup>.

As one of the steps towards delinking Nepalese economy from that of India, the Nepalese Government, on April 16, 1956, announced that the Nepali currency would be acceptable at all governmental treasuries in the Terai area of Nepal where only the Indian currency was acceptable till then<sup>1011</sup>.

On May 27, 1956, Acharya disclosed before a press conference at Kathmandu that his Government had made an informal approach to the Government of India suggesting that a revision of the Indo -Nepal Trade Treaty of 1950 be made and had received back the assurance from the Indian Government that if a suggestion is mooted formally for the revision of the existing treaty, it would be duly considered.

While his party along with the 'fellow - travelers' faithfully campaigned for the new political line, Acharya took care to put a face of friendliness towards India also<sup>1012</sup>.

#### 5.1.15 Nepal's 'Diversification' Policy at Work

Acharya's attempts at giving a new orientation to Nepal's for Foreign Policy, on the other hand, gave the Chinese the much desired opportunity to embark upon their Himalayan blue-print. A congratulatory telegram was sent by Chou En-lai to Acharya on his assumption of the office, who assured back to the Chinese Premier that the ties of friendship and cooperation between their two countries would be consolidated on the basis of the Panch Sheela ( Five principles).<sup>1013</sup>

On February, 3 1956, that is a couple of days after Acharya's pronouncements on foreign policy, the Chinese Ambassador to India and Nepal, General Yuan Chung -haien, rushed to Kathmandu for a four-day visit, during which he offered liberal economic aid what appeared to be in response to the Nepalese Prime Minister's plan of reducing Nepal's dependence on India in that direction. This "friendly gesture" met with the grateful acknowledgement of the Nepalese Prime Minister. Acharya told pressmen, on February 7, 1956, that China had offered assistance for the economic development of Nepal through the Ambassador during his visit to the capital 'without any approach on the part of Nepal'. He reaffirmed his earlier willingness to accept Chinese aid if it was without strings<sup>1014</sup>.

Soon afterwards, on February 14, 1956, Acharya announced that the Government of Nepal would soon take up the question of revision of Nepal's hundred years old treaty with Tibet to regularize Sino - Nepalese relations in the light of Tibet's changed position in the Chinese Republic<sup>1015</sup>. He further disclosed that a high-powered Nepalese delegation would visit Peking shortly to negotiate a new treaty which would cover the entire range of relations between the two countries and added that the question of a clearer demarcation of the 500 miles of Nepal's frontier with Tibet would also be included in the new treaty. He maintained that such a definition of the Nepal - Tibet border would prevent once for all the sporadic raids on Nepalese frontier districts by lawless Tibetan elements<sup>1016</sup>.

During the course of the news -conference, he had to admit that Nepal had experienced many border incidents with Tibet in the past few months, especially in the Mustang district of Nepal. Referring to the latest reports of these raids by Tibetan hordes", he tried to mollify Nepalese public opinion by informing them that he had already ordered the dispatch of a team of officers

and an armed force to the area to investigate the matter. If the reports were found to be correct, he asserted, Nepal could and would take up the matter with the Chinese Government. Acharya also announced his intention to ask the police to open an outpost in Mustang<sup>1017</sup>.

The visit of the Chinese Ambassador was soon followed by a high-powered Chinese delegation headed by the Chinese Vice -Premier Ulanfu -- this time to participate in the King Mahindra's coronation ceremony held on May 2, 1956<sup>1018</sup>. The King In his post- coronation proclamation on the same day, referred to Nepal as a friend of all nations and declared that," in foreign affairs, we steadfastly follow the policy of friendship with all countries. We stand for peace and friendship throughout the world"<sup>1019</sup>.

The address did not mention any special relationship of his Kingdom with India at all -- a significant departure from the age old tradition. In fact India was equated in it with any other country of the world<sup>1020</sup>.

#### **5.1.16 Nepal -China Exchange Diplomatic Visits**

The Chinese Vice - Premier Ulanfu also laid stress on the "traditional friendship" between his country and Nepal on the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" in the mutual relations of nations and on Nepal's active role in international affairs. He also expressed China's "sympathy with Nepal's economic development" and assured China's readiness to extend economic co-operation and promote mutual assistance.

This indicated the amount of interest China was evincing in the kingdom and its future plan to join the countries which were giving aid to Nepal<sup>1021</sup>. The Chinese delegation was also reported to have indulged in lobbying in Kathmandu. What concerned most to the Indian commentators was the fact that these overtures on the part of the Chinese delegation were said to have met with favorable response in certain influential Nepalese quarters<sup>1022</sup>. Reflecting the anxiety felt in Indian diplomatic circles over the developments, the Hindustan Times's 'Insaaf' wrote that,

“The Chinese delegation to recent coronation of King of Nepal made its presence felt leaving behind the impression that some Chinese diplomats may not be averse to playing the Rana game. He further pointed out that some of the Nepalese "wish Nepal to act as a buffer between the two great powers so that it can blackmail both"<sup>1023</sup>.

That the Ulanfu had discussed the matter of new treaty with Nepal thoroughly during his stay in the capital was confirmed by Acharya himself when he announced before his press conference on May 29, 1956 that Nepal had agreed to the revision of the Nepal - Tibet Treaty of 1856 and that talks in this regard would soon begin. Asked if the Nepalese Ambassador designate to China would initiate talks in Peking when he would go there to present his credentials, Acharya replied back vaguely, "Not necessarily. He would not be commissioned for that, but if they raise the question, he might discuss the matter".

An earlier authoritative report had said that a Chinese delegation would soon come to Kathmandu to negotiate and sign a new treaty with Nepal which would be comprehensive enough to cover "trade and friendship". Asked in this context that if the Chinese, with whom Nepal had diplomatic relations, had suggested the opening of a Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu, he was again evasive: "We are going to have the old treaty revised. Nothing can be said now of an Embassy here."<sup>1024</sup>

Emphasizing that Nepal was enjoying very good relations with India also, the Premier, however, added that Nepal should not be misunderstood when it wanted friendly relations with other countries " This is the age of peaceful coexistence", he remarked, "There should not be any ground for fear even if Nepal developed good relations with the Soviet Union"<sup>1025</sup>.

In June 1956, General Daman Shumsher left for Peking as the first Nepalese Ambassador to China<sup>1026</sup>. On July 3, 1956, the Nepalese Foreign Office announced that Acharya had accepted an invitation from the Chinese Premier En-lai to visit China, through the exact date was yet to be fixed for the same<sup>1027</sup>. After that, a Nepali cultural delegation under the leadership of Bal Chandra Sharma, the Education Minister of Nepal, visited Peking from July 10 to 20, 1956, at the invitation of the Chinese Government<sup>1028</sup>. Since Sharma happened to be a close associate of Acharya, the political significance of the mission could not be overlooked.

The Chinese, however, continued to display a considerable consideration to the Indian susceptibilities and India invariably figured in Chinese utterances on Sino- Nepalese relationship during these exchange visits<sup>1029</sup>. Earlier, the first ever women's delegation from Nepal had visited China in May in 1956. One may take this as yet another indication of Acharya Government's attitude and approach towards foreign policy matters -- since it was China and not India that was visited by these 'first ever' delegations from Nepal.

### 5.1.17 Sino - Nepalese Negotiations on Tibet Begin

Thus after sufficient spadework had been done, final negotiations on Tibet started between the two countries at Kathmandu on August 14, 1956, when the Chinese delegation headed by its new Ambassador to India and Nepal, Pan Tzu-li, arrived there for the purpose. The Chinese team also included a Tibetan, Pintso, who was a senior member of the 'Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Tibetan region of China', formed by the Chinese Government, and was thus more a henchman of the Peking regime than a representative of the Tibetan Local Government,<sup>1030</sup> The Nepalese side was led by its Foreign Minister, Chuda Prasad Sharma, a confidant of the Nepalese Prime Minister. The King closely watched the negotiations.

The political direction of the negotiations was reflected in Acharya's utterances at his press conference of September of September 2, 1956. He declared that:

“We must develop neutrality under which Nepal will be able to serve the cause of peace and afford sympathy for the oppressed. We do not like the block system in human relations. We want open and frank relations between the neighbors and nations based on mutual cooperative co-existence.”<sup>1031</sup>

The focal point of the discussions was the special privileges in the matter of trade, commerce and residence that Nepal had enjoyed in Tibet for over a century. Public opinion at home was sharply divided. The Praja Parishad and the Communist Party favoured their total abandonment. Although in power, the Praja Parishad, however, represented only pro-Communist forces and enjoyed support of a microscopic minority of the total population. The Nepalese business community, on the other hand, was the chief beneficiary of these privileges and wanted Nepal to retain them<sup>1032</sup>.

The Nepali Congress which commanded a considerable support amongst the Newari business community, understandably took up a stand against surrender of these privileges without a quid pro quo from China<sup>1033</sup>. In fact the party was basically of the opinion that the Tibetan autonomy should have been maintained<sup>1034</sup>. It also felt that subjugation of Tibet was fraught with dangerous possibilities for Nepal<sup>1035</sup>. Therefore, while it admitted that Nepal could hardly do anything to help Tibet in that regard and that it would have to refashion its relationship on the basis of new status of Tibet as a part of China, it insisted that China should also extend some concessions to Nepal in lieu of a abandoning of its privileged positions and sought a rectification of the Tibet - Nepal borders applying the watershed principle so that security risks arising out of a co-terminus

China could be lessened or contained. It felt that the opportunity should be utilized to eliminate all cause of possible frictions, especially on boundary issues, lest China might use them as an excuse to undermine Nepal<sup>1036</sup>.

In a press - statement, the President of the Nepali Congress, B.P.Koirala warned the government not to be a party to the ousting of the Nepalese from Tibet, where they had been living for a thousand years. He also demanded that the Tibetan laws should be made humane before they were to be applied to the Nepalese residents also in that land.<sup>1037</sup> King Mahindra too was said to be in favour of retaining at least some of the traditional privileges for Nepal in Tibet<sup>1038</sup>. But China was determined to do away with all concessions required through the Treaty of 1856, which, it felt, were incompatible with the new status of Tibet as a part of China. Further, these privileges, such as the accordance of Nepalese citizenship to male off-shoots of the "Kachars" or the Nepali - Tibetan mixed breed should create difficulty in the future in the way of "Sinocisation" of Tibet and in putting down the Tibetan revolt effectively. The Chinese attitude remained firm and uncompromising on the issue and they made it plain to Nepal that, at least in principle, reciprocity would be the basis of all future relationship between Nepal and the 'Tibet region of China'. China's flat refusal to yield on the point left Nepal with no option but to accept the Chinese position as the basis of future arrangements. Above all, there was the precedent set by India, which had waived all its claims in Tibet lock, stock, and barrel, without a quid pro quo. This had made any claim to retain such things on the part of Nepal still more untenable.

#### **5.1.18 The Arrangement Concluded**

The Government of India also advised the Nepalese Government not to insist upon untenable claims and instead try to earn the goodwill of the new Chinese Government<sup>1039</sup>.

After almost five weeks of tough bargaining, an "Agreement to maintain Friendly Relations and on Trade and Intercourse", was ultimately signed on September 20, 1956<sup>1040</sup>.

The preamble of the Agreement reaffirmed Panch Sheel as the guiding principle of their mutual relationship. It abrogated all past treaties and instruments entered into between Nepal and China including those between "Tibetan Region of China and Nepal" (Article 2). Nepal was allowed to retain trade agencies at Shigatse, Karng and Nylam, in return for the Chinese right to establish equal number of trading agencies in Nepal, "The specific locations of which will be discussed and determined at a later date by both parties" (Article 4, Para 1). The Nepalese merchants were



permitted to trade at Lhasa, Shigatse and Yatung - a facility which had been enjoyed by them for centuries - while the Government of Nepal agreed that "when with the development of Chinese trade in Nepal, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in Nepal", it would specify an equal number of markets to be used by Chinese for trade in Nepal (Article 4, Para 2). The border trade by the traders of the two countries could continue at the traditional markets (Article 4, Para 2 (iii))

The Agreement also envisaged that the pilgrimage by religious people of either country would continue according to religious customs (Article 4, Para 3)<sup>1011</sup>. The treaty, for the first time, introduced passports and visas for travel and trade between Tibet and Nepal (Article 4, Para 5(i) and (ii)). However, inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries, who cross the border to carry on petty trade, to visit friends or relatives, or for seasonal changes of residence", were allowed to do so 'as they have customarily done heretofore' without travel documents (Article 4, Para 5(iii)). Similarly, pilgrims of either country were also exempted from these formalities, but were required to register themselves at border posts (Article 4, Para 5(iv)). Both the Governments further reserved their right to deny entry to any particular person notwithstanding any provision of the treaty (Article 4, para 5 (v)).

The agreement was also accompanied by "Notes Exchanged on trade and Intercourse between the Tibetan Region of China and Nepal" on the same date, i.e., September 20, 1956<sup>1012</sup>. It was agreed therein that

- (1) Nepal could immediately establish consulate general at Lhasa; China could also do so in Kathmandu at a date 'to be discussed and determined at later date';
- (2) Nepalese Government would withdraw completely its military escorts from the Tibetan territory within six months;
- (3) The Nepalese will no more entertain any extra - territorial rights or privileges in Tibet, which they were enjoying for past hundred years; they were now to be taxed in every respect as any other foreigner and were to pay customs and import duties etcetera and were made liable to civil and criminal law of the land;
- (4) No one would be allowed to retain the Nepalese nationality regardless of the duration of the stay in Tibet. Further, 'Kachara', the products of the mixed Nepali - Tibetan parentage, were, at the time of attending the age of 18, given option to adopt the Chinese nationality<sup>1013</sup>.

However, may be as consideration to India, the two parties agreed that, "The diplomatic representatives exchanged between China and Nepal will be for the time being their respective ambassadors accredited to India".<sup>1044</sup>

Obviously, more important and controversial issues were sought to be dealt with through the 'notes' rather than by treaty itself. Again, while the provisions contained in the notes were to become operative as soon as they were exchanged, i.e., from the date of the signing of the treaty, the treaty was to become operative only after rectification. The reason was apparent. The treaty was going to be a much more publicized document in comparison to the 'Notes'. As such, both the parties were anticipating a stiff opposition to the treaty in Nepal- which was likely to delay the process of rectification. Eager to do away with the Nepalese privileges as soon as possible, therefore, the Chinese side preferred to dispose of the matter relating to the 'regularization' of relations between Tibet and Nepal through exchange of notes rather than by the main treaty itself. While the provisions contained in the notes were to become operative as soon as they were exchanged, i.e., from the date of the signing of the treaty, the treaty was to become operative only after rectification. The reason was apparent. The treaty was going to be a much more publicized document in comparison to the 'Notes'. As such, both the parties were anticipating a stiff opposition to the treaty in Nepal- which was likely to delay the process of rectification. Eager to do away with the Nepalese privileges as soon as possible, therefore, the Chinese side preferred to dispose of the matter relating to the 'regularization' of relations between Tibet and Nepal through exchange of notes rather than through the main treaty.

This argument is substantiated by the fact that Nepal actually failed to return the ratified copy of the treaty until January 17, 1958, while Peking did so on November 16, 1956<sup>1045</sup>. In fact Dr. K.I. Singh during his premiership in 1957, publicly denied any ratification of the 1956 treaty and charged that the Acharya Government had ignored the Nepalese interests while negotiating the treaty with the Chinese<sup>1046</sup>.

#### **5.1.19 Reactions to the Agreement in Nepal, China, and India**

Acharya, while he was in Calcutta en route Peking, declared on September 22, 1956, that the Treaty marked the normalization of Nepal's relations with China with respect to Tibet and was a "historic event in the trans - Himalayan relations"<sup>1047</sup>. The assemblage, however, pointed out a major lacuna in it, namely, the frontier question was left unresolved and indeed under an

animated suspension. This had become all the more pronounced in face of Acharya's unequivocal declaration before the negotiations were actually taken up to the effect that the negotiations were to cover the entire range of relationship between the two countries, including the frontiers.<sup>1048</sup>

As the matter stood, in the absence of any declaration on the part of the new regime of China that it accepted the existing borders as such, the Peking Government retained in its hands, as in the case of India, the trump card which it could use any time suited to it. Meanwhile it would have provided China an additional leverage in its dealings with Nepal. Acharya, however, replied that he was satisfied with the arrangement, maintaining that questions relating to Nepal's border with China were not discussed at the talks as "we have no border dispute with China"<sup>1049</sup>. One wonders if he was re-echoing the stand taken by the Government of India in the latter's relations with China.

Commenting on the new treaty, the former Foreign Minister of Nepal, Dr. Regmi, expressed his fear that:

"The concession given to the Chinese to establish three reciprocal trade agencies in Nepal may ultimately bring about complete Chinese influence in the 10 - mile belt of our northern borders. I also apprehend that our country might become an arena of power politics"<sup>1050</sup>.

Ganesh Man Singh, a prominent leader of the Nepali Congress, criticized Acharya Government for "its failure to protect the rights of Nepalese in Tibet" and in finding a just solution to their problems.<sup>1051</sup>

Chinese press and its leaders, on the other hand, profusely welcomed the agreement. Significantly, India again figured in their pronouncements. The People's Daily declared in its editorial that the successful conclusion of the Agreement on Tibet had established good neighborly relations with Nepal on a "new basis"<sup>1052</sup>. Referring to India, it pointed out that,

"Nepal is also India's close neighbor and the two countries have always maintained friendly & close Relations....Let China, India and Nepal work ceaselessly to strengthen our good neighborly relations ..."<sup>1053</sup>

Similarly, throughout during T.P. Acharya's earlier referred visit to China on the heels of the conclusion of the Agreement, the Chinese Government tried to project its relationship with Nepal as an additional dimension to Sino - Indian friendship. Even in the state banquet hosted

in honor of the visiting Nepalese Premier on September 29, 1956, Chairman Mao Tse-tung toasted to "the health of the king of Nepal" and the "Unity between China, India and Nepal"<sup>1054</sup>. The agreement and the accompanying developments in the Sino- Nepalese relations were received with mixed feelings in India.<sup>188</sup>

Concern was expressed in the Parliament about the Agreement's possible repercussions on the kingdom's vital relations with India<sup>1055</sup>. The Indian Government, however, tried to play it down by replying back<sup>1056</sup> that it was kept informed by both the Chinese and Nepalese Governments throughout the process<sup>1057</sup>. But its anxiety was betrayed in the reply the Deputy External affairs Minister Anil K. Chandra gave to the query of another member of the Parliament who wanted to know how the Government of India felt about China's direct contacts with Nepal in the context of the stand taken by it during the former days disfavoring any interference or any association of foreign powers in Nepal,

"China is a neighboring country to Nepal and they have vital commercial and other interests. And times have also changed since the time he (the member) is referring to"<sup>1058</sup>.

#### **5.1.20 Implications for Indo - Nepalese relations**

In fact China was well able to achieve its objectives. The so called extra-territorial rights of the Nepalese were successfully abolished and the Chinese Government was able to remove 'last traces' of 'foreign influence' from Tibet<sup>1059</sup>. After conclusion of the Sino - Indian Agreement of 1954, Nepal had remained, at least theoretically, the only country which had international relations with Tibet - this treaty marked the end of that last sign of the Tibetan international life and personality. The way was now clear for Tibet's fuller annexation or incorporation into China. Tibet could no more turn towards Nepal even for moral support. "National boundaries of China" were now consolidated and Peking's Communist regime could now feel confident in dealing with effectively any 'machination' on the part of the Western block from the Nepalese side.

After achieving its primary objectives, the Chinese Central Government was prepared to accommodate both Nepal and India on minor points so as to allay their apprehensions about the Chinese future designs in the sensitive Himalayan region. Thus, while in principal reciprocity was admitted, China did not demand actual implementation of its right to open trade agencies, trade marts or resident consulate office in Nepal immediately.

Nepal apparently had gained nothing new by the Agreement. In a stout defense of the agreement, however, Acharya had later on pointed out that the considerations of geography and racial composition made it imperative for Nepal in its national interests to seek and win China's friendship without doing violence to its relations with India.<sup>1060</sup> The treaty was the culmination of the process initiated in 1950 by the Communist China with its invasion of Tibet. With the annexation of Tibet, for the first time in history, China had expanded its borders up to India and Nepal. The implications of this development were deep and far-reaching. China had absorbed Tibet without agreeing to own Tibet's international obligations arising out of that country's existing engagements with its neighbours - such as Simla Conventions of 1914. The two agreements entered into with India and Nepal through which these countries had recognition to Chinese annexation had also failed to incorporate China's formal and explicit recognition either of the existing borders or of the prevailing political understanding in the Himalayan region. The old geopolitical balance was disturbed and the changed situation called for the formulation of a new power-equation in the Himalayan region.

Nepal was now forced to reconsider its traditional ties with India. King Mahendra's regime was quite willing to do so, as the situation presented him with an opportunity to revive the old theme of the pre-Rana foreign policy - of playing one neighbour against the other. Consequently, Nepal began to transform its role from an ally of India to that of a buffer, or as the Nepalese themselves like to be called, 'a link between China and India' in the interim period.

This had put great strains on Indo-Nepalese relations. India suddenly found that it had lost its position of "friend, philosopher and guide" to the strategically important kingdom of Nepal - a status it had enjoyed for more than a century. In the changed circumstances, India was reduced to a level of approximate equality with the other powerful neighbor - China. Though China had till then shown consideration to the India's pre-eminent position in the Kingdom, the New Delhi Government could not possibly base its most vital strategic calculations solely and indefinitely on such a fragile basis. China had also started vying for influence in the Kingdom, through subtly. With a wedge fast developing between India and China on the border issue, this competition was bound to become more and more acute.

Obviously, this was not conducive to the growth of healthy, close and cordial relations between India and Nepal. With the apparent inclination of the Nepalese Palace and the insecure Prime Minister thereof to exploit the inherent rivalry between its two powerful neighbours to extract some immediate concessions from India and to use it as a weapon in meeting the mounting

domestic challenge to their authority instead of taking a sustained, long-ranging and enlightened view of Nepalese national interest in the context of the new Himalayan power-equation. The graph of the Indo-Nepalese friendship appeared to be heading for a Zigzag course at the close of 1956 - the year of the final annihilation of Tibet's international personality.



# CHAPTER 6



## SEEDS FOR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA, NEPAL, AND CHINA



## **CHAPTER - 6**

### **SEEDS FOR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA, NEPAL, AND CHINA**

The foregoing study make it amply clear that the Indo-Nepal relationship between 1946 to 1956 has not been a jumble of unconnected and stray incidents dependent upon the whims and caprices of any particular individual or government in either of the two countries; nor has it been an isolated affair by itself. Instead, the graph of their bi-lateral relationship has always observed local logical, action - reaction pattern corresponding to the two Governments (Indian and Nepalese) response to the developments in the Himalayan region generally, and in Tibet particularly. The Himalayan regional politics also in its turn bears certain clear-cut patterns and to that extent, the patterns followed by the Indo- Nepalese relationship have been a logical corollary to the broad and general pattern of inter-state diplomacy in the region. One can also discover the existence of certain geo- political factors (beside ethnic, religious and economic ones) which have been instrumental in shaping the world-view of the people and governments in the area. These factors account for the formation of general attitude and approach of one particular state towards the rest. These factors have been fundamental to the definition of the "national interest" and, therefore, the foreign policy objectives of the states concerned in the past, remain so in the present and are likely to wield considerable influence over decision-making process of these governments in future as well. As such they may well be termed as foreign policy determinants. In fact a cause and effect relationship has been existing between these factors and the actual foreign policy instance taken at different times by the Governments of India, Nepal,

Tibet and China towards each other and towards the regional development as a whole. Further, since these determinants have remained more or less constant despite changes in rulers and governments of the countries concerned, and since they have been not only common to all Himalayan states but have also been greatly influencing the policies of the bordering powers of India and China towards the Himalayan region, they have provided a considerable amount of consistency, continuity and regional character to the inter-state politics of the area, notwithstanding the fact that the cooperative importance of one particular factor or the other has kept varying from state to state and from time to time. In fact, it is the existence of these factors, which has made it possible to analyse and understand the rationale behind various foreign policy-moves adopted by the governments of India, Nepal, Tibet and China in the past and to predict the probable re-action of these governments to a certain set of circumstances in future.

Foremost amongst the important determinants involved in Himalayan politics are the climatic factor and topographical features of the region. The most difficult and inhospitable climate, rugged terrain comprising of deep -valleys, snow - clad motifs and narrow passage, which remain impassable for the best part of the year, and the extremely poor state of communication virtually divides the entire Himalayan region into several geo- topographical compartments. The boundaries of these fragments at some places coincided with those of a politically organized unit or a state, and at others they have created sub-regions within a state. The region as a whole has been extremely backward in matters of economic, educational, scientific and technological development. Agricultural output has been very low and much below the mark of self-sufficiency. Moreover, looking from the point of view of production, industrial development and economic growth, the area has been suffering from glaring inequalities and dis-equilibriums. Economic prosperity has varied from one country to another and from one part of the same state to that of the other. For instance, areas adjoining the neighboring powers of India and China have been more advanced than the rest of the country concerned. Similarly the plains have witnessed better economic growth than the hilly regions of these states. Consequently inter - state and inter-regional migration of the population has been in normal phenomena in each country of the region. The shortage of food- stuff, scarcity of essential commodities and other processing economic needs have encouraged the Himalayan states to participate in inter - regional and international trade and commerce. Later on, the profits that used to accrue from such trans - Himalayan trade to the rulers, local lords and, in Tibet, to the Lama hierarchy, personally, made their ruling elite all the more keen on enhancing trade with their neighbors. This inter-alia meant establishment of diplomatic ties between the participant governments. The geographical and

topographical constraints however had rendered the Himalayan region an excellent sanctuary from their hearth and home on account of political or religious persecution, foreign invasions, and internecine feuds during various power-struggles across the plains of India. With these migrants had travelled their culture, traditions and religion to the furthest corner of the Himalaya. In fact the socio-cultural -religious currents have always been flowing mainly from the plains of India (and in case of Tibet, from China also) to the isolated states of Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Both the Buddhism of Tibet, Bhutan and the Hinduism of Nepal had its origin in India, through each country (and even different parts of the same country) developed its own peculiar shade or variation of the original religion and mother-culture. All this has resulted in the inter-mingling of the races, religions and culture in the area and practically speaking, every Himalayan state has not only been entertaining a large segment of non-indigenous population but often the leading lights of their societies, their ecclesiastical heads and even their rulers happened to emerge from out of the migrants from the high bound neighboring countries. Naturally enough, all these factors had a decisive bearing upon the formation of the world view of the Himalayan people. The geographical, topographical and political milieu, for instance, has led the Himalayan states to develop close economic, diplomatic, social, cultural and religious ties with their neighboring powers on the one hand and has instilled a feeling of separateness and group-exclusiveness, - a sense of distinct identity and strong local and regional loyalty, on the other. A natural corollary of this "welt-an-schauung" has been the Himalayan peoples' craving for independence. Freedom has been viewed as an instrument of securing protecting and promoting their indigenous way of life, traditions, language, religion, race and culture, when faced with a superior might having designs on their freedom, the Himalayan states have often invited external support to combat the situation; but in no case have they accepted subjugation or external domination either of the assisting -power or of the aggressor- state. Their craving for independence and local loyalties working in the background of the variegated ethnic and cultural complex, the difficulties of transport and communication and the varying influence of different sects of Buddhism or other religions over different parts of the Himalayan region have given rise to sub-regional and factional rivalries also - both within a country and between two or more countries of the area. As indicated earlier, when political boundaries have coincided with the geographical and topographical ones, there has been a rivalry between in and clash with the latter, there have arisen local rivalries within the bounds of such a state. The local populace in these states has not only abhorred the idea of bearing an alien yoke and has been prepared to sacrifice everything to avoid, it, but has even resented the efforts initiated by its own central authority to control and govern them too closely. The Central Governments of the Himalayan states have

been therefore weak and a constant prey to intrigue and manipulations of various local lords, ecclesiastical leaders and different feudal and ethnic groups and factions within. These rival factions have deemed it fit even to solicit external support to bolster up their respective position or counter the central authority, exploiting the social- cultural and economic ties existing between them and the neighboring powers at local level. Varying attitudes of the Dalai Lama and the Pancham Lama or of ruling - classes of Lhasa, Tsang, U & Khan provinces towards the British Indian, Indian, Chinese and Russian Governments at crucial junctures of history and the difference in postures adopted by different factions of the ruling elite of Nepal or revival contenders to its throne vis-a-vis the British Indian, Indian or Chinese authorities at different occasions provide its apt illustrations. The neighboring powers, India, China and Russia, on their part had been only too willing to impart such a help in the past, because any such opportunity to entrance into the inter - state or domestic conflicts of Himalayan countries could well be utilized to promote their own economic, trades, commercial, political and strategical interest in the area. In fact the Chinese rulers have been practicing since the time of the most powerful Tibetan monarch, Tsang, a well thought - out strategy to cultivate and subdue their rugged nomadic Tibetan cousins through extension of cultural, racial, religious and economic ties, and by applying a combination of force and favour to it. Thus, contrary to the view held by many western scholars, we witness, a natural tendency amongst the Himalayan people to welcome international contacts in every walk of life – religion, trade, commerce, culture and diplomacy, and they have exhibited a marked capacity to absorb and assimilate various inter -regional movements of population and ideas within their own fold. The typical growth of their societies and state - systems bears an ample testimony to that. This observation applies only so far as the natural tendencies of the Himalayan - dwellers are concerned. But when these international contacts threatened to convert themselves into the channels of enslavement, the rulers of Tibet and Nepal have always preferred the preservance of their long – cherished independence above everything. Such an apprehension had arisen as a direct consequence of the British occupation of India on the one hand and Chinese efforts on the other to convert its priest Petron relationship with Tibet firstly into suzerainty, then into sovereignty and ultimately into forced integration of the latter nation. The instant reaction of both the governments was to sever all such connections with expansionist regimes of their neighboring powers as could even remotely be used as an instrument of alien domination. The logic behind it was very simple and there is no contradiction between the two apparently reverse- looking trends of the Himalayan diplomacy., vis., the one of welcoming international contacts and the other of exclusiveness end of jealous pursuit of maintaining a separate identity. When their statesman asked for external assistance, it was meant to protect

their country's independence from foreign invasion. Even when search help was sought for by a particular faction or local authority against the existing regime, it either stemmed out of its desire to perpetuate the local or religious autonomy of a sect or part, or for a decisive win in the internal power-struggle. But when that assistance or association tended to destroy their freedom of action or appeared to convert itself into domination of the existing power, the entire purpose was lost and the process tended to become counter-productive and was rejected outright.

In such cases the strategy evolved both by Tibet and Nepal was two-fold - namely, isolation and balance. The policy of isolation meant keeping the country's relations with the possible source of coercion or enslavement down to the minimum possible limit. In an effort to keep their country insulated, the first reaction of both the Nepalese and Tibetan Governments was to strengthen the natural barriers existing between them and their powerful neighbors, British India and China respectively. For the last many centuries, their country's typical location had been providing their inhabitants with a somewhat real sense of security and they had therefore begun to look upon those geographical and topographical barriers as an asset and, at times, a boon in disguise in containing their powerful neighbors. As such, they depreciated and even opposed any move initiated by either of the two giant neighbors to improve the means of communication in the area. They considered the inaccessibility of their land as the best and cheapest form of defense against the encroachments of the mighty British and Chinese empires. The rulers of these countries have been willing to forego substantial economic gains which could accrue to them from participation in the international trade and commerce in favor of their isolationist policy. This attitude baffled the East India Company officials, whose own motivations were primarily economic. The example of the British, who had entered into India as humble traders but ended up as rulers of the country, on the other hand, strengthened the belief of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of modern Nepal, that keeping his country's trans-Himalayan contacts (specially with the British), to the barest possible minimum was the only way to preserve his country's freedom. Even the most fertile land of the Nepalese Tarai was allowed to be converted into a malaria-infested for this reason.

This prejudice in favor of maintaining "invulnerability" of their country accounts also for the failure of the Bogle, Manning, Logan, Turner and Gossain Purnagir missions to Tibet as also the failure of Lord Curzon's initial efforts to communicate with Tibetan authorities directly. Tibet could ultimately be 'opened' for the British in 1904 - 05 only with the force of arms. Similar has been the case with Nepal. Except for some minor abbreviations that occurred due to the internal feuds in which one side or the other temporarily sought the assistance of the East India Company

or the British Indian Government (such as in the case of Jai Prakash Mall, Bahadur Shah and Jung Bahadur's descendants in the case of Nepal and Bogle - Pancham Lama understanding against Lhasa authorities in the case of Tibet), both Nepal and Tibet have tried their best to keep the British at respectable distance and to keep their countries closed to them at all levels. Even the Ranas of Nepal who had developed a kind of personal affinity and political alliance with the British in India in a reversal of the traditional anti - British attitude of the Nepal Durbar, most scrupulously followed the policy of friendly isolation in their country's dealings with the latter. They were obliged to accept a British Resident under the terms of Segauli Treaty, but despite the ostentatious pretensions, he remained throughout the history a 'glorified prisoner' in the valley, to use a British Resident's own phrase. With all their persuasions, pressures and concerned efforts, the only concession or relaxation the British could receive from the Nepal Durbar in this respect was to extract invitations for games in the Tarai forests or a few ceremonial visits to the capital - Kathmandu - for their top dignitaries. The following statement of Jung Bahadur, the founder of Rana oligarchy in Nepal, made before a British Resident about his regime's 'isolationist' policy is illustrative of the Nepalese geo - political thinking:... we attribute that independence solely to our own peculiar policy (you can call it selfish if you like, but we cannot alter it to please you) ... you can force us to change our policy, you can take our country, if it pleases you to do so. But we will make no changes in that policy, by strict observance of which, we believe, that we preserved our independence as a nation to the present time, unless you compel us to do so.

As regards Tibet, what all-out British efforts could earn them was to permission to come up till the outlying trade centres of Tibet for trade. Even the risk of an armed retaliation from the mighty British could not deter Tibetans from their stand and the British could enter that country beyond the Phar Mart only by using the armed - might of the Younghusband mission. On the other hand, the British pressure for breaking Tibetan isolation and China's inability to help them in resisting it - in fact Chinese bowed down to many of the British demands in this regard in the Sikkim Convention the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century - led the Tibetan to search for other alternative sources of protection and this was primarily responsible for the fifth Dalai Lama's apparent inclination to accept Tsar's umbrella, who was also reported to be willing to adopt Buddhism. But, as indicated above, the isolation was invented and affected against the British only in response to the aggressive postures of that alien empire. Except for the abbreviation of the two centuries of the British rule in India, the official relationship between the bordering and other princely states of India and Tibet and Nepal has been excellent. As for as the mass - level contact and relationship

amongst the peoples of the three countries and concerned, that has always been intimate without any exception. In fact it has been two way process. The fact that no Indian ruler, not even the Moghuls or other Muslim rulers, ever fixed a greedy eye on the Himalayas or organized any expedition to subjugate these peoples went a long way in establishing mutual trust it encouraged inter-state movements in the trans - Himalayan region and helped racial, lingual, religious and cultural assimilation process. Thus even during the days of the British rule in India when the British Resident was not allowed to move out of his residency in Kathmandu or when the Tibetans had refused to receive the letter of the British Indian Viceroy, Indians were enjoying every a free - moment in both Nepal and Tibet and were having uninhibited mixing with the local populace. In fact the British themselves used the media of Indians - Gossain Poornagir in Tibet and Molvi Qadir in Nepal for instance - to establish initial contacts with these governments. The Nepalese ruling class also used to maintain political and personal communication exchanges with the Indian princess which were later on scuttled down to non-political correspondence only by the British under bi-lateral territories because of the British fear that a continuance of the process might lead to any possible alliance between the two. Similarly, the Nepalese nationalist freely participated in the Indian Freedom Movement and later on unhesitatingly asked for Indian corporation and assistance in their endeavour to free their own country from the tyranny of the Rana autocratic rule. The Nepalese monarch Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev also saw no harm or lose of prestige either for himself or his country in seeking Indian advice or assistance not only in freeing himself from the clutches of the Rana autocracy but in the field of an all round development of his kingdom ranging from the developmental planning to the defense preparedness and military reorganization. The stray resistance to the moves like that of the construction of Tribhuvan Rajpath or Aerodrome, etc., by a handful of disgruntled Nepali politicians may be attributed to the political strategy and expediency of their local politics or, at best, to their psychological hangover of the recent past and can in no case be regarded as the sustained view of the Nepal Government or people. As far as Nepal's relations with China during 1949-54 period are concerned, its policy of keeping a responsible distance with China was the outcome to the expansion of fears of Communist China. The same friendliness has heavy attitude of Dalai Lama and the entire Tibetan nation towards the Indian people throughout the course of history. As far as Tibet's attitude towards China is concerned, it had shirked political relations with the latter only due to the expansion practiced by various Chinese governments against their nation by the Manchus, the Republicans and the Communists alike. In the hours of their crises, the Tibetans have always turned towards India for guidance and support. The fact that isolationist policy was permanently founded in 1947 following the British withdrawal from the sub-continent

- both by Nepal and Tibet- is the conclusive proof of the correctness of this conclusion. Thus, the so - called isolation has neither been in 'national tradition' nor a regional characteristic, nor a natural corollary of essentially ethnocentric Meltaschauung of the Himalayan people as inferred by the Western scholars of the area generally. It was only a 'freak of history', a protective defense strategy adopted by these weak states against the mighty British and the Manchu expansion across the Himalayas - which lasted only for the period till these exceptional circumstances existed in the sub-continent. The see -saw policy on the part of the Tibetan and Nepalese Governments means balancing of the two neighboring regional powers of India and China against each other. The psychology of being land-locked has contributed to the development of the strategy of planning one neighbor off the other. This has been visualized as a means of maximizing the scope of their maneuverability and of weakening of the source and channels of coercion vis-a-vis the big neighbors. It is to be pointed out here, however, that the use of this strategy has been rendered possible only when there existed the strong governments both in India and China interested in extending their area of influence in the region and willing to exert pressure for strengthening their hold over their strategically vital neighbors - Nepal and Tibet - respectively. An approximate equality of strength between the two powers would offer an ideal situation for the application of this policy from the point of view of the two Himalayan States. For this Purposes, however, strength meant the pressure - economic, political or military - which the powers concerned could muster to coerce the smaller states to the toe down their line at that particular point of time.

The 'balance diplomacy' was, therefore, deployed mostly by Nepal, Tibet could hardly find the requisite circumstances. Apart from the fact of this theocratic state's long-drawn political - religious relations with China, Tibet has been physically and strategically much more vulnerable to China than to India. Even if an Indian Government would have wished to counter China military in Tibet, the difficulties of terrain and surgical disadvantages would have been enough to dissuade it from such a costly, taxing and risky venture. The fact that India was under and align rule for the last two centuries till the year 1947 also contributed towards the consolidation of the Chinese position over the Himalayan chrest at least negatively. This in turn weekend Tibetan visa vs China in the same ratio. The only opportunity when it could employ this strategy successfully was the period between 1905 to 1949 when Britishers acting on their Himalayan blue point, had entered the scene and had forged an alliance with it, and the Chinese Central Government was on the other hand too weak to challenge their ambitions in the region effectively. Between 1947 - 1949 the position basically remained the same for the Tibetan



Government except for the fact that the independent Indian Government had explained the British Imperial Government. The Tibetan revolt against the Chinese occupation during 1908-12 period could succeed only because of their success in accentuating the Anglo Chinese rivalry in the Himalayas and dragging the British out against the Chinese. It was the Tibetan move to forge an alliance with Mongolia and the Tsarist Russia culminating into the alleged initialing meeting of the draft 'Tibet Mongolia Treaty of 1914' which forced the British to offer and unconditional and full-fledged support to the Dalai Lama against Chinese aggression. Again during the post - Simla Conference days of the twenties when removal of Chinese factor from the Himalayan Government vacillating and nigogordy in fulfilling their promise of arms and other allied supplies to Tibet in difference to the Nepalese susceptibilities and the Nepalese rulers could see an excellent opportunity for themselves in the Indian Government's apparent concern about Tibet and in the rivalry between India and China for influence in the region inherent in the situation which they often tried to accentuate and exploit. Their vehement protests against the same, the Tibetan Government, by moving into the direction of obtaining and replenishing their supplies from Japanese and Mongolia Russian sources and adapting a comparatively soft attitude to work the new Chinese Government (predicting an imminent shift in their foreign policy) forced and British Government to revise its policy in favor of the former. As far as Nepal is concerned, the statesmen appear to have excelled themselves in the art of playing one neighbor off the other. Nepal's adoption in this policy, however, has been itself impressed by the opportunities and scope provided by the Indian Government's interest and concern about Tibet and by the inherent rivalry between India and China over the region which it often tried to accentuate and exploit. Thus, wherever Nepalese rulers felt pressurized and found their autonomy and freedom of action in peril from the South, they sought to use Nepal's connections with China acquired as a bi-product of in the context by virtue of its relationship with the birth to counter the British Indian Government. In fact it was primarily the adroit play upon the British apprehensions that any attempt to subjugate Nepal might invite Chinese relation against their trade in Canton by the Nepalese which would save them from being sub-merged into the ever-expanding bounds of the British Empire in the sub-continent during one of its most aggressive face in the nineteenth century. It took considerable time for the British to understand the real nature of Sino- Nepalese relationship in face of deceptive Nepalese postures and their attempts to exaggerate and dramatize the sub-missive nature of their ties during the pre-Rana period. Rana also did not abandon this diplomacy completely. The stray and irregular dispatch of the so-called 'tributary' missions to China at the crucial junctures of the British India - Nepal relationship are illustrations of the development of the very same strategy. It may be remembered

here that as for as treaty stipulations of 1772 and 1856 are concerned, Nepal was obliged to send these mission every five years. The practice was, however, abandoned in the later half of the nineteenth century except for the occasional revivals coinciding with the tensions and images in Indo- Nepalese relationship. The moves to dispatch a mission on such occasions only were initiated by the Nepalese obviously in an attempt to checkmate the British. The extraordinary and unusual welcome accorded to the Chinese missions and the flattering response to the Chinese overtones to revive the dead Sino- Nepalese relations during 1930 and in 1946 respectively are also instances of the same strategy.

During 1946-50 period, when China could not possibly be used as a counter - weight to India, a somewhat revised version of the balance - theme was adopted by the Nepalese Government by substituting China with the western powers. It may also be pointed out here that the twin policies of isolation and balance were usually employed simultaneously and for achieving basically the same purpose. Wherever it did not remain feasible to apply the balance policy because of the absence of the pre -requisite conditions, the 'isolation' was enforced all the more vigorously.

Similarly, when China posed an imminent threat to the Nepalese sovereignty to its freedom and vital interests in the Himalayan region, an alliance with India, has been sought for to meet the situation. Thus, during the 1792 war with China and Tibet, the Nepalese Darbar, which had been rebuffing each and every effort of the East India Company Government to enter into a trade and commerce agreement earlier, rushed for the very same treaty taking the initiative; but as soon as the war ended, the Durber's interest again receded-back and, it turned its back on the treaty commitments already entered into.

Similarly, during 1902-05 period, the Nepalese Prime Minister became one of the most assiduous a better of the proposed British opening of Tibet and offered all kinds of assistance to the latter to set the Russian mechinations in Tibet at rest. Again, in 1908- 11 period, when Chinese tried to take Tibet under the direct control, the Nepalese Prime Minister went to the extent of offering a revision of the Segauli Treaty to provide for a definite sub-ordination of Nepal to the British Indian Government in its dealings with China in return for the British umbrella in Tibet. The period between 1951- 54, or the 'Era of spatial relationship' as it is called, had gone much further and can be regarded as an exception to the last two hundred years of diplomatic tradition of Nepal. During this period, both the policies of isolation and balance were reversed in favour of an all-out friendship with India because of the ominous developments both within the kingdom and outside it on the regional plain. As far as the policy of isolation was concerned, it had lost its purpose after the withdrawal of the British from the Indian soil and was therefore

given a permanent good-bye. The most important factor to be reckoned with in respect of employment of the balance theme was the rise of militant and aggressive communist regime in China with threatening postures against Tibet and other Himalayan border countries including Nepal. The Nepalese statesmen sought to balance China and counter the ill-effects of the so-called "liberation" of Tibet by completely aligning themselves with India. (The informal understanding on defence and foreign policy matters was this time sought to be transferred into a defence -alliance through conclusion of the Indo -Nepalese Treaty of Friendship 1950 and through the letters exchanged therewith). But as soon as apprehensions against the new Peking regime of intentions were claimed down and an opportunity appeared on the surface for the kingdom to rest back to the balance - theme in its more classical form, King Mahindra lost no time to avail it for himself and for his country. The other characteristic of this diplomatic strategy has been that whenever it did not remain visible to apply the balance policy, both Nepal and Tibet have sought an accommodation with their immediate and more intimate neighbor, namely Nepal moved with India and Tibet with China. Thus, when British Indian Government under policy directives from its home Government at London, with its troops from Tibet and preferred to remain silent spectator to the Chinese onslaught on Tibet and expressed its inability to assist Tibetans during the 1908-11 period, the Dalai Lama first tried to secure Russian help, but when failed in that also, he preferred an accommodation with the Chinese throne. In the same fashion, when Nepalese Premier Bir Shumsher failed in his secret endeavors to keep the British out of Tibet by using the instrumentality of China, he changed this tactics of bargaining with the British of Tibet -Chinese counter and instead tried to establish Nepal as a loyal and valuable allied of the British Indian Government by offering Gorkha recruitment and other facilities to it. As the Chinese power continued to decline and ultimately faded away completely in the Himalayan region, the Ranas continued the policy of wooing the British Indian Government and to win its plaudits by offering loyal services to the imperial Government, both in peace and war. The keenness of the Himalayan states to preserve their freedom in face of their precarious existence between China and British India under the expansion minded regimes - affected their world view in one more way - adding yet another dimension to their kaleidoscopic diplomatic strategy. In these circumstances it was deemed expedient to cultivate, and if necessary, to align, with one of their two powerful neighbors so that the alliance might be used as a potential sources of support in times of need and so as to use it as a deterrent to the other neighbor from contemplating or embarking upon any aggressive plan against them. In making the choice between the two, however, the geo-political factors again dominated their approach. Distance and comparative physical invulnerability were regarded as the two safe-guards against the day-to -

day interference in internal affairs and against the political and territorial encroachments from the side of the aligning power itself. Troubles were naturally anticipated more from that physically proximate neighboring power to which their respective country was strategically more exposed than from a country whose actual seat of power was remote and whose central of the areas adjoining their territories was more feeble. As a consequence of this geo-political thinking, the immediate or closer neighbor was considered to be a potential enemy against which a constant vigil was imperative, while that neighbor's neighbor was regarded as a natural friend or ally against the former in any possible conflict after the formula that enemy's enemy is a natural friend. Thus Nepalese rulers regarded the Peking Government as too distant to pose any real threat to its autonomy but at the same time, close enough to serve as a counter-weight and deterrent to the Government at New Delhi in case the latter nourished an aggressive design against it. Similarly, the Lhasa Government had always conceived India as a possible ally in their confrontation with China while it posed so actual danger to the independence of its country. Both Nepal and Tibet, therefore, have generally strived to curry favor with China and India respectively and have tried to forge an alliance on crucial occasions against the other and when such an alliance was not found feasible, they have tried to establish at least a working -relationship with the latter power.

The only exception to the Tibet's cordial attitude towards an Indian Government was its antagonism towards the British Government during the dawn of the twentieth century. But once the Lama hierarchy was able to overcome its initial suspicious of the British, it assigned to the British Indian Government precisely the same place in its foreign policy calculations which the Nepalese Government have been giving to China in its diplomatic strategy. On the reserve, the attitude of the Nepal Durbar towards British India and Tibetan Government's attitude towards China during most of the period under study has been marred by mutual suspicion, acapticism and distrust.

The geo-political factors, vis., the strategic location of the Himalayan region in general and Tibet and Nepal in particular at the tri-junction of India, China and Russia and at the roof of the world coupled with the ethnic, cultural, religious and economic factors, specially the great prestige enjoyed by the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama as the living gods amongst the Bhuddhist population of Mangolia. China and the Himalayan states themselves, as well as in NEPA, Ladakh and other frontier states of India, have assigned to the otherwise tiny Himalayan states a prime place in the strategic capitalization and foreign polivy calculations of their giant neighbors - India and China. For geo-political reasons, the policies of India and China in respect of Nepal and Tibet have had many features of similarities. As a result of it, two clear-cut sets or patterns of

international behavior are visible in the area, vis., the one followed by the Himalayan states as discussed earlier, and the other followed by India and China on the regional plain. In the first place, despite their immense interest into the politics of the Himalayan region as a whole, the nature, scope and emphasis of both Indian and Chinese diplomacy have varied from one part of it to the other and from one state to the other according to their own geo-physical and political interests. They have evinced keener interest in the affairs of what may be termed as 'vulnerable' or 'weakspots' on their borders and have strived to maintain an exclusive influence over them, notwithstanding any particular form of Government, political system or ideology of the rulers in the two Himalayan states. China, for instance apart from other factors enumerated above has found itself strategically more vulnerable to the external threat from and through Tibet than from the side of Nepal or from any other Himalayan states. This "vulnerability" had multiplied with the consolidation of the British Empire during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries on the southern slope of the Lama land.

Similarly, besides the intimate ties of shared history, race, religion, culture, trade and commerce, India has found itself utterly exposed to external military invasion or to subversive political forces from the side of Nepal in case the latter passed under an inimical influence or control. (Every pan-Indian Government has, therefore, considered Nepal as an essential adjunct to India's own security). As a consequence China has, always tried to help the Northern slopes of the Himalayan including the Tibetan crest as its exclusive preserve, while every organized Indian Government has regarded penetration of any rival political or military influence down to the southern slopes of the high mountains, specially into Nepal, a direct threat to India's own security and territorial integrity and has therefore tried to immense the southern slopes of the Himalayas from such a contingency and to help it under its own political diplomatic influences to the best of its capacity. Indian and Chinese policy-objective in their respective "vulnerable", and also the most intimate, neighboring Himalayan state has been to control or regulate the latter's external relations vis-à-vis the region. Thus India has tried to see that the Nepalese Himalayan policy did not fall apart its own regional strategy and that it did not leaned towards China unappropriately, while China has tried to monopolies Tibet's international contacts, including that country's relations with India. Policy or strategy applied by them in their so-called 'weak-links' of their own defence-systems has, however, varied in detail from time to time and according to the exigencies of the situation. Further, while both India and China have desired to see that Nepal and Tibet fell under their respective influence, they have considered to be their 'minimal' or essential interest co-related with their own survival that their respective weak

neighbor did not become a pawn of the other; and whenever this minimal interest has appeared to be in jeopardy, both of them have reacted sharply and have tried to remedy the situation to the limit of their power. On the other hand, when Tibetan and Nepalese Governments have showed an appreciation of the Chinese and Indian policy –objectives in the area, and have been willing to concede to their respective close neighboring power that the latter has considered to be its "minimum" interest vis-à-vis themselves, the Chinese and Indian Governments also have generally been prepared to accommodate their small neighbor's claim to autonomy, at least an internal autonomy during the past. Furthermore, so long as the Chinese and the Indian Governments have been allowed what they considered to be their due role, in Tibet and Nepal, respectively, they have not bothered about the form, nature or ideology of the Government in that country; or even about the terminology employed by its rulers to describe the political status of their country. The democratic India's recognition of the oligarchic Rana Government in Nepal (and kingship in Bhutan and Sikkim) during 1947-50 period is an apt example of their attitude. Some has been the case with various Chinese Governments in relation to Tibet barring the attitude of the communist China towards the Dalai Lama's Tibet which has been the only exception. But the generality of the above referred behavioral pattern is established from the fact that even Mao' tse Tung's Government deemed it fit to pay a lip service to the Tibetan claim to "Internal autonomy " and its promise to work through the instrumentality of the theocratic Government in the initial stages of Chinese occupation of that country. This, however, does not mean that India lacked interest or had no stakes in Tibet, or that China kept aloof from Nepal. Both Indo-Tibetan and Sino-Nepalese ties have been age-old. In the case of India's relationship with Tibet , we have already noted that the very same considerations of geo-politics and strategy that had rendered the country important in the eyes of China, had imparted a key place to it in India's geo-political –strategical scheme also. The British strategists had found it extremely difficult , almost impossible , to defend the southern slopes of the Himalayas comprising of the Indian border states and the independent kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan from any military thrust from or through Tibet (due to the nature of the terrain consisting of steep heights undulations , rigors of the climate and allied problems of acclimatization, etc., to be face by the troops of these countries in meeting an attach from the heights of Tibet squarely without holding an output in the Tibetan plateau itself and without having a friendly region at Lhasa. The British Indian Government had, therefore, conceived its strategic frontiers or the 'outer defense line' as running through Tibet, while its "inner defense line" was identified with the border line running between Nepal-Bhutan and the Indian frontier provinces. The technological developments in the modern warfare have tendered to enhance rather than to diminish Tibet's strategic and

political importance for India as well. In fact Tibet's passage into an inimical influence has been fraught with more dangerous possibilities for India than it would have been for China if reserve would have been the case in the context of the new power balance that has emerged in Asia in the later forties and fifties of the century. The religious, cultural and economic aspects of the Indo-Tibet relations have been no less important. While Himalayas have been traditionally an object of worship for the millions and millions of the Indians people. Tibetans also have been regarding Indians as their "friend, philosopher and guide". Similarly for China, an alliance with Nepal outflanking Tibet has been obvious value. Whenever developments in the Lama-Land threatened Chinese of the country, much an alliance was sought for the encounter those elements in Tibet who had tried to exclude China playing an effective role in Tibet. in the situation that was persisting between 1949 to 1956, it further offered China a handle against India. Furthermore, if China could gain a dominant influence in Nepal, Indian defences, both political and military, vis-à-vis China would have been seriously inspired. Also Nepal provides China a counter to bargain with India on Tibet. But, despite all these factors, both India and China could assign only a secondary importance to Tibet and Nepal respectively in comparison to their relationship with them in the reserve order. Tibet enjoyed subsidiary place in India's strategic calculations in comparison to Nepal which remained the area of its prime concern; similarly Nepal could receive only a desultory interest of the Peking Government while strategy to control Tibet has always remained their occupation. The policy of the two powers towards what may be termed as their 'area of secondary interest' has displayed some more similarities. Both Indian and Chinese policy towards their neighbours of 'secondary concern' has been largely designed to protect their interests in the area of their more intimate interest and consequently it had varied with the relative power-position in the latter states. This has been particularly true with regard to the Chinese policy vis-à-vis Nepal and Tibet. Geographically speaking, China and Nepal had shared no common frontier, Tibet intervened in between. It were the Chinese and Nepalese interest and stakes in Tibet that had exposed each other to a direct relationship which accounted for the development of bi-lateral relationship between the two countries. As such China's interest in the Gurkha kingdom has fluctuated with its relative power -position in Tibet. Whenever Sino-Tibetan ties were considered to be sufficiently strong and the latter's borders secure from the southern side, the Peking Government had hardly bothered about Nepal and their mutual relationship had gone into a limbo or has even developed strains such as one during the 1908-12 period. It would only be in a situation of Chinese authority being challenged in Tibet or Tibet itself under threat from other powers that China would consider strengthening of its ties with Nepal by-passing /out - flanking Tibet. In the first situation, as it existed till the last decade of the

Nineteenth Century, the repeated Nepalese S.O.S. to Chinese throne to bail it out of its war with the British in India went unheeded. The Chinese Government refused to be involved in any of the Anglo-Nepalese clashes even if it was to result into the subjugation or annexation of Nepal to the British India. The only thing China insisted on was that Nepal should continue to dispatch its quinquennial missions to China as per stipulations of the 1792 Treaty as a token of latter's continued submission and as a guarantee that it would not create any trouble to Tibet or on that country's borders.

Throughout the course of history, China tried to keep Tibet not only out of any external rival influence but under its own influence to the extent of its capacity. Thus, as soon as the Younghusband Mission withdrew from Tibet, Peking's Republican Government, even at that critical state of the country when it was becoming difficult for it to hold the country together and when the southern part of it was suffering under the extra-territorial rights of the alien powers, endeavored to throw its scant resources in organizing an expeditionary force to capture Tibet, and it factually kept the latter under its occupation till its men were virtually thrown out of the soil by the Tibetan revolutionary forces. The regime was not prepared to give away its claim over Lama-land and it constantly refused to rectify the Shimla Agreement even against the British threat of withholding recognition of the Republican Government – a thing of utmost importance to the new regime. Similarly, Indian interest in Tibet has been secondary: it never staked a rival claim of hegemony over that territory against China and never invaded it to achieve its policy-objectives over there, even though its vital interests were at stake. The only exception has been that dispatch of Younghusband's expedition in 1904, which can be explained in the context of British-Russian imperial rivalry and of the fact that Tibet had sought to sever all communication links with the Curzon Government. It may be pointed out here that India could expect its intimate ties of race, religion, trade and culture to continue unbroken and its strategic interests safe only so long as Tibet enjoyed its age-old autonomy, which included the capacity to enter into International Agreements with the neighbors. That is why India has always advocated for the maintenance of the Tibetan autonomy with the same vehemence as displayed by the Tibetans themselves. But when this autonomy of Tibet was threatened to be destroyed by China in 1908-13 period, the Indian Government confined its support to Tibetan peoples to the extent of exerting diplomatic pressure on China. It had almost abetted the process of forced integration when China decided to ignore those remonstrations. Again, during 1950-56, i.e., during the last phase of our study, when the communist regime of China sought to destroy the de-facto independence of Tibet, which it had been enjoying at any rate since the conclusion of



the Shimla Agreement and after the complete eviction of the Chinese forces from Tibet in 1913, through the use of brute force and attempted at the annexation of that land into its own, the Indian Government objected and protested to 'soft-paddle' the issue the issue. Indeed, the Indian Government thought it prudent to concede Tibet to China in lieu of latter's implied acceptance of India's dominant position in the south of the Himalayas and recognition of its "special relationship" with the independent kingdom of Nepal. But the reserve has been the Indian attitude in the case of Nepal, the area of its prime concern, The Chinese military invasion of Tibet coincided with the most active phase of Indian diplomacy in Nepal resulting in the formalization and consolidation of Indian position in that country. In order to counter ill-effects of the establishment of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, India asserted its "special relationship" with Nepal and entered into a friendship treaty and allied agreements with the latter which announced to a formal alliance between the two countries of defence and foreign policy. Thus, while India reluctantly conceded Tibet to China, it refused to accept any Chinese *locus standi* in Nepal. Chinese, in turns, accepted India's claims in Nepal while they rejected any such thing vis-à-vis Tibet. The only deviation from this geo-political thinking in respect of the bordering powers has been approach of the Tibet India Company Government towards the Himalayan states. The company Government had given more weightage to Tibet than to Nepal in its scheme of things. In fact it tried to establish a working-relationship with Nepal primarily to use it as an instrument of furthering its objectives in Tibet. But then the Company Government was more of a profit - seeking commercial organization than a government and its motivations were therefore bound to be different from that of the latter. The company officials attached much Importance to the task of forging ties with Tibet due to their expectations of obtaining a favorable trade-balance in bullions and of finding an alternative trade route to China as well as due to their fond hope of using the two Tibetan pontiffs - Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama - as a channel to open a direct communication with the Chinese throne.

This initially it was Tibet, which aroused the Company Government's interests in Nepal, but soon after, Nepal started growing in importance and with the additions of the strategic element, it began to occupy the prime place in the Himalayan strategy of the post -1857 British Indian Governments. Both China and India have, however, felt called upon the undertake more active policy, at time to the extent of using military forces, in these states of their subsidiary interest when developments over there have tended to put their interests in the states of their primary concern in jeopardy ; or, when their relations with the former could reasonably be expected to be used to bolster or consolidate their respective positions within the latter in territory. This

accounts for the Chinese military venture beyond the bounds of Tibet into Nepal in the year 1792. The venture was regarded necessary to keep up the Chinese prestige and position in Tibet and to secure the frontiers of Tibet against the aggressive postures of the Gurkhas by 'teaching to the Nepalese a lesson'. The Chinese emperor Cheing-lung had undoubtedly succeeded in achieving his primary objective: the Nepalese for a long time to come retained "a single dread" of the Chinese might in their memory. But, at the same time, it had been a lesson to China also—the arduous, expansive and risky nature of the venture made the Chinese all the more convinced of the need to avoid being embroiled in the politics of the states to the South of the Himalayan peaks until and unless it become an utmost necessity. In the latter years, China always tried to settle Tibet –Nepal disputes peacefully and if necessary, through its mediation. Such Chinese mediation, however, did more harm to Tibet than to Nepal. The Chinese in their anxiety to retain their hold over Tibet as well as keeping its borders with India and Nepal safe and peaceful, tended to placate and appease the military Gurkhas at the cost of Tibetans. Every such intervention meant further erosion of Tibetan autonomy also. The Tibetan understandably therefore, tried always to avoid such a contingency. The second occasion was the Chinese assertion of its suzerainty over Nepal during the 1910-1912 period. This also steamed out of the Chinese realization that their position in Tibet itself could not remain safe in face of British expansion in this direction until and unless an alliance, or at least close relationship, was established with the states lying between Tibet and India and with which Tibet had enjoyed intimate cultural –religious relations and ethnic bonds. This was considered absolutely necessary to forestall any re-occurrence of the incident like the Younghusband Mission of 1904. Indian interest in Tibet likewise used to increase whenever its relations with Nepal become strained and it tried all the more to consolidate its ties with the former on those occasions. Even the forced opening of Tibet was sought to be justified before the British Home Government at London by the British Indian Government on the ground that it had become essential in order to put the Indo-Nepalese relations on an even keel. Chinese and Indian policies towards the 'peripheral states', i.e., towards Nepal and Tibet respectively, have got one more common feature, viz., that both the Governments have avoided using military forces to secure their interests and objectives in these countries and have usually relied on diplomatic, economic and, in case of India's policy in Tibet, cultural and religious ties to exert their influence. The twin exceptions were Chinese invasion of Nepal in 1792 and British forced opening of Tibet in 1904 due to the exceptional circumstances discussed earlier. There also, once the British Indian Government was able to establish diplomatic relations with the Lhasa Governments, it too refrained from using force to secure its policy-objectives in the territory even during the most critical phases. It never claimed

a formal paramountcy over Tibet even during the days it was all powerful in the sub-continent. All the Indian Governments (including the British and the independent Indian Government), on the other hand, have tried to strengthen their ties of trade, commerce and culture with Tibet, and to maintain a political influence over the roof of the world through a positive friendship and goodwill the Tibetan people and Government. It has supported Tibetan endeavours to maintain its autonomy. But this support and always the inbuilt limitation –it fell short of armed intervention. Another outstanding feature of Indian and Chinese diplomacy in the region has been the fact that both the powers have regarded Himalayas as the geo-political and strategical boundary between themselves. While there always has been a sublime rivalry for influence in the region between the two, it has been more cultural in nature than the political. The geography and topography of the great mountain ranges had rendered it a sufficient barrier against any hostile invasion of one against the other in the past. Naturally enough, an informal political division of the region into some kind of two sphere of influence or some of intimate interest has followed the suit. According to the two countries geographical formulations, the northern fall of the Himalayas constituted Chinese domain, while southern slope of the same was considered to be falling within India's sphere of intimate concern. As to the position above the crest of the Himalayas, i.e., on the plateau of Tibet itself. India has been willing to accommodate China's claim of political hegemony over these, while China in the past had not objected to the maintenance of a direct and uninhibited socio-cultural and economic relationship between India, Nepal and Bhutan, etc., with Tibet quite independent of China and has been recognizing Tibet's capacity to enter into international agreement with its neighbours. So long as this broad understanding and frame –work of inter-state relationship based on the same work, Indian and Chinese ambitions in the area rarely came into direct conflict with each other and in no case they reached the stage of actual conformation with the result that there has been an easy going between them before the advent of the British in India. The British Indian Government also has been bothered more about Russia than about China till re-emergence of China in Tibet in 1902-12 period. Afterwards also, its dispute with China over the status of Tibet had been more in the nature of an academic and diplomatic duel than an actual confrontation. It was only in the fifties, i.e., after the communist take-over of China, than one could be perceived as a rival or real threat to the other. This has been so because of the radical change in the Himalayan power- balance that had taken place as a result of the destruction of Tibetan autonomy and its absorption into a strong, united and militant China having its own aggressive version of international communism. The annexation of Tibet gave China the possession of the Himalayan crest along with its adjoining slopes towards the south and the crucial passes on the borders of other

Himalayan states and India. This has put the former on immensely advantageous strategic position vis-à-vis India, which possessed only the foothills and the downwards portions of the slopes. This situation was further complicated because of the fact that communist China was able to annex Tibet without inheriting or even recognizing its old agreement with India and Nepal including those settling Tibetan borders with the two neighbours. Politically also, while China could ensure its invulnerability towards the south by advancing its defence line to southern slopes of the great mountain, India could not possibly have organized an equally effective defence line even on the southern falls and foothills of the Himalayas due to the constraints put forth by the interruption of the independent kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan in between. The addition of the elements of national security and political ideology have further sharpened the edge of the existing competition between the two powers which was bound to generate a lot of tension and cold war (which ultimately resulted into the Sino-Indian border-war of 1962). The situation can not materially improve until and unless the question of Tibet and its boundaries with India are finally settled and a new but mutually agreed political balance is evolved in the sub-region. The above attitude of India and China towards each other and towards the region in between Tibet and Nepal has affected the Himalayan politics in a very significant way. A community of interest was often found between China and Nepal, at least in one respect that Tibet was not to be allowed to become so strong as to challenge the extra-territorial rights and privileges enjoyed by them inside its territories. An alliance between Tibet and India or Russia, therefore, was too discouraged and prevented at all costs. Further, when their respective positions in Tibet were endangered either by local elements or by the bordering powers, they looked for at least a working alliance between themselves to meet the situation. As for as Nepal is concerned, it always preferred a Chinese presence in (but not total control of) Tibet and has tried to woo the former to strengthen its own position vis-à-vis Tibet. That is why Nepal agreed "to obey China as before" in the preamble of its treaty with Tibet in 1856 even though it had won the war and had avenged its earlier defeat in the hands of combined Sino-Tibetan army in 1972. Faced with the prospects of a Sino-Nepalese alliance it, Tibet tried in the first place to forestall such a possibility by trying to thwart any direct relationship between the two and when found that a complete separation was not possible, it tried at least to insert itself in between. Furthermore, it would also try to come in terms with its relations with the same to mount a counter-pressure on both Nepal and China on such occasion.

## **SUMMING UP**

1. Himalayan politics provides a key to a deeper understanding of the development of the Indo-Nepalese relationship, of which Tibet remained a constant if not a solitary factor. That this subsumes the principle of geo-political determinism cannot be over-emphasized.
2. The period of the British suzerainty and the period subsequent to it from two distinct groups in each of which India and Nepal fashioned their relationship with an eye on Tibet and since independence, Indo-Nepalese relationship has often been clouded by tensions generated during the period of the British overlordship. The major diplomatic strategies during the period since independence have had to be largely directed towards the normalization of the background within the context of India-Tibet-Nepal axis.
3. The tensions of the Tibet- Chinese relationship specially in its later phase, and the long background thereof, decided Tibet's priorities in respect of international understanding or détente. This single factor would be treated as a primary source of motivation both for Tibetan manoeuvre and for the initiative of India and Nepal.
4. It is a commonplace of international relations that economic and cultural links gradually and in course of time, transform themselves into political and diplomatic points of contact. That this also happened in the case of Tibet, India and Nepal, is merely to state the obvious, except that Tibet being so strategically important the process of such transformation was quicker and surer.
5. In the case of a country like Tibet with its hoary background of cultural and religious history, the dynamics of power in international relationship asserted itself in somewhat esoteric ways. The kind of cultural sharing, even more than ethnic factors, guided the relationship between Tibet, Nepal and India. In the main body of this dissertation, this historical aspect of the politics and policies of the Himalayan kingdom has been discussed with illustrative examples.
6. Like any other international set of relationship, India-Tibet-Nepal relationship passed through friction, indifference and amity. In fact, in a triangular relationship of this kind, imbalance and distrust nurse more quickly than in a simple bi-lateral relationship. The Nepalese incentives to court peaking through Lhasa have strained Indo-Nepalese relationship as fully as its reserve.
7. The irritants between Nepal and India over the issue of Tibet stemmed from their rival claims to create a viable power umbrella and with the ominous shadow of China and Russia in the background, the two Governments sought to create a parity of views not so much benefit

Tibet as to protect their own interest and also to forestall problems of regional security consequent upon the Chinese occupation or total control of Tibet, periodic or regular. Thus in 1905, India and Nepal closed their ranks in the face of the threat of the Russian umbrella. The Younghusband Mission (1904-05) was greatly helped by this development in the region just as, at a later period, India and Nepal pursued similar objectives in the face of the threatened occupation of Tibet by China during 1908-12 period and later between 1949-54. The Chinese, as could be expected, looked upon maneuvers with disapproval and resentment. As subsequent history was to reveal, the Chinese, after consolidating their control over Tibet, cast their eyes on other Himalayan kingdom, notably Nepal and Sikkim and precipitated a situation of diplomatic confrontation that culminated, through a dubious mischance of diplomatic bungling, in the India-China war of 1962. It must however be stated that against this background, it was natural for India and Nepal relations to cool off when the Chinese control of Tibet became fully effective in that, with the removal of a common threat, Nepal sought to branch out on its own. In this connection, almost as a corollary, it can be pointed out that, as in any triangular relationship, a détente between the two make a third party exasperated and at the time of the Shimla Conference India and Nepal continued to redefine their objectives from time to time. The Nepalese always considered India-Tibet détente as ominous specially so because of its geo-political position and its fear that a powerful Tibet would be positively against the best interest of Nepal. It is noteworthy that for well over thirty years, between 1915 to 1949, Indo-Nepalese relations involved a diplomatic sorting-out a number of Nepal -Tibet disputes.

8. The long history of strife between Nepal and Tibet can only be fully understood against the background of the Himalayan politics so that it was found necessary in evolving a clear picture of Indo-Nepalese relationship to grasp its true nature and to appraise the factors underlying these disputes. The point need not be over emphasized that a study of Indo-Nepalese relationship requires a comprehensive understanding of the extraordinary politics of the Himalayan kingdom's namely Tibet and Nepal and both in terms of their bilateral and international entities is it true than of the Himalayan kingdoms that a great many political priorities were the outcome of a choice ordained upon them, singly or collectively, by their provenance. A discussion of Tibet -Nepal and subsequent role of Russia and China has been developed in the body of the dissertation in order to rationalize the shift in politics through which India, Nepal and Tibet indicated towards each other as a group or as angles in a triangle. Occasionally, such was the sensitive balance of power in the region that serious

misunderstandings were caused even by false alarms as happened between 1922-28 in the wake of supply of arms to Tibet.

9. It is hoped that the discussion within the thesis on the background of the Himalayan politics with documented examples from history help to diagnose and occasionally to identify the very sensitive nature of Indo-Nepalese relationship. It is modestly to suggest that the handling of this relationship at the highest political or diplomatic levels must precede from a familiarity with Tibet and the historical causes that are kept constantly under focus in our discussion on the Indo-Nepalese relationship. To treat it as bi-lateral in an absolute sense would be to turn our face from the historic-political realities of the situation. Inconsistency or, even lack of clarity between India-Nepal relations can best be explained in terms of the place of Tibet in their respective diplomatic affection at points of time. In a curious way, the Chinese control of Tibet and the banishment of the Dalai Lama and the subsequent Indian offensive to secure Nepal to their side made Nepalese politicians, including at times the king himself, (used as they were to the policy of playing Tibet against India and vice versa, a feature of policy bound by nature to become counter-productive) play-up the bogey of Indian overtures as imperialistic, which, much to the discomfitures of India, bred a rabid kind of nationalism in Nepal and allowed India-Nepal relations to remain clouded for near on a decade. The reversal of this attitude and the gradual re-emergence of sanity is a phase of Indo-Nepalese history that lies outside the scope of this work. A close look at the British-Tibet complex of relationship and practical positions thrones, on the one hand, ample light on the Chinese and the Russian role in the history of Tibet and, on the other, re-assert the central thesis, played a key role in determining Indian diplomatic positions and, as a consequence, its relationship with Nepal, among other things. The history of the treaties (of 1814, 1815, 1923, 1950 and the proposal for treaty accepting subordinate role by the Nepalese in respect of China in 1908) between India and Nepal, likewise, as stated at length in the body of the thesis, reveal that Tibet remained a crucial factor in deciding the nature and complexion of relationship between India and Nepal. It is a subject that in our view merits an independent enquiry based on primary sources.

Various crises in Tibet as reflected in the Indo-Nepalese relationship as in 1903-05, 1908-11 and finally post - 1949, have thus promoted a warm phase of Indian diplomacy in Nepal; and the Tibetan debacle (1949-51) laid the foundation for the period of amity and cooperation between India and Nepal. Occasionally, the two Governments elevated their concern for Tibet to a state of paranoia and caused each other much embitterment and disenchantment. That such periods

of enormous strain should have still allowed India and Nepal to remain within reach of friendship proclaims not only the essential unity of their national objectives but of resilience of the two people who share among themselves so much history, myth, and legend.



## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup>A number of books contain detailed discussion on the evolution of the Tibetan State and its relations with neighbours, India, Nepal and China, during early times.

In fact early histories of the two countries and their dynastic records are interwoven and inseparable from each other. For selected accounts of the Indo-Nepalese contacts from the earliest times to the medieval age,. For detailed discussion on the evolution of the Tibetan State and its relations with neighbours, India, Nepal and China, during early times, see; D.V. Sircar, *Select Inscription Bearing on Indian History and Civilisation* (Calcutta, 1942), pp.104n. and 226m., W.W. Rockhill, *Tibet: A Geographical Ethnographical and Historical Skatch Derived from Chinese Sources* (Peking, 1939), originally published as an article in the *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (henceforth, cited as *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*) (London, 1891), pp.1-281, Sir Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present People of Tibet* (Oxford, 1968), pp.9-18, H.E. Richardson , *Tibet and Its History* (London, 1962), pp. 28-43; David Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya* (New York,1958), pp. 121-64; David Snellgrove and Hugh Richardson , *A Cultural History of Tibet* (Delhi, 1968), pp. 19-95; Tsung-Lien Shen and Shen-Chi Liu, *Tibet and The Tibetans* (California, 1952), pp. 18-25; E.B. Havel, *The History of Aryan Rule in India* (London. n.d.), p. 249; S.W. Bushell, "The Early History of Tibet", *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society* , Vol. 12, 1880, pp.435-541; and Sharat Chandra (contd. F.N.-1)--Das, "Contributions on the Religion, History, etc., of Tibet, "*Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal* (Calcutta), Vol. L, Part I, 1881, pp. 213-51.

<sup>2</sup>. In fact early histories of the two countries and their dynastic records are interwoven and inseparable from each other. For selected accounts of the Indo-Nepalese contacts from the earliest times to the medieval age, see: Sircar, *Ibid*, Vol. I, pp. 17f, 84n, 252, 254 n, and 366 n;

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Bhagwanlal Indiraji and G. Buhler, Twenty - three inscriptions from Nepal (Bombay, 1885); J.P. Jain, *The Jain Sources of the History on Ancient India (100 B.C. - 900A.D.)* (Delhi, 1964), p. 103; D.D. Kosambi, *An Introduction to the Study of India History* (Bombay, 1956), pp. 37-156 and 290; H.N. Jha, *The Licchavis (of Vaishali)* (Varanasi, 1970), 223 pp., R.C. Majumdar, *The History and the Culture of the Indian People, The Glacial Age* (Bombay,1962), Vol. III, pp. 8,60,81-88,101-3,111-13, 124-27, 136-39, 144, 377, 418, 592 and 623;Radhagovid Basak, "The Kingdom of Nepal", *The History of North Eastern India (320-960)* (London ,1934),pp.239-302;H.C. Roy, "The Dynastic History of Nepal", *The Dynastic History of Northern India (Early Medieval Period)* (Calcutta,1931), Vol. I, pp. 185-232; K.P. Jayaswal, "Chronology and History of Nepal, 600 B.C. to860 A.D. ", *The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (Patna), Vol. XXII, Part III, 1936, pp.161-285; K.P. Jayaswal, "Nepal Chronicles on the Caste of the Guptas", *Ibid*, pp. 108-10;Luciano Petech, *Medieval History of Nepal (C.750-1400)* (Rome,1958), 238 pp; Dainal Wright, ed., *History of Nepal; Translated from the Original Parbativa Text* (Cambridge,1877), pp.77-160; Sylvain Levi, *Le Nepal: Etude Historique d'un Royaume Hindu* (Paris,1909), English Translation in typescript available in the School of International Studies Library, New Delhi, Vol. I, pp. 67 - 266; Giusppi Tucci, *Nepal: The Discovery of Mallas* (New York,1962), tr. from Italian by Lovett Edwards, 96 pp.; D.R. Regmi, *Ancient and Medieval Nepal* (Kathmandu, 1952), pp. 37-97,102-06 and 129- 78; Dhanbajra Bajracharya and Gyanmani Nepali, eds., *Aithihisik Pattrā Sangrah* (Collection of Historical Papers) Kathmandu,1957, Part I, 100 pp., Baburam Acharya, *Nepal Ko Sanchit Vritant* (A brief Account of Nepal) (Kathmandu, 2222 V.S.), pp. 1-121 and Ishwar Baral, *Nepal Aur Bharat ka Sanskritik Sambandh* (Cultural Relations Between Nepal and India) (Kathmandu, n.d.), pp.1-36.

<sup>3</sup>For details of the contribution of the Mongoloid people, see; S.K. Chatterjee, K.P. Chattopadhyaya , and Gopal Singh Nepali in the Bibliography.

<sup>4</sup>The Tibetan monarch Song-tsen gam-po invited scholars of both India and China to participate in a debate to determine as to which from the Buddhism was superior or real. This "Great Debate" took place in Lhasa during 792-94 A.D., in which Indian Pandit Kamalashiel won. He was (contd. F. N.-4)--requested by the, King to stay on the Tibet and preach his countrymen the real precepts of Buddhism. Kamalashiel deputed Santriksita in his place. Santriksita, however, found himself not suited for the peculiar circumstance of Tibet and suggested an invitation to another great Indian scholar, Padma Sambhava. The whole story has been narrated in Tibetan inscriptions. For a translation of these inscriptions, see Daga-Ston, *Tombs*, pp. 94 and 95.

For a detailed account, based on Tibetan sources, see Tasepon, W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet, A Political History*, (Yale University , 1967), pp. 36-39. The subject has been dealt with by a number of Indian, Chinese and Western scholars also. See bibliography for their references.

<sup>5</sup>The subject has been dealt with by a number of Indians, Chinese and western scholars also. See bibliography for references.

<sup>6</sup>For a detailed account, based on Tibetan sources see Tasepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet, A Political History*, (Yale University , 1967), pp. 36-39.

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<sup>7</sup>For a triangular religious relationship amongst Tibet, Nepal and India, See: Bell , Religion of Tibet, n.4, pp. 34-36 and Snellgrove, Buddhist Himalaya, n.1, pp.91-120.

<sup>8</sup>See Levi, R.K. Shah, Cammann , and Filippi, Filippo de, in Bibliography.

<sup>9</sup>Patterson lends support to this view. Rockhill also claims that the regular relationship between the two started in seventh century and continued till the eight and ninth centuries. George N. Patterson, Tibet in Revolt (London, 1960), pp. 17-18.

<sup>10</sup> "Tibet was at the height of its power. During that period of its history, it carried its victorious arms far into India, central Asia and China. In the last mentioned country it had time and again over -run a large part of the present provinces of Kansu, Sou-Chuan and Yun-nan, had even entered Chang-anju, the capital of the Tang Emperors , (contd. F.N.-10)--and placed , for a time, on the throne of China a prince of its choice. During the period the Tibetans were the allies of Calliphas of Baghdad and supported them with their arms. This period is marked, on the part of the rulers of China, by extreme friendliness for Tibet: its . kings were given imperial princes as wives, treaties of alliance were made with them and every assistance rendered to introduce Chinese culture into the country and draw closer its political and commercial relations with the empire", W.W. Rockhill, The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China , 1644-1908 (Leyden, 1910), p. 1, Reprinted from T'oung-Pao, Series 2, Vo. XI (1910), pp. 1092. See also Bell , Religion of Tibet, n. 4, pp. 34-36

<sup>11</sup>Parker, n. 5, p. 238.

<sup>12</sup>For details of internal developments in Tibet and their impact on Sino-Tibetan relations, following accounts, apart from those already cited in footnote 1, are extremely useful, Rockhill, n. 11, pp. 1-11, Bell, Religion of Tibet, n.4, p. 66; H.E. Willoughby, "The relations of Tibet with China", Central Asian Society Journal (London), Vol. II, 1924, pp. 187-203; Sung, n.4, pp. 1-6, basing his observation on Chinese officials sources , particularly Liu Chun, comp. T'angShu

<sup>13</sup>For a detailed analysis of the patron -Lama relationship so established and subsequent developments see; Shakabpa, n.4, pp. 61-72; Bell, The Religion of Tibet, n.4, p.66. ;Tibet (Peace hand Book) (London, 1920), no. 70, (a collection of source material prepared by the British Foreign office), p. 33; and Sung Lian et al, comp., Yuan Shih , (peking, 1000 A.D.). vol. 202, p. 454, qu, in Sung, n.4, pp. 6-7; Phagpa (or Paspas) , the famous head of the Shakya Monastery was invested with the authority to rule TriparChiksum (Central Tibet) also by Kublai Khan , see; Shakabpa, *Ibid*.

<sup>14</sup>Ming Shih (The History of the Ming Dynasty), comp. By Chang Ting-yu and others (1739) ,Chuan (vol.) 33, pp. 846-50, qu. In Sung, n. 4,pp. 7-8.

<sup>15</sup>As the followers of Toangka -pa were to wear yellow dress in order to distinguish them from the old sect who wore red dress , the Tbsngka-pa' sect came to be known as 'yellow Sect' , while the former sect came to be called as 'Red Sect'.

<sup>16</sup>Ching-Shih Keo(The draft History of the Ch'ing Dynasty) comp. By Chao Erh-sun and others (Peiping, 1938), vol. 126, p. 3, qu, in Sharat Chandra Das, n.4.

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<sup>17</sup>Emperor Keng Hsi (1661-1772) saw that if Lhasa went under Mongol rule or if Tibet was absorbed into a greater Mongolia, Manchu rule would be in jeopardy. Emperor Chien Lung (1736-96) therefore, came to the conclusion that, "As the Yellow Church inside and out side (of China proper) is under the supreme rule of these two men (the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama), all the tribes bear allegiance to them. By patronising the Yellow Church we maintain peace with Mongols. This being an important task, we cannot but protect this religion"; Ramakant, Nepal, China and India (Nepal -China Relations) (New delhi,1976) p. 7; see also Willoughby, n.12, p. 190; Ching Shih Kao, n.16, P. 7; and Sung, n. 4, P.11.

<sup>18</sup>In 1747, a group of Tibetan conspired to assassinate the Chinese Resident in Lhasa and his deputy. To punish the conspirators as well as to exercise more effective control in Tibet, more Chinese troops were despatched to Tibet. Upon the recommendation of the Chinese commander of the garrison, Emperor Chein-lung issued an edict abolishing the office of 'Thipa', who had till then administered Tibet on behalf of Dalai Lama, Sung, *Ibid*.

<sup>19</sup>Tieh-tseng Li, Tibet: Today and Yesterday (New York, 1960), p. 214 and Sung, n. 4, PP. 10-12.

<sup>20</sup> For detailed discussion on Nepal - Tibet - China relationship during the period is well recorded. See Bibliography for references of treaties by Leo E Rose, R.K.Shah; E.H. Parker, Rama Kant, T.P. Acharya, Babu Ram Acharya, C. Chittaranjan Nepali, on the subject.

<sup>21</sup>Tu Yu, Tu'mg-Tien. n.6, pp. 18b-190; Levi, n.2, Vol. II, p. 52; Filippo de Fillipi, n.6, pp. 130-1, and Cammann, n. 6, pp. 5-6.

<sup>22</sup> Petech, n. 2, p. 210; Shah, n. 8, pp. 21-22; Levi, n.2, Vol. I, p. 67 and Vol. II, p. 228; Huang Sheng-Chang, "China and Nepal", People's China (Peking), May1, 1956, p. 9; Ming Shih, no. 4, vol. 80, Chaun 309,

<sup>23</sup>Fillippo de Fillippi, n.6, pp. 130-31 and Shah, n. 8, pp. 23-25.

<sup>24</sup>Shah, n. 8, pp. 25-28, For Further details see: Bibliography.

<sup>25</sup>Narharinath Yogi and Baburam Acharya, eds.; Sri Panch Bado Maharaja Prthvinarayan Shah ko Divya Upadesh (Divine Counsel of the Great, 5 times illustrious, king Prithvinarayan Shah) (Kathmandu, 1953); Toni Hagen, Nepal, The Kingdom in the Himalaya (Berne, 1961), p. 20 and K.C. Chaudhuri, Anglo-Nepalese Relations; From the Earliest Times of The British Rule in India till the Gorkha War (Calcutta, 1960), pp. 1-3.

<sup>26</sup>This line of reasoning is based on the interpretation of what Prithvi Narayan Shah himself has been attributed to have said recorded in his Divopadesh that, "By closing the roads through east and west, I shall open the road through Nepal". In the meantime, the Tibetan Lamas and the officials had developed heavy financial stakes in this trade and they were also interested in revival of the trans-Himalayan trade. An occasion of Anglo-Nepalese collaboration was provided during the company's campaign against Chet Singh, Raja of Banaras. Prithvi Narayan Shah readily came to the Company's aid and tried to impress upon them Nepal's friendly intentions. The sudden change of policy on the part of Prithvi Narayan Shah may also be explained differently.

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<sup>27</sup>The tales of Tibet as a land of gold and great wealth had permeated down in India and were widely believed even by the usually 'hard-headed' Scotsmen who predominated the Company's posts. This seemed to be substantiated by the fact that the Tibetan trade resulted in a, "flow of specie into British territory at a time when the Company was being criticized for

<sup>28</sup>Tibetan internal politics had long been characterized by the power rivalry between Lamas between the yellow-hat power-centre, and the Shakya monastery of tshil-hum-po of Tsang province a stronghold of the red-hat sect. This rivalry had been predominantly religious in character during the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The ascendancy of yellow-hat Dalai Lama in the power struggle ultimately resulted in the establishment of the yellow-hat Panchen Lama at Tashilhumpo Monastery-but this did not put an end to the struggle, also because Tsang still contained important pockets of the red-hat strength full the bitterness about the suppression of their sect by the former. By the eighteenth century, the struggle had assumed political and economic dimensions also. This rivalry explains for comparatively soft attitude taken by the Tashil-sum-po and Tsang authorities towards the British overtures and towards Bogle and other missions. In the present instance, it was not merely a fight for the control of the Tashil-hun-po monastery, but for the broad temporal and spiritual (contd. F.N.-28)-power that used to go along with the regent ship of Panchen Lama as Governor of the Tsang province.

<sup>29</sup>"Historical Note on Relations between Nepal and China" Government of India, Foreign Dept. Secret Consultations Proceedings (henceforth referred as For. Sec., E. Cons.), July, Nos. 248-280, National Archives of India (N.A.I.).

<sup>30</sup>The Chinese General then reported to the Emperor that the Gorkha chief only wished to send a tribute mission to China and that he had settled the little frontier incident without the loss of a single soldier or the spending of a single Tael (The Chinese coin). The Gurkha mission was thereupon to proceed to Peking and the Emperor, in his blissful ignorance of the attack on the Tibetan frontier, sent to Gurkha Raja, on dismissing it, patent of King", Tung-huaCh' uan-luCh' uen lung (The imperial Chinese records of Chien -lun, the Emperor), translated by Rockhill, n. 11, p. 51. See also Chin-ting, n. 39, nos. 13/70, pp. 56-13b; Wei-Yuan, n. 41, CXIV, pp. 296-330; and Shah, n.8, p. 47. For translations of various patents of the Chinese Emperor, see enclosures to the "Historical Note on Relations between Nepal and China", For.Sec.E., *Ibid*.

<sup>31</sup>C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Tibetian Engagements and sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries (New Delhi,1929), Vol. XIV, pp. 55-56.

<sup>32</sup>The Nepalese offered to relinquish the conquest Tibet, restore the loot from Tashilhumpo and pledge to send periodical tribute to China, Rockhill, Dalai Lama, n. 11, p. 52; see also D.O. from Resident in Nepal to Foreign Secretary, May 26, 1904, For.Sec.E., August 1904, nos. 160-1 (N.A.I.). See also Chingvou-tsi(contemporary Chinese history of the campaign), tr. Imbault Huart, Journal Asiatique(Paris), vo., XII, 1878, p. 348 and Levi, n. 2, vol. 1, p. 188.

<sup>33</sup>For a consolidated account of the origin, process and results of the Tibeto-Nepalese wars of 1789 and 1791-92, the actual terms of the two treaties and their critical appraisal under International law, including an up to date evaluation of the Sino-Tibetan - Nepalese ties, see author's two papers, "Chinese of Suzerainty over Nepal -I", Modern Review (Calcutta), August 1968, pp. 570-84; and "Chinese Claim of Suzerainty over Nepal-II" Modern Review, September

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1968, pp. 673-85. The official Chinese versions of the episode is available in Chin-ting K'ou-er-K'aChi n.39, and Wei-Yuan, n. 41.

<sup>34</sup>British Agent, Dr. Buchanan, who spent fourteen months in Nepal during 1802-3 period, commented that, "The Gurkhalis are in the habit of saying that should they have any dispute with the English their only formidable neighbor, they will seek the protection of the Chinese, with whose influence over the Company they seem to be much better acquainted than one would have expected", n. 48, p. 249.

<sup>35</sup>Rishikesh Shah, a former Nepalese Foreign Minister and a scholar, maintained that the Nepalese actually began to take pride in their vassalage to China as , "it connected Nepal with a great country whose power and affluence they were prone to overestimate for a long time, second, the Gurkhas, in view of the growing might of the British in India, were guided by the practical consideration that when it came to the question of choosing between subservience to the Chinese and that to the British, the former was preferable in as much as the distance between the two countries, capitals and the slackness of the Chinese administration would probably have allowed the Nepalese greater freedom in managing their own affairs ..... " R.K. Shah, *Nepali Politics: Restospect and Prospect*,(Delhi,1975),p.111

<sup>36</sup>Chaudhary, n. 25, p. 145.

<sup>37</sup>For details , see Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, *Indo-Nepalese Relations, 1837-1877* (unpublished thesis submitted to I.S.I.S., New Delhi, 1962), p. 26-37; For text of the treaty , see Aitchison, n. 41, pp. 205-11 (Calcutta, 1863 ed.).

<sup>38</sup>Chitta Ranjan Nepali, *Janral BhimSenThapa raTatkalin Nepal* (Kathmandu, 1957), Appendix, letter from Raja GribanJUdha to Emperor of China , pp. 301-2.

<sup>39</sup>Letter from Chinese Resident at Lhasa to Nepal Government, dated September 15, 1914, *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>E.H. Parker, "Nepal and China", n. 20, p. 78.

<sup>41</sup>For. Secret. Cons., No. 3 ,January 11, 1817 (N.A.I.).

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>For details, see letter from Chinese Commander in Tibet to Governor General of India, 23Jamad-i-Sani, 1231 Hizri (May 21, 1816), Report from British Muslim Agent; (For. Se. Cons., No. 17, July 13, 1816) (N.A.I.) & Chinese officials in Tibet to Nepal Government, May 18, 1816 (For. Secret Cons., No.12, 27 July, 1816) (N.A.I.).

<sup>44</sup>Often these appeals were directed by the motive of discrediting its rival factions in the domestic politics by the ruling clique.

<sup>45</sup>Decree from the Chinese Emperor to the Nepalese King bearing the date identical to 1842. The author has personally seen the original patent along with its Nepalese version in the Nepalese Foreign Offices, Singh Durbar , Kathmandu.

<sup>46</sup>Meng Pao, *Si Tsang-Tson-Chu* (West Tibet Memorial Reports), (1951) privately published by MengPao, the Chinese Resident at Lhasa from 1839-42, Vol., III, Chuan 3. Imbault Huart has

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rendered French translation of this portion of the work in his *Un Episode des 'Relation Diplomatique de la in China Avec is Nepal' en 1842*, *Revue d' l' Extreme Orient* . Vol. III (Paris, 1887), p. 21, *Ibid*. It is important to note that Chinese had classified and called Nepalese as "foreign barbarians" in the communication.

<sup>47</sup>D.R. Regmi, *A Centuary of Family Autocracy in Nepal: 1846-1949* (Banaras, 1950), pp. 110-12.

<sup>48</sup>C.H. Nicholette, Assistant Resident , Nepal to Government of India (G.O.I.), Nepal Residency Records (N.R.R.), serial No. 4, Events (N.A.) (1840-51). Lord Dalhousie, however, declined the offer. He thought it to be motivated more by the desire of providing employment to the large and idle Nepalese army than any friendship for the British. Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, *Indo-Nepalese Relations* , n. 56, pp. 282-3.

<sup>49</sup>For. Sec. E. Pro. No. 50, May 26, 1854, Br. Resident Ramsay's report of his conversation with Jung Bahadur, sent to G.O.I. , dated May 6, 1859,(N.A.I.).

<sup>50</sup>For. Sec. E. No. 45, August ,1856: Ramsay to G.O.I., July 15, 1856 (N.A.I.).

<sup>51</sup>For. Sec. E. No. 50, May 26, 1854. Ramsay to Government of India, May 6, 1859 (N.A.I.).

<sup>52</sup>Government of Nepal (G.O.N.), Jaisi Kotha Records, (dealing with Nepal's relations with Tibet & China), 1790-1900, Amban to King Surendera, June 24, 1885.

<sup>53</sup>The draft treaty was signed on March 24, 1856, and was ratified by the Amban and the Tibetan Kasag in June, 1856: The final ratification of the treaty was done on July 31, 1956, at Thapathali Durbar, Kathmandu. For details, see G.O.N., Jaisi KothaRecords, *Ibid*; Singh, Budhimman, *Compilation, Vamshavali* (Nepali chronological manuscript); Rose, *Nepal , Strategy*, n.6, pp. 108-18; Mojumdar, N. 36, pp. 147-54; Asad Husain , *British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857-1947* (London, 1970), pp. 74-75.

For critical analysis of Nepalese, Tibetan and Chinese versions , see author's two papers, Nigam, Ashok, n.48.

<sup>54</sup>Aitchison, n. 41, (New Delhi, 1929), p. 50. Emphasis added. There has been a difference of opinion over the exact expression used in the treaty.( For the underlined portion , the official Nepali text use the expression , "laiagidekhimani Aya Bamojim mane rahanu" that is "(the Emperor) will be respected (or honoured), as he has been respected (or honoured) in the past", Narharinath , Sandhi Pattra Sangarh, n. 38, vol. II, pp. 118-21. London translated it as the Emperor of China "shall continue to be regarded with respect" by Nepal and Tibet" as before", London, n. 48, vol. II, App. XXII, p. 282. Sir Charles Bell, using the Tibetan text , translated the phrase to read as "they have agreed to regard the Chinese Emperor as heretofore with respect", Bell, *Tibet: Past and Present*, n. 1, App. Iv, p. 278. Major W.F. Connor, during Younghusband's expedition to Lhasa, translated the Tibetan text as "paying respect to the Chinese Emperor" (For.Dept. Pol. & Sec., Letter from India, April 14, 1910 (I.O.L.)

<sup>55</sup>Nepal Residency Records, Serial No. 4, n.2.

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<sup>56</sup>For Sec. E. Feb. 1855, No. 12, (N.A.I.), For the working of the treaty arrangements and critical assessment , see, "On the Extradition Treaty with Nepal", from Col. G. Ramsay to For. Secy., G.O.I., No. 9, dt. March 23, 1866. For. Sec. E. June, 1866, No. 34, (N.A.I.).

<sup>57</sup>Nepal Durbar was badly divided over the issue of supporting the British against Indian Princes and people. The British Indian Government was also not enthusiastic about asking or accepting Nepalese help in the beginning. A lengthy correspondence thus ensued between the two Governments through the British Resident at Kathmandu, Major G. Ramsay. Jung Bahadur was able to persuade his men and the hard-pressed Company Government also was forced to accept the Nepalese officer in June 1857. See, Ramsay to G.F. Edmonstone, Secretary to the G.O.I. in the Foreign Department, dt. 29<sup>th</sup> Feb. , 1857, No. 64 of 1857, For. Sec. E., 27<sup>th</sup> Nov., 1857, No. 425, Part II (N.A.I.); Secret despatch from G.O.I. to the Secy. Of State ,For. Sec.E., June 29, 2857, No. 33; and Nepal Residency Records n. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Husain, Asad. *British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857-1947: A Diplomatic History of Nepal*. Vol. 8. Taylor & Francis, 2023.

<sup>59</sup>John C. Hoar, Contemporary Nepal: A Historical Study of Political and Economical Development, Unpublished Thesis , Uni. of Georgetown , 1969, pp. 50-51 (Microfilm).

<sup>60</sup>For details, see also Pradyumna P. Karan and William M. Jenkins, *The Himalayan Kingdoms: Bhutan , Sikkim and Nepal* (New York, 1963), pp. 36-37 and 59; Sung, n.4, pp. 16-17; Tarak Nath Das, n. 36, p.10.

<sup>61</sup>Ramsay to For. Secy., G.O.I., No. 15, June 9, 1866. For. & Pol. Sec. E., June 1866, Nos. 163-4. (N.A.I.).

<sup>62</sup>For Sec. E., *Ibid*.

<sup>63</sup>Lawrence, the British Resident, Nepal, to For. Secretary, G.O.I., No. 2-p, 22<sup>nd</sup> May, 1971. For .Pol. -A, July 1817. Nos. 100-5 (N.A.I.)

<sup>64</sup>The Under Secy. For. Dept. , G.O.I., to Resident, For., Pol. -A., Oct. 1873, Nos. 67-69 (N.A.I.).

<sup>65</sup>"Memorandum as to the state of relations between Nepal and Tibet, and of affairs in Tibet according to the most recent information", Home Dept. Pol.-A. Oct. 1874, No. 97, K.W. (N.A.I.).

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>68</sup>Sung, n. 4, p. 18.

<sup>69</sup>The right was obtained through insertion of a separate article in the Cheffo Agreement with China , concluded on September 13, 1876. See Ching-Chih Wai-Chiao , (The Diplomatic Documents of the End of the Ching Dynasty) hereinafter referred to as Ching-Chih, Comp. by Wang Liang, (Peking, 1932), 32 vol. 2, gu. in sung, n.4, p. 18. (F. N.32).



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<sup>70</sup>See Acting Amban's Memorial, Peking Gazette, May 11, 1876; also For., Sec. E., No. 130, September, 1876 (N.A.I.).

<sup>71</sup>T.H. Thorton, off. For. Secy., G.O.I., to Sir T.F. Wade, Br. Minister at Peking , No. 1713, Simla , July 25, 1876. For., Sec.E., Sept. 1876, No. 131 (N.A.I.).

<sup>72</sup> Henry, Br. Resident, to G.O.I., dt. April 29,1877 For., Sec. E., Dec. 1877, No. 104 (N.A.I.).

<sup>73</sup>J. Scully, off. Resident, Nepal, to A.C. Lyall, For., Sec., G.O.I., No. 111, dt. Nepal , April 19, 1878 (conf.), For.Sec.E., May 1878, No. 76 (N.A.i.).

<sup>74</sup>E.C. Impey, the Off. Resident, for instance, warned the G.O.I., in his letter dated April 12, 1876 (conf.), to keep a cautious eye on these offers, as it could be used as an excuse by the Nepal Durbar for increasing its forces. Pro. No. 77; see also Lyall to Impey, No. 1027-P, dt. Shimla, may 18, 1878, Pro. No. 78, For.Sec.E., May 1878, Nos. 76-79. (N.A.I.).

<sup>75</sup>For., Sec. E., No. 24, March 1888 (N.A.I.).

<sup>76</sup>Ting-pao Hen, the Government of Szechuan, wrote to Peking on November 19, 1877, that, " ..... Now fortunately we still have Bhutan and Nepal which both border on Tibet and could become our buffer states .... Now if the British wished to penetrates into Tibet, they must take the route through these two countries which could be troublesome to them, if we endeavoured to establish ties with the two countries and frustrate the British connections with them, then Tibet would not lose its strategic passes and we should be covered by a strong screen .... if we do not .... British surely would try to establish connections with them and thus Tibet would be exposed and Szechuan province would have its door opened.... "

Ching-Chi-ch'ou-Tsang-Tsou-Tu(Memorial and correspondence concerning the arrangement of affairs during the latter part of the Ching dynasty), (Peking, 1938), vol. 1, p. 162, qu. In Rose, n. 6, p. 138.

<sup>77</sup>See Szechuan Governor's Memorial to Peking, Peking Gazette, dated march 24, 1879; and For., Sec. E., No.135, June, 1879 (N.A.I.).

<sup>78</sup>For., Pol. A.,No. 33, Feb. 1877 (N.A.I.). Ting-pao Chen's assessment might have been the major reason for subsequent Chinese actions.

<sup>79</sup>Chinese Imperial Script, dated June 22, 1893, published in the Peking Gazette, June 29, 1883; see also For. & Pol., Sec. E., April, 1884, No. 240 (N.A.I.).

<sup>80</sup>The text of the agreement and Nepalese version of the dispute is to be found in Government of Nepal's (G.O.N.), Jaisai Kotha Records, which the author has seen personally, but was not given an authentic copy.

<sup>81</sup>Noting was by H.M. Durand Secretary, For. Dept. , G.O.I., on 19<sup>th</sup> may, 1884. For ., Sec. E., K,W. No.2 , Nos. 438-59, June , 1884 (N.A.I.).Commenting on the British Indian Policy towards China , he further pointed out that, "It is all ways to our interest to be on good terms with the Chinese. Putting aside the fact that they might give us a great deal of trouble on various parts of our frontiers, and even cause us serious danger under certain circumstances, in the north-west, a possible ally of much value....."

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<sup>82</sup>For details , see Report by the Deputy Secretary, For. Dept. G.O.I., For ., pol. A., Feb. 1882, Nos. 283-304 (N.A.I.); Memo. From Maharaja ranodip, For. Sec. E., February 1884, No. 63, (N.A.I.); For. Po. B., April, 1881, Nos. 401-6; Resident Girdlestone to Cockerall, Secy. To Bengal Govt., dated Nepal May 22, 1880 (N.A.I.); Cockerell to For. Secy., G.O.I., For. Pol. B., April , 1881; Nos. 401-6 (N.A.I.); and deputy Commissioner of Police, Calcutta to Cockerell; Memo , No. IP, dated June 29, 1881 (conf.) For.,Sec E., Sept. 1882. No. 234 (N.A.I).

<sup>83</sup>C.E.R. Girdle stone, British Resident, Nepal, to H.M. Durand, For Secy., dt. Nepal. December 19, 1884 (D.O.). For., Sec. E. April, 1885, Nos. 72-101 (N.A.I.). See also "Proposed improvement of the relations between the Government of India and Nepal by means of mutual concessions", a note by the Secretary of State, For., Sec. E., November, 1884, Nos. 234, K.W. No. 1 (N.A.I.).

<sup>84</sup>For., Sec. E., October, 1886, No. 353 (N.A.I.); also "Memorial from Men-Shin (The Chinese Amban in Tibet) to Chinese Emperor" (which included text of the Nepali letter), Peking Gazette, August 17, 1886.

<sup>85</sup>For., Sec. E., March, 1888, No. 20, Memorial from Wen-shin to Chinese Emperor; Peeking Gazette, April 8, 1887, and Buddhi man Singh, Vamshawali, No. 73.

<sup>86</sup>For., Sec. E., Sept. 1888, Nos. 181-83 (N.A.I.).

<sup>87</sup>Notes ,For., Sec. E., August , 1889, Nos. 27-28 (N.A.I.).

<sup>88</sup>For., Sec. E., Oct. 1890, Nos. 88-9 (N.A.I.): Proceeding (Pro.) No. 89, Major Durand to For Secy., G.O.I., Sept. 4, 1890.

<sup>89</sup>For., Sec. E., Oct. 1890, Nos. 88-9 (N.A.I.): Proceeding (Pro.) No. 89, Major Durand to For Secy., G.O.I., Sept. 4, 1890.

<sup>90</sup>See, for instance , the letter of the "Jetha Maharani", (Mother of King Prithvi Bir and refugee in India ), to Governor General Lansdowne, *Ibid*, Nov. 1889, Proceedings (Pro.) No. 84, October 10, 1889 (N.A.I.).

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid*, January, 1890, K.W. No. 2, Pro. No. 252-63; Maj. Durand to For. Secy., G.O.I., October 22, 1889. (d.o.).

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid*, January, 1890, K.W. No. 1, Pro. 254-63; Intra-official note signed by Lansdowne, 18<sup>th</sup> Sept., 1889; See also *Ibid*, June, 1888, K.W., No. 1 Pro. No. 259-81; H.M. Durand's note July 11, 1880; and August 1888, K.W. No. 1, Pro. No. 152-197; *Ibid*, note by H.M. Durand , August 5, 1888.

<sup>94</sup>These intelligence operations were continued until June, 1893, when Lord Roberts, the Comm-in-Chief of the British Indian Army ordered a halt to them. Extl. B., Jan, 1894, K.W. No.1, Pro. No. 104-6; and Memo., Extl, E. June 3, 1893 (N.A.I.).

<sup>95</sup>Oscar T. Crosby, *Tibet & Turkestan*, (N.Y., 1905), p. 212.

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<sup>96</sup> Sessional Papers, British House of Commons (hereinafter cited as S.P.) 1904, (ed. 1920), LO 26, Enc. 8, Annex. 1, p. 95; The Times (London), November 1, 1886, p. 5; and Bell, n. 8, p. 60.

<sup>97</sup> Sir Francis Young -husband, India and Tibet, A History of the Relations which have subsisted between the two Countries from the Time of Warren Hastings to 1910, with a particular Account of the Mission to Lhasa of 1904 (London), (1910), p. 48.

<sup>98</sup> Landon, n. 8, vol. I, p. 87.

<sup>99</sup> For details of the settlement worked out at the cessation of hostilities, kindly refer to ; S.P., 1904, no. 1, pp. 4-5; no. 2, p.5, encl., pp. 6-7; Ching-tai Chu-tsang-ta-chenkao (Biographies of the Chinese Ambans in Tibet), compiled by Tin Shi-chun (henceforth referred to as Ching-tai), Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, Nanking, 1948, translation by Sung, n.4, and Bell, no. 1, pp. 280-1.

<sup>100</sup> Bir Shumsher, however, expressed his disappointment on not receiving G.C.S.I. title. The Resident then hinted that if he continued to render assistance in the future, he might be given further honours. The British further assisted him by ordering sufficient control over the Nepali refugees -in India so as to prevent them from making British territory a base for active hostilities against him. Exti.-A., May, 1892, Cons. No. 180 & Extl.A. June, 1892, Cons. Nos. 283-290, K.W. No. 2 (N.A.I.).

<sup>101</sup> Extl. B., Dec. 1895, Pro. No. 4, Col. Waylie to G.O.I., November 26, 1895 (N.A.I.).

<sup>102</sup> For. Sec. E., July, Cons. No. 113-21, K.W. No. 2, Wyllie to G.O.I., Feb. 20, 1876, May 2, 1896 (N.A.I.). Twice during the dispute in 1892 and 1894, Bir Shumsher had visited Calcutta with the objective of obtaining arms. The Government of India initially showed some reluctance but finally agreed to assist Nepal in obtaining supply of arms up to a reasonable limit. For., Conf. A Sec. B., 1893, Pro. No. 10, Kharita, from Governor General Lansdowne to Nepalese King, n.d., but prior to Oct. 11, 1893 (N.A.I.).

<sup>103</sup> Ching-chih, n.89, vol. 112, p.20; vol. 115, p.3; and S.P., n. 50, 1904, no. 21, p. 71, nos. 26, encl. 8, annex.1, p.9, No. 13, pp. 24-42.

<sup>104</sup> S.P., 1904, No. 15, p. 51.

<sup>105</sup> For an intimate account of Curzon as the Viceroy of India and his attitude Tibetan problem and Nepal, see L.J.L.D. Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon (being the authorized biography of (London, 1928), vol. 2, pp. 37-38, 272-80.

<sup>106</sup> S.P., 1904, No. 26, enc. 7, p. 87.

<sup>107</sup> Ching-tai, n. 119, p. 115.

<sup>108</sup> S.P. 1904, no. 26, pp. 86-87.

<sup>109</sup> As far as I can ascertain, the relationship between Nepal and Tibet are particularly cordial at present. General Deb Shumsher informed me a few weeks ago that having sent emissaries to Lhasa to buy old Buddhist manuscripts, the Tibetan Government insisted on making a present

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of them to Nepal" Resident's Annual Report on Nepal, For., Sec. E., July 1900, Nos. 28-95 (N.A.I.).

<sup>110</sup>For., Sec.E., Sept. 1900, K.W. No.1, Pro. 78-100 (N.A.I.) Memo; H. Daly to Curzon, January 11, 1900.

<sup>111</sup>London, n. 49, vol. 2, pp. 87-88.

<sup>112</sup>Amrit Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta), May 28, 1902.

<sup>113</sup>Memorial from YuTai to Emperor, October 29, 1904, n. 89.

<sup>114</sup>S.P., p. 143. For details of the suspected Russian intrigue, see, For., Se. E., April, 1903; Nos. 192-94 (N.A.I.); "Tibetan Affairs" letter from Nepalese Prime Minister to Resident describing his interview with a Japanese monk, Ekai, Kawaguchi, who fled from Tibet and was alleged to be in know of-- (contd. F.N.-114)-- secrets of Tibetan affairs and was disguised as a Mongol. In reply to a query of the Prime Minister, the Monk stated that "The Tibetan are afraid of the British. They do not like them. They liked the Chinese as long as they could give them protection, but now as they are weak and powerless, they wanted to join the powerful Russian Government which gave gifts to them."

Later on, in his account, the monk reported to the G.O.I. through Shart Chandra Das, that he had seen several hundred camel loads of arms arriving in Lhasa. Ekai Kawaguchi, *Three Years in Tibet* (Madras, 1909), pp. 505-6. See also Shakabapa, n. 4, p. 203; and, "Notes on Tibet", *National Geographic Magazine* (Washington), no. 15, July, 1904, pp. 292-94. It must, however, be kept in mind that Japan was interested at that time in British -Russian rivalry over Tibet.

<sup>115</sup>For the text of alleged treaty, see Great Britain Foreign Office, *Papers Relating to Tibet*, (London, 1904), Encl. No. 49; & Extract from *China Times*, July 18, 1902, p.140. Curzon took the threat seriously enough to write on Nov. 13, 1902, to the Secretary of State, "I am a firm believer in the existence of a secret understanding, if not a secret treaty, between Russia, and Tibet, and so I have said before, I regarded it as duty to frustrate this little game while there is yet time ..." Ronaldshay, note. 125, pp. 166- 167.

<sup>116</sup>S.P., 1904, no. 44, pp. 125-30.

<sup>117</sup>Ching-tai, no. 119. p.122.

<sup>118</sup>S.P., 1904, no. 66, p. 155.

<sup>119</sup>Louis Dane, the former Foreign Secretary's comments in the meeting of the East India Association at London, on Feb. 7, 1939, following the lecture by M. Milliard on "Nepal - The land that Leads to Paradise", published in *The Asiatic Review* (London), vol. XXXV, April 1939, pp. 258-9.

<sup>120</sup>Louis Dane, the former Foreign Secretary's comments in the meeting of the East India Association at London, on Feb. 7, 1939, following the lecture by M. Milliard on "Nepal - The land that Leads to Paradise", published in *The Asiatic Review* (London), vol. XXXV, April 1939, pp. 258-9.

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<sup>121</sup>Letter from Viceroy's Council to Lord George, H.M.'s Secretary of State for India , dated January 8,1903, For., sec. E., February, 1903, Nos. 1-88, p. 93 (N.A.I.).

<sup>122</sup>Asiatic Review , vol. XXXV, April, 1930,

<sup>123</sup>During the discussions on the proposal contained in the Government of India's dispatch of January 8, 1903, which originated in the Committee meeting held on February 20, it became necessary to explain, in support of the proposals of the G.O.I., that the establishment of Russian influence at Lhasa would have repercussion on Nepal compelling Nepal to throw in her lot a Russianized Tibet.

See India office dispatch, Collin Campbell, Asst. Secy., to L.E.Dane, Secy., For. Dept., G.O.I. and the note by the Political Secretary, For., Sec.E., October 1903, Nos. 129-300 (N.A.I.).

<sup>124</sup>S.P., 1905 (cd. 2370), no. 13, p.6

<sup>125</sup>S.P., No. 37, p. 13.

<sup>126</sup>S.P., 1905, no. 43, p. 15; For., sec.E., November, 1904, Nos. 118-58, Pro. 130 (N.A.I.).

<sup>127</sup>The porters supplied by Chandra were described by one eye witness as "practically an impressed gang and proved both 'discontented' and refractory and were kept under control only with great difficulty , Edmund (contd. F.N.-127)—Candler, *The unveiling of Lhasa* (London, 1905), p. 90. The Yaks were also of questionable value, as most of them died before being put to use. However, when Prime Minister was informed of the desertion of certain porters, he ordered arrest of every deserter and told the Resident that he will inflict heavy punishment on them when caught. See Nepalese Prime Minister to British Resident in Nepal, For., ex. B., May, 1904, No. 308.

<sup>128</sup>For., Sec. E., No. 1903 , Nos. 152-53 (N.A.I.).

<sup>129</sup>For., SecE.,Feb. 1905, Nos. 73-107, Pro. 76 (N.A.I.).

<sup>130</sup>The British Resident in Nepal informed the Foreign Secretary, G.O.I., on May 26, 1903, that Chandra Shumsher has instructed the Nepalese Representative to inform the Lhasa authorities that as there is a British Resident at Kathmandu and a Nepalese Representative at Calcutta , and that as the state is indebted to the Government of India for much consideration and favours, and dependent on our goodwill and friendship, there could be no possibility of assistance to Tibetans, but that when the commission neared Lhasa, the Representative was to proceed to meet the Commissioner and offer all services in his power. For., Sec.E., August , 1904, Nos. 82-92 (N.A.I.).

<sup>131</sup>For Bhutan's role in the dispute, see letter from Viceroy to Resident, For., Ext.B., October 1, 1904, Nos. 32-39 (N.A.I.). In fact Bhutani officials were badly divided over the British invasion of Tibet. The most powerful of these, Tong-so-Renbon saw in it an opportunity to establish his control over Bhutan with British acquiescence. He, therefore , rendered valuable assistance to the Young-husband Mission. Afterwards, in 1907, with Calcutta's assent and support , he made himself Maharaja of Bhutan , a position his family had held since.

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<sup>132</sup>Letter from the Nepalese Prime Minister to the four Kazis of Tibet, dated v.s. 1960, For., Sec.E., November, 1903, nos. 110-58 (N.A.I.).

<sup>133</sup>Chandra Shumsher to Dalai Lama, no date, but sent in June, 1904, For.Sec.E., November 1903,Nos. 118-58 (N.A.I.).

<sup>134</sup>*Ibid.*, Dalai Lama to Chandra Shumsher , dt. 8<sup>th</sup> July, 1904.

<sup>135</sup>*Ibid.*, Chandra Shumsher to the Dalai Lama, August 6, 1904. The strange simile used in this letter leads one to wonder whether the letter was written for Lhasa's or Calcutta' consumption.

<sup>136</sup>For., sec.E., February 1903, Nos. 903-1020 (N.A.I.).

<sup>137</sup>For., Extl.B., October, 1904, Nos. 32-36 (N.A.I.).

<sup>138</sup>Gazette of India, Extraordinary, January 2, 1905.

<sup>139</sup>For., Ext. B., June 1905, Nos. 132-143 (N.A.I.).

<sup>140</sup>Maj. M. Smith, Resident, Nepal to Secretary, For. Department, Government of India, No. 133, dated July, 30, 1906. For., Sec.E., March, 1907, Nos. 537-588 (N.A.I.).

<sup>141</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>142</sup>For the text of the Convention, see S.P., n. 50, no. 194, encl.1, annex., pp. 90-92, also Bell, Tibet , past and Present , n.1, pp. 284-86.

<sup>143</sup>Government of India's memo to John Morley, Secretary of State for India, dated June, 1907, For., Sec.E., June 1907, Nos. 554-602 (N.A.I.).

<sup>144</sup>For., Sec.E., August , 1904, Nos. 160-1(N.A.I.).

<sup>145</sup>Parliamentary Debates, British House of Commons (henceforth cited as British Parliamentary Debates), vol. 130, 1904, col. 1112.

<sup>146</sup>*Ibid.*, cols. 1134-40; Crosby, n. 49, p. 255.

<sup>147</sup>In fact London had never sanctioned the terms extracted by Col. Younghusband from the Tibetans and it reprimanded him for exceeding his authority. See "Tibetan Negotiations", For.,Sec.E., n. 164, also the letter from Lord Middleton, who was Secretary of State for India in 1904, published in The Times (London), April 19, 1936, p. 19E. Thus the indemnity was reduced from seventy-five lakhs to five lakhs and the period of occupation of Chumbi valley was also shortened from seventy-five to five years, "as an act of grace, for which the Tibetan were expected to be grateful" claimed the declaration issued by the Viceroy of India on 11 November, 1904, Annual Register (Review of public events at home and abroad, prepared by the British Government) (London, 1904), p. 373. For full text of the declaration, see S.P., n.50, 1905, no. 194, p.2; Bell, n.8, p.287.

<sup>148</sup>This question has been a major irritant in the British India-Nepal relations right from the time the British were able to control the flow of arms , ammunition and other warlike material to the landlocked kingdom. While every Nepalese Government strived for an unrestricted right to import them in the amount and manner they deemed fit, the British would always try to keep it

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under their absolute control. During the Governor General ship of Lord Lansdowne, however, the British Indian Government, through his Kharita (letter) of 11<sup>th</sup> October, 1893, agreed to permit the Nepal Government to import and acquire arms, etc. in the quantity "reasonable for Nepal". For., Sec. E., November, 1894, No. 128 (N.A.I.)

(contd. F.N.-108)—The Nepalese Premier acknowledged it as an absolute freedom of such importations (*Ibid*). The Lord Elgin felt obliged to explain the Nepal Durbar that Government of India's permission was not, "without - ( contd.)

<sup>149</sup> (Contd.) --stand exposed to the charge of furnishing later with the war-like stores. See noting by C.L.S. Russel on the file, dated 11<sup>th</sup> September, 1903, For. Sec. E., November 1903, Nos. 35-38 (N.A.I.)

<sup>150</sup>For., Sec.E., June 1906, Nos. 272-95 (N.A.H.I.)

<sup>151</sup>While adjudging various aspects of the problem, F. Rennie, in the Military Department, pointed out still new possibilities which heightened the role of Tibet. He reminded that the Nepal is contiguous with Tibet on its northern frontier, and had independent foreign relations with China through that country. A Nepalese mission had 'lately' started with the customary tribute for the Emperor of China. According to the unconfirmed reports, the Tibetans were also engaged in importing the Russian arms and ammunitions through Mongolia. "If we refuse the Nepalese the 5,000 rifles, is there anything to prevent them importing similar number of absolutely modern rifles through China and Tibet, absolutely unknown to us?", he asked. (For., Sec.E., Nov. 1907, Nos. 575-87 (N.A.I.)

<sup>152</sup>For. Secy., L.W. Dane's noting on the file, August 17, 1906, *Ibid*.

<sup>153</sup>For., Sec.E., December, 1909, Nos. 43-47 (N.A.H.I.)

<sup>154</sup>For., Sec. E., August , 1904, Nos. 82-89 (N.A.I.)

<sup>155</sup>For., Sec. E., August , 1904, Pro. No. 161: Letter Resident to For., Secy., G.O.I., dated July 10, 1904 (N.A.I.)

<sup>156</sup>S.P., 1905, No. 144, p. 3.

<sup>157</sup>For, full text of the Peking Convention - 1906, see S.P., n. 50, 1910, No.4, pp. 51-52; Bell, n.8, pp. 287-9.

<sup>158</sup>After learning that the Lhasa Convention was tantamount to a virtual declaration of British protectorate over Tibet, the Chinese Government had initially (i.e., on August 28, 1904) ordered You Tai , the Amban, not to give his sanction to the Convention under any circumstances , You Tai Chou-tu (The memories of You Tai ), vol. I, p. 26, cited in Sung, n.4, p. 45.

<sup>159</sup>This was primary object of the Government of India in their negotiations. It had informed the Secretary of State that, "It is desirable that we should obtain Chinese adherence to the satisfactory guarantee already obtained from the Tibetan Government. But our object in doing so is to strengthen, not to weaken, the guarantees, and we have therefore, consistently deprecated the adoption of a policy by which we would obtain adherence by whittling away what we have already obtained from Tibet. In the present case same considerations appear as good as in the case of

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the Convention itself. The Amban's assurances in as far as they deal with Article 9, even if unconfirmed, considerable strengthened our position in Tibet, but it would obtain still further value, if confirmation by the Chinese Government were - (Contd. Foot Note 161) -obtained. We therefore, see no objection to an endeavour being made to obtain such confirmation by the insertion of its purport as a provision in the Adhesion agreement so long as no part of its substance is sacrificed."

<sup>160</sup>For.,Sec.E., Feb. 1905, nos. 1147-80, Pro. Nos. 1154 (N.A.I.).

<sup>161</sup>The use of term 'Indian Empire' for all Border States including Nepal is significant. The Foreign Secretary, L.W. dane pointed out at a later date that, "this definitely puts Nepal into the Indian Empire". Note on the departmental file, For., Sec.E., Pro. April 1907, Nos.116-18, Notes to the proceeding No. 116, dated Feb. 16, 1907 (N.A.H.I.).

<sup>162</sup>Extract from a letter from Sir E. Grey, H.M.'s Principal Secy. of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir A. Nicolson (No.536, dated December 5, 1906 ), regarding Anglo - Russian agreement in respect to Tibet, cited in For., Sec.E., Pro. April, 1907, Nos. 116-18 (N.A.I.).

<sup>163</sup>Tibet, Peace Handbook, n. 14, vol.12, no. 70, p. 37.

<sup>164</sup>S.P., cd. 1920, Nos. 83-84, pp. 187-88.

<sup>165</sup>The Times, September 27, 1907, p.17, sung, n.4, p. 53 and Li, n.19, p.120.

<sup>166</sup>British Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 184, col. 537.

<sup>167</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup>The Amban Yu Tai had, from the very beginning, urged Tibetans to negotiate a settlement with the Government of India before the expedition. The Tibetans, however, did every effort to exclude Chinese from the settlement-proceedings. Yu Tai wanted to serve as mediator, but was denied permissions by the Tibetans even to proceed to Younghusband's camp in that capacity. For. Sec. E., February, 1905, Nos. 73-107, Pro. No. 76, National Archive of India (N.A.I.) Sir Charles Bell, Tibet, Past and Present (London 1927), p. 58.

<sup>169</sup>For., Sec. E., August 1910, Nos. 58-240 (N.A.I.); also Great Britain Foreign office, Papers Relating to Tibet, p. 54, India Office Library (I.O.L).

<sup>170</sup>Charles Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama (London, 1946), p. 68.

<sup>171</sup>Sessional Paper (S.P.), British House of Commons (London), 1910, No. 109, p. 62, No. 126, p. 67; and Sir Francis Younghusband , India and Tibet, a History of the Relation which have subsisted Between the Two Countries from the Time of Warren Hastings to 1910; with a Particular Account of the Mission to Lhasa of 1904, (London), p. 378.

<sup>172</sup>Chang Ying-tang Chou-tu (The Memoir of Chang Ying-Tang), compiled by Wu-Fing-pei (Changsa, 1938), vol.1, p. 2-10, qu. In Sung, n.4; Chu Chu-ming, Ching-ChihBatang Pien-lanShihmu Chin (The Batang Revolt), Kang tao Monthly, vol. 5, no. 10, January 1944, pp. 59-62, gu-in Sung, n. 14, pp. 57 -59; Erich Teichman, Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet,



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Togather with a History of the Relations Between China, Tibet and India (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 21-24.

<sup>173</sup>The Imperial Chinese decree of November 3, 1908 published in the Peking Gazette, qu. In Teichman, *Ibid*, pp. 19-20; S.P. , n. 4, 1910, no. 264, p. 170; bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, n.3, p. 73; and W.W. Rockhill, The Dalai Lama's of Lhasa and their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644, 1908 (London, 1910), p. 6.

<sup>174</sup>S.P., 1910, n. 109, p. 62; no. 126, p.67, no. 222, p. 141, no. 223, p. 141;Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, n.3, pp.68-69.

<sup>175</sup>S.P., n.4, no. 297, enclo. 2, annex.2, p. 1870.

<sup>176</sup>For., Sec.E., March 1910, Nos. 385-510, Pro. No. 6 (N.A.I.).

<sup>177</sup>Tibetan Blue Book, British Foreign office (London, 1910), p. 67. See also For.,Sec.E., August 1910, Nos. 38-246, App. To notes (N.A.I.); and Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, n. 3, p. 81.

<sup>178</sup>Ch'ing-Chi-Ch'ou-Tsang-Tsou-Tu (Memorials and Correspondence during the latter part of the Ch'ing Dynasty), (Peking, 1938), vol. III, Chuan 2, p.33 ; telegram from Chang Yin-t'ang to the Foreign Office, Peking, February, 1907, qu. In L.E. Rose, Nepal: Strategy For Survival (Berkeley, 1971), p. 162. Chang also repeated his recommendations along these lines in a latter memorial; *Ibid*, December, 1907, Chuan 5, p. 10.; see also For., Sec. E., June, 1907, Nos. 76-102 (N.A.I.).

<sup>179</sup>"Twenty one Points of instructions " from the Emperor , delivered by Chang to the Tibetan Government in 1907, For.,Sec.E., June, 1907, Nos. 76-102. (N.A.I.).

<sup>180</sup>Perceval Landon, Nepal (London, 1928), vol. 2, p. 128.

<sup>181</sup>Translation of the letter from Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to the P.M. of Nepal, dated December 13, (enclo. 1 to Pro. 80), enclosure to British Resident's letter to the G.O.I. 20<sup>th</sup> January, 1907, For., Sec., E., June, 1907, Nos. 76-102, Pro. No. 80 (N.A.I.).

<sup>182</sup>For., Sec., E., June 1907, Nos. 554-602 (N.A.I.). Commenting on the same , Wilten , British Commissioner in N.E.F. Area, pointed out the common line taken by the then Amban Lien, Ex-Amban , Yu-tai, and of late, Chang, and remarked that "when, therefore , three such man openly attempt to unite Nepal and Tibet against us and when it is remembered that none of those three is a man of strong character of unusual ability. It may perhaps be inferred that they are merely conveying the views held in high quarters at Peking; For., Sec., E., (Notes) May, 1908, Nos. 741-94, Pro. No. 77 (N.A.I.).

<sup>183</sup>For.,Sec.E., April, 1906, Nos. 357-385 (N.A.I.).

<sup>184</sup>Letter from Resident Smith to For.,Secy. No. 61, dated April 23, 1907. For.,Sec.E., June, 1907, Nos. 554-602,Pro.No. 557 (N.A.I.).

<sup>185</sup>For.,Sec.E., December, 1908, Nos. 41-69, Pro.No. 58 (N.A.I.).

<sup>186</sup>Letter from British Resident to For.,Sec., No. 16, dated August 22, 1909, For.,Sec.E., March , 1910, Nos. 385-510 (N.A.I.).

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<sup>187</sup>For.,Sec., to the British Resident, No. 1488, E.B., dated September 7, 1907, *Ibid.*

<sup>188</sup>Letter from British Resident to For.,Secy. dated October 1, 1909, For.,Sec.E., January , 1910, nos. 72-95, Pro. 77 (N.A.I.).

<sup>189</sup>Siquanthay, officiating Comdt. of the Chinese troops at Dhapchi , told the Nepali Representative that, "The Amban thinks that it will be our mutual advantage if it could be managed to take in some Gurkhas in the army here. The interests of China and Gurkhas are indissolubly tied together. If to preserve our identical interests, it be not possible to supply more men; even 10, 20, 30 or 40 will do, add the Amban will be very glad to have them. Please submit a report at once to his Highness the Maharaja". The Nepalese Representative, however, declined to entertain it as not "feasible one"; Resident to Foreign Secretary. may 14, 1910, For.,Sec.E., August 10, No. 98-246, Pro. 79 (enclo.) (N.A.I.).

<sup>190</sup>Landon, n. 13, p. 128; Sir Charles bell collection ,India office Library (henceforth referred as I.O.L.) Nepal Note Book Mss. Eur. F-80, Nepalese letter of April 20, 1907.

<sup>191</sup>Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, n.3, p. 236.

<sup>192</sup>For.,Sec.E., (Notes) May, 1908, Nos. 741-91 (N.A.I.); London, n. 1, p. 129, f.n. 2.

<sup>193</sup>Notes on Wilton, British Commissioner for N.E.F., entitled India's North-East Frontier Relations, sent to Secretary of State for India, London, For.,Sec.E., (Notes), May, 1908, Pro. No. 74 (N.A.I.).

<sup>194</sup>For., Sec.E., June, 1909, No. 908; Resident Smith's Report of his interview with P.M., dated Mat 12, 1909, to the For. Secy., G.O.I. (N.A.I)

<sup>195</sup>Letter from Resident to Foreign Secy., dated December 25, 1909, forwarding copies of two news-letters from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to the Prime Minister, Nepal, For., Sec.E., march 1910, Nos. 385-510 , Pro.No. 412 (N.A.I.).

<sup>196</sup>Letter from Kazies of the Kasyal of Tibet, to Chandra Shumsher, Prime Minister, Nepal, dated November 23, 1909, Sub-encls. To enclo., Pro. 413, *Ibid.*

<sup>197</sup>Letter from Chandra Shumsher, Nepal, dated December 29, 1909 (conf.). Copy of the letter was enclosed to the letter from Resident to For. Secy., dated January, 1909, enclo. To Pro. No. 413, *Ibid.*

<sup>198</sup>English translation of the said instrument from Chinese Imperial Gazette of 1905, communicated to Nepalese Prime Minister, was rendered by Herbert Coffee, Acting British Counsel - General, Chengtu in his dispatch to the For.Secy., G.O.I., dated 6<sup>th</sup> January, 1906. For.,Sec.E. , June 1906, Nos. 241-245, Pro. No. 241 (N.A.I.).

<sup>199</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>200</sup>For., Sec,E., July 1911, Nos. 148-80: translation of the Circular in English by E.H. Parker , sent to G.O.I., on November 9, 1910 (N.A.I.).

<sup>201</sup>For., Sec,E., June 1907, Nos. 254-602 (N.A.I.): Memo from G.O.I. to Secy. of State of India, dated Shimla, June, 1907.

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<sup>202</sup>What worried them most was, explained by the British Indian Govt. in its letter to the Secy. of State in the summer of 1908, that, "it appears that Mr.

<sup>203</sup>For., Sec.E., June 1907, Nos. 76-102. Notes to Pro. No. 87 by Holland, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Department, dated March 16, 1907 (N.A.I.).

<sup>204</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>205</sup>*Ibid*: Noting on the file by S.W. Clarke, dated March 7, p. 197.

<sup>206</sup>*Ibid*, Noting by l. W. Dane, For Secy. on file, dated March 17, 1907.

<sup>207</sup>M. Smith, British Resident to For. Secy., Letter No. 61, dated April 23, 1907, Pro. No. 557, For., Sec.E., June 1907, Nos. 554-602 (N.A.I.).

<sup>208</sup>British Resident, Col. M. Smith's report of his interview with the Nepalese Premier, Chandra Shumsher, dated 18, 1907, D.O. No. 139, (Conf.): For., Sec.E., September, 1908, Nos. 457-459 (N.A.I.). For text of the Anglo-Nepalese treaty of 1815, see C.U. Atchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sunuds Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, (Calcutta, 1863), Vol. 11, pp. 205-11.

<sup>209</sup>Assistant Secretary, Holland's noting on the file. For., Sec.E., September 1908, Nos. 457-59 (N.A.I.).

<sup>210</sup>Note on the file by L.W. Dane, For. Secy., dated September 9, 1907, For., Sec.E., *Ibid*.

<sup>211</sup>Letter from Lon Chen (the body combining Kasang, the Tibetan Governing Council and the National Assembly) to the Viceroy, G.O.I., encl. to Pro. No. 74, For., Sec.E., August, 1910, Nos. 38-246 (N.A.I.).

<sup>212</sup>For., Sec.E., March, 1910, Nos. 385-510, Pro. No. 387 (N.A.I.)

<sup>213</sup>Telegram from Viceroy to Secy. of State, dated 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 1910, Pro. No. 493, For., Sec.E., March, 1910, Nos. 385-510 (A) (N.A.I.).

<sup>214</sup>The Times (London), February 25, 1910, p.5.

<sup>215</sup>S.P., n.50, no.332; See also Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, n.3, pp.92, 94-95.

<sup>216</sup>S.P., *Ibid*, no. 311, p. 193, and no. 332, p. 203; Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, *Ibid*.

<sup>217</sup>S.P., no. 347, pp. 215-16; The Times, August 3, 1910.

<sup>218</sup>Butler, Secretary, For. Dept., to Smith, telegram No.S -113, dated February 27, Pro. No. 503, For., Sec. E., March 1910, Nos. 385-510 (N.A.I.).

<sup>219</sup>Tel. from Resident to For. Secy., March 10, 1910, Pro. No.373, For., Sec.E., June, 1910, Nos. 276-550 (N.A.I.).

<sup>220</sup>Resident to Secy., For. Dept., G.O.I., dated March 8, 1910, Pro.No. 378, *Ibid*.

<sup>221</sup>Memo. from Chandra Shumsher to M. Smith, dated March 11, 1910, encl. To Pro.No.87, For., Sec.E., June, 1910, Nos. 276-393 (N.A.I.).

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<sup>222</sup>Resident to For., Secy., G.O.I., Pro. No. 387 (N.A.I.). *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>224</sup>Tel. from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, no. Secret-25, dated May 1, 1910, Pro. No. 522, For.,Sec.E., June, Nos. 276-550 (N.A.I.).

<sup>225</sup>Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated May 25, 1910, Pro. No. 78, For.,Sec.E., August, 1910, Nos. 58-246 (N.A.I.).

<sup>226</sup>From For. Secy. to Resident, Nepal, No. 5-301, dated June, 1910, Pro. No. 93, For.,Sec.E., August, 1910, Nos. 58-246 (N.A.I.).

<sup>227</sup>British Resident, Nepal to Prime Minister, Nepal *Ibid.*

<sup>228</sup>P.M. to Resident , dated 19<sup>th</sup> June , 1910, Enclosure to Pro. No. 136, *Ibid.*

<sup>229</sup>G.O.I. to Secy. of State for India , No. 93-S, dated July 21, 1910, Pro. No. 136, *Ibid.*

<sup>230</sup>Letter from Secy. of State for India to G.O.I., No. 26 (Sec.), dated August 26, 1910, Pro. No. 16, For.,Sec.E., November 1910, Nos. 15-17 (N.A.I.). For text of the letters exchanged between the G.O.I. and the Nepalese Prime Minister regarding his country's relations with China and Tibet, see: British Resident to Prime Minister, dated June 15, 1910, encl. 2 to Pro. No. 135, For.,Sec.E., August 1910, Nos. 58-246 (N.A.I.); P.M. to Resident , June 19, 1910, encl. to Pro. No. 136, n.59; Resident to For Secy., G.O.I., No. 98, June 22, 1910 (Conf.), Pro. No. 136, *Ibid*; G.O.I. to Secy. of State, No. 93-5, July 21, 1910, Pro. No. 216, *Ibid*; and

Resident to For. Secy. G.O.I., no. 115, August 12, 1910, Pro. No. 115, For.,Sec.E., November, 1910, Nos. 15-17 (N.A.I.).

<sup>231</sup>Noting on the For. Dept. file by Butler, the For. Secy., on September 25, 1910 For.,Sec.E., November, 1910, Nos. 15-17, Notes , pp. 2-39. (N.A.I.).

<sup>232</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>233</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>234</sup>Lord Morley, the Secy. of State for India, was a leading supporter of such a policy, Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, n.3, pp. 98-99.

<sup>235</sup>Bell, *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>236</sup>Noting on the Tibetan developments by K. Flink, encl. to Pro. No. 388, dated January, 1910, For., Sec. E., March, 1910, Nos. 385-510 (N.A.I.)

<sup>237</sup>Even as late as on February 23, 1910, the Secy. of State had instructed the Viceroy that "it is essential that a strictly non-committal attitude should be maintained on all points at issue between China and Tibet", tele. P., dated London , February 23, 1910, Secy. of State to the Viceroy , Pro. No. 496, For., Sec. E., March, 1910, Nos. 385-510-A (N.A.I.).

<sup>238</sup>Noting on the file by Butler , Secy., For. Dept., G.O.I., on January 23, 1910, For., Sec. E., March, 1910, Nos. 385-510, Notes, p. 11 (N.A.I.).

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- <sup>239</sup> Viceroy's note on the file , on January 29, 1910, *Ibid*.
- <sup>240</sup> The Times, July 15, 1910, p. 5.
- <sup>241</sup> For., Sec.E., August, 1910, Nos. 55, pp. 61-61 (Corres.), (N.A.I.); The Times, *Ibid*; You-ting Sung, Chinese-Tibetan Relations 1890-1947, (University of Minnesota, 1947), unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, p. 77.
- <sup>242</sup> For., Sec. E., (N.A.I.), *Ibid*; S.P., 1910, no. 340, encl. 2, p. 209 and London, n. 13, p.115.
- <sup>243</sup> S.P., 1910, no. 340, encl. 3, p. 210.
- <sup>244</sup> S.P., 1910, n.4, 340, encl. 3, p. 210.
- <sup>245</sup> *Ibid*, no. 344, pp.211-12 (encl.).
- <sup>246</sup> *Ibid*, no. 345, p. 213
- <sup>247</sup> Bell, Portrait of the Dalai Lama, n.3, p. 80 and S.P., n.4, 1910, no. 346, p. 214.
- <sup>248</sup> For text of the treaty, see Bell, Tibet, Past and Present, n.1, App. XI, p. 297.
- <sup>249</sup> British Minister Max Muller's note to the Chinese Foreign Office, dated April 11, 1910, sub-encl. to Pro. No. 366, For., Secy.E., August 1910, Nos. 58-246 (N.A.I.).
- <sup>250</sup> For., Secy.E., November, 1911, Nos. 15-17, Pro. No. 13 (N.A.I.) : Prince Ching to Muller , dated April 18, 1910, Ching-Chih, n.5, vol. 17, p. 41, quoted in Sung, n.4, pp. 80-81; Prince - Ching to Br. Minister , April 18, 1910, Secret Department , May 21, 1910, Indian office Library (I.O.L.).
- <sup>251</sup> For., Secy.E., January, 1911, Nos. 124-207, Pro. No. 178 (N.A.I.).
- <sup>252</sup> *Ibid*, Pro. No. 184.
- <sup>253</sup> For., Sec.E., August , 1910, Nos. 58-246, Pro. No. 366 (N.A.I.).
- <sup>254</sup> The Chinese Foreign Office to the Br. Minister, Peking, dated October 28, 1910, For., Sec.E., January 1911, Nos. 124-207, Pro. No. 204 (encl.1) (N.A.I.).
- <sup>255</sup> Prime Minister, Nepal, to Br. Resident, dated 19<sup>th</sup> November, 1910, encl. 3 to pro. No. 178, *Ibid*.
- <sup>256</sup> Letter from Secretary of State to Secy., For. Dept., G.O.I., No. 50, dated December, 1910, received on January 1, 1911, For., Secy.E., July, 1911, Nos. 248-80 (N.A.I.).
- <sup>257</sup> Max Muller to Prince Ching, dated January 17, 1911, For., Secy.E., July, 1911, Nos. 248-80, sub encl. to Pro. No.253, *Ibid*.
- <sup>258</sup> Annex. To British Resident's letter to G.O.I., dated September 20, 1910, Pro. No. 130, For., Secy.E., January 1911, Nos. 124-207 (N.A.I.).
- <sup>259</sup> Pro. No. 139, For., Secy.E., January 1911, Nos. 124-207, *Ibid*.

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<sup>260</sup>Tel., P., from Secy. of State to Viceroy, G.O.I., dated October 15, 1910; Pro. No. 150, For., Secy.E., January 1911, Nos. 124-207, *Ibid*.

<sup>261</sup>*Ibid*

<sup>262</sup>Translation of a letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa to the Prime Minister of Nepal, dated November 6, 1910, enclosed to his letter by the Prime Minister to the British Resident, dated December 2, 1910, encl. 1, 191, *Ibid*.

<sup>263</sup>Letter from Prince Ching to the British Minister at Peking dated 31<sup>st</sup> March, 1914, 1911, sub-encl.1 to Pro. No. 265, For .,Sec.E., July 1911, Nos. 248-80 (N.A.I.).

<sup>264</sup>Encl. to Pro. No. 279, *Ibid*; British Minister , Peking to Prince Ching, dated May 10, 1911, Ching-Chih, n.5, vol. 17, p. 41, quoted in Sung , n.4, p.81.

<sup>265</sup>Tel. from Secy. of States to Viceroy , G.O.I., dated November 14, 1911, Pro. No. 60, For., Secy.E., February 1912, Nos. 60-71 (N.A.I.)

<sup>266</sup>Notes, Pro. No. 62, For.,Sec., E., February 1912, Nos. 60-71, *Ibid*.

<sup>267</sup>Pro. No. 60, For.Sec., E., February 1912, Nos. 60-71, *Ibid*.

<sup>268</sup>Resident to Prime Minister, December 10, 1911, encl. to Pro. No. 68, For., Sec.E.,February 1912, Nos. 60-71, *Ibid*.

<sup>269</sup>Prime Minister to Resident, dated December 17, 1911, encl. to Pro. No. 102, For., Sec.E., May 1912, Nos. 102-06 (N.A.I.).

<sup>270</sup>Notes, Pro. No. 791, For., Secy.E., May 1912, Nos. 102-06, *Ibid*.

<sup>271</sup>Resident to Prime , dated may 1, 1911, Pro.No. 791, For., Secy.E., May, 1912, Nos. 102-06, *Ibid*.

<sup>272</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>273</sup>Prime Minister to the Resident, dated June 19, 1910, encl. to Pro. No. 136, For., Sec.E., August 1910, Nos. 58-246 (N.A.I.).

<sup>274</sup>For., Sec. E., October 1912, Nos. 59-239 (N.A.I.), Pro.Nos. 208, 209, 210 and 244.

<sup>275</sup>Letter from Resident to For., Secy.E., G.O.I., No. 47, dated April 22, 1912 , Pro. No. 25, reporting outcome of his discussion with the Prime Minister. For., Secy.E., October, 1912, Nos. No. 12-45 (N.A.I.).

<sup>276</sup>Noting on the file by McMohan on April 29, 1912, For., Secy.E., October, 1912, Nos. 12-45, Pro. No. 25, *Ibid*.

<sup>277</sup>Noting by McMohan on May 7, 1912, (Notes) For., Secy.E.,october, 1912, Nos. no. 12-45, Pro. No. 25, *Ibid*.

<sup>278</sup>memo prepared by M/s S.H.Butler, S.A. Imam, W.H. Charles, R.W. Carlyle and R.H. Gadock, comprising For. Dep. Committee , G.O.I., dated May 13, 1912, For.,Sec.,E., October, 1912, No.s 12-45, *Ibid*.

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<sup>279</sup>For.,Sec.,E., October, 1912, Nos. 12-45, Pro. No. 36 (sub-encl.3), (N.A.I.); Tibet, Piece Handbook, prepared by the Historical Section of British Foreign Office , vol. 12, No. 70, pp. 40-41 and China year Book (Shanghai), 1925, p. 439.

<sup>280</sup>For.,Sec.,E., October, 1913, Nos. 170-509, Pro. No. 194 (encl.) (N.A.I.); Tibet, Piece Handbook, *Ibid*, p. 41. For details of Chinese moves , see Tin Nai-Chien, Kang-tsang Shih-ti-pong (The Political Relations Between Tibet and Sikking) (Yan, 1942), vol. 2, p. 25, qu. in Sung, n. 74, p. 85; Liu Men-huei, Chung-kuoTuei-tsangChih sin Cheng-Chien (The manuscripts of the New Chinese Policy towards Tibet) (1947), p. 32, qu. in Sung, n. 7, p.85; Teichman, n.5, pp. 41-42.

<sup>281</sup>Yin , n. 114, vol. 2, p. 26.

<sup>282</sup>The Japan Weekly Chronical (Kobe), May 16, 1912, p. 81.

<sup>283</sup>Bell, Portriat of Dalai Lama, n.3, pp. 127-128.

<sup>284</sup>Yin, n.114, p. 26, Making a policy-statement on Tibet , Sir Edward Grey told the British house of Commons that China should become strong at home and consolidates and organize her own Government. But she embarked upon a forward policy in Tibet and tried to transform Tibet into an ordinary province of china, instead of being content with the influence she exercised there under the status quo. He further emphasized that forward policy sooner or later to disturbances on the Tibetan frontier. British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (henceforth cited as British Parliamentary Debates), vol. 53, p. 455, 1912.

<sup>285</sup>For., Sec. E., October 1912, Nos. 59-232, Pro. Bo. 181 (encl.) (N.A.I.).

<sup>286</sup>For., Sec. E., *Ibid*, Pro. No. 210.

<sup>287</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>288</sup>*Ibid*, Pro. No. 219.

<sup>289</sup>For., Sec. E., February, 1913, Nos. 170-509, Pro. No. 184 (sun-encl.) (N.A.I.); China Year Book , 1919, p.615; Tibet, Peace Handbook, 1920, p. 41; Bell, Tibet, Past and Present, 2, p. 149; North China Herald (Shang-hai), September 7, 1912, p. 686.

<sup>290</sup>For., Sec. E., February 1913, Nos. 170-509, Pro. No. 191-192 (N.A.I.).

<sup>291</sup>*Ibid*, Pro. No. 433.

<sup>292</sup>For., Sec. E., *Ibid*, Pro. No. 244.

<sup>293</sup>*Ibid*, Pro. No. 230, Teichman, n.5, pp. 38-39; Yin, n. 114, Vol. III, p.24,; Rose , n.11, p. 167.

<sup>294</sup>*Ibid*, encl. to Pro. No. 259; Teichman, n.5, p. 39.

<sup>295</sup>Liu, n.114, p. 31; and Bell, Tibet : Past and Present, n.2, p.121.

<sup>296</sup>Gen. Chung, Chinese Aman, Yatung, to P.M., Nepal, dated February 23, 1913, For., Sec. E., August, 1913, Nos. 240-50, Pro.No. 248, p. (N.A.I.).

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<sup>297</sup>"With regard to the question of union with five affiliated races of China, I am sorry that as Nepal is an ancient Hindu Kingdom, desirous of preserving her independence and separate existence, she cannot entertain the idea of such a Union with the affiliated races said to contribute the Republic of China", Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher's letter to General Chung, dated March 16, 1913, For., Sec. E., August, 1913, Nos. 240-50, Pro. No. 248 (encl.) (N.A.I.).

<sup>298</sup>Rose, n.11, p.167.

<sup>299</sup>Tibet; Piece Handbook, n. 113, p. 41; Teichman, n. 5p. 39; Bell, The Relation of Tibet (Oxford, 1924), pp. 391-92; Yuan-ta-Chung-tungshu-tu (Yuan Shi-kai's correspondence) vol. 1, pp. 11-12.

<sup>300</sup>Kuo-min Pao, Chinese daily, October 29, 1912, cited in For., Sec. E., October, 1913, Nos. No. 170-509, Pro. No. 451 (sub -encl.) (N.A.I.); Bell, Portrait, n.5, p. 135.

<sup>301</sup>Tibet, Peace Handbook, n.113, 1920, p. 133; H.E. Richardson, A Short History of Tibet (New York, 1962), p. 265. About a month earlier, on January 13, 1913, treaty was concluded between Tibet and Mongolia by Dorjeff, wherein also Tibet had asserted its new "independent" status. See China Year Book, 1921-22, p. 611.

<sup>302</sup>Tieh-Tsang Li, Historical Status of Tibet (New York, 1956), p.134; China Year Book, H.G.W. Woodhead ed. (Tientsin, 1921-22), pp. 151, 304-5 & 611; Tibet, Piece Handbook, 1920, p. 44; The Times, 11<sup>th</sup> January, 1913, p.4; Richardson, *Ibid*, pp. 265, 300.

<sup>303</sup>China Year Book, 1921-22, p. 611, and Bell, Tibet, Past and Present , n.2, pp. 148-49, 152.

<sup>304</sup>Yin, n.114, vol. III, p. 29; and Bell, Portriat of The Dalai Lama, n.3, p. 345.

<sup>305</sup>Teichman, n. 5, p.44.

<sup>306</sup>Yin, n. 114, Vol. II, p. 30.

<sup>307</sup>Resident's Annual Report to the Government of India, dated July 11, 1914, For., Sec. E., August, 1914, Nos. 384-86, Pro. No. 384 (N.A.I.). It seems that the fears of the Nepalese Prime Minister were not totally unfounded. For instance, when the Nepalese Government sought compensation from the Tibetans for the ravages wrought by mutinous Chinese soldiers before their final withdrawal in 1912, the Dalai Lama, rejecting the claim, advised them to dispatch a delegate to the proposed Shimla Conference to negotiate the matter. When this information was communicated to the British, Mr. Bell, the Officer on Special Duty to Foreign Secretary, wrote, "I do not, however, think that we want this. It might bring Nepal in undesirably close relationship with China and might complicate matters generally". For., Sec. E., September, 1914, Nos. 406-23 (N.A.I.).Both Mr. Bell and the Foreign Secretary, therefore agreed that the Nepalese Representative should not be asked to come to the Conference table. See For. Secy. Mc Mohan's note on the subject, *Ibid*.

<sup>308</sup>Tsang-an Chih-lio (Memorandum of the China - British Negotiations on Tibet), confidential, prepared by the Dept. of Political Affairs of the Chinese Foreign office, (Peking, 1923), hereinafter cited as Memorandum, p.16, qu. In Sung, n. 4, p.100; Bell Past and Present , n.1, pp. 154-55 and Teichman, n.5.



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<sup>309</sup>Ivan Chen's telegraphic report to Peking, For., Sec. E., June 1915, Nos. 135-220 (N.A.I.); Memorandum n. 142, p. 15; and Sung, n.4, p. 103.

<sup>310</sup>Sung, n.4, p. 103; Alastair Lamb, *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*, (London, 1966), p. 506.

<sup>311</sup>Letter from For., Secy., Govt. of India to the Resident, dated September 9, 1914 (G.O.I.) and the D.O. letter from Lt. Col. J.M. Smith, Resident, to A.H. Grant, For., Sec., G.O.I., dated 12 Dec., 1914, For., Sec. E., June, 1915, Nos. 135-220 (Appd. to Notes, p.1) (N.A.I.).

<sup>312</sup>Resident to G.I.O., "Annual Report", For., Sec. E., October, 1915, Nos. 1-3 (N.A.I.).

<sup>313</sup>Records in the Russian Archives give a clue that initially Russians did try to strike a bargain with records, the British on Simla Convention. According to these records, the British proposed revision of Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 concerning Tibet in the spring of 1914. The Russian Foreign office proposed to the Government that, "as the British proposal apparently amounted to converting Tibet into Britain's virtual protectorate, we should ask for compensation either in Afghanistan or in Persia", noting on the file, Documents des archives des imperial at provisoire 1878-1917, Series III, 1914-17, vol. I, p. 500, Nos. 384, 396 and 430. The outbreak of world war might have dislocated their efforts in between.

<sup>314</sup>Charles Bell, at a later occasion during his trip to Lhasa in 1921, noted that, "No doubt the Nepalese here do not altogether like seeking a British Government official in direct and friendly contacts with the Tibetan Government. In the old days, they were to some extent, in a position of an intermediary between us, and they do not like losing that position. But we cannot help that".

Contd. Foot Note No. 141 - Bell, P.O. Sikkim to For., Secy., dated Lhasa, April 22, 1921, pro. 271, p. 47. For., Sec. E., June 1921, Nos. 45-283 (N.A.I.).

<sup>315</sup>Lonchen Shastra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary, to A.H. Mc Mohan, British Plenipotentiary dt. China-Tibet Conference, Simla, the 15<sup>th</sup> day of the 5<sup>th</sup> Tibetan month of the Shing-tag (wood-tiger) year (July 8, 1914). For., Sec. E., June, 1915, Nos. 135-220, (N.A.I.), pro. No. 135.

<sup>316</sup>*Ibid*, Notes to Pro. 183, p. 21, see A.H. Grant, Secy., Fo. Dept., G.O.I., to t. Manner Smith Resident in Nepal dt. 25<sup>th</sup> Nov., 1914 (Conf.).

<sup>317</sup>British Resident, Nepal, to for. Secy., G.O.I., dt. 19<sup>th</sup> November, 1914 (Conf.), *Ibid*, notes, p. 21-22.

<sup>318</sup>Resident to P.M., Nepal, dt. 27<sup>th</sup> November, 1914, referred to in former d.o. to Grant secy., For. Dept., G.O.I., dt. Dec. 8, 1914, App. to Notes, p. 1, *Ibid*.

<sup>319</sup>Chandra Shumsher, P.M., Nepal, to M. Smith, British Resident, D.O. dt. Dec. 4, 1914, App. to Notes, p.1, *Ibid*.

<sup>320</sup>M. Smith, Br. Resident, Nepal, to Grant, For., Secy., G.O.I., dt. Dec. 8, 1914, App. to Notes, p.1, *Ibid*.

<sup>321</sup>Foreign Secretary's noting on the file, App. to Notes, p.2, *Ibid*.

<sup>322</sup>For., Secy.'s, d.o. to Resident, dt. February 19, 1915, *Ibid*, App. to Notes, p.6.

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<sup>323</sup>Article 7 of the said Gorkha-Bhat Treaty of 1856 provided that, "Gorkha Bhardar residing a Lhasa will not interfere in the dispute of the Tibetan subjects, merchants , traders, etc., who may quarrel amongst themselves. Neither will the Tibetan Govt. interfere in any dispute between subjects of the Nepal Govt., Kashmiris, etc. who may be resident within the jurisdiction of Lhasa but whenever quarrels may occur between Gorkha and Tibetan subjects, the authorities of two states will sit together and will jointly adjudicate them; and all Amdani (i.e., income resulting from fines, confiscations , etc.) will, if paid by subjects of Tibet, be taken by the Govt. and if paid by Gorkha subjects, Kashmiris., will be supported by Gurkha Sardar". Aitchison, n. 41, Vol. II, part II, p.99 footnote.

<sup>324</sup>For text of the agreement, see Bell, Tibet; Past and Present, n.2, pp. 291-97.

<sup>325</sup>maj. Campbell, Br. Trade Agent. Gyantse to Br. Po. Off. Sikkim, n. 28 (conf.), dt.Gyantse, Aug. 12, 1916, encl. to pro. No. 4, For., Sec., E., May, 1917,, Nos. 4-11 (N.A.I.).

<sup>326</sup>P.M., Nepal , Br. Resident , dt. September 17, 1916, Encl. to Pro. 6, *Ibid.*

<sup>327</sup>Foreign Secretary's notings on the file, Notes to Pro. No. 9. For., Sec. E., may 1917, Nos. 1-11 (N.A.I.)

<sup>328</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>329</sup>Prime Minister, Nepal, to Resident, September 26, 1916, For.,Sec.E., May 1917, Nos. 90-97, Pro. 90 (N.A.I.).

<sup>330</sup>For.,Sec.E., April 1913, Nos. 322-223 (N.A.I.).

<sup>331</sup>Br. Trade Agent, Campbell's News Report, No. 3, dt. 6<sup>th</sup> August, 1916, For., Sec.E., Nov. 1916, Nos. 1-65, Cors., pp. 37-38 (N.A.I.).

<sup>332</sup>For Bell's comment on the Nepalese psychology, see n.5.

<sup>333</sup>Br. Trade Agent at Yatung to P.O. Sikkim, December 4, 1916; Br. Trade Agent at Gyantse to P.O. Sikkim and C.A. Bell, P.O. Sikkim to G.O.I., December 16, 1916 For., Sec., E., May, 1917, Pro. 93 (N.A.I.).

<sup>334</sup>Notes, For., Sec., E., May 1919, Nos. 1-4 (Deposit) (N.A.I.).

<sup>335</sup>No. 27, For., Sec., E., Sept. 1917, No.s 21-35, Corres. P. 12 (N.A.I.).

<sup>336</sup>Political Secy's Notes, dt. June 21, 1916, For., Sec., E., October, 1916, Nos. 40-72, Notes, p. 9; see also p.3, Notes, For., Sec., E., Sept. 1917, nos. 21-35 (N.A.I.).

<sup>337</sup>See n. 23.

<sup>338</sup>See Br. Envy, Nepal, O'Connor's dispatches to the Secretary, For. Department, G.O.I., dt.16<sup>th</sup>& 22<sup>nd</sup> May, 1927, For., Sec., E., June, 1922, Nos. 1-23 (N.A.I.). The Viceroy also informed the Secretary to State for India on 10<sup>th</sup> May, 1921; "There is the unpleasant and significant fact that Japanese arms are already being ordered by Tibet from Mongolia and that she is considering sending further orders on a large scale". For., Sec., E., June, 1921, Nos. 45-283, Pro. 280 (N.A.I.);

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see also Charles Bell's note to Denys Bray, For., Sec., G.O.I. No. 17-c, dt. February 21, 1921, *Ibid*, Pro. 205.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>340</sup> Notes to Pro.186, p. 15, For., Sec., E., June, 1921, Nos. 45-283 (N.A.I.).

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>342</sup> Kenyon, Br. Envoy, to Denys Bray, For., Secy., G.O.I., dt. April 26, 1921, For., Sec., E., June, 1921, Nos. 148-157, Pro.156 (N.A.I.).

<sup>343</sup> Bell to Bray, For., Secy., dt. Lhasa, April 22, 1921, Pro.. 271, p. 147, For., Sec., E., June, 1921, Nos.45-283 (N.A.I.).

<sup>344</sup> O', Connor, Br. Envoy, Kathmandu to G.O.I., d.o. dt. May 16, 1922, F.N. 97 (1) X-1992, Sec. (N.A.I.), Notes, p. 13, Pro. 271, p. 147.

<sup>345</sup> O' Connor, Br. Envoy's d.o. dt. May 22, 1922, p. 14, F.N. 97 (1) X-1992, Sec. (N.A.I.).

<sup>346</sup> O' Connor's d.o. , letter no. 50 (Conf.), dt. Feb 8, 1922 to the For., Sec., G.O.I.

<sup>347</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>348</sup> O' Connor, Br. Envoy, Kathmandu to Denys Bray, For. Secy., G.O.I., d.o. May 22, 1922. For., Sec., E., Nos. 1-25, 1922 Pro.18 (Notes), p. 14 (N.A.I.).

<sup>349</sup> Viceroy to Secy. of State for India, Tel. P., No. 2522-5, dt. Nov. 8, 1921. For., F.N. 353-Extl. 1922, S.N. 4 (N.A.I.). Tel. from secy. of State for India to Viceroy, no. 6210, dt. Sep. 6, 1921 (Conf.), F.N. 353-X, 1923, N.6, P.8 (N.A.I.).

<sup>350</sup> British Envoy, Kathmandu, to For. Secy., G.O.I., reporting his interview with the Nepalese Prime Minister letter no. 17 (Conf.), dt. June 26, 1922, F.N. 97 Extl., Part-I, Nos. 1-25, Pro. 20 (N.A.I.).

<sup>351</sup> Br. Envoy, O'Connor, to For, Secy., letter no. 43-6, dated January 4, 1922; reporting his interview with the Nepalese prime Minister, For., Sec. E., Part I, Nos. 1-25, 1922 (N.A.I.). For. Secy., Denys Bray noted on the file at the occasion on July 10, 1922 that, "the Secretary of State's refusal to sanction the inevitable concessions we pressed for has landed us in somewhat dangerous position. It has put the idea of a new treaty, into the Prime Minister's head, and it is doubtful whether we shall be able to make him change his mind once again". For., Sec. E., No. 97 (1) X 1922 (N.A.I.), notes p. 16.

<sup>352</sup> Viceroy Reading, et al to Viscount Peel, Secy. of State letter no. 5-A, dated July 17, 1922, F.No. 97-E, Part I, pro.No. 24 (N.A.I.).

<sup>353</sup> O' Connor's d.o. to For. Secy., dt. June 25/26, 1922, pp.15-16 (Notes). F.No. 97 (1) X-1922 (Sec.) (N.A.I.).

<sup>354</sup> Letter from Kenyon, Br. Resident, to Bray, Secy., For. Dept., No. 59-C, dated June 27, 1921. F.No. 353 X- 1922, S.No. 2, pp. 15-17 (N.A.I.).

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<sup>355</sup>Viceroy to Secy. of State, No. 5-A, dt,July 27, 1922, *Ibid*.

<sup>356</sup>Note by F.H. Humphreys, Dy. Secy., For. Dept., G.O.I., p. 3, F.No.353 x 1923 (N.A.I.).

<sup>357</sup>F.H. Humphreys, Dy. Secy., For. Dept., D.O. to R.L. Kennan , Br. Envoy in Nepal, no. 2439-E;B., dated September 7, 1921 (Conf.), *Ibid*, p.5.

<sup>358</sup>Kennion, Br. Envoy, Nepal's D.O. to Denys Bray, For. Secy., G.O.I., No. 122-C, dated September 13, 1921 (Conf.) , p. 6, n.37, *Ibid*.

<sup>359</sup>Kennion, to Denys Bray, letter No. 59-C, dated June 27, 1921,ibis.

<sup>360</sup>For text of the treaty and letter exchanged at that time, see Aitchison, n. 41, vol. XIV, pp. 75-77.

<sup>361</sup>For text of the treaty and accompanying letters exchanged see, Aitchison, n.41, vol. II, pp. 205-11.

<sup>362</sup>British trade Agent's Report, tel. no. 25-5, dt. May 26, 1923, For., F.N.N. 459(2)-X, Sec., 1922-23.

<sup>363</sup>Charles Bell's News letter to G.O.I., no. 4, dated June 1, 1921, Pro. No. 135, For. Extl. B., July, 1922, Nos. 135-36 (N.A.I.); also Atchison, n. 41, vol. II, part II, p. 99.

<sup>364</sup>Letter from Long Sholkang, the Tibetan Premier, to Maj. J.M. Bailey, Br. Political Officer, Sikkim, forming encl. to Bailey's letter to For. Secy., G.O.I., No. 432-P, S.N. 2, For.Sec. E., 452(3)-X, 1922-23 (N.A.I.).

<sup>365</sup>Notes by C. Latimore, Dy. Sect., For.Dept., dated July 23, 1924, p. 15, *Ibid*.

<sup>366</sup>Letter from the Nepalese prime Minister to Perceval Landon, dated July 15, 1924, sent by the letter to the Secy., For. Dept., G.O.I., For.,F.N. 457 (Sec.), 1922-23 (Notes), p. 15 (N.A.I.).

<sup>367</sup>Latimore, Dy. Secy., For. Dept. to Political Officer, Sikkim. D.O. tel. No. 1186-5, dated July 25, 1924, *Ibid*.

<sup>368</sup>Denys Bray , For. Secy. to London ,dt,July 25, 1924, *Ibid*.

<sup>369</sup>Letter from Perceval landon to the Viceroy, dated June 30, 1924, For.,F.No. 161-X, 1924, pp. 10, 15-16 (N.A.I.).

<sup>370</sup>Copy of telegram from P.M. Nepal to the Dalai Lama, dt.October 3, 1929, S.N. 39-A, *Ibid*.

<sup>371</sup>For a British appreciation of the "Bolshevik danger" to Tibet, Nepal and India, see For., Sec. 21-X 1928, App. III to Notes (N.A.I.) and the letter from Nepalese Prime Minister to the British Prime Minister to the British Envoy, Kathmandu , supplying his intelligence report on Tibetan affairs , particularly the "Bolshevik danger" , For., Sec.F.N. 38(2), 1927, p. 14 (N.A.I.). See also discussion in the Indian Foreign Department on "Declaration of the Pan Asiatic League Against British Intrigues in India, Nepal and Tibet", signed by some Indian patriots in exile, including Mahendra Pratap Singh and Japanese dignitaries like Dr. O. Kawa, Director of Investigation Bureau , Manchurian Rly, and Prof. T. Nakatani of Hosel University, For.Sec., 264-X, 1930, S.N. 211 (N.A.I.).

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<sup>372</sup>G.O.I. to Br. Envoy, Nepal.tel. dated September 23, 1929, S.N. 14, For.,Sec.E., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405.

<sup>373</sup>Br. Envoy to G.O.I., d.o. no. 1/28, dated October 3, 1929, n.51 or S.N. 37, *Ibid*.

<sup>374</sup>Tel. P., from Br. Envoy, Nepal to G.O.I., no. 128, dated October 3, 1929, *Ibid*, S.N. 37.

<sup>375</sup>For. Secy., G.O.I., to Br. Envoy, Nepal, Tel. no. 3091 (Conf.), dated October 7, 1929, *Ibid*. S.N. 46.

<sup>376</sup>S.N. 75, For. and Pol. 228/1929-X, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.).

<sup>377</sup>Minutes as recorded by Denys Bray, for. Secy., G.O.I., dated December 12, 1929 of his interview with the Nepalese Representative , Col. Chunder Jung , dated December 1929. For., Sec., 297 X-1929 (N.A.I.), Notes , pp. 3-4.

<sup>378</sup>Letter from G.O.I. to Dalai Lama, dated January 13, 1920, S.N. 143, For., Sec. E., 228-X 1929, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.). Sardar Bahadur Laden La was an officer of Bengal police services who was earlier lent to Tibetan Government to recognize their police system.

<sup>379</sup>Tel. to the Secy. of State , London, by G.O.I., No. 52-5, dated January 8, 1930, S.N. 124, For., Sec.E., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.). The mention of arbitration as referred to in this tel. refers to G.O.I.'s communication to Nepal Government, Tel. 2866-5, dated September 23, 1929, referred to earlier.

<sup>380</sup>Letter from British Envoy at Nepal, to G.O.I., no. 1/28-C, dated January 5, 1930. S.N. 127, For.,Sec.E., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.).

<sup>381</sup>Tel. No. 88-S, from G.O.I. to Secy. of State, dated January 11, 1930, Pro. No. 135, *Ibid*.

<sup>382</sup>Tel. to Secy. of State, London, No. 94-3, dated January 12, 1930, S.N. 138, For., Sec., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.).

<sup>383</sup>Tel. From Secy. of State for India, no. 205, dated January 17, 1930 to G.O.I., S.N. 150, *Ibid*.

<sup>384</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>385</sup>Tel. from br. Envoy, Nepal, No. 92-C, dated January 24, 1930, S.N. 155, For., Sec.E.,228 X 1929 , Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.).

<sup>386</sup>The Nepalese Government had earlier invited British Commander -in -Chief to visit Nepal, which was agreed to by the Indian Government. The G.O.I. seized the opportunity to step up moral pressure on the Prime Minister saying that if the dispute was not settled soon, he might have to cancel his trip. The Prime Minister , as expected , assured back to Commander-in-Chief that his Government would do its best to settle the matter amicably and that the project should not be abandoned, For.,Sec.,84-X, 1930, S.N. 145 (N.A.I.).

<sup>387</sup>Tel. from Secy. of State No. 352, dated January 29, 1930, S.N. 176, For., Sec.E., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.).

<sup>388</sup>Tel. from secy. of State, S.N. 176, dated January 29, 1930, For.Sec. E., 228 x 1929, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.).

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<sup>389</sup>See Tel P., from G.O.I., to Secy. of state, London, No. 297-S, dated January 30, 1930, S.N. 178, *Ibid*.

<sup>390</sup>G.O.I. to Political Officer Sikkim, tel. No. 350-S, dated February, 4, 1930, S.N. 188, *Ibid*.  
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<sup>391</sup>Political Officer Sikkim to G.O.I., Tel. no. 1 (1) P, dated February 23, 1930, S.N. 256, *Ibid*.

<sup>392</sup>S.N. 257, *Ibid*.

<sup>393</sup>Telegraphic report from P.O., Sikkim, to G.O.I. dated march 11, 1930, For.,Sec. E., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-409, pro. No. 311.

<sup>394</sup>Tel. from Br. Envoy to G.O.I., dated March 21, 1930, For.,Sec. E., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405, Pro. No. 332 (N.A.I.).

<sup>395</sup>For.,Sec. E., 228 X 1929, pro. No. 271 (N.A.I.).

<sup>396</sup>*Ibid*, pro.No. 272.

<sup>397</sup>*Ibid*, Pro.No. 275.

<sup>398</sup>*Ibid*, Pro. No. 313.

<sup>399</sup>Weir's reply to G.O.I., dated November 18, 1930, For.,Sec. E., F. No. 279 X (Sec.) 1930, page no. 30 (N.A.I.)

<sup>400</sup> British Political Officer Col.Weir's reply to For. Dept., D.O. dated March 26, 1931, For.,Sec. E., 279 X 1930, Notes pp. 23-24 (N.A.I.).

<sup>401</sup>See Notes on Nepal-Tibet Relations , pp. 11-14, For., Se.E., 279 x 1930 (N.A.I.).

<sup>402</sup>laden La's conversation with Dalai Lama, letter from Pol. Officer, Sikkim to G.O.I., No. 4, (3)P/30, dated April 4, 1930, S.N. 367, For.,Sec. E., F.N. 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405 (N.A.I.).

<sup>403</sup>G.O.I., to Secy. of State, Nos. 453-5, dated February 10, 1930, *Ibid*, S.N. 207.

<sup>404</sup>Secy. of State for India to G.O.I., tel. No. 549, dated February 13, 1930, S.N. 223, For.,Sec. E., 228 X 1929, Nos. 1-405, (N.A.I.) .)

<sup>405</sup>C.Y.N. Ming, "China's interest in the Complications Between Tibet and Nepal", Shanghal, dated April 15, 1930, China weekly review (Calcutta), April 26, 1930, pp. 329-33

<sup>406</sup>Chang Ming (alias Daniel J. Lee) "National China Re-establishes Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal', China weekly Review , December 27, 1930, pp. 148-9.

<sup>407</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>408</sup>Br. Envoy, Col. Daukes to Secy., For. Dept., G.O.I., dated February 18, 1932 ,For., Sec. E., 351 X 1931 (Notes) (N.A.I).

<sup>409</sup>*Ibid*, Pro.No. 40.

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<sup>410</sup>See various reports from Rai Bahadur Norbu, a Tibetan British Agent, citing his interviews with the Dalai Lama and other officials, For., Sec. E., 1 (2) X 1934 (N.A.I.).

<sup>411</sup>Williamson, P.O. Sikkim, to G.O.I., dated July 8, 1934. Pro.No. 72, p. 96, *Ibid.*

<sup>412</sup>British Minister at Kathmandu to G.O.I., Tel., No. 14, dated December 22, 1934, S.N. 216, *Ibid.*

<sup>413</sup>Williamson, P.O. Sikkim to G.O.I., dated August 29, 1934, For., Sec. E., 1(2) X 1935, Pro. No. 133 (N.A.I.).

<sup>414</sup>Dy. Secy. For. Dept. G.O.I., to For. Envoy in Nepal, dated July 17, 1934, For., Sec. E., 1(2) X 1934, Notes, p. 32 (N.A.I.).

<sup>415</sup>"Appreciation of the Sino-Tibetan situation in its bearing on Nepal", by Br. Envoy, Col. Daukes, sent by him to G.O.I. along with his d.o. no. 1-C, A/34, dated October 31, 1934, For., Sec. E., 1(2) X 134, Notes, pp. 68-72 (N.A.I.).

<sup>416</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>417</sup>Daniel J. Lee, "Chinese Mission to Nepal", The China weekly Review, November 17, 1934, no. 70, pp. 440-1.

<sup>418</sup>Price, Br. Vice Consul in China, narrated his talks with Marichi Man Singh, the Bada Kazi (Chief Secretary) of Nepal Government, during his stay at Kathmandu in March 1933. He found Bada Kazi quite curious about the present military strength of China. Price felt that with all their enlightenment and knowledge of the outside world, the Nepalese had not yet realized the exact condition of China as a military power. The Bada Kazi could not understand why the Chinese had made such an ineffective stand against the Japanese and also expressed his amazement at the lack of patriotism among the Chinese. He said that he found it hard to realize that the threatened loss of so much territory still failed to unite them. See J.P. Price, Hon. Attachi to Br. Legation, Kathmandu to Br. Minister, Peking, dated 31<sup>st</sup> March, 1933, p. 67, For., Sec., 94 X 1933 (N.A.I.).

<sup>419</sup>Tie-tsen Li, The Historical status of Tibet (New York, King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 274, citing Liu Man-Ching. K'ang Tsang Yas-Ching (Shanghai, 1933), pp. 120-1.

<sup>420</sup>Hoar, John C., Contemporary Nepal; A Historical Study of the Political and Economical Development, 1959, unpublished Thesis, Georgetown University (Microfilm), p. 257-58.

<sup>421</sup>Daukes, Br. Envoy, Nepal to G.O.I., D.O. No. 1-c/A/34, dated October 31, 1934, For., Sec., 1(2) x 1934, Pro. No. 71, S.N. 199, (N.A.I.).

<sup>422</sup>Lo Chia-lun, "Chien Kai-ching Lin Che -kaun "Hsitsangti Mu" Teuyu Chung-kue, vol. III, No. 7, p. 230, cited in Tieh-Tseng Li, Tibet, Today and Yesterday, (New York, 1960), p. 195. Similarly, Tibet was depicted outside China in a map that was shown in a film entitled "Kashmir" before the members of the diplomatic corps in New Delhi in the autumn of 1948. The Chinese Ambassador, Prof. Lo Chia-lun, lodged a written protest against the same. "After having been urged several times", noted the Professor, the Government of India replied back that the film was not the production of the Indian Government, which would however, "pay

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attention to this matter henceforth". The map in the film, however, according to Prof. Lo Chia-lun, remained uncorrected, *Ibid*, p.195.

<sup>423</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 232-33.

<sup>424</sup>As Richardson himself remarked: "The transition was almost imperceptible, the existing staff was retained in its entirety and the only obvious change was the change in the flag". H.E. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History* (London, 1962), p. 173.

<sup>425</sup>Lo Chia -lun, n.1, pp. 230, 234, cited in Li, n.1, p. 196.

<sup>426</sup>Tu Po, Jen-min Jih-pao (or as People's Daily, hereinafter cited as People's Daily) (Peking), 7<sup>th</sup> September 1949, trans. Li, n.1, p. 287, footnote (abbreviated as f.n.) 260.

<sup>427</sup>Ram Gopal, *India, China, Tibet Triangle* (Lucknow, 1964), p. 18; AniBhaman, *India's Foreign Policy with particular reference to Asia and Africa*, University of Maryland, unpublished thesis, 1957 (microfilm), pp. 123-28. See also Li, n.1, pp. 197-99; Li Yu-hi, *Tikuo Chu-I Ch'naluh Histsandti Shih Shih*, pp.36-37, quoted in Li, n.1, p. 287 (f. nos. 264 and 265).

<sup>428</sup>Daniel J. Lee, "Chinese Mission to Nepal", *China Weekly Review* (Calcutta), no. 70, 71 November 1934, pp. 4001.

<sup>429</sup>Letter from the Director General, Foreign Affairs, Nepal to the Chairman of the Committee on the Admission of New Members in the U.N.O., dated Kathmandu, 22 July 1949, U.N. Security Council Documents (New York), Nos. S.C./2/26, 8 August 1949 (Annex. I).

<sup>430</sup>For the Nepalese Government's view on the issue of friendship with U.S. and U.K., see note in *Gorkhapatra* (an official daily of the Government of Nepal), (Kathmandu), vol. 45, no. 56, 23 Kartik 2003 (November 1946); and "Nepal ko Parrastra Niti" (Foreign-- (contd. Note 9)--Policy of Nepal), *Gorkhapatra*, vol. 57, No. 58, 9 Bhadra 2004 (August 1947).

<sup>431</sup>The author's view was shared by almost all the Nepalese politicians when during his interviews, he discussed the subject with the leading politicians of Nepal during his field trip to Kathmandu and other places in Nepal in the summer of 1969.

To quote R.K. Shah, a former Foreign Minister of Nepal and a noted Nepali Congress leader, "As the British were transferring power to the Indian hands, the Ranas, out of their natural fear and suspicion of the new Indian rulers who were natural allies of the democratic forces in Nepal, sought to secure international contacts for protection of their political stakes in future".

<sup>432</sup>Asian Relations organization, *Report of the proceedings and Documents of the First Asian Relations Conference: New Delhi, March -April 1947*, (New Delhi, 1948), p. 54.

<sup>433</sup>*Gorkhapatra*, vol.48, 14 Jaistha, 2009, V.S. (May, 1948), Sindur Jatra Special Number.

<sup>434</sup>U.N. Security Council Documents, No. S/C2/16, 8 August 1949, Annex. I, Para 4E; see also *Kessings Contemporary Archives* (London), vol. VI, 1946-48, p. 8712(B).

<sup>435</sup>"Nepal ra America" (Nepal and America), *Gorkhapatra*, vol.46, 4 Marg 2003 (November, 1946).



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<sup>436</sup>U.N. Security Council Documents, Note 8, Annex.1.

<sup>437</sup>For text of the agreement, see U.N. Documents, No. 251, 21 June 1948; also *Treaties and other International Acts series, 1585*, Department of State Publication, 3858, Washington D.C. 1947; and, *Kessing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. IV, 1946-48, p. 8609.

<sup>438</sup>In establishing relations with U.S., Ranans were conscious of 'United States' leadership of the western block and its willingness to fill the 'vacuum' caused by the eclipse of British power from the continent. This is made obvious by the Nepalese Ambassador's speech at the time of presenting his credentials to President Truman. For the text of the speech, see *Gorkhapatra*, vol. 47, No. 132, 18 Falgun, 2002, V.S. (February-March 1948).

The United States, on its part, welcomed the contact, looking forward for Nepal's cooperation in its purported strategy "to defend freedom and peace"; see President Truman's reply to Nepalese Ambassador's speech, *Gorakhapatra*, vol. 47, No. 132, 18 Falgun 2004, *Ibid*.

<sup>439</sup>United Nations Security Council Document, No. S/C/2C16/ 9 August 1949.

<sup>440</sup>Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: Strategy For Survival*, (Berkeley, 1971), p. 183; Ramakant, *Nepal-China and India* (New Delhi, 1976), p. 71

<sup>441</sup>*Kessing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VI, 1946-49, pp. 8987 (B).

<sup>442</sup>Forbes Duncan, *Johnny Gurkha* (London, 1974), pp. 138-40.

<sup>443</sup>Duncan, n.21, p. 142.

<sup>444</sup>See, for instance, the Nepalese Prime Minister's speech of 13 February 1950, *The Hindu* (Madras), 16 February 1950. See also interview of Bijoya Shumsher, The Director general of Foreign Affairs, Nepal, and son of Nepalese Prime Minister, in *New York Times*, 18 April 1950; and various other Statements, *Gorkhapatra*, vol. 47, No. 27 Jaistha 2009 (June 1947).

<sup>445</sup>Rose, *Strategy*, n.19, p. 295 (f.n.23).

<sup>446</sup>Nehru, in the early forties, noted that "the only truly independent kingdom in India is Nepal on the North-Eastern frontier, which occupies a position analogous to that of Afghanistan, though it is rather isolated". Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 366.

<sup>447</sup>Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress - (11): 1935-1947* (Bombay, 1947), *Append.*, pp. cc XIV-cc ii.

Former Nepalese Foreign Minister, R.K. Shah, has pointed out, "It was Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who for the first time described Nepal as a sovereign independent Country in the Indian Parliament. No Governor - General or Viceroy of India had in the past so referred to Nepal. Nepal's sovereignty and territorial integrity found mention only in her treaty with Republican India in 1950" - Shah, n.10, pp. 39-40.

<sup>448</sup>Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates (hereinafter referred as Constituent Assembly Debates), pt.1, vol, VII, No.2, 2 September 1948, col. 773.

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<sup>449</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha on 6 December, 1950: India Parliamentary Debates (hereinafter referred as Parliamentary Debates), pt.II, 6 December 1950, cols. 1267-71.

<sup>450</sup>Constituent Assembly Debates, n.27, pt. I, vol. IV, No.1, 28 November 1949, col.9.

<sup>451</sup>Anirudha Gupta, Politics in Nepal: A Study of Post-Rana Developments and Party Politics (Bombay 1964), p. 28; D.R. Regmi, A Century of Family Autocracy in Nepal (Banaras, 1950), pp. 235-55; K.P. Srivastava, Nepal ki Kahani (Delhi, 1955), pp. 128-33; Shriman Narayan, India and Nepal: An Exercise in Open Diplomacy (Bombay, 1970), p. 17; and Kessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII, 1950-52, p. 11210A.

<sup>452</sup>See Home Dept. File Nos. 44/81/1943; 44/34/45-Pol.(1) and 45,45-Pol. (I), National Archives of India (N.A.I.); Regmi, n.30, p. 257; Bhola Chatterji, A Study of Recent Nepalese Politics (Calcutta, 1967), p.34, 37; & Srivastava, K.P., n. 30, pp. 127-28.

<sup>453</sup>Home Dept. File Nos. 44/81/1943; 44/36/45-Pol. (1) and 33/30/1945, Srivastava, n.30, p. 132; and Chatterji, n.31.p.35.

<sup>454</sup>Bal Chandra Sharma, Nepal ko Aitihāsik Rooprekha (Banaras, 1951), p. 375; Srivastava, n. 30, pp. 133-35; Giri Lal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (Bombay, 1959), p. 12.

<sup>455</sup>Bhola Chatterjee, n. 31, p. 39.

<sup>456</sup>Bhola Chatterjee, himself an active participant in the movement and an 'insider', claimed in his account that Nehru finally telegraphed some such messages to Mohan Shumsher, "should anything happen to B.P. Koirala in your prison, it would surely do much harm to the Indo-Nepalese relations." Chatterjee, n.31, p. 45. Chatterjee confirmed this account to the author during a personal interview at New Delhi in September 1975. See also Sharma, n. 33, p. 391; and, Nepal Today (Calcutta), 5<sup>th</sup> issue, July 1949.

<sup>457</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru, speech in the Parliament, New Delhi, on December 6, 1950, Parliamentary Debates, pt. 2, vol. VI, No. 17, December 6, 1950, col. 1268-70.

<sup>458</sup>*Ibid*

<sup>459</sup>Sharma, n. 33, p. 397.

<sup>460</sup>Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha, Parliamentary Debates, pt.2, vol. Vi, No. 17, 6 December 1950, col. 1269.

<sup>461</sup>Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (henceforth referred to as C.C.P.) (July 1922), in the Statement of objectives (Nos. 4 and 5), documented in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, (London, 1952), p. 64. The third congress of the C.C.P. (Chinese original name Kung-Chuan-tang) held in June 1923 at Canton, however, paid a lip sympathy to the principle of 'self-determination'. Under point 8 of the declaration, it assured to "grant the People of Tibet, Mongolia and Sinkiang, the right of self - determination. They may unite with China if they so wish," M.C. Wilbur and Julie Lien -ying, eds., Documents on Communism, Nationalism, Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927; Papers Seized in the 1927 Peking Raid (New York, 1956), p. 69.

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<sup>462</sup>Hsin Hua ( the New China New Agency, henceforth cited as N.C.N.A.), 2 September, 1949.

<sup>463</sup>Ho Hsu-ching "The Nehru Government cannot explain away the plot to annex Tibet", *People's Daily*, 12 September 1949; Richardson, n.3, pp. 177-8; Ram Gopal, n.6, p. 30; Mullik, *My Years With Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal* (New Delhi, 1971), p. 60.

<sup>464</sup>Tieh Tseng-li, n.1, p. 199.

<sup>465</sup>Tsu-wen Kuo, ed., *His-tsang ta Shih -chi 1949-1959 (Record of Major Events in Tibet 1949-59)* (Peking, may 1959), p.1, tr. By Joint Publications Research Services (hereinafter referred to as J.P.R.S.) (New York), 28 August, 1959; *Tibet: 1950-1967* (a collection of source material, published by Union Research Institute) (Hong Kong, 1960), p. 730, n.1.

On 2 September 1949, Peking Radio broadcast charged that, "On July 8 the Tibetan local authorities expelled the Han people and the KMT personnel in Tibet under the instigation of British and American imperialism and their stooge, the Indian Nehru Government" , GiriLal Jain, *PanchSheela and After: A Re-Appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the Tibetan Insurrection* (Bombay, 1960), p. 17.

This was followed by an Article in *People's Daily* by a Chinese jurist, Ho Hsu-ching, which was put to broadcast also on 13 September 1949 by the Radio Peking. The article reiterated that, "the expelling of the Han People and the Han Lamas , and the closing down of Han schools by Tibetan authorities on 8 July , lays bare an international plot. On 27 July, the official News Agency of the Nehru Government announced that Tibet had never recognized Chinese suzerainty. On the same day, British authoritative circles told the United Press that if China attempted to force her rule on Tibet, Tibet would seek British intervention.

"Nehru and Company are openly engineering cleavage between the different peoples in China,, undermining their unity, and interfering in China's internal affairs by declaring in the name of foreign country that Tibet has never recognized Chinese suzerainty". Ho Hsu-ching, "The Nehru Government cannot Explain Away the plot to Annex Tibet", *People's Daily*, 13 September 1949.

<sup>466</sup>Mullik, n. 42, p. 60.

<sup>467</sup>N.C.N.A., 24 September 1949. The Conference was held in Peking on 21 September 1949. For detailed discussion, see *The Common Program and Other Documents of the First Plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference* (Peking, 1950) pp. 19-20.

<sup>468</sup>Later, Marshal Chu Teh, the Vice - Chairman of the Chinese Republic, called upon the meeting of "democratic personages" under the auspices of the Nationalities Affairs Committee at Peking to discuss the Tibetan question and to alter the earlier minority or nationalities doctrine of 'self-determination' to suit the 'liberation' programme through army in pursuance of the "Common Programme" adopted earlier by the people's Political (contd. Note-47)--Consultative Conference. *His-tsang ta Shih-chi*, n.44, cited in Rowland John, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations : Hostile Co-Existence* (New York, 1967), pp. 54-55; and *Tibet, 1950-1967*, n.44, p.1.

<sup>469</sup>*China Monthly Review* (Peking), vol. 119, no.2, October 1950, p.11, and *Conferring the Question of Tibet* (Peking, 1959), p. 207. See also statement of the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry, N.C.N.A., 20 January 1950.

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This warning did achieve its purpose to some extent. In any event, the Western Countries declined to receive the Tibetan Diplomatic Missions. The Tibetan Mission to India, however, arrived in New Delhi in February 1950, from where it planned to go to Peking. In Delhi it tried to negotiate terms with newly appointed Chinese Ambassador, but failed to achieve any (contd. Note-48)--success. See Nanyang Shang-pao (Singapore), 29 April 1954, quoted in Tibet, 1949-59, n.44, p. 730; and Mark C. Feer, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations", India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. IX (1953), pp. 367-81.

<sup>470</sup>See, for details, Chang Ku-hus, "Tibet Returns to the Bosom of the Motherland", People's Daily, 25 October 1962, tr. by J.P.R.S.; and S.P. Verma, Struggle for the Himalayas (Delhi, 1963), p. 16.

<sup>471</sup> Mao Tse-tung, on People's Democratic Dictatorship (Peking, 1950), p. 11.

<sup>472</sup>"Mighty Advance of the national Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Development Countries", editorial, "For a lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy" (an organ of the Cominform) (Bucharest), 27 January 1950, p.1, reprinted in the Communist (Bombay), vol. III, No.2, (February-March 1950), for detailed discussion, see John H. Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party of India (Massachusetts, 1956), pp. 86-104.

<sup>473</sup>Extracts, "Note by the States Ministry on New Problems of Internal Security Caused by the Chinese occupation of Tibet", Sardar Patel's Correspondence, vol. 10, p. 341. See also Mullick, n.42, pp. 190-1.

<sup>474</sup>Liu Shao-chi, n.50, pp. 46-47.

<sup>475</sup>World Culture (Peking), 1949, column by observer. See also Jain, n.44, p.6.

<sup>476</sup>China Digest (Peking), 1949, column by observer. See also editorial "Crush the Scheme of the Pacific Anti-Communist Union," World Culture (Shanghai) 22 July 1949, quoted in Jain, n.44, p.6.

<sup>56</sup>Liu Shao-chi, n.50, pp. 46-47. Later, in his presidential address to Asian and Australian Trade Union Conference held in Peking in November 1949, he advocated "armed struggle" for defending people's democratic rights in a "colonial or semi - colonial areas", "The Opening Speech at the Asian and Australian Trade Union Delegates' Meetings", 16 November 1949, Collected Works Of Liu Shao-chi: 1945-1957, Union Research Institute (Hongkong, 1969), p.181.

Liu Shao-chi's pronouncement about India, was followed by a series of similar a malicious articles in the Chinese publications against Nehru and the Indian Government's policy. The Communist uprising in Telangana, 'or even small demonstrations were lionized and braved for their fight' against "hirelings" and "stooges" of "Anglo-American Imperialism". See, for instance, "American Imperialism Lays Hand on a New Slave", World Culture, 28 october1949; Column by Wang Yu, World Culture, 2 November 1949; editorial, The Observer (Shanghai), 11 April 1950 end editorial People's Daily (Peking), 16 June 1950.

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The Peking Radio persistently carried out the same propaganda. Its broadcast of 1 July 1949, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 13 September 1949, and of 13 May 1950 as recorded in Jain, n.44, pp. 8-9, be specially mentioned in this respect.

<sup>479</sup>Telegram sent by Mao Tse-tung to B.T. Ranadive , General Secretary, C.P.I., published in N.C.N.A., 20 November, 1949; reproduced in R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao-tse-tung*, p. 260; also published, in part, in the *Communist (Bombay)*, January 1950.

<sup>480</sup>"Indian and Anglo-American Imperialism", *World Culture (Shanghai)* September 16, 1949.---

<sup>481</sup>Article -1, Indo-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, 8 August 1949, For text of the treaty , see *Foreign Policy of India : Text of Documents , 1947-64 (A Government of India Publication) (Delhi, 1966)*, pp. 4-8.

<sup>482</sup>Ho Hsu-ching, Foot note. 42.

<sup>483</sup>Mullik, n. 42, p. 104.

<sup>484</sup>Constituent Assembly Debates, pt.I, vil. IV, No.1, 28 November 1949, p. 9: Nehru's reply to Mono Mohan Das.

<sup>485</sup>Rose, *Strategy*, n.19, p.183; and Jain, n.33, p. 14.

<sup>486</sup>Mullick, n.42, p. 123.

<sup>487</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>488</sup>For Indian attitude over the issue, see Nehru, *Parliamentary Debates*, pt, II, 17 March 1950, cols. 1697-98. This was further confirmed to the author by several top Rana officials of the time, including M.M. Dixit, the then Foreign Secretary of the Government of Nepal, during their interviews with the author during his field trip to Kathmandu in June -July months of 1969.

<sup>489</sup>*Amrit Bazar Partika (Calcutta)*, 6 November 1950.

<sup>490</sup>*The Statesman (Calcutta)*7, 21 February 1950.

<sup>491</sup>*New York Times*, 14 February 1950.

<sup>492</sup>*The Hindu, (Madras)*, 15 February 1950.

<sup>493</sup>*The Hindu*, 15 February 1950.

<sup>494</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, pt. II, 17 March 1950, cols. 1997-98.

<sup>495</sup>See Joshi BhuwanLal and Leo E. Rose, *Democratic Innovations in Nepal, A Case Study of Political Acculturation (Berkeley, 1966)* p. 66; *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, 29 December 1949.

<sup>496</sup>For details, see S.K. Jha, *Uneasy Partners: India and Nepal in the Post Colonial Era (New Delhi, 1975)*, pp. 27-30.

<sup>497</sup>*The Times (London)*, 18 February 1950.

<sup>498</sup>Karan P.P. and W. Jenkins, *The Himalaya Kingdoms: Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal (Princeton, 1963)*, p. 115 and C.L. Sulezberge, *New York Times*, 5 February 1950. The Socialist leader Dr.

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Ram Manohar Lohia, for instance, warned the nation while presenting his report on international situation to the party's Eight National Conference, held in Madras in July 1950, that, "Tyranny of a small clique in Nepal had caused vacuum and unless its people are actively helped in self-rule, the Atlantic, on the Soviet power would inevitably rush in". Cited in Bhola Chatterjee, n. 33, pp. 54-55.

<sup>499</sup>People's Daily, 23 May 1950, quoted in Ting Nai-min. ed., Tibetan Source Book (a collection of source material translated in English from original Chinese, published by the Union research institute, Hong Kong) Hong Kong, 1964) p.1.

<sup>500</sup>For text of the treaties, see Foreign Policy of India; Text of Documents, 1947-59, (GOI Publication, New Delhi), pp. 32-35.

<sup>501</sup>Article 4 of the 1923 Treaty read: "...the British Government agrees that the Nepal Government shall be free to import from and through British India into Nepal whatever arms, ammunitions, machinery, warlike material or store may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Nepal and that this agreement shall hold good for all time as long as the British Government is satisfied that the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importation. The Nepal Government, on the other hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition, etcetera, across the frontier of Nepal either by the Nepal Government or by private individuals..." For full text of the treaty, see C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and sunnuds Relating to India and Neighboring Countries, vol. XVI (Calcutta, 1929), pp. 77.

<sup>502</sup>The existence and content of these letters was first made public by Jawahar Lal Nehru during the course of his press conference on 3 December 1959, in an effort to explain the background of his earlier statement in Lok Sabha regarding Nepal. He had, on 27 November 1959, told the Lok Sabha that any aggression against Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim would be treated as an aggression against India - which served as a grinding material to anti-Indian propaganda in Nepal. See Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru's Press Conference, Press Information Bureau of India (New Delhi), 3 December 1959. Some comments and wordings of the first paragraph were repeated by Nehru before Rajya Sabha also, while initiating debate - on Indo-Chinese relations, on 3 December 1959. See Parliamentary Debates (Rajya Sabha), vol. 27, pt. 11, cols. 1716-18.

<sup>503</sup>Rose, Strategy, n. 19, p. 186.

<sup>504</sup>When author drew attention of Sri. Dinesh Singh, the then External Affairs Minister of India, in early 1966, soon after Nepal had enacted the Brita Land Act and other allied laws denying Indians equal treatment, Sri. Ashok B. Bhadkambar, Joint Secretary in the Ministry, replied back to the author vide his letter no. D.15835-NR, dated 26 November 1966, that, "the Indian Embassy in Nepal had drawn the attention of the Government of India as soon as these laws were enacted" and that, "The matter has been under the active consideration of the Government ever since...you will readily appreciate the principal fat in the conduct of these relations, which though extremely friendly, are nevertheless delicate, it is necessary to exercise the utmost tact and patience..."

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Later on, the matter was also raised in Indian Lok Sabha as started Question No. 9 on 25 July, 1966, by a member, Lahtan Chaudhary. The external Affairs Minister admitted in the reply that, "The Government of Nepal have enacted legislation barring registration of land in the name of foreigners including Indians without their prior approval," and added that an Aide Memoire was sent to the Government of Nepal about the same. See Lok Sabha Debates, pt.1, 3<sup>rd</sup> series, vol. LVII, 1966, cols. 31-38.

<sup>505</sup>Reference to other paragraphs of the letters exchanged with the Treaty of 1950 is based on the cyclostyled text of them which the author received from the Indian Embassy at Kathmandu.

<sup>506</sup>In the fact the Indian Government did ask the Nepalese Government to abandon Chinese venture of building the road in the Janakpur-Biratnagar sector of the proposed "East -West Highway" running very close to Indian borders and instead took upon itself to fulfill the project, even after China had actually signed the agreement. For details, see R.K. Shah, *Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect*, (Delhi, 1973), pp. 161-62.85.

<sup>507</sup>R.K. Shah, "Nepal, Tibet and China", Souvenir issue: Nepal Council of World Affairs (Kathmandu), 2 June 1970, p. 80.

<sup>508</sup>B.P. Koirala, "Economic Policy of the Nepali Congress", *Indian Affairs*, 2 November 1950, pp. 135-8.

<sup>509</sup>Devakota, *Nepal Ko Rajnitik Darpan* (Collection of political documents in Nepal in Nepali), (Kathmandu, 2015 V.S.), pp. 20-21.

<sup>510</sup>N.B. Thapa, *A Short History of Nepal* (Kathmandu, 1960), pp. 165-6; S.D. Mani, *Foreign Policy of Nepal* (Delhi, 1973), p. 16; Bhola Chatterjee, n.31, pp. 67-94.

<sup>511</sup>Quoted in Warner Levi, "Government and Politics in Nepal", *For Eastern Survey*, vol. Xxi, no. 18, 17 December 1952, pp. 187-8.

<sup>512</sup>N.C.N.A., 5 August 1950.

<sup>513</sup>K.N. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London, 1955), p. 105.

<sup>514</sup>Note by the People's Republic of China to Government of India, dated November 16, 1950, N.C.N.A. See *Current Background* (U.S. Consulate General, Hongkong), No. 31, 27th November, 1950 and *Tibet 1950-67*, no.44, document no. 5, pp. 16-18.

<sup>515</sup>The Chinese Note to Government of India, dated 16<sup>th</sup> November, 1950, *Ibid*, n.92.

<sup>516</sup>Ho Hsu-ching, *People's Daily*, n.42.

<sup>517</sup>Military Communiqué on Entry of Chinese Army into Tibet N.C.N.A., 8 November 1950. The text of the communiqué is also available in *Jen-min-Shou-tse*, 1951, p. wu-25, tr. Union Research Service (Hong Kong) & *Tibet, 1950-67*, n.44, document no.1, pp.2-3. For details of the invasion, see Peter Calerrossi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1949-50* (London, 1953); Li Fang-chen, *Shen pi tiHasi-tsand* (Mysterious Tibet) (Taipeh, 1951), pp. 56-57, quoted in Li, n.1, p. 201.

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<sup>518</sup>U.N. Document, A/1549, 24 November 1950, cablegram received from the Tibetan delegation, Shakabpa (House Kalimpong). See also, for Chinese version, Chang Kuo-hua, "Tibet Returns to the Bosom of the Motherland", People's Daily, n.49, Li Tang-Chen, n.95.

<sup>519</sup>Panikkar, n.91, p.112.

<sup>520</sup>Note from the Government of India, dated 26 October 1950, India News Bulletin (published by the Indian Embassy in U.S.A.), (Washington), 14 November 1950, quoted in M.W. Fisher and J.V. Bondurant, Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations (Indian Press Digest-Monograph Series) (Berkeley, 1956), Appendix 1, p. (ii) N.C.N.A., Supplement No. 59, 21 November 1950; Tibet: 1950-67, n.44, pp.11-12 and Current Background, No. 31, 27 November 1950.

<sup>521</sup>Chinese reply, dated 16 November 1950, to Indian notes, N.C.N.A.; Current Background, and Tibet: 1950-67, n.92.

<sup>522</sup>See Panikkar, n.91, p.112.

<sup>523</sup>N.C.N.A. , 25 October 1950 and S.P. Verma, Struggle for the Himalayas (Delhi, 1963), p.18, Also referred to in the Indian Note of 28 October 1950.

<sup>524</sup>Memorandum on the problem of Tibet by the Government of the Republic of India, delivered by the Indian Ambassador on 31 October 1950, Indian News Bulletin, quoted in Fisher and Bondurant, n.98, Appendix I, pp. i-ii, N.C.N.A. Supplement No. 59, 21 November 1950; Tibet, 1950-67, n.44, document No. 5, pp. 10-11, and Current Background, No. 31, 27 November 1950.

<sup>525</sup>Rowland, n.47, p.56.

<sup>526</sup>Note from the Government of India to the Foreign Minister of China dated 26 October 1950, Indian New Bulletin, quoted in Fisher and Bondurant, n.98, Appendix I, pp. ii-iii; N.C.N.A., Supplement no. 59, 21 November 1950; Tibet 1950-67,n.44, pp. 12-13, document No. 5 and Current Background, no. 31, 27 November 1950.

While Fisher and Bondurant mention 26 October as the date of the note, other sources mention it as 28 October 1950.

<sup>527</sup>Reply of the People's Republic of China to the Memorandum and Note of the Government of India dated 30 October 1950, N.C.N.A., Supplement No. 59, 21 November 1950; Indian news Bulletin, quoted in Fisher and Bondurant, n.98, Appendix I, pp. ii-iv; Tibet 1950-67, n.44, document no. 5, p.13 and Current Background, No. 31, 27 November 1950.

<sup>528</sup>Note from the Government of India to the Foreign Minister of China, dated 31 October 1959, Indian News Bulletin , quoted in Fisher and Bondurant, n.98, pp. iv-vii, N.C.N.A., Supplement No. 21, 1950; Tibet, 1950-67, n.44, document No. 5, pp. 13-16 and Current Background, No. 31, 27 November 1950. The text of the letter released by India has employed term "suzerainty" to describe China's relations with Tibet as accepted by the Government of India , but the text released by the N.C.N.A., replaces it with "sovereignty"



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<sup>529</sup>Letter from Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, dated New Delhi, 7 November 1950, Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1945-50, Durga Das, ed. (Ahmedabad, 1947), vol. x, letter no. 245, p.337.

<sup>530</sup>*Ibid*, p. 339.

<sup>531</sup>*Ibid*, p.340. The Peking had told the Indian Communists that their weakness (in the context of their revolt in Telangana, in Circars and ceded district of Andhra, in certain parts of Malabar, hill area of Maharashtra, and in certain ravines of West Bengal and Assam, in Eastern U.P. and in tribal areas of Manipur and Tripura) was that they did not have a firm rear such as the Chinese had in Soviet Union when they had moved from South to north-west China; Mullik, n.42, p.110.

<sup>532</sup>Mullik, n.42, pp. 111,113. Sardar Patel's letter of 7 November 1950, n.107, pp.339-40, had also put forth identical suggestion.

<sup>533</sup>Note prepared by Intelligence Bureau for consideration of the Government of India on Border Defence', Mullik, n.42, pp. 111,13.

<sup>534</sup>Mullik, n.42, p.129.

<sup>535</sup>*Ibid*, p. 122.

<sup>536</sup>Himmat Singh ji Committee Report, quoted in Mullik, *Ibid*, pp124-27. For further discussion, see also L.J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947-1965* (Berkeley, 1967), p. 96 and D.R. Mankekar, *The Guilty Men of 1962* (Bombay, 1968), pp. 137-38.

<sup>537</sup>Bal Chandra Sharma, n.33, p. 376; Chatterjee, n.31, p.31, and also D.R. Regmi, n.30, pp. 249-50.

<sup>538</sup>Chatterjee, n.31, pp. 38-39.

<sup>539</sup>For an interesting account of King Tribhuvan's secret anti-Rana activities, see L. Erika, with the King in Clouds (London 1958) and the memoirs of C.P.N. Singh's brother, Rajeshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, an eye witness of the incident, as published in the *Dharma Yug* (Bombay), 26 April, 1970, pp. 26-27 and 47.

<sup>540</sup>Kessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VII (1950-52), 28 October - 4 November, p. 11052.

<sup>541</sup>*Ibid*, 13-20 January 1951, p. 11210 A.

<sup>542</sup>Press Committee issued by the Government of India, Press Information Bureau, dated 7<sup>th</sup> November 1950; *The Hindu*, 8 november,1950.

<sup>543</sup>According to the *New York Times*, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Indian cabinet met in emergency to discuss the 'mysterious turnover' on 8 November 1950 and decided to grant the King all facilities , *New York Times*, 9 November 1950.

<sup>544</sup>*GorkhaPatra*, 26 kartik , 2007 V.S.; G.B. Devakota, .87, p.33.

<sup>545</sup>Kessing's Contemporary Archieves, vol. VIII (1950-52), 13 January - 20 January 1951, p. 11210-A.

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<sup>546</sup>Devakota, n.122, p.38.

<sup>547</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 33-34.

<sup>548</sup>The Hindu, 4 November 1950.

<sup>549</sup>The Statesman, 9 November 1950.

<sup>550</sup>Ram Manohar Lohia, *India .China and Northern Frontiers* (Hyderabad, 1963), p. 109.

<sup>551</sup>Sardar Patel's letter to Nehru, dated October 7, 1950, Correspondence, n.107, pp. 341-6. It is to be noted that one of the basic assumption of non-communist world while dealing with China had been to consider it working at the instance of, or at least in collaboration with Soviet Russia. They had no idea of any inner conflict or contradiction of the communist world.

<sup>552</sup>The Hindu, November 19, 1950; Arya Mitra (Lucknow), November 1950, pp. 3-4 (translation from Hindi by the author). Sardar Patel was addressing (contd.Foot Note- 131)--a meeting organized by Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha to commemorate the 67<sup>th</sup> death anniversary of Swami Dayanand Saraswati in New Delhi on November 9, 1950.

<sup>553</sup>November 11, 1950; Jain, n. 33, p.1. For detailed discussion on this score, see the account given by Bhola Chatterjee, an active procurement of arms. The author has published photostate copies of certain relevant documents also in his support. Chatterjee, n.31, pp. 103-37.

<sup>554</sup>W. Levi, *Free India in Asia* (Minnesota, 1953), pp. 106-10.

<sup>555</sup>Parliamentary Debates (Loksabha), November 14, 1950, pp. 106-10.

<sup>556</sup>The Statesman, November 21, 1950.

<sup>557</sup>The Hindu, November 21, 1950.

<sup>558</sup>*Ibid*, November 11, 1950.

<sup>559</sup>Quoted in Jain, n. 33,p..22.

<sup>560</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>561</sup>Chinese note, dated November 16, 1950; N.C.N.A., *Current Background, and Tibet, 1950-67*, n.92.

<sup>562</sup>Panikkar, n. 91, p. 113.

<sup>563</sup>Mullik n.42, pp. 179-80. The then Director of the Intelligence Bureau of India, B.N. Mullik's interview with Nehru in Mar. 1951.

<sup>564</sup>Quoted in Varma, n. 101, p. 22.

<sup>565</sup>Times of India (Bombay), November 7, 1950, quoted in Varma, n.101, p. 22)

<sup>566</sup>"Request by the Delegation of El Salvador for the inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Fifteen Session: Note by the Secretary General", U.N. Doc., A/1549, 24 November, 1950.

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<sup>568</sup> *Ibid.*: official Records of the U.N. General Assembly , General Committee , 73 rd Meeting , Fifth Session.

<sup>569</sup> *Ibid.*: See also Kessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 8 (1950-52), January 27 - February 3, 1951, p. 11240, A.

<sup>570</sup> The draft policy statement of the C.P.I. Polit Bureau issued on November 15, 1950 declared that, "It might be possible that our comrades in Nepal, where there is only a small and young party unit, may be able to successfully utilize the present national upsurge and the struggle that is going in there, boldly advocate this form of struggle (i.e., the armed guerilla struggle) and adopt it as and when conditions are mature. The Nepali people, militants by tradition, inspired by the victories of the liberation army of China on their borders, might in a short time take to this guerilla form of struggle before some other territories in India where the party and people's movement are stronger will be able to take up this form of struggle due to several reasons. The armed guerilla struggle had already been prescribed as principal form of struggle at this stage". M.B. Rao, ed., Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India (New Delhi, 1976), vol. VII (1948-50), p. 1078. Emphasis added by the author.

<sup>571</sup> Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha, December 6, 1950. Parliamentary Debates, (Lok Sabha), PT.2, vol. 6, no. 17, December 6, 1950, col. 1269-149. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's speech in Lok Sabha, December 6, 1950. Parliamentary Debates, (Lok Sabha), PT.2, vol. 6, no. 17, December 6, 1950, col. 1269

<sup>572</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 1270.

<sup>573</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>574</sup> S.P. Mukherji's speech ,*Ibid.*, col. 1283.

<sup>575</sup> Acharya J.B.Kripalani's speech ,*Ibid.*, col. 1291.

<sup>576</sup> H.N. Kunzru's speech ,*Ibid.*, col. 1326.

<sup>577</sup> H.N. Kunzru's speech ,*Ibid.*, col. 1326.

<sup>578</sup> S.N. Mishra's speech, *Ibid.*, col. 1350.

<sup>579</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru's speech, *Ibid.*, col. 1268.

<sup>580</sup> Nehru's speech in Parliament on December 21, 1950, Parliamentary Debates, pt. II, vol. 7, No. 8, cols. 2133-42.

<sup>581</sup> Kessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 8 (1951-52), January 13-20, 1951, p. 11211.

<sup>582</sup> See Chanakya Sen, Tibet Disappears (Bombay, 1960), pp. 65-77; Ram Gopal, n.6, pp. 31-34,

<sup>583</sup> Amni Bhaman, n.6, p. 131.

<sup>584</sup> Nehru in Parliament on 21 December 1950, Parliamentary Debates, pt. III, vol. 7, no.8, cols. 2140-2.

<sup>585</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>586</sup>The Hindu and The Statesman, December 23, 1950; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 8 (1950-52), January 13-20, 1951, p. 11211.

<sup>587</sup>Press Communique issued by the Nepalese Embassy, New Delhi, December 26, 1950; The Hindu and The Statesman, December 26, 1950; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, *Ibid*.

<sup>588</sup>Hindustan Times (New Delhi), January 3, 1951.

<sup>589</sup>Both B.P.Koirala & M.P. Koirala, the two former Prime Ministers, told so to the author in their interviews, former in Varansi & later at Kathmandu, during his field trips in December, 1972 & July, 1969 respectively.

<sup>590</sup>New York Times, January 9, 1951.

<sup>591</sup>The Hindu, January 9, 1951. For full text of the declaration date Singh Durbar, 24.1.2007, see Devakota, no. 87, pp. 39-43.

<sup>592</sup>Gorkhapatra, 1 Magh, 2007 V.S.; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 8 (1950-52), 13-20 January 1951, p. 11212.

<sup>593</sup>The Hindu, January 12, 1951

<sup>594</sup>K.P. Srivastava, Head of the Provisional Government in the captured areas of western Nepal, said so in his statement at New Delhi, The Hindu, January 10, 1951.

<sup>595</sup>M.P. Koirala's statement: The Hindu, January 11, 1951. For reactions of various other Nepali leaders, see Devakota, n. 87, pp. 43-44 and 45-47.

<sup>596</sup>For text of the statement, see Nepali Congress President, M.P. Koirala's statement of January 16, 1951, as published in The Hindu, 17 January 1951; and for D.R. Regmi's statement, see The Hindu, 16 January 1951. See also, for details, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 8 (1950-52), p. 12212.

<sup>597</sup>See Devakota, n. 87, p. 44.

<sup>598</sup>For details, *Ibid*, pp. 47-49.

<sup>599</sup>Gorkhapatra, 5 falgun, 2007 V.S. For text of the King's declaration, see *Ibid*, pp 47-49. 177.

<sup>600</sup>The origin and growth of anti-Rana Movement in Nepal and India and the role of Indian leaders and government therein has been dealt with in (contd. Foot Note- 179)—several books, pamphlets and articles, including accounts from those who have themselves been participants. While there are some minor differences, there is a surprising degree of unanimity on major developments. The author has interviewed a number of prominent actors/ participants in this regard during his stay at Kathmandu and other places in Nepal in May to July months of 1968, and in India itself, including B.P. Koirala, M.P. Koirala, Dr. D.R. Regmi, Subarna Shumsher, S.P. Upadhyaya, Dr. K.I. Singh, T.P. Acharya, Bhola Chatterjee, and N.M. Dixit, and some important Ranas, who prefer to remain unidentified, as well as Indian leaders like late Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, J.P. Narayan, Shibban Lal Saxena, etc., who have been active supporters of the movement, as also certain important government officers of the two countries, and the present account is based on the same.

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<sup>601</sup>See budget speech of the Finance Minister presenting "the first budget in the history of Nepal: 2005 V.S.", Nepal gazette (Kathmandu), 3 February 1952 (21 Marg 2008 V.S.). For details of the public and financial administration of the country and the state of economy, see H.N. Agrawal, *The Administrative System of Nepal: From Tradition to Modernity* (New Delhi, 1976), pp.111-32.

<sup>602</sup>Gorkha Patra (Kathmandu), 3 Baisakh, 2008 VikramSamvat (VS); also G.B. Devkota , Nepal Ko Rajnitik Darpan (Kathmandu), pp. 85-86. For B.P. Koirala's statement of 9<sup>th</sup> April 1951, see GorkhaPatra, 17 Falgun, 2007 V.S.

<sup>603</sup>The Hindu (Madras), 8 May, 1951. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), vol. VIII. (1950-52), p. 11525 (A).

<sup>604</sup>The Hindu, 11 May 1951 and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. III (1950), p. 11525(A). For a detailed discussion of the working of Ranas-Nepali Coalition and the developments , see Anirudha Gupta, *Politics in Nepal – A study of Post-Rana Political Developments and Party Politics* (Bombay, 1964), pp. 51-62; R.S. Chauhan, *The Political Developments in Nepal, 1950-70* (New Delhi, 1971), pp. 42-54; S.K. Jha, *Uneasy Partners : India and Nepal* ,(New Delhi, 1971), pp. 57-62; and Bhola Chatterjee, *A Study of Recent Nepalese Politics* (Calcutta, 1967), pp. 148-52 ; and K.P. Srivastava, *Nepal Ki Kahani* (Delhi , 1955), pp. 172-74. The author has corroborated the information available in these and other accounts and the contemporary press with information obtained through personal interviews (contd. F.N.-4)–with the Nepalese statesmen. A list of important persons interviewed for purpose has been given in the end.

<sup>605</sup>See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII (1950-52), p.11336 (A) and Devkota, n.2, pp. 52 and 53-55.

<sup>606</sup>The Hindu, 18 June 1954.

<sup>607</sup>John C. Hoar, *Contemporary Nepal: A Historical study of the Political and Economic Development*, unpublished Thesis (Georgetown University, 1059), p. 108. Microfilm.

<sup>608</sup>"Transition in Nepal", The Times (London), 21 April 1951. See also "unrest in Nepal", *Ibid*, 5 March 1951; and "Transformation of Nepal", *Ibid*, 28 December 1951.

<sup>609</sup>The Statesman (Calcutta), 20 February 1951.

<sup>610</sup>According to the Statesman's report, K.I. Singh's gang had killed 64 men on 11 February. *Ibid*, 20 February 1951.

<sup>611</sup>K.P. Karunakaran, *India on world Affairs, February 1950- December 1953* (Oxford, 1958), p. 196. See also India, *Parliamentary Debates*, (New Delhi) (hereinafter cited as *Parliamentary Debates*), pt. I, vol. Vi, no. 26, 12 March 1951, col. 2108, pp. 2163-64. See also Gorkha Patra, 10 Chaitra, 2007 V.S.

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<sup>612</sup>National Herald (Lucknow), editorial, "Return to Nepal", 18 February 1951. (The paper has large circulation in U.P. and Indian districts bordering in Nepal. Jawaharlal Nehru was its founder-patron). See also G.L. Jain, *India Meets China in Nepal* (Bombay, 1959), p.20.

<sup>613</sup>John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations: Hostile Co-existence* (New York, 1967), p. 63; *New York Times* (New York), 26 November 1952, quoting Mao Tse-tung, and 21 June 1959; The Dalai Lama XIV, *The International Status of Tibet* (Addressed before the Indian Council of World Affairs) (New Delhi, 7 September 1959); The Dalai Lama's press Conference in Mussoorie on 20 June 1959 as reported in *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 21 June 1959; *U.S. News and World Report*, 6 July 1959, pp. 60-61; and *International Commission of Jurists, Question of Tibet and Rule of Law* (Geneva, 1959), pp. 68-75.

<sup>614</sup>"Tibet covers a large area but is thinly populated. Its population should be increased from the present two or three million to five or six million, and then to over ten million" Mao Tse-tung's directive on work in Tibet', given at Peking to the visiting Tibetan delegation on 8 October 1952, repeated by Leosha Thubtentarpa, the leader of the delegation, in his Radio Address, Jen-min Jihpao (Peking) 12 November 1952, quoted in *Tibet, 1950-67* (A collection of documents, source material on Tibet translated and published by Union Research Institute) (Hongkong, 1968), p. 45.

<sup>615</sup>*People's Daily*, 23 May 1950. See also notes to chapter -1, *Tibet, 1950-67*. n.15, p.1.

<sup>616</sup>The Dalai Lama, *My Land and My People: An Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama -XIV*, ed. By David Howarth (New York), 1962, pp. 79-80.

<sup>617</sup>Thubten Jigme Norbu, and Heinrich Harrer, *Tibet Is My Country* (New York, 1961), pp. 230-2.

The Chinese Government tried to persuade the Dalai Lama to give up the idea of seeking foreign help to maintain the independence of Tibet. It, on the other hand, assured to acknowledge his status, to recognize Tibet's regional autonomy, and to allow the Tibetan full freedom of worship. According to the Dalai Lama, Nagbho (Norbu) also impressed upon the Dalai Lama the uselessness of further resistance. See Ram Rahul, *The Government and Politics of Tibet*, (Delhi, 1963), p. 24.

<sup>618</sup>B.N. Mullik, *My Years With Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal* (New Delhi, 1971), p. 71; H.E. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History* (London, 1962), p. 187; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (1950-53), p. 11610A.

<sup>619</sup>*International Commission of Jurists*, n.14, p.7; also Tieh-Tseng Li, *Tibet, Today and Yesterday* (New York, 1959), p. 20.

<sup>620</sup>The Dalai Lama, n.17, p. 85.

<sup>621</sup>Heinrich Harrer, *Seven Years in Tibet*, (London, 1953), trans. from German by R. Graves, p. 283; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (50-52); p. 11610A; & *International Commission of Jurists*, n.14, p.7.

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<sup>622</sup>George N. Patterson, *Tibet in Revolt* (London, 1960), p. 81; *The Dalai Lama*, n. 17, pp. 78[79; Li, n.20, p. 206.

<sup>623</sup>Tzu-Yuan, "Historical Relations between the Tibet Region and the Motherland", *Min-tsuYen - Chiu* (Nationalities Research) No.4 (Peking, 4 April 1949), trans. by The U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, hereinafter abbreviated as J.P.R.S., 27 July 1959; also Rowland, n.14, p. 65, f.n.5.

<sup>624</sup>Tsu-wen Kuo, ed., *His-tsang ta Shih-chi, 1949-59* (Chronology of Events in Tibet, 1949-59), Chinese Monograph (Peking, 1959), trans. J.P.R.S., 28 August 1959, No. 14799/1959. See also Tzu Kuo Chou H'an (*China Weekly*) (Hongkong), No. 137, 15 August 1959, trans. By Union Research Institute (Hong Kong), henceforth cited as U.R.I., *Tibet, 1950-1967*, n.13, p. 731.

<sup>625</sup>Rowland, n.14, p.66

<sup>626</sup>*The Dalai Lama*, n. 16, p. 78 (1962 Indian Edition).

<sup>627</sup>*People's Daily*, editorial, 28 May 1951. See for details, *His-tang ta Shih -chi*, n. 25.

<sup>628</sup>See Chinese Note to Government of India, dated 30 October 1950, HsinHua or New China News Agency (henceforth abbreviated as N.C.N.A.) (Peking), Supplement No. 59, 21 November 1950; *People's Daily*, 17 November 1950, quoted in *Tibet 1950-1967*, No. 31, 27 November 1950; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11120; and *India News Bulletin* (Embassy of India, Washington, D.C.), 14 November 1950.

<sup>629</sup>The Govt. of India had, at one place pointed out, that, "In view of these developments (i.e. Chinese invasion of Tibet on 7 October and onwards), the Government of India was no longer in a position to advice the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking unless the Chinese think it fit to order their troops to hold their advance into Tibet". Indian Note to the Chinese Government , 31 October 1950, *Indian News Bulletin*, n. 29, 14 November 1950; M.W. Fisher and J.V. Bondurant, *Indian Vies of Sino-Indian Relations* (Berkeley, 1956), App. pp. iv-vii; *Current Background*, n.29, No. 31, 27 November 1950; N.C.N.A, Supplement No. 59-21 November 1950; *People's Daily*, 17 November 1950, *Tibet, 1950-67*, n.15, pp. 13-16; and also, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11102. In the preceding lines, however, the Government of India had categorically repudiated charge of any foreign influence being responsible for the delay in departure of the Tibetan delegation to Peking.

<sup>630</sup>Nehru's press conference, 13 March 1951, *Times of India*, *Manchester Guardian* (Manchester), and *New York Times*, dt. 19<sup>th</sup> march 1951; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vo. VIII (1950-52), p. 11610A; See also K.M. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of A Diplomat*, (London, 1955), p. 114.

<sup>631</sup>George Ginsburg and Michael Mathos, *Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years* (The Hague, 1964), p. 10.

<sup>632</sup>These three groups were: a six man mission coming directly from the Dalai Lama; a fifteen - men party headed by the Tibetan representative chosen by Chinese, Kalon Nagpoo, and delegates recruited from amongst the Tibetan dignitaries and officials of the eastern territories occupied by the Chinese as back as in October 1950 - some of them were only recently released

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from the Chinese military custody, and a deputation from the Chinese –sponsored so-called 'Provisional People's Government' for the 'Autonomous Area of Tibet', headquartered at Tsinghai province, composed of renegade Tibetans and various exiled elements opposed to the Lhasa regime, B.P. Gurevich, *Osvobozhenie Tibeta (The Liberation of Tibet)*, (Moscow, 195) , pp. 166-7, trans. U.R.I.; *Facts on File* (New York, 1951), p. 171; and Ginsburg, n. 32, pp. 10-11.

<sup>633</sup>See Nehru's press conference on 13 March 1951, *The Hindu and Manchester Guardian*, 14 March, 1961; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11610A.

<sup>634</sup>*Parliamentary Debates, Part-1*, vol. VI, No. 26, 12 March 1951, col. 2108, pp. 2163-4.

<sup>635</sup>*Ibid*, Part -1, vol. III, No.1, 17 May 1951, cols. 4358-9.

<sup>636</sup>*Ibid*, Part -1, vol. IX, No.10, 2 August 1951, col. 465.

<sup>637</sup>*Ibid*, Part -1, vol. VI, No.26, 12 March 1951, col. 2164.

<sup>638</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>639</sup>A.S. Bhasin, ed., *Documents on Nepal's Relations With India and China -1949-1966* (New Delhi, 1970), p. 145. See also ,*The Hindu*, 1 March 1952, p. 4. Some Nepalese officials to whom author had interviewed during his trip to Kathmandu in the summer of 1969, however, maintained that this was done due to the resistance put forth by the Nepali Government servants.

<sup>640</sup>See Press Note issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, G.O.I., *Parliamentary Debates*, Appendix 1, Annexure 27, p.58. For detailed discussion on administrative reforms in Nepal and Indian assistance in the same, see *Buch Commission : Report on the Administrative Survey of Nepal* (Ministry of External Affairs) (New Delhi, April 1952); *Nepal Administrative Reorganization Committee , Report* (Ministry of External Affairs) (New Delhi 1952), hereinafter referred to as *Buch Committee Report*; Sushila Devi Gangal, *Survey on the Reports of Foreign Experts in Administration of Nepal* (Centre for Economic Development and Administration, Nepal) (Kirtipur, 1971); Merrill Goodall, *Report on Administration in Nepal to the Prime Minister* (Kathmandu, 1952), typescript, U.N.; Mangal Krishna Shrestha, *Public Administration in Nepal* (Kathmandu , 1975) and Agrawal, n.1

<sup>641</sup>*The Hindu*, 17 May 1951; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11552A; and Devkota, n.2, pp.91-92.

<sup>642</sup>Rowland, n.14, pp. 66-67.

<sup>643</sup>*New York Times*, 17 May 1951.

<sup>644</sup>Text of the press note issued on 16 May 1951 by the Press Information Bureau; *The Hindu*, 17 May 1951.

<sup>645</sup>For B.P. Koirala's reaction, see *The Hindu*, 17 May 1951.

<sup>646</sup>*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11552.



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<sup>647</sup>N.C.N.A., 27 May 1951. The agreement was signed on 23 May 1951. Ginsburg, however, has wrongly dated the signing of the Agreement. He puts it on 27 May 1951 instead of 23 May 1951, Ginsburg, n. 32, p.10. For text of the Agreement, see N.C.N.A., *Ibid*; People's Daily, quoted in Tibet, 1950-1967, n.15, pp. 19-23; People's China, vol. III, No. 12, Supplement, pp. 3-5; Russian text in Pravda, 29 May 1951; G.V. Ambedkar and V.K. Divekar, ed., Documents on China's Relations With South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (Bombay, 1964), p. 411; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11102.

<sup>648</sup>Tzu-Yuan, n. 24, p.18; Rowland, n. 14, p. 67 and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11610.

<sup>649</sup>His-tang Ta Shih -chi, n. 25, p. 6; Rowland, n. 14, p. 67.

<sup>650</sup>The Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, n.17, pp. 87-88. See also Ginsburg, n. 32, pp. 10-13 and Rowland, n. 14, pp. 66-68.

<sup>651</sup>The Dalai Lama's press statement at Mussoorie on 20 June 1959, The Statesman, 21 June 1959, also International Commission of Jurists, n.14, Document 20.

<sup>652</sup>Speech of Li Wei -hand, People's China (Peking), vol. III, Supplement No.12, p.8.

<sup>653</sup>Hong Kong Standard (Hong Kong), 15 August and 27 October 1951. For detailed discussion, see Frank Moraes, The Revolt in Tibet (Delhi, 1960), pp. 68-69.

<sup>654</sup>For the full text of the Agreement, see N.C.N.A., n.48; Tibet, 1950-1967, n. 48; People's China, n.48; Ambekar and Divekar, n.48; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.48.

<sup>655</sup>The Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, n. 17, p. 80.

<sup>656</sup>Commenting on the Sino-Tibetan Agreement, Kenneth Younger, the British Minister of State, told the House of Commons, that:

This agreement purports to guarantee Tibetan autonomy and safeguard her religious freedom but the arrangements for the entry of the Chinese army, the setting up of a Chinese military and administrative head- quarters in Tibet, and the recognition by the Tibetan Government of a Chinese -sponsored candidate for the office of the Panchen Lama, throws considerable doubt on the value of those guarantees. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11610A.

<sup>657</sup>For the text of the Agreement, see n.48.

<sup>658</sup><sup>ii</sup>In addition to these considerations, the relatively easy reassertion of Peking's sovereignty over Tibet was aided by a number of incidental developments in international diplomacy: the U.N. pre-occupation with the Korean war; the geographical remoteness and physical inaccessibility of Tibet; and also perhaps a general impression that preservation of Tibetan independence at the cost of armed intervention would not materially contribute to the strengthening of Western defenses in Asia. Furthermore, most governments needed to have expected Nehru to take the lead in dealing with Peking, since India was the party most affected by Red China's show of force in Tibet, only to find him first adopting a hands-off policy and then hastening to recognize Tibet's newly defined status", Ginsburg, n. 32, p. 200.

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<sup>659</sup>Prime Minister Nehru's statements before Lok Sabha while tabling the White Paper-II on India- China relations during which he quoted Chinese Prime Minister's reply to Indian Ambassador, reproduced here Verbatim. Parliamentary Debates(Lok Sabha) , Series 2, vol. XXXV, 1959, col. 1687.

<sup>660</sup>Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations (New Delhi, 1961), vol. 1, Part-I,p. 184. The handout has been published by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.

<sup>661</sup>For text, see n.48.

<sup>662</sup>People's Daily, 12 November 1952; Tibet , 1950-1967, n.15, pp. 44-45.

<sup>663</sup>See, for instance, the Indian Ambassador's account ,Panikkar , n.31, pp. 112-14 and 170-1.

<sup>664</sup>See the Chief of Indian Intelligence Bureau, B.N. Mullik's record of his interview with Nehru, Mullik , n.19, pp. 180-82.

<sup>665</sup>For a critical analysis of the British geo-political strategy in the Himalayas and its influence on Indian foreign policy, see Lord Curzon, *Frontiers: The 1907 Roman Lectures* (London , 1907); and, Bisheshwar Prasad , *Our Foreign Policy Legacy: A study of British Indian Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1965), pp. 30-33, 65-80, 82-85.

<sup>666</sup>For a detailed discussion on the physical conditions in the Himalayan battle ground and a comparison of advantages that China has over India, see Mullik , n.19, pp. 12-30; Curzon , n. 66 Wayne Wilcox , "China's Strategic Alternatives in South Asia", *China's Politics in Asia and America's Alternatives* , Tangtson, ed. (University of Chicago, 1968), vol. II, pp. 395-431.

<sup>667</sup>An analysis of India's perception of political –ideological threat to itself and Nepal has been dealt with in Chapter III of the thesis. For a more detailed discussion, see Sardar Patel's letter to Nehru , 7 Nov. 1950, Durgadas, ed. , *Sardar Patel's Correspondence* (Ahmadabad, 1974), vol. X, letter no. 245. See also, "Note by the Home Ministry on New Problems of Internal Security caused by Chinese Occupation of Tibet ", *Ibid*, pp.341-42, and Prime Minister's Note on China and Tibet, 18 Nov. 1950, pp. 342-47, *Ibid*; Indian Intelligence Bureau, *A Note on New Security Problems* , quoted in Mullik, n.19, pp. 110-15, and Himmat Singhji Committee Report, August 1951, *Ibid*, pp. 124-8.

<sup>668</sup>See, for instance , Prime Minister Nehru's declaration in his press conference of 28 February 1952, *The Information Service of India* , Jawaharlal Nehru: *Press Conference* (New Delhi, 1952), pp. 13-17; also Nehru's speech in the Parliament on 18 May 1954, *Parliamentary Debates* (Rajya Sabha), vol. VI, no. 47, 18 May , cols. 676, 3-64.

<sup>669</sup>Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (Bombay, 1970), pp. 71-72; also Mallik, no. 19, pp. 156-8.

<sup>670</sup>Keesing's *Contemporary Archives*, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11552 (A); *The Hindu*, 17 May 1951; Devkota, n.2, p. 91.

For Nepali opposition's criticism of the Rana-Nepali Congress –Coalition for their alleged act of 'slavery' to India, see Devkota , *Ibid*, pp. 91-92. For more details, see Foot note-5 .

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<sup>671</sup>Prime Minister Nehru's Press Conference held in New Delhi, 11 June 1950, *The Hindu*, 12 June 1951; also Devkota, n.2, p. 95.

<sup>672</sup>*The Hindu*, 17 June 1951; Devkota, n.2, p. 96.

In an interview with the correspondent of *The Hindu*, the leader of the arrested group of ten persons identified themselves as belonging to the "Nepali Mahila Sangh", the women wing of T.P. Acharya's Praja Parishad, *The Hindu*, 17 January 1951. It corroborates with the Devkota's account of the incident: see Devkota, *Ibid*.

A day earlier, an "Open Letter to Nehru" was circulated in Kathmandu by the Nepali National Congress, charging Nehru of supporting 'fascist' Rana-Nepali Congress Ministry, of conniving at the smuggling of arms through Indian borders and thereby holding the "reign of terror at loose" along the 300 miles long Indo-Nepal border.

The pamphlet was seen and copied by the author at the residence of Sri D.R. Regmi, a former Nepalese Foreign Minister and President of the Nepali National Congress, through the latter's courtesy during the author's field trip to Kathmandu in June 1969.

<sup>673</sup>*The Hindu*, 17 June 1951.

<sup>674</sup>Speech by Jawaharlal Nehru at a public meeting, Kathmandu, 14 June 1951: text released by the Ministry of External Affairs, G.O.I., cited in A.S. Bhasin, n. 40, pp. 36-37.

<sup>675</sup>*The Hindu*, 17 June 1951.

<sup>676</sup>*Ibid*, 17 June, Devkota, n.2, pp. 95-96.

<sup>677</sup>*The Hindu*, 11 June 1951, Devkota, n.2, pp.93-94.

<sup>678</sup>Devkota, n.2, pp. 103, 107, 110-11 and 113-16; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII (1050-52), p. 11861(A); "party Government in Nepal", editorial, *The Times* (London), 30 January 1951.

<sup>679</sup>Devkota, n.2, 117-21, pp; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11861 (A) and the *Hindu*, 13 June 1951.

<sup>680</sup>See B.P. Koirala, *Nepal Congress Ra Sarkar* (Biratnagar, 1952); also Devkota, n.2, pp. 123-4.

<sup>681</sup>*The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 11 August 1952. For further details, see Devkota, n.2, pp. 123-4, 140, 149, 169-71, & 176-90; B.L. Joshi and L.E. Rose, *Democratic Innovations in Nepal* (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 96-100; and Gupta, n.5, pp. 67-68, 171-4.

<sup>682</sup>*The Statesman* (New Delhi), 10 February 1952.

<sup>683</sup>Dr. Singh in the above referred interview given to the author in July 1969 at Kathmandu, denied that he had demanded inclusion of the Communist party, which according to him, was not in the picture then.

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<sup>684</sup>Devkota, n.2, p. 154; *The Hindu*, 11 August 1952. See also *National Herald*, editorial, 13 August 1952; *Indian national*, 22 July 1952; *Hindustan Standard*, 22 July 1952; *Amrita Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta)*, 23 July 1952; and *Hindustan Times*, 26 June 1952.

<sup>685</sup>Dr. K.I. Singh's press-interview in India after his return from China, as published in *National Herald*, 17 November 1955. These and other facts enumerated over here were substantially confirmed by Dr. K.I. Singh himself in his interview with the author referred to earlier.

<sup>686</sup>See, for instance, the appraisal made in, "The problem of Dr. K.I. Singh", *Indian Press Digest (Berkeley)*, vol. I, No.4, September, 1952, pp. 28-30.

<sup>687</sup>See Moraes, n. 54, pp. 190-91; S.P. Verma, *Struggle for the Himalayas : A Study in Sino-Indian Relations (Delhi, 1965)*, p. 29; and R.K. Shah, *Nepal and the World (Kathmandu, 1962)*, p. 48.

<sup>688</sup>Dr. K.I. Singh has been perhaps the most controversial figure in the Nepalese politics during the early fifties. There are conflicting accounts of his abortive coup d' etat of January 28, 1952 and his escape into Tibet and opinions widely differ over his motivations behind it. The narrative given here is based on a critical analysis of the published accounts and information obtained from Dr. Singh himself and other Nepalese politicians' personal interviews by the author. For a detailed discussion, see Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena, "Dr. K.I. Singh" (a biographical sketch), *National Herald*, 18 November 1955; "The Problem of Dr. K.I. Singh", *Indian Press Digest*, vol. I, No. 4 (September 1952), pp. 28-30; Fisher and Bondurant, n.30, pp. 148-49, 153-162; and Devkota, n.2, pp. 55-82. For Nepalese official version of the whole episode, see *Nepal Gazette*, 4 Phalgun, 2008 V.S.

<sup>689</sup>Frank Moraes, n.54, p. 68.

<sup>690</sup>The Dalai Lama, n.17, p. 83.

<sup>691</sup>News Despatch of Associated Free Press, hereinafter abbreviated as A.F.P. (Paris), 14 June, (Calcutta) 4 July, 1951; Li, n. 20, p. 207; and *Tibet*, 1950-67, n. 15, p. 24.

<sup>692</sup>Rowland, n.14, p. 70.

<sup>693</sup>The Dalai Lama, n.17, pp. 83, 90; His-tsang Ta Shis-chi, n. 25, p. 7; *Tibet 1950-67*, n.15, p. 24.

<sup>694</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII (23 August- 1 September 1951), p. 11679(A); His-tsang Ta Shis-chi, n.25, p.7, and The Dalai Lama, n.17, p. 90.

<sup>695</sup>See Lowell Thomas, *Out of this World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet (New York, 1950)*, n.20, p. 200.

<sup>696</sup>For detailed discussion see, Varma, n.88, p.20; and Li, n. 20, pp. 199-200.

<sup>697</sup>Text of the resolution entitled, "the Summary of Basic Experience in Promoting Regional Autonomy Among Minority Nationalities", adopted at the 3<sup>rd</sup> session of the Nationalities Affair Commission of the Central People's Government dated 15 June 1953, *People's Daily*, 9 September 1953, full text quoted in *Tibet, 1950-67*, n. 15, Document no. 7, pp. 26-37.

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<sup>698</sup>News Dispatches of Pan Asia, hereinafter abbreviated as Pan Asia (Tokyo), 14 September 1951; Hong Kong Standard, 31 October 1951; Li, n. 20, p. 208; Tibet , 1950-67, n. 15, p. 24; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. VIII (1950-52), p. 11743 (C).

<sup>699</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>700</sup>Tibet, 1950-67, n.15, p. 768.

<sup>701</sup>Hong Kong Standard, 15 August and 27 October , 1951; Li , no. 20, p. 208, and Tibet , 1950-67, n. 15, p. 768.

<sup>702</sup>People's Daily , 22 and 30 November 1951; Tibet , 1950-67, n.15, p. 24; and N.C.N.A. (Lhasa) 30 November 1951.

<sup>703</sup>New Despatches from Associated Press, hereinafter abbreviated as A.P. (Sanfrancisco), 29 may and 17 July 1951; Chung-Kuohsinwen, hereinafter referred as China New Service (Lhasa), 19 December 1954; Li no. 20, p. 208 ; and Tibet 1950-67, n.15, p. 54.

<sup>704</sup>N.C.N.A. (Lhasa), 20 October 1955; Moraes , n.54, pp. 78-79; The Statesman (Calcutta), 4 Dec. 1954; &Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952-54), p. 13932 (G).

<sup>705</sup>People's Daily, 12 to 20 Dec. 1951; Tibet , 1950-67, n. 15, p.24.

<sup>706</sup>The Statesman, 27 November, 1951; its Pacific correspondent's report from Kalimpong.

<sup>707</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>708</sup>The Reuter (Kalimpong) 14 March 1952.

<sup>709</sup>N.C.N.A., 19 February 1952.

<sup>710</sup>The Dalai Lama, n.32, pp.110-12,124.

<sup>711</sup>For Chinese version of the dismissals, etc., see His-tsang Ta Shi Chi, n.25, p.9.

<sup>712</sup>The Dalai Lama's Press Conference, n.14, The Statesman, 21 June 1959; for further details, see The Dalai Lama, n.17, p. 87.

<sup>713</sup>N.C.N.A., Daily Dispatch (Chung King) 8 May 1952; Tibet , 1950 -67, n.15, pp. 24, 735; Shanghai Daily News; 10 May, 1952, 18 and 24 June 1952.

<sup>714</sup>For details, see Li, n. 20, p. 209 and Moraes, n. 52, pp. 79 -81

<sup>715</sup>Tibet, 1950-67, n.15, p.99.

<sup>716</sup>*Ibid*

<sup>717</sup> Facts on File, 1952,p.3; B.P.Gurevich, Note 43,p.183; Thomas, Note 84; &, Tibet, 1950-67, *Ibid.*

118."Sights in the Sunny City of Lhasa", Wen hui Pao (Hong Kong), 3 July 1953, quoted in Tibet, 1950-67, n. 15, pp. 462-63.

119 Times of India, 22 April 1953.

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<sup>720</sup>See Panikkar, n.31, pp. 170-71, 175; also Maxwell, n.70, p. 76.

<sup>721</sup>Panikkar, n.31, p. 175.

<sup>722</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>723</sup>Mullik, n.19, p. 149; and Rowland, n.14, p. 76.

<sup>724</sup>Mullik, *Ibid.*; and Rowland, *Ibid.*

<sup>725</sup>The Hindu, 16 September 1952; The Statesman (Calcutta), 16 September 1952; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1952-54), p. 1358. For detailed discussion over the issue, see Richardson, n. 19, p. 196; and Rowland, n.14, p. 76.

<sup>726</sup>Mullik, n.19, pp. 149-50.

<sup>727</sup>Quoted in Mullik, *Ibid.*, p. 150. See also Richardson, n.19, p. 296 and Rowland, n. 14, p. 84.

<sup>728</sup>Quoted in Mullik, *Ibid.*

<sup>729</sup>See Manifesto of the second National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party's (C..C.P.), July 1922, published in Conrad Brandt Benjamin Schwarts John K. Fairbank, ed., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (London, 1952), p.64; the "Third 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", June 1923; M.C. Wilbur, and Julie Ying , eds. Documents on Communism, Nationalism, Soviet Advisers in China, 1918 -1927 : Papers seized in the 1927 - Peking Raid (New York, 1956) , p 69; and Resolution of C.C.P., September 1949, N.C.N.A. 2 September 1949. The subject has already been discussed at length in the preceding chapter.

<sup>730</sup>Mao tse-tung, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (Peking, 1939), p.1; see also Stuart R. Schram, ed., The political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York, 1963), p. 257.

<sup>731</sup>See for instance, Mao tse-tung, on People's Democratic Dictatorship (Peking, 1950), p.11; and Liu Shao-chi, Internationalism and Nationalism (Peking, n.d.), p. 32.

<sup>732</sup>"The Draft Policy Statement", issued by the Police Bureau of the Communist Party of India, dated 15 November 1958, see M.B. Rao, ed., Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India (New Delhi, 1976), vol. VII (1948 - 50), p. 1878.

<sup>733</sup>Mao tse-Tung's telegraphic message to the Communist party of Nepal in the summer of 1951, quoted in Varma, n. 88, p.29.

<sup>734</sup>New York Times, 13 December 1951.

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<sup>735</sup>The incident was reported on 30 July 1952, see Keessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX, (1952-54), p. 12584. See also Warner Levi, "Government and Politics in Nepal-II," Far Eastern Survey, vol. XXII, No. 1, 14 January 1953, p. 87.

<sup>736</sup>The subject has already been discussed at length in Chapter II. See also Charles Bell, *Tibet, Past and Present* (Oxford, 1968), pp.234-240 and 242-43.

<sup>737</sup>See article II and VI of The Gorkha -Bhoot Treaty of 1856, C.U. Aitchison, *A collection of the Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, vol. XIV (New Delhi, 1929), p. 50. For Tibetan text of the Treaty, see Bell, *Ibid*, App. IV, p. 278.

<sup>738</sup>Though the goods in the traditional Nepal - Tibet trade ranged from the most precious articles to the minor items, "HiraDekhi, Kia Samma", the principal items of export, from Nepal to Tibet composed mostly of copper, brass ,bronze and other metal goods, rice and flour and some manufactured commodities imported from India. Tibet, on the other hand , exported to Nepal coarse woolen goods, raw wool, musk, salt, chaury, cattle , borax, quick-silver, bullion etc.; the greater part of Musk, borax and Bullion used to be re-exported to India.

<sup>739</sup>For detailed discussion on Tibet's place in Nepalese external trade and economy, see Eugene BarmerMihaly, *Foreign aid and Politics in Nepal: A Case study* (Oxford, 1975), p. 8; B.P. Shreshtha , *An Introduction to Nepalese Economy* (Kathmandu, 1962), p.132-36. The author of the latter book was also for some time, Vice - Chairman of the Nepalese Planning Commission.

See also L.E. Rose, *Nepali: Strategy for Survival* (Berkeley , 1971), pp.14, 18 and 19. The importance attached to the Tibetan trade in Newari Community is reflected in a marriage custom still prevalent amongst the Newari elite - where a person draped in Tibetan attire is included in the marriage procession - indicating that the groom's family has trade connections with Tibet, and thus is wealthy. See also Purna Harsh Bajracharya, "Newar Marriage Customs and Festivals", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* (University of New Mexico -Albuquerque), vol. XV (1959), p. 420.

<sup>740</sup>No complete and reliable statistics of Indo - Nepal trade during 1947 - 57 period is available. Moreover, there is every possibility of substantial unrecorded flow of goods across the open land frontier between India and Nepal. An analysis of the trade- data for the following three years, i.e., between1957-60, however, revealed that Nepal's imports with India had an edge over the export. (See table at the end).

<sup>741</sup>M.C. Regmi, of *Industrial Potentials of Nepal* (Kathmandu, 1957), p. 7, (an US Operation Mission Publication); Mihaly , n.140, p.12; Shrestha , n.140, pp. 135-36. No proper data on the volume and value of trade between Nepal and Tibet during early fifties is available. The earliest trade figure available is for the year 1957 - 58, which shows that till then it remained tilted in favour of Nepal, despite suffering the adverse impact of the Chinese take -over of Tibet & their efforts of "squeezing -out" the Nepali traders from Tibet and the abrogation of special trade rights and privileges enjoyed by the Nepalese during the past one hundred years (See Table II).

<sup>742</sup>See Bell, n.137, p. 237.

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<sup>743</sup>The statistics available for the three consecutive years following the conclusion of Sino-Nepalese Treaty of 1856, embodying Nepal's recognition of Tibet's incorporation in China and abrogation of its rights and privileges in that country, reveal a complete reversal of export -import balance between Nepal and Tibet. While the trade balance was in favour of Nepal upto 1957, its export to Tibet declined steadily as a result of the Chinese control of the Tibetan trade and Commerce and their efforts directed at making it more and more China -oriented. (See Table III).

<sup>744</sup>This point has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (part-I). However, specific mention may be made of the following files in this regard, Foreign Department Consultations, Secret E, (For., Sec.E.) September 1908, Nos. 457-459, National Archives of India (N.A.I.); For., Sec. E., October 1912, Nos. 12-45 (N.A.I.).

<sup>745</sup>Hindustan Times, 31 December 1951.

<sup>746</sup>The Statesman, 19 November, 1951.

<sup>747</sup>Hindustan Times, 2 May, 1952.

<sup>748</sup>The Statesman, 8 March, 1952; The Tribune, 14 March 1952.

<sup>749</sup>Rose, Nepal; Strategy for Survival, n.140, p.204.

<sup>750</sup>The Statesman, 15 March 1952; Awaz (Kathmandu), 14 Falgun 2008 V.S. (February-March 1952), vol. II, No.6, p.1; see also Hindustan Times, 2 May 1952.

<sup>751</sup>Hindustan Times, 2 May 1952.

<sup>752</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952-54), p. 12583.

<sup>753</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>754</sup>Hindustan Times, 2 June 1952.

<sup>755</sup>King Tribhuvan's speech before the Nepalese Advisory Assembly on 4 June 1952. See His Majesty's Government of Nepal, Hamro Par RashtraSamparka (Kathmandu, 1954), p. 20-21; Devkota, n.2, p.163; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol., IX, (1952-54), p. 12583A. Emphasis added by the author. See also Nepal News Bulletin (Kathmandu), vol. I, No.2, 11 July 1952, pp. 1-3.

<sup>756</sup>New York Times, 8 May 1954.

<sup>757</sup>The Statesman, 17 March 1954.

<sup>758</sup>New York Times, 8 May 1954.

<sup>759</sup>The Statesman, 7 April 1954.

<sup>760</sup>Hindustan Times, 15 April, 1954.

<sup>761</sup>The Statesman, 7 April 1954; HamroParrashtraSampark, N. 156, No. 13, p.50.

<sup>762</sup>Hindustan Times, 29 April 1954.



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<sup>763</sup>The Hindu, 7 May 1954.

<sup>764</sup>Panikkar, n. 31, pp. 170-71

<sup>765</sup>JawaharLal Nehru, Press Conference, n.69, p.14.

<sup>766</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952-54), p. 12548.

<sup>767</sup>Hindustan Times, 5 June 1952.

<sup>768</sup>Hindustan Times, 31 December 1951.

<sup>769</sup>The Hindu, 19 January 1952

<sup>770</sup>The Indian Government had earlier dispatched its Deputy Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Waryam Singh, to suggest the Rana Prime Minister the necessity of opening check- post. The Premier had accepted it and indeed sought Indian co-operation for the venture. Some posts were subsequently established in September 1951. See Mullik, n.19; .P.P. Karan and W.M. Jenkins, *The Himalayan Kingdoms: Bhutan and Nepal* (New York, 1963) p. 117, and *Northern India Patrika* (Allahabad), 9 September 1951.

<sup>771</sup>*Northern India Patrikaia, Ibid.*

<sup>772</sup>During the author's interview with M.P. Koirala at the latter's residence in Kathmandu in June 1969, he had informed him that his Government had requested the Indian Government to supply Indian technicians and wireless - operators to man the eighteen check-post opened at strategic points on his country's border with Tibet, "for such time as the Nepalese could replace them", which India had accepted .

<sup>773</sup>Rose, *Nepal: Strategy for Survival*, n. 140, pp. 197-8; also Mihaly, n.127, p.26.

<sup>774</sup>Dr.K.I.Singh's attempted coup led King Tribhuwan to invite the Indian assistance, *Devkota*, n.2, pp. 136-37, and Mihaly , n. 2, pp. 25-26.

<sup>775</sup>B.V. Keskar, Deputy External Affairs Minister, informed the Indian Parliament, in reply to a question by Hari Vishnu Kamath "... That the Nepalese Government had been pressing for some time that we should help them in the reorganisation of their Army", see *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. I (part-I), No. 15, 27 February 1952, cols 274-5.

<sup>776</sup>Press Notification issued by the Press Information Bureau (P.I.B.) dated 23 February 1952; *Bhasin* , n.56, pp. 37-8 and *The Hindu*, 24 February (cotd. F.N.-177)-1952. See also *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. I (Part I), No. 9, col. 272, 29 May 1950.

<sup>777</sup>Jawahar Lal Nehru: Press Conference, n.69, p. 13. See also, *The Hindu*, 29 February 1952.

<sup>778</sup>The delegation included S.P. Upadhyay (Home Minister) SubaanaShamsher (Finance Minister) and Kaiser Shumsher (Defence Minister), *Devkota* , n.2, p. 160.

<sup>779</sup>See *Hindustan Times*, 3 November 1953 quoted in *Jha* , n.5, p. 77.

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<sup>780</sup>For Indian version, please refer to the Press notification issued by the P.I.B., 23 February 1952, n.179,p. 84; Deputy External Affairs Minister B.V. Keskar's reply to H. V. Kamath in the Parliament, n.178; and Nehru's press conference of 28 February 1952, n.180.

<sup>781</sup>Nepal Gazette, 14 April 1942, V.S.

<sup>782</sup>The Hindu, 5 June 1954.

<sup>783</sup>*Ibid*, Emphasis added

<sup>784</sup>The Hindu, 15 April 1952; and Devkota, pp. 150-51.

<sup>785</sup>Werner Levi, "Political Rivalries in Nepal," *Far Eastern Survey* (New York), vol. XXIII, No. 7, July 1954, pp. 103-4.

<sup>786</sup>Mihaly, n.140, pp. 25-26; Devkota, n.2, pp. 136-7.

<sup>787</sup>G.L. Jain, *Indian Meets China in Nepal* (Bombay, 1959), pp. 95-96.

<sup>788</sup>The Hindu, 24 April 1952.

<sup>789</sup>The Statesman, 28 March 1953.

<sup>790</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952 -54),p. 13136 (A) ; See also Gupta, n.5, p.77.

<sup>791</sup>The Statesman (Calcutta), 20 July 1953; Devkota, n.2., p.223.194. The Statesman (Calcutta), 20 July 1953; Devkota, n.2., p.223; see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952-54), p. 13136(A).

<sup>792</sup>*Ibid*, 23 July 1953; Devkota, n.2, p.223-24.

<sup>793</sup>Hindustan Times, 24 July 1953; Devkota, n.2, p.223.

<sup>794</sup>See the accounts given in The Statesman, 5 May 1954; Joshi and Rose, n.82, pp. 156-57 and 159, and Jain, n.191, Councilors, on 26 August 1952, Nepal Gazette, vol. II, No.3, 10 Bhadra, 2009 V.S.

<sup>795</sup>D.C. Lal, D.I.G. Police , Punjab, was deputed for the purpose. For details, see The Statesman, *Ibid*; Agrawal, n.1, p. 163; and Rose, n.140, p.198.

<sup>796</sup>Initially two senior Indian Civil Services officers (I.C.S), Shri. Nagesh and Govind Narain, were deputed to the Government of Nepal from April 1951 to February 1952. Two others, Brij Narain and S.K. Sinha , were added later on the job.

<sup>797</sup>Parliamentary Debates, Appendix I, First Session, 1952, Annexure 27, 'Answer to Starred Question No.101', Press Note, Ministry of External Affairs, p. 58.

<sup>798</sup>It comprised of N.M. Buch, I.C.S. (leader), K.P. Mathrani, I.C.S. and S.K. Anand, I.P.S. (members). The Nepalese Government deputed Col. Tilak Shumsher, Secretary, Finance, to assist the Commission. See Buch Committee Report, n.41, pp.1-3.

<sup>799</sup>*Ibid*, p.1, para 2(i).

<sup>800</sup>*Ibid*, p.1, para 2(ii).

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<sup>801</sup> *Ibid*, p.129, para 236.

<sup>802</sup> For text of its recommendations, see Buch, *Ibid*, Appendix I, pp. 131- 141.

<sup>803</sup> R.C. Malhotra, "Public Administration in Nepal" *Indian Journal of Public Administration* (New Delhi), October - December 1958, vol. IV, N.4, p.457. Malhotra was a senior Civil Servant in the Government of Nepal.

<sup>804</sup> For detailed discussion on the administrative reforms in Nepal and the Indian assistance therein, see Buch, n. 41; Indian co-operation Mission, *Progress of Nepal - India co-operation Programme -1951- May -1968* (Kathmandu, 1951), mimeographed, 15 pages; B. Lal, *Proposal for re-organization of the P&T Services in Nepal* (Kathmandu, Indian Aid Mission, 1958), typescript; and Goodal, *Report on Administration in Nepal to Prime Minister*, n.141, typescripts, 22 pages. Apart from these primary information sources, for critical revolution of India's contribution to the development of public administration in Nepal, see also Gangal, n. 41; Shrestha, n.1; Ralph Bribauti, ed., *Asian Bureaucratic System Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham, 1966); Walter Fisher, *Personal Administration in Nepal* (Kathmandu, United Nations Technical Assistance Agency (U.N.T.A.A.) October 1958) typescript 18 pages; and Sir Pric Franklin, *Draft Final Report on Public Administration in Nepal* (Kathmandu, U.N. Mission, December 1966), typescript 72 pages.

<sup>805</sup> For text of the Interim Constitution, see *Nepal Gazette*, 4 Bhadon, 208 V.S., pp.1-44. For detailed analysis of the Act, see Joshi and Rose, n. 82, pp. 148 -50 and Agrawal, n.1, pp.149 -52

<sup>806</sup> *Nepal Gazette*, vol. II, No. 18, 8 Paush 2009 (22 December 1951).

<sup>807</sup> GovindNarain, Secretary, Government of India, was assigned the job, see "Royal commission", 7 Kartik 2008 V.S. Devkota, n.2, pp. 108-09. See also Mihaly, n.140, pp. 25-26; and L.S. Deb, ed., *India, 1952, part I, vol. I, No.12, col. 486.*

<sup>808</sup> "2009 SaalKaRashriyDivasma Shri 5 TribhuwanKaShahiSandesh", Devkota, n.2,p.208. See also Werner Levi, "Political Rivalries in Nepal", *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. XXIII, No. 71, July 1954, p. 103.

<sup>809</sup> See Table No. IV in the Appendix for details.

<sup>810</sup> Mihaly, n.140, p. 49.214. *The Hindu*, 17 June 1951; *The Statesman*, 17 June 1951.

<sup>811</sup> According to a well - informed journalist who had a long assignment in Nepal, King Tribhuwan mooted a few requests to Nehru during his Kathmandu visit, especially for a road -link between Kathmandu and India and for an air-field in the capi--l, "both indicating his desire that Nepal of tomorrow may have closer bonds with India". If so, Nehru's public reference to India's willingness to provide aid might have emanated from his request of the monarch from this request of the Monarch. See TribhuwanNath, *The Nepalese Dilemma* (Delhi, 1975), p.119.

<sup>812</sup> Mihaly, n. 140, pp. 45-45. For detailed discussion, see also Jha, n.5, pp. 69-71.

<sup>813</sup> After M.P. Koirala's talks in India and before the departure of Nepalese Ministerial delegation to discuss the details of the aid, Finance Minister SubarnaShumsher declared that, "I want to make it clear that the Indian Government had not attached any strings to the assurances of

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economic aid .... While taking economic aid and technical aid our Government will not accept such terms as shall endanger our sovereignty and independence.... you will surely join me in thanking the Indian Government for its help and co-operation in our time for need" Nepal Gazette, 3 February 1952.

<sup>814</sup>India, Parliamentary Debates, Appendix I, first session, Annexure 27, p. 58. See also Mihaly, n.140, p. 44 -45; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952 -1954),p. 2584.

<sup>815</sup>Press Note of the Ministry of External Affairs, dated 25 April 1952, released through the Press Information Bureau, Government of India.

<sup>816</sup>India, Lok Sabha Debates or the House of peoples, (New Delhi) (hereinafter seated as Lok Sabha Debates) Part-I, vol.II, No. 31, 13 May 1953, cols. 3095 -6.

<sup>817</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952-50), p.12584.

<sup>818</sup>Nehru Press Conference, n.69, p. 15.

The Rajpath was thrown open to traffic on 11 December 1955, cutting the journey between Nepalese capital, Kathmandu and the nearest Indian railhead, Raxaul from more than two days to 8 hours only. The road not only became the main gateway to India but also served to link- up the capital with the other hitherto unconnected and almost inaccessible parts of the Kingdom, providing thereby the much desired administrative-link between Kathmandu and the Terai area.

<sup>819</sup>Co-operation for Progress in Nepal, n.224, p.13.

<sup>820</sup>The Statesman (Calcutta), 29 July 1953; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952 -54), pp. 13136.

<sup>821</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, *Ibid*.

<sup>822</sup>Figures supplied by the Indian Co-operation Mission, Kathmandu. See also Mihaly , n. 127, pp. 147 -48.

<sup>823</sup>H.M. King MahendraBirBikramSah Deva, Proclamations, Speeches and Messages, vol. I, July 1951-December 1960 (Kathmandu September, 1967), (trans. by Dr. Tuladhar, Department of Publicity, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,H.M. Government, Nepali), pp. 28-32; The Pioneer(Lucknow), 26 February 1955; Devkota, .2, 7 Falgun, 2011 V.S., pp. 278-79. See also King Mahendra's speech delivered on 8 May 1955, before the "Convention of Political Parties and Socio-Cultural Organizations", Times of India (New Delhi), 10 May 1955, Proclamations, Speeches and Messages, *Ibid*, p.9- 11.

<sup>824</sup>The Pioneer (Lucknow), editorial, 20<sup>th</sup> February 1955. The paper then had a large circulation in U.P. (India), including its districts bordering Nepal. It had been chief spokesman of the British Government during the British rule and had continued to evinced great interest in the Nepalese affairs throughout. See also Jain, n. 13, p.41.

<sup>825</sup>For a detailed discussion on the land tenure system, & the problems of 'Birata' land system existing and the efforts and achievements of post -Revolution Governments in this respect, see M.C. Regmi, Some Aspects of Land Reforms in Nepal (Kathmandu, 1960) Y.P. Pant, Planning

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For Prosperity In Nepal (Kathmandu, 1957), pp. 41 -47; B.P. Shrestha, n. 140, pp. 51 -57; Mihaly, n.140, pp. 9 -10 & 33; TribhuwanNath, n.215, pp. 14 -44; Joshi and Rose, n. 75, pp. 160-61. For specific moves of the post- Rana Governments in the direction of Land Reforms , please refer to Notifications from the Nepal Gazette, 1951 -56 (Kathmandu ,1956) pp. 1-118; "Nepal Government's Press Note on Reforms, Kathmandu, 16 Jan. 1951", Nepal News Bulletin, no. 29; B.R. Nepali, "BirtaPratha", Prakash (Kathmandu), 9 May 1958, p. 3.

<sup>826</sup>See U.S. Operation Mission, Economic Data Papers – Nepal, iii/1 (Kathmandu January, 1961), p. 32; Mihaly, n. 140, p. 24; B.P. Shrestha, n.140, pp. 164 and 166. For statistics about the fall in purchasing capacity of the Nepalese Rupee vis-à-vis Indian Rupee, See B.P. Shrestha, *Ibid* & table Nos. V and II. For Nepalese Government's efforts to stabilize its currency during the period, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. IX (1952 -50), p. 12584.

<sup>827</sup>The author interviewed in number of Nepalese politicians during his field trip to Kathmandu and every one of them was full of grievance against C.P.N. Singh. Even some Indian journalists, who were posted there during the period, were of the opinion that a major portion of blame for anti- Indian feelings goes to the credit of C.P.N. Singh's behavior.

<sup>828</sup>Commenting on this situation in the New York Times, Robert Trumbull claimed that the "Nepalese appear to fear India's encroachment on its ancient freedom more than Communist infiltration from its northern neighbor.... It is said openly in Kathmandu that the real ruler of Nepal to-day is the Indian Ambassador, Mr. C.P.N. Singh.... Anti -Indian feeling is intensified by the consciousness of every Nepalese that India could, if she wished throw an economic strangle- hold on the country by her geographical position. It is known that India discouraged the consideration by Nepal of opening diplomatic relations with China". See The Dawn (Karachi) 21 December 1951, quoting Trumbull's dispatch published in the New York Times.

C.P.N. Singh, however, dismissed all charges leveled against him by B.P. Koirala and others of taking 'undue interest' in the domestic affairs of Nepal as 'utterly baseless and unjust'. But he maintained that, "we cannot remain completely disinterested towards the political and economic developments of Nepal, which has much in common with us an on whose security depends our security". Hindustan Times, 25 December 1951; also Devkota, n.2, pp. 135 -36.

<sup>829</sup>This remark was made by N.M. Dixit during his interview to an Indian researcher, S.K. Jha, see Jha, n.5, p. 91. Later on, Shri. Dixit confirmed the same to the author also during latter's meeting <sup>with</sup> him at his residence at Kathmandu in 1969.

<sup>830</sup>Nepali Congress (KantipurShakha) KoSikshanSibirKoUdghatanSamaroha (Kathmandu, n.d.), pp. 4-6; also B.P. Koirala's statements in Times of India, 22 February 1952.

<sup>831</sup>Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival, n.140,p. 197.

<sup>832</sup>The Hindu, 14 April 1952; Hindustan Times,14 April 1952. See also Devkota, n.2, p. 150-51; "PahiloSalahkarSabhaKoUdaghatan Ma Shri. 5 Tribhuwan bat bakes KoShahiSambhodhan", 2414/2009 V.S., Devkota, *Ibid*, p. 163: "2009 SaalkoRashtriya Divas Ma Shri. 5 TribhuwanKoShahiSandesh", Devkota, *Ibid*, pp. 207-211.

<sup>833</sup>Devkota, n.2, p. 163; The Hindu and Hindustan Times, 15 April 1952.

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- <sup>834</sup> Hindustan Times, 16 February, 1952
- <sup>835</sup> Karan and Jenkins, n.172, p. 118.
- <sup>836</sup> Jatiya Jantantrik Samyukta Morcha Ko Ghosnapatra, (Kathmandu, 1951), p.3.
- <sup>837</sup> Sikshan Sibir Ko Udghatan Samaroha, n.235, pp. 4-6.
- <sup>838</sup> The Times of India, 16 March 1953.
- <sup>839</sup> Hindustan Times, 30 April 1953.
- <sup>840</sup> Nehru's Press Conference on 28 February 1952, Press Conferences, n.69, p. 16.
- <sup>841</sup> Lok Sabha Debates, part I, vol. II, No. 28, 8 May 1953, cols. 2909-10.
- <sup>842</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>843</sup> Rose, Nepal : Strategy For Survival, n.140, p. 198.
- <sup>844</sup> Charvak (pseud), "Nepal ma Samjavad, Ek - Dristi-Kou" (Communism in Nepal, A View - Point), Rastrahit (Kathmandu), year 1, No.5, 1 Kartik 2009 V.S. (October-November 1952).
- <sup>845</sup> Mihaly, n.140, pp. 45-46 and 50. For a critical analysis of Mihaly's criticism and a detailed treatment of the subject, see Tribhuwan Nath, n.217, pp. 118-133; Jha, n.5 pp. 72-75; S.D. Muni, Foreign Policy of Nepal (Delhi 1973), pp. 87-96; Rose, Nepal: Strategy For Survival, n.140, pp. 198-201; Jain, n.13, pp. 95-100.
- <sup>846</sup> Hindustan Times, 30 May, 1956; The Statesman, 30 May 1956; Asian Recorder, vol. II, 28 June 1956, p. 873.
- <sup>847</sup> Jagdish Prasad Sharma, Nepal's Foreign Policy 1947-1962 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania 1968), p. 118. For Nepalese politician allegations against the Mission, see Devkota, n.2, pp. 143 - 51.
- <sup>848</sup> For full text of the resolution passed by the Nepali Congress Working Committee on 13 March 1953, see Nepal Pukar (Kathmandu), years 5, issue 25, 13 Chaitra 2009 V.S. (March -April 1953), The Hindu, 16 March 1953 and Devkota, n.2, p.146. The cur attitude of the Nepalese Congress existing at that time was reflected in the virulent propaganda campaign launched against the Indian Military Mission (I.M.M.) through the pages of its above referred journal ,Nepal Pukar. See, for instance, Nepal Pukar, year 5, issue 9, dated 7/12/2009 V.S. and 3 March 2009 V.S.; year 5 , issue 12, dated 8/12/2009 V.S.; year 5 , issue 25, dated 12/13/2009 V.S. and year 6, issue 12/13, dated 2/19/2010.
- <sup>849</sup> The Times of India, February 20 1953, see also Devkota, n2, p. 145.
- <sup>850</sup> Rastravani (Kathmandu), 2 June 1953, issue 5, (An Organ of the Gurkha Parishad).
- <sup>851</sup> Rastriya Congress Bulletin (Kathmandu) No. 51, Vaishakh 2009.
- <sup>852</sup> Gorkhapatra, 21 Chaitra 2008 V.S. (March-April 1952); Devkota, n.2, p. 148. For Nepalese Government warning against the rumour-mongering, see The Tribune (Ambala), 27 April 1952.

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<sup>853</sup> Hindustan Times, 30 April 1953; Devkota, n.2, p.149.

<sup>854</sup> AmritBazaar Patrika, 1 May 1953.

<sup>855</sup> Hindustan Times, 10 May 1952; Devkota, n.2, p.144.

<sup>856</sup> The Hindu, 15 April 1952; See also Palace Communiques, Devkota, n.2, pp. 138-40, 150-51. Hindustan Times, 24 April 1952.

<sup>857</sup> The Hindu, 6 May 1952; See also Devkota, n.2, pp. 146, 149, 150-51.

<sup>858</sup> India, RajyaSabha (Concil of States) Debates, vol. V, No. 19, 17 December 1953, col. 2571.

<sup>859</sup> Nehru, Press Conference (1952), n.69. 13-17.

<sup>860</sup> G.S. Bajpai, The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, (University of Madras, 1959), vol. III, pp. 3-8.

<sup>861</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>862</sup> . The Statesman, 6 June 1954.

<sup>863</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>864</sup> Parliamentary Debates, part III, vol. VI, No. 17, 6 December 1950, col. 1268.

<sup>865</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>866</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 December 1950, col. 1383.

<sup>867</sup> In fact, J.P. Narayan's mediation once resulted in an agreement between B.P. and M.P. Koirala in Calcutta in April 1952. For text of the agreement, see The Statesman (Calcutta), 6 August 1952. But afterwards he too failed and finally gave up such efforts. For detailed discussion on the internecine quarrel in Nepal Congress resulting in the split of the party and the fall of the Government. See B. P. Koirala, Nepali Congress Sarkar, n. 81; Devkota, n.2, pp. 122, 169 and 181; Gupta, n. 5 pp. 72 - 74 & 771 -74 Joshi and Rose, n. 82, pp. 133, 135 - 36.

<sup>868</sup> Rose, n.140; Mihaly, n. 140, p.24.

<sup>869</sup> BholaChaterjee, n.5, pp. 153.

<sup>870</sup> In his critical assessment of India's early economic aid to Nepal, an American scholar, Eugene BramerMihally, speculated that:

While accepting the thesis and that economic progress was necessary to political stability... India appears to have deducted that Communism as represented by China was best excluded from Nepal by the maintenance of the kingdoms special (economic and political) relationship with India. The two projects began in 1953 (i.e. Gauchar airport and TribhuwanRajpath projects), in addition to being economically valuable had the advantage of facilitating this relationship. The road from Kathmandu to Raxaul, known as TribhuwanRajpath, not only opened the Kathmandu market to trade with India but it facilitated the difference of Kathmandu by the Indian Military. Mihally,n.140, p.46

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<sup>871</sup>Indian commentators appeared to have taken for granted that abolition of Indian "privileges" in Tibet was inevitable, and after Nehru made it known through his reply in the Rajya Sabha on December 8, 1954 that opening of the Kashgar Consulate in Tibet was not going to figure in the agenda of the talks because People's Government of China considered Sinkiang to be a closed area, it was presumed that the settlement of all remaining problems would hardly consume six weeks. The delay in reaching the agreement caused anxious queries from various quarters. Various speculations were made in the press and the public. Amongst them, the Amrit Bazar Patrika's commentator, K.L. Shridharni, claimed to have learned from "Delhi insiders" that India, unable to think of Tibet as "an absolutely foreign country," wanted facilities "that go beyond the usual routine diplomatic relations", whereas the Peking Government was anxious "to show that India cannot inherit the traditions left behind in Tibet by British Imperialism," Amrit Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta), 22 February 1954. See also for a convenient reference to various press - reports and comments, M.W. Fisher and J.V. Bondurant, *Indian views of Sino-Indian Relations* (Berkley, 1956), pp. 21 - 23.

<sup>872</sup>For text of the agreement, see S.L. Shankdher, ed., *Foreign Policy of India; Text of Documents 1947-64* (hereinafter cited as *Foreign Policy of India*) (Lok Sabha Secretariat, Government of India) (New Delhi, 1966), pp. 199-203; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (G.O.I.), *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between The Government of India and China 1954-59; White paper* (henceforth referred as *White Paper (1954-59)*) ( New Delhi), pp. 98-101; Hsinuhua New Agency (or New China News Agency, hereinafter abbreviated as N.C.N.A. ), *Daily News Release (PeKing)*, No.1, 618, 30 April 1954, and *Jen-min Jih-pao* (hereinafter referred as *People's Daily*) (PeKing), 30 April 1954, trans. Union Research Institute (U.R.I.); *Tibet 1950-67* (Hongkong), Document 17, pp. 66-69; and U.N. Treaty Series, vol. CCXCIX, No. 4307.

<sup>873</sup>For text of the identical notes, see *Foreign Policy of India, Ibid*, pp. 203-5; *White Paper -I, Ibid*, pp. 102-4; N.C.N.A., *Ibid*, and *People's Daily, Ibid*, quoted in *Tibet 1950-67, Ibid*, pp. 70-72.

<sup>874</sup>*Indigram* (A serial publication of the Indian Embassy in U.S.), (Washington, D.C.), No. 445, 4 May 1954, p. 4; Fisher, n. 1, p. 21.

<sup>875</sup>Nehru's interview with B.N. Mullik, the Director General , Intelligence Bureau of India, immediately after signing of the agreement with China as reported by the latter in his book - B.N. Mullik , *My Years With Nehru : The Chinese Betrayal* (New Delhi, 1971), p. 157.

<sup>876</sup>Mullik, *Ibid*, p. 183.

<sup>877</sup>*People's Daily*, 30 April 1954; *Tibet 1950-67*, n.2, Document No. 19, pp. 73-74.

<sup>878</sup>*National Herald* (Lucknow), 1 May 1954.

<sup>879</sup>*The Times of India* (Bombay), 1 May 1954.

<sup>880</sup>*Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 1 May 1954.



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<sup>881</sup>Statesman (New Delhi), 1 May 1954; National Herald, 1 May 1954; Times of India, 1 May 1954.

<sup>882</sup>Hindustan Times, 1 May 1954.

<sup>883</sup>Nehru's statements as recorded in Lok Sabha Debates, part II, vol. v, No. 70, 15 May 1954, col. 7495.

<sup>884</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>885</sup>See Congress Bulletin (a serial publication of All India Congress Committee) (New Delhi) No. 5, June -July, 1954, pp.245 - 51.

<sup>886</sup>Nehru's press - conference, New Delhi 13 November 1954, Jawahar Lal Nehru, Press Conference : 1954 (New Delhi, 1954), pp. 25-26, (published by the Government of India, herein -after cited as Press Conference).

<sup>887</sup>For development in this regard and text of the instrument, see Baghdad Pact 1955, Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.) vol. XXV, No. 643, 22 October 1954; The Baghdad Pact (Washington, D.C. 1956) (Department of State Publication); SEATO: the First Year 1955-56 (Singapore, n.d.), pp. 20-25 (SEATO Secretariat publication); G.V. Ambekar and V.D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's Relations with South and South East Asia, 1949-1960 (Bombay, 1964), pp. 75-79, and Hindustan Times, 24 July 1954.

For Nehru's opposition to the concept of SETO and other security pacts, see Indian News (Indian Embassy, Washington), 17 January and 26 January 1953 and 21 November 1953. See also Nehru's presidential address before the A.I.C.C. Session at Hyderabad, Hindustan Times, 24 January 1954.

<sup>888</sup>The Maratha, (Poona } , 28 May 1954; The Organisor (New Delhi),24 May 1954; The Vigil ( New Delhi),13 & 22 May1954; The Thought (New Delhi) ,29 May 154; The Mysindia (Banglore), 30 May 154;& The Janta (Bombay)30 May 1954.

<sup>889</sup>The Organiser,10 May 1954.

<sup>890</sup>The Thought, 29 May 1954; Mysindia, 30 May 1954; Maratha,2 July 1954.

<sup>891</sup> The Thought, 29<sup>th</sup> May,1954,p.9; Mysindia,30<sup>th</sup> May,1954; & Marattha,2<sup>nd</sup> July1954.

<sup>892</sup>The Thought , *Ibid.*

<sup>893</sup>Meghnad Saha's query with the Prime Minister Nehru in continuation of Nehru's replies on Sino-Indian boundary questions , India, Parliamentary Debates, vol. II, part- I, No. 37, 7 April 1954, col. 1821.

<sup>894</sup>The Pioneer, 1 May 1954.

<sup>895</sup>The Tribune (Ambala), 1 May 1954.

<sup>896</sup>Hindustan Times, 4 May 1954, column by 'Insaf'.

<sup>897</sup>The Statesman, 16 April 1954.

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<sup>898</sup> *Ibid*, 10 May 1954.

<sup>899</sup> The author formed this opinion after interviewing many Nepalese dignitaries, including the then Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Nepal, Sri M.P. Koirala and Dr. D. R. Regmi. The Indian commentators were also united in agreeing that the Nepalese leaders had been officially advised by India to "regularize" relations with China over Tibet – which would in effect mean accepting the Chinese position that Tibet would no longer pay annual tribute to Nepal, nor would the Nepali merchants retain their special rights in Tibet.

<sup>900</sup> Even as late as in 1939, Mao Tse-tung had listed Nepal amongst one of the "dependent states" of China which the British had snatched away from it. Mao Tse-tung, *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* (Peking, 1939), p.1.

The repetition of these old Imperial Chinese claims in Mao's work was particularly relevant in as much as it indicated the inclination of the supreme decision - maker in China to cling to the empire's past to that extent, while advocating Communism at the same time.

<sup>901</sup> See for instance, map of China published in the People's Republic school text book, Liu Pei-hua, *A Short History of China* (Peking, 1954). Its Photostat copy had been reproduced in John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations : Hostile Co-existence* (New York, 1967), p. 143.

<sup>902</sup> See also question -answers in the Indian Parliament, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. XI, part I, No. 37, 7 April 1954, cols. 1820-21, and Warner Levi, "Nepal in world Politics", *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. 30, September 1957, p. 243.

<sup>903</sup> Levi, *Pacific Affairs*, *Ibid*, p.244.

<sup>904</sup> *Hamro Par RashtraSampark* (a Nepal Government Publication (Kathmandu, 1954), p. 54; and the *Statesman*, 6 May, 1954.

<sup>905</sup> *The Hindu*, 7 May 1954.

<sup>906</sup> *Hamro Par RashtraSampark*, n.36, p. 54, *TheHindu*, 7 May 1954; *TheStatesman*, 7 May 1954.

<sup>907</sup> Regmi's press conference at New Delhi, *Hindustan Times* , 9 May 1954; and *The Statesman*, 9 May, 1954. He also vocally supported the line the Indian and Chinese Governments were talking on international issues; he welcomed Chou Enlai's visit to Delhi and the Chou- Nehru joint declarations, supported ceasefire in indo - China and strongly denounced military pacts between Pakistan and the U.S. *The Stateman*, *Ibid*; *Survey of China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong) (henceforth abbreviated as S.C.M.P.), No. 804, 9 May 1954, p. 28.

<sup>908</sup> *The Statesman*, 6 May 1954.

<sup>909</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>910</sup> *GiriLaL Jain*, *India Meets China in Nepal* (Bombay, 1959) p. 110.

<sup>911</sup> Warner Levi, "Political Rivalries in Nepal", *For Eastern Survey*, vol. XXIII, July 1954, pp. 107.

<sup>912</sup> *The Statesman*, 26 June 1954 and *Hindustan Times*, 26 June, 1954.

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<sup>913</sup>See Chou En -Lai's statement at his arrival at New Delhi on 25 June, his banquet speech on 26 June, the press - conference on 27 June and the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the three -day talk between him and Nehru, *Hindustan Times*, 26,27, 28 and 29 June 1954.

<sup>914</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>915</sup>The *Hindu*, 28 June 1954. The contrast with the Chinese Communist Party's earlier stand over the issue is noteworthy. Afterwards, in 1962, when the need for allaying Asian suspicions was no more, it was again to repudiate this liberal stance and to return to the original position. China's definitive doctrinal statement, "The Differences between Comrade Togliatti and U.S.", asserted that: "It is inconceivable that peaceful co-existence can be achieved without a struggle. It is still less conceivable that the establishment of peaceful co- existence can eliminate class struggles in the world arena and can abolish the antagonism between the two systems, socialism and capitalism.... But Comrade Togliatti and those (principally the U.S.S.R.) who attack China, hold that through peaceful co-existence it is possible to "renew the structure of the whole world and to establish a new international order" ... In reality they are substituting class - collaboration for class - struggle .... advocating a fusion of the socialist and capitalist systems", *People's Daily*, 3 December 1962.

<sup>916</sup>The *Hindu*, *Ibid* and, *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, 28 June 1954.

<sup>917</sup>*Foreign Policy of India*, n.2, pp. 97-98.

<sup>918</sup>*S.C.M.P.*, No. 840, p.8; *Hamro Par RashtraSampark*, n.36, p. 55. See also *The Statesman*, 30 June 1954.

<sup>919</sup>*The Statesman*, 8 September 1954.

<sup>920</sup>*Times of India*, 1 July 1954.

<sup>921</sup>*S.C.M.P.*, No. 895, 24 September 1954, p. 3; *HindustanTimes*, 28 September 1954; *Gorkha Patra* (Kathmandu), 13 Ashvin 2011 V.S. (29 September 1954).

<sup>922</sup>*S.C.M.P.*, No. 899, p. 29. The *Hindustan Times*, however, reported the last sentence as reading, "we are willing to give a serious thought to the proposal whenever it reaches us", *Hindustan Times*, 28 September 1954.

<sup>923</sup>The author was told so by the former Nepalese Prime Minister, M.P. Koirala and former Foreign Minister, Dr. Regmi during his visit to the two leaders at their residence in Kathmandu in the summer of 1969. Mr. Koirala showed few letters written by Nehru to him during former's premiership which confirmed Sri. Koirala's contention that Nehru wanted him to wait for a while in the matter of diplomatic ties with China.

<sup>924</sup>The Chinese official pronouncements and documents also admit Tibetan rebellions and constant resistance against Chinese occupation during the period, through they attributed it to the 'machinations' of 'a handful of reactionaries' under the instigation of and in collusion with imperialism and the 'Indian expansionists', and tried to under play their dimensions. See, for few such references, *Concerning the Question of Tibet* (Peking, 1959), pp. 211-12; "Premier Chou's reply to questions concerning Tibet", *Hong Kong Ta -pungPao*, 12 December 1956, trans.

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Union Research Service (U.R.S.) (Hongkong); speech delivered by Shirbo Jaltso, Deputy to the National People's Congress, Kuang-ming Jih-pao (hereinafter cited as Kuang-ming Daily) (Peking), 30 June 1956, trans. U.R.S.; N.C.N.A. (Lhasa), 24 April 1959; "Criticism and suggestions Concerning Various Undertakings in Minority Nationalities Areas at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Session of Nationalities Committee" Kuang-ming Daily, 10 July 1956; and, Chao K' un -yuan, Deputy Secretary's speech at 2<sup>nd</sup> Plenary Session of 2<sup>nd</sup> Tsinghai Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) Provisional Committee, Tsinghai Jih-pao (or Tsinghai Daily), 24 November 1956, trans. U.R.S.

For Tibetan version of the events, see the Dalai Lama, *My land and My People* (London, 1964), panther edition, pp.123-24.

<sup>925</sup> Director, Intelligence Bureau of India (I.B.), B.N. Mullik's report to Nehru about the reactions of Indian border population and the Tibetan refugee -settlers of Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, Mullik, n.8, pp. 156-57.

<sup>926</sup> Ram Rahul, *The Government of Politics of Tibet* (New Delhi, 1969), p.92. Later on, in the summer of 1958, GyalpoThonduk, the Dalai Lama's elder brother, SitubLokang-wa, the exiled Prime Minister of Tibet and other prominent Tibetan leaders repeated their charges of ruthless suppression, genocide and transportation of Tibetan population against the Chinese in their letters to the Indian Prime Minister of India and urged him to intervene. See, *The International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of law* (Geneva, 1959), doc. No. 11, pp. 143-44.

<sup>927</sup> Throughout the period, Nehru has been publicly taking this position. To quote one such statement on his Government's stand on the Indo-Tibetan boundary, he asserted in the Parliament on 20 November 1950 that, "Mc Mohan line is our boundary and that is our boundary, map or no map," *Parliamentary Debates (Lok Sabha)*, vol. v, No. 4, 20 November 1950, cols. 155-56.

(contd. F.N.-59)–The Chinese Government never took any exception to such assertions. Chinese silence over all such statements as well as acquiescence in 1951 take-over of Tawang in a move to fill the deserted McMohan line by India (contd.F.N.-59)–were naturally interpreted as Chinese recognition of the Indian stand on the borders. For details of the 'Twang incident', see *Government of India, Report of the officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (hereinafter abbreviated as Report) (New Delhi, 1960). For a critical view of India's approach to the frontier question, see Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (Bombay, 1970), p.73.

Nehru's thinking on this question is well reflected in the policy -directive issued by him to the various ministries concerned after conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954. It described the agreement as a "new starting point of our relations with China and Tibet", and added that "both as flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our agreement with China, this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one, which is not open to discussion with anybody. A system of check-posts should be spread along this entire frontier. More especially, we should have check posts in such places as might be considered disputed areas. This memorandum appeared in indirect quote in D.R. Mankekar, *Guilty Men of 1962* (Bombay, 1968), p. 138.

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The author has verified the above quoted lines from the original copy of the memorandum still in possession of Sri. Mankekar. For further details, see also Maxwell, *Ibid*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>928</sup>See accounts of the negotiations given by the I.B. Chief B.N. Mullik, Mullik, n.8, p.151. Mullik's version is also in conformity with the account given by Maxwell, n. 59, pp. 78-79, 81-82. Later on, in his letter to Nehru, (contd. F.N.-61)--dated 17 February 1959, Chou En-Lai made his argument more explicit when he stated that it was "natural that the two countries should hold different opinions regarding the boundary" since they have never been delimited. White Paper-III, p. 55.

<sup>929</sup>"The Indian delegation throughout took the line that all questions at issue between the two countries were being considered and once the settlement was concluded, no question remained" -Indian note of 12 February 1960, White Paper-III, p. 91.

See also the dialogue between Chou En-Lai and the Indian delegation in the opening session of the Sino-Indian negotiations on 31 December 1954, as reproduced in Mullik, no. 8, p. 151.

<sup>930</sup>The Indian note of 12 February 1960, White Paper - III, *Ibid*. Reliance was placed on the fact that the repeated assertions of Nehru on border question had not evoked any objection from the Chinese Government. Nehru, for instance, has stated in the Parliament as early as in November 1950, that "Tibet is contiguous India from region of Laddakh to the boundary of Nepal, and from Bhutan to the Irawaddi/ Salween divide in Assam. The frontier from Bhutan eastwards has been clearly defined by the McMohan Line which was fixed by Shimla Convention of 1914. The frontier from Ladakh to Nepal is defined chiefly by long usage and custom". Parliamentary Debates(Lok Sabha), vol. v, No. 4, 20 November 1950, cols. 115-16.

<sup>931</sup>Chou En-Lai's later explanation that 'the time was not ripe' lends itself to sinister interpretation, and may have reflected the Chinese belief, well founded in their experience, that boundary negotiations are best left until they can be conducted from position of strength". Maxwell, n.59, pp. 81-82.

Please also refer to G.S. Bajpai's observation (n.60) about Chinese reluctance to open talks on border issue - - "naturally, they have no intention of raising it until it suits their convenience".

<sup>932</sup>Note submitted by the Chinese Counselor in India to the Ministry of External Affairs, dated 17 July 1954, White Paper-I, p.1.

<sup>933</sup>See Nehru's statement in the Parliament on 20 November 1950, Parliamentary Debates (Lok Sabha), vol.v, No. 4, 20 November 1950, cols 155-56. When Sino-Indian negotiations were in their last phase, the question was pressed hard in the Parliament again. See, for instance, Meghnad Saha's queries about the same. Parliamentary Debates (Lok Sabha), vol. II, No. 37, April 1954, cols. 1820-21.

<sup>934</sup>See n.34.

<sup>935</sup>The Pioneer, for instance, reflected general Indian opinion when it opined that, "A clear and unequivocal undertaking should have been obtained from China that old claims would not be revived" and that "an agreed map of China" would be officially prepared. The Pioneer, editorial, 1 May 1954. Home land were to be solved before initiating any dialogue between the two

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countries. Nehru expected to sort out these issues with Peking during his forthcoming visit to China in October 1954, and as such, he advised Kathmandu to wait till his return from China.

<sup>936</sup>Dr. Regmi informed the author during his interview at the former's residence in Kathmandu in the summer of 1969 that during the last phase of his discussions with Nehru in May 1954 at the Teen Murti Bhavan, the New Delhi residence of the Prime Minister, Nehru simply handed over to him the draft aide memoire for his Government's consideration.

<sup>937</sup>See Regmi's press-statement at Kathmandu soon after the publication of the aide memoire, G.B. Devkota, *Nepal Ko Rajnitik Darpan* (Kathmandu, 2015 V.S.), p. 280.

<sup>938</sup>The original text of the aide memoire is believed to be in English. The present text, however, is a translation from Nepali text as it appeared in the *Jhyali* (Kathmandu), Year 3, No.1, dated 24/3/2015 V.S. (8 July 1958), p.2. Though minor terminological differences are possible from the original one, the content remained essentially the same. Dr. Regmi himself has confirmed it to the author. Moreover, it has not been challenged by any one subsequently also. The Nepali text later on appeared in the *Samaj* (Kathmandu), 14 July; and in Devkota, n.70, pp. 280-81 also.

<sup>939</sup>Dr Regmi's press conference, New Delhi, 8 May 1954, *The Statesman*, 9 May 1954.

<sup>940</sup>*The Hindu*, 20 May 1954

<sup>941</sup>M.P. Koirala, during a personal interview granted to the author by the former prime minister in Kathmandu in the summer of 1969 at his residence, claimed his ignorance of the whole affair until the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu passed on a copy of the original draft to him for his Government's approval.

<sup>942</sup>*The Statesman*, 2 June 1954; Devkota, n.70, p.280. For reactions of other Nepalese statement, see Devkota, *Ibid*, pp. 279-81.

<sup>943</sup>*The Hindu*, 8 June 1954; Devkota, n.70, pp. 245-47.

<sup>944</sup>While the Praja Parishad and the Communist Party's front organizations had openly arranged the demonstration - B.P. Koirala declared it to be "a symbol of people's resentment against unimaginative Indian policy in Nepal", *Statesman*, 2 June 1954; another prominent leader of the Nepali Congress, Ganesh Man Singh, called it a "people's demonstration", *The Statesman*, 26 July 1954. Similar was the reaction of the Gorkha Parishad leader, Ranbir Subba. For details, see Devkota, n.70, pp.245-47. The above description was generally confirmed by those Nepalese statesmen also whom the author met during his field trip to Kathmandu in the summer of 1969. The list of the persons interviewed is given in the end.

<sup>945</sup>For detailed discussion, see S.D. Muni, *Foreign Policy of Nepal* (Delhi, 1973), pp. 77-79; L.E. Rose, *Nepal's : Strategy for Survival* (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 86-87. The contention given above was also confirmed to the author by the dignitaries concerned during their interview in Kathmandu.

<sup>946</sup>Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Debates, part I, vol. IV, No. 1, p.2.

<sup>947</sup>An interview granted to the correspondent of *The Statesman* as late as in November 1954, M.P. Koirala declared that "India and Nepal should have common foreign policy based on partnership and equality": *The Statesman*, 3rd November 1954.

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<sup>948</sup>Hindustan Times, 15 October 1954; Fisher and Bondurant, n.1, p. 101.

<sup>949</sup>The Dalai Lama, n.56, pp. 05-106.

<sup>950</sup>Letter from Indian Prime Minister Nehru to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, dated 14 December 1958, White Paper -I, p. 49.

<sup>951</sup>Report, n. 59, p.87.

<sup>952</sup>"The Chinese people are proud of having chosen the people's Democratic system for themselves after liberalization. At the same time, they have not the slightest intention of forcing the peoples of other Asian countries to follow suit.. They believe this is something every nation has the right to decide for itself. They sympathies with the national aspirations of the peoples of all lands and respect their right to self -government", People's China (Peaking), 16 October 1954, p.34; The Hindu, 19 October 1954.

<sup>953</sup>Press Conference, 1954, n.19, pp. 27-28.

<sup>954</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>955</sup>N.C.N.A., 29 September 1956; S.C.M.P., 27 September 1956, p. 48 and 29 September 1956, p.55; Asian Recorder, vol. II, 6-12 October 1956, 1061; 3.

<sup>956</sup>Dr. K.I. Singh's issue, including his escape into Tibet and asylum in China after his abortive coup in Nepal has been already discussed in the preceding chapter, more especially in its footnote nos. 86, 87 and 89.

<sup>957</sup>Nehru's remark about K.I. Singh came in response to a question posed by W. Attwood of the Look as to whether the Prime Minister could explain the "sudden popularity with the Chinese", of two Communist exiles , K.I. Singh of Nepal and Pridi Phanonyan of Siam", who were feted in Peaking and "hailed as public leaders of their countries?". See W. Attwood , "Nehru Talks", The Look (New York), vol. 18, No. 22, 2 November 1954, pp. 31-35.

<sup>958</sup>Times of India, 5 November 1954.

<sup>959</sup>When asked by the newsmen as to whether he had taken up the case of K.I. Singh with the Chinese Government, Nehru informed back that "... this case was mentioned by me, not as affecting us here, but a general thing. I was told back that political asylum had been given to him in the normal way and nothing more. There was no further argument about it. I do not think that Dr. K.I. Singh will function in future", The Tribune, 14 November 1954.

<sup>960</sup>R. K. Shah, Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect (Delhi, 1973), pp. 143 - 44.

<sup>961</sup>In his interview with the correspondent of The Statesman at Calcutta en route to Darjeeling (n.80), M. P. Koirala revealed that his Government was contemplating direct relations with the Peking Government, but he would like to consider Nepal's next move in this direction only after hearing first hand Nehru's impressions on China: The Statesman, 3 November 1954.

<sup>962</sup>Nehru's press conference at New Delhi on 13 November 1954, Press Conference, 1954, n.19,pp. 27-28.

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<sup>963</sup>See Foreign Minister Regmi's statement, *The Statesman*, 18 December 1954.

<sup>964</sup>S.C.M.P., No. 875, p.15.

<sup>965</sup>See King Mahindra's republic statements on 18 February 1951, *Devkota*, n. 70, pp. 253-7; on 28 July 1951, His Majesty King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva: *Proclamations, Speeches and Messages* (compiled by D. R. Tuladhar ) (Kathmandu 1967), vol. I, p.1 (henceforth cited as *Proclamations*), Proclamation on 18 February 1955, pp. 31-32; Proclamation on 16 May 1955, pp 12-13 and *Devkota* , n.70, pp.278-90.

<sup>966</sup>Foreign Affairs record (New Delhi), March 1955, p.62. Emphasis added. Nehru's dwelling at the causes of insufficient progress made by the Kingdom in the direction of democracy was not without purpose: he wanted to point out that it was not due to any inherent defect in the democratic polity itself as contended by King Mahindra in his various utterances at home, but because of the very special circumstances the Kingdom was passing through, and that the things could be set right through a patient handling.

<sup>967</sup>For details, see the Dalai Lama, n.56,pp. 94, 111-12; "The State Council Resolution on the Establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet", as adopted by the 7<sup>th</sup> plenary session of the State Council on 9 March 1955, *People's Daily*, 13 March 1955; the Dalai Lama's Report at the Inaugural Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet", *People's Daily*, 25<sup>th</sup> April 1956; *Tibetan Source Book*, compiled by Ling Nai -min (Hong Kong, 1964), pp.140-78.

<sup>968</sup>See the text of the 'Radio Address' at the Radio Peking given by Leosha Thubtentarpe, head of the Tibetan local Government's Delegation to Peaking, quoting Mao Tse -tung advice to the delegation on the subject, *People's Daily*, November 1952, trans. by U. R. S.; and *Tibetan Source Book* n.100,pp. 42-44.

<sup>969</sup>*New York Times*, 28 November 1956 and 6 February 1957. In a letter written to the Indian Prime Minister in the summer of 1958, Tibetan leaders including the ousted Prime Minister Sitsuh Lokangwa , the head of the 1950 Tibetan Trade Delegation to India, U.S. and other countries, Shakab-pa, and the brother of the Dalai Lama, Thunduk, claimed that the Chinese, after occupying Tibet, had settled soon for million Chinese immigrants in the eastern and north - eastern regions of the Country, *The question of Tibet*, n.58, doc. No. 11, p.143. In another memorandum, they charged Mao Tse-tung of "devising a scheme to settle thousands of their immigrants in Tibet" on the recommendation of the Chinese Representative in Tibet, Tang Chen Wi, see *Ibid*, doc. No. 13, p.153.

<sup>970</sup>The Dalai Lama, n.56, pp. 113-24.

<sup>971</sup>The Dalai Lama, n.56, pp.113-24. The fact of Tibetan resistance against Chinese domination has been admitted in the Chinese official reports also (n.56).

<sup>972</sup>See Jen-min Shou -tse, 1958 (Peking, 1958), p.16, trans. U.R.S., "Premier Chou's reply to Questions Concerning Tibet", *Hong Kong Ta - Kung Pao*, 12 December 1956, trans. U.R.S.; and L.E. Rose, "King Mahindra's China Policy", *Nepal: An Assertive Monarchy* , S.D. Muni, ed., (New Delhi, 1977), p.223.



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Pointing out the impact these gestures created on Nepalese mind, Rose has remarked that "Mao was lying, of course, and in fact setting the stage for the 1959 military campaigning in Tibet, but quite a few Nepalese accepted his statement at its face value and supported adjustments in Nepal's foreign policy, that this seemed to make reasonable and safe" Rose, *Ibid*, pp. 223-24.

<sup>973</sup>See note from the Chinese Government to the Government of India, 26 December 1959, White Paper-III, pp. 67-68; and, "Sinkiang- Tibet Highway Completed" , Kuang-ming Daily, 6 October 1957, trans. U.R.S.

<sup>974</sup>N.C.N.A., 4 March 1955.

<sup>975</sup>New Developments in Friendly Relations Between China and Nepal (PeKing, 1960), p.55; Dakota, n.70, p. 231.

<sup>976</sup>Asia- Africa speaks from Bandung (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia) Djakarta, July 1955), pp. 105-7; Devkota , n. 70, p. 321.

<sup>977</sup>Chinese Communist World Outlook (Bureau of Intelligence & research, U.S. Department of State Publication 7379 Far Eastern Series 112) (Washington, D.C., September 1962), and Devkota, n.70, p. 322.

<sup>978</sup>S.C.M.P., No. 1100, p. 28.

<sup>979</sup>Asian Recorder, vol., I, 23-29 July 1955, p. 332.

<sup>980</sup>Hindustan Times, 29 July 1955.

<sup>981</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>982</sup>For text out the communiqué, see PeKing Radio broadcast at monitored at Tokyo, S.C.M.P., No. 1100 (30 July - 2 August 1955), pp. 29-30.

<sup>983</sup>*Ibid*; also Dakota, n. 70, p. 307.

<sup>984</sup>S.C.M.P., No. 1174, p.40.

<sup>985</sup>For text of the 'notes exchanged, on 20 September 1956' see S.C.M.P., 1378, 27 September 1956, pp. 17-23 and A.S. Bhasin . ed., Documents on Nepal's Relations with India and China 1949 -66 (henceforth abbreviated as Documents) (New Delhi, 1970), p. 188.

<sup>986</sup>Hindustan Times, 8 August 1955 and Asian Recorder, vol. I, 6-17 August 1955, p. 360. King Mahindra claimed that through it, Nepal's relations with China were being put on a "new basis". The Chinese view was also the same. See Ta Kung Pao, "New Developments in Friendly Ties Between the Two Countries" S.C.M.P., No. 1102, p.28.

<sup>987</sup>S.C.M.P., No. 1100, p.28.

<sup>988</sup>The Statesman, in its editorial of 3 August 1955, pointed out that, "India has long urged upon Nepalese leaders the wisdom of facing facts. Last, but not the least, there was a formula ready at hand, the Panch Sheel".

<sup>989</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, part I, vol. IV, No. 16 August 1955, col. 3702.

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<sup>990</sup>The Hindu, 14 August 1955. The latter part of its assessment about China's pre-occupation with internal development closely reflected Nehru's own views expressed in his press conference of 13 November 1955, see n. 19.

<sup>991</sup>The Hindu, *Ibid*.

The Thought's assessment, however, was quite different, it wrote that "India now watches with concealed trepidation" the developments in Nepal, such as the unusual welcome given to the Chinese delegation, including a 19 gun salute, and the fact that the delegations of political parties were visiting the Chinese ambassador, and like.

<sup>992</sup>The Statesman, 27 September 1955.

<sup>993</sup>See n. 88. According to New York Times columnist C.L. Sulzberger, when Nepalese Premier T.P. Acharya asked for a Chinese guarantee of Nepal's northern frontiers with the "Tibet Region of China", Chou En-lai replied back that New Delhi had informed him that this subject would not arise. See C.L.Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: Comments on Growing Trends to Neutrality and Red China in Buffer Kingdom of Nepal", New York Times, 18 March 1957.

<sup>994</sup>For reactions of prominent leaders, including T.P. Acharya, Subarna Shumsher, M.P. Koirala and Ganesh Man Singh, see Devkota, n. 70, pp. 293-94 and 295; for Nepali Congress Praja Parishad, Nepal Rashtriya Congress and Rashtriya Praja Party's joint press - statement, see *Ibid*, pp. 301-2 and 305. For Nepali Communist Party's critical resolution, Nepal Sandesh (Kathmandu) 2 January 1956, p.2. See also the news report in Hindustan Times, 16 November 1955.

<sup>995</sup>For his various utterances and public speeches made during the six week tour and the news reports of his visit, see Asian Recorder, vol. I, 5-11 (contd. F.N.-128)--November 1955, pp. 482 and 499; Proclamations, n. 98, pp. 19-31; and Dakota, n. 70, pp. 325-63.

<sup>996</sup>King Mahindra's speech in reply to the civic reception given at Red Fort, New Delhi, on 7 November 1955, The Statesman, 8 November 1955; Hindustan Times, 8 November 1955.

<sup>997</sup>Proclamations, n. 98, p.32; Devkota, n.70, p. 362; The Statesman, 20 November 1955; The Times of India, 20 November 1955.

<sup>998</sup>The Statesman and Times of India, 28 November 1955. For text of the proclamation, see Proclamations, n. 98, 13 March 2012 V.S., p. 34 and, Devkota, n.70, pp. 371-3.

<sup>999</sup>For reaction of Nepali Congress leader, B.P. Koirala, S.P. Upadhyay and Ganesh Man Singh, etc., see Devkota, n.70, p. 373.

<sup>1000</sup>This assessment is well proved by the fact that in the first ever general elections held in the Kingdom in 1959, Acharya's Party, Praja Parishad, could secure only two seats out of 107 seats and Acharya himself forfeited his deposit.

<sup>1001</sup>Gorkha Patra (Kathmandu), 30 January 1956, and Times of India, 30 January 1956. See also Asian Recorder, vol. II, 21-27 January 1956, p. 641.

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<sup>1002</sup>In his inaugural address before his people at TundilKhel ground in Kathmandu on 2 May 1956, immediately after his coronation, King Mahindra declared that, "In foreign affairs, we steadfastly followed a policy of friendship with all countries. In keeping with our tradition, we stand for (contd. F.N.-135)--peace and friendship throughout the world. We have been working, and it will be our endeavor, to expand the area of our friendship with all peace-loving countries of the world". Proclamations, n. 98, p.43; Dakota, n. 70, p.398.

The address was conspicuous by its omission of any reference to his Country's 'special' friendship with India, which has been the tradition with Nepal in the past.

<sup>1003</sup>The Pioneer's correspondent, for instance, observed that "In the formation of the present Ministry, the Indian sentiments had been more or less completely ignored."The correspondent further quoted a high-ranking Indian official as saying that the Indian aid to Nepal was one of the most thankless jobs. Whether certain forces were working against India was not certain, but it was obvious to him that, "the ruling section, if it can afford it, will not accept any help or assistance from Indian quarters", The Pioneer, 3 March 1955.

<sup>1004</sup>In subtle reference of this fact, Acharya, on the occasion of announcing inauguration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, on 20 July 1956, declared that "we all know, how, with the objective of easing International tension our great neighbor India has been establishing with the different World Powers contacts and relations based on the Principles of Panch Sheel. Following the noble example set by India, we, too, are establishing contacts with Great Powers of the world and it shall be our endeavour to promote fraternity and peace of the World", The Statesman, 21 July 1956.

<sup>1005</sup>See M.P. Koirala's Press Conference, 3 June 1954, The Hindu, 5 June 1954.

<sup>1006</sup>*Ibid.* See also Devota, n.70, pp. 15-55.

<sup>1007</sup>See, for instance, the account given in Rose, n. 78, p.197.

<sup>1008</sup>President Rajendra Prasad's Welcome Address at the State banquet hosted in King Mahindra's honour on 7 November 1955, Asian Recorder, vol. I, November 1955, p.229; Devakota, n. 70, p. 332.

<sup>1009</sup>See Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Report (New Delhi), 1951-52; 1952-53; 1953 - 54; 1954-55 and 1955-56.

<sup>1010</sup>The Statesman, 18 April 1956.

<sup>1011</sup>For instance, Acharya emphatically refuted a Pakistani suggestion that India had "brought Nepal under her sphere of influence with designs on the Himalayan Kingdom" and declared during the same press conference of 29 May 1956, that "India does not have any design on us. We are having the best of relations with India and we understood each other well." Asian Recorder, vol. II, 2-8 June 1956, p. 873.

<sup>1012</sup>Times of India, 15, February 1956, Asian Recorder, vol. II, 11-17 February, 1956 ,p. 678;2;8.

<sup>1013</sup>Jain, n. 42, pp. 116-67.

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<sup>1014</sup> Asian Recorder. Vol. II, 11-17 February 1956, p.6, 78:2:

<sup>1015</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1016</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1017</sup> Devkota, n. 70, p. 393; Asian Recorder, vol. II, 28 April - 4 May 1956, p. 813.

<sup>1018</sup> Asian Recorder, Inid, p. 813:2 and Proclamations, n. 93, 2 May 1956, p.43.

<sup>1019</sup> *Ibid*, see also Devkota , n.70, pp. 396-98; and Gorakhptra, 7 May 1956, pp.1-2.

<sup>1020</sup> N.C.N.A., 7 May 1956; Rose, n.78, p.210; S.C.M.P., No. 1265, p. 36.

<sup>1021</sup> See Jain, n. 42, p.114.

<sup>1022</sup> The Hindustan Times, 5 June 1956.

<sup>1023</sup> The Hindustan Times, 30 May, 1956; The Statesman, 30 May 1956; Asian Recorder, vol. II, 2-8 June 1956, p. 873; 1-2.

<sup>1024</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>1025</sup> Current Background, No. 440, p. 7.

<sup>1026</sup> Asian Recorder, vol. II, 30 June - 6 July 1956, p. 915.

<sup>1027</sup> Asian Recorder, vol. II, 15-24 August 1956, p. 982: 3:D.

<sup>1028</sup> S.C.M.P., No. 1333, p. 32.

<sup>1029</sup> Asian Recorder, vol. II, 8-14 S.

<sup>1030</sup> The Statesman, 3 September 1956; S.C.M.P., No. 1364, 6 September 1956; 44.

<sup>1031</sup> See the 10 point Memorandum submitted by the Nepalese Businessman's Association of Tibet to the Nepalese Government on the issue, Nepal Bhasha Patrika (Kathmandu), August 1956; Asian Recorder, vol. II, 8-14 September 1956, p.1018:2. See also, The Statesman, 21<sup>st</sup> August 1956.

<sup>1032</sup> See Devkota, *Ibid*; also, Nepali Congress General Secretary's statement, dated 2016/9/17 that V.S., *Ibid*, p. 431.

<sup>1033</sup> The Nepali Congress resolution dated 2016/1/15 V.S., Devkota, n. 70, pp. 431-32.

<sup>1034</sup> The Nepali Congress resolution dated 2013/5/12 V.S., Devkota, n.70, pp. 30-31.

<sup>1035</sup> This observation is based upon author's personal interviews with Nepali Congress leadership, including B.P. Koirala and S.P. Upadhyay, the then president and general secretary of the party, respectively.

<sup>1036</sup> Hindustan Times, 29 September and 2 October 1956.

<sup>1037</sup> Author was told so by a dignitary close to the palace, who prefers to remain un-identified. This view was supported by many other politicians also during their interviews with the author.

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<sup>1038</sup> B.P. Koirala, in a personal interview given during his stay at Sarnath residence in Varanasi in November 1972, told the author that before signing of the treaty, T.P. Acharya invited him to dinner at his residence and asked his opinion about the proposed terms of the treaty. When Koirala repeated the argument that they should strike a bargain instead of unilaterally surrendering privileges, Acharya replied back to him that Nehru had advised against this. When B.P. Koirala contacted Nehru, he explained to him that Nepal was a very small country vis - a - vis China and, from a long-term point of view, it would be better for Nepal to live with China on friendly terms rather than to encourage suspicion and distrust of the new regime of China.

<sup>1039</sup> For the text of the treaty, see, S.C.M.P., 1378, 24 September 1956; pp. 23-25; New Developments in Friendly Relations, n. 108, pp. 1-6; Devkota, n. 70, pp. 423-26. See also Asian Recorder, vol.- II, 6-12 October 1956, pp.1071-72.

<sup>1040</sup> Op. Cit.

<sup>1041</sup> For text of the Note, see S.C.M.P., *Ibid*, p. 21-23; New Development in Friendly Relations, n. 108, pp. 7-14; Asian Recorder, *Ibid*; Devkota, n.70, pp. 426-28; Bhasin, Documents, n. 118,p.118.

<sup>1042</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>1043</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>1044</sup> New Developments in Friendly Relations, *Ibid*, p.1.

<sup>1045</sup> The Samaj, (Kathmandu), 28 September 1957.

<sup>1046</sup> Hindustan Times, 23 September 1956; The Statesman, 23 September 1956; Asian Recorder, vol. II, 6-12 October 1956, p. 1071.

<sup>1047</sup> Asian Recorder, vol.II, 11-17 February 1956, p.6,78: 2:A.

<sup>1048</sup> Hindustan Times, 23 September 1956; The Statesman, 23 September 1956; Asian Recorder, vol. II, 6-12 October 1956, p. 1071.

<sup>1049</sup> Asian Recorder, *Ibid*.

<sup>1050</sup> See Ganesh Man Singh's statesman, 2013/ 6/12 V.S. Devkota, n.70, p. 430. For reactions of various other Nepali leaders and press also, see, Devkota, *Ibid*.

<sup>1051</sup> People's Daily, 24 September 1956; S.C.M.P., 1378, 27 September 1956, pp.24-26.

<sup>1052</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>1053</sup> Times of India, 1October 1956.

<sup>1054</sup> While reaction of The Statesman, (2 October 1956) was guarded, The Organizer took it as a prelude to a decline of India's influence in Nepal. The Organiser, vol. IX, No. 8, 15 October 1956, p.2. The Hindu reflected perhaps most closely the general feelings in India on this score:

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“Nepal, as an independent country, naturally has the right to enter into friendly relations with all countries but public opinion in India will naturally be reluctant to believe that she can ever be more friendly with any other country that she can be with us”.

The Hindu 6, December 1956.

<sup>1055</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, part I, vol. VIII, No. 7, 22 November 1956, col. 372.

<sup>1056</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>1057</sup>*Ibid.* Emphasis added.

<sup>1058</sup>The Dalai Lama's Report at the Inaugural Meeting of the Preparatory Committee For The Autonomous Region of Tibet", People's Daily, 25 April 1956; and, Tibetan Sources Book, n. 100, pp. 140-78.

<sup>1059</sup>See T.P. Acharya's interview given to the editor of the Times of India, Giri Lal Jain, during his Premiership of Nepal. Jain, n.42, pp. 125-27. The author has confirmed its authenticity with Acharya himself during his own interview with him in the summer of 1969 in Kathmandu. His contention in this regard is significant, as in making out a case for his pro-China policy, Acharya has thrown ample light on the impact of the subversion of Tibet on Indo-Nepalese relations. He contended that over 50% of Nepal's total population was of Mongolian origin and a policy of exclusive friendship with India would fail to win their support. Also, Nepal had ties of trade, culture and religion with Tibet, which it was neither wise nor possible to disrupt. He further pointed out that Nepal had a 500 mile long border with Tibet and that in absence of means of transport and communication, the people living in the border areas had weak links with Central Government in Kathmandu. Nepal could not, therefore, risk China's hostility. Acharya concluded his (contd. F. N.-193)-- argument by claiming that the Chinese in Tibet would not create difficulties for the Nepalese Government in the border areas as long as the latter did not allow its territory to be used as a centre of espionage and hostile activities against them.

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# RISE & FALL OF TIBET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIA

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

### DR. ASHOK NIGAM



Dr. Ashok Nigam is a Lawyer by Profession and is the senior-most designated senior advocate of Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench). Currently he is practicing Law at Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench). Formerly, he was Additional Solicitor General, Government of India. He has also served twice as President of the High Court (Oudh) Bar Association. He has done his Doctorate from Lucknow University in International Relations. He has published numerous articles in newspapers, national and international Journals, and represented India in various International Conferences on legal and judicial matters and International Relations.

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